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Abstract 
This thesis exammes how international criminal justice mechanisms construct legal 
recognition, protection and redress of the civilian victims of armed conflict. Using the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ('ICTY') as a case-study, it 
explores how the rules and practices of humanitarian law address and redress acts of 
civilian victimisation. Since the early 1990s, the United Nations has identified 
international criminal justice mechanisms as central to the prosecution of perpetrators of 
civilian victimisation. It has also increasingly understood that such mechanisms are 
important for their provision of 'restorative' justice to victims, including their 
recognition, participation and redress. This thesis examines the factors that enable or 
constrain the process of legally recognising civilian victims in light of this changing role 
of legal mechanisms. Chapters one and two outline the theoretical and methodological 
frameworks of the thesis. Chapters three and four analyse the protective rules of 
humanitarian law and the ICTY's prosecutions of civilian victimisation. A central 
principle of humanitarian law is that all parties to a conflict must distinguish between 
civilians and combatants. Civilians are all persons who are not combatants. However, this 
thesis argues that social categories of group membership are drawn upon and evoked 
during the processes of legally recognising civilian victims. It shows how the legal 
category of 'civilian' has been historically imbued with particular notions of nation, 
ethnicity and gender that can act as exclusionary categorisations. This thesis then 
examines how the ICTY designates 'civilian' status to individuals and collectivities by 
focusing on trial proceedings. Drawing on fieldwork at the ICTY, chapters five and six 
show that civilian victim-witnesses rarely conceive of conflict as a solitary experience, 
but instead view their victimisation in terms of structural and relational harms to 
themselves and others. However, this thesis argues that the ICTY's current form of legal 
practices do not establish recognition of all civilian victims nor adequately capture their 
collective and harmful experiences of victimisation in conflict situations. 
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Introduction 
The Protection of Civilians in War and Law 
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Since the early 1990s, the United Nations ('UN') has increasingly focused on the 
protection of civilians as a central concern. The increasing importance of the protection of 
civilians can be seen in a number of UN Resolutions and Reports, as well as the emerging 
norm of a 'responsibility to protect' (Panyarachun, 2004).2 In this new conception of an 
international responsibility to protect, the UN describes the safety and security of 
civilians as resting on the parties to a conflict complying with the protective rules of 
international humanitarian law. It condemns breaches of these protective rules and 
I Photographer unknown. Source: www.sarajevo-x.com. 
2 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, 28 October 2007 (S/2007/643) ('Report of the Secretary-General, 2001'); United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1738 (2006), 23 December 2006 (SIRES11738 (2006)) (,Resolution 1738'). 
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contends that such acts of civilian victimisation may constitute war crimes, crimes against 
humanity or genocide.3 
The United Nations has also increasingly characterised international criminal justice 
institutions as key mechanisms for the regulation, enforcement and prevention of acts of 
civilian victimisation that breach the protective rules of humanitarian law.4 Following the 
growing emphasis on the provision of forms of retributive and restorative justice by legal 
institutions, it considers that 'such mechanisms can promote not only individual 
responsibility for serious crimes, but also peace, truth, reconciliation and the rights of the 
victims,.5 The UN has increasingly claimed that legal institutions should function to 
render justice to the civilian victims of crimes of war. In this formulation, international 
criminal justice mechanisms will designate civilian status to persons that were the targets 
of intentional victimisation through the practices of prosecution, trial adjudication and 
judgement. In this model, the function of international criminal justice is to legally 
recognise the civilian victims of acts of intentional victimisation, condemn its 
perpetration and provide redress for their sustaining of harm. 6 
This thesis exammes the international legal recognition, protection and redress of 
civilians in armed conflict. It explores the institutions, rules and practices that address and 
redress acts of civilian victimisation. In particular, as will be set out, it employs a case-
study of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ('ICTY') to 
analyse its legal recognition, protection and redress of the civilian victims of the 
Yugoslavian conflict. The UN has developed a broad framework of international 
3 Report of the Secretary-General, 2007; United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 
24 October 2005, paras. 138-9 (AIRES/601l) ('World Summit Report'). 
4 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006),28 April 2006 (SIRES11674 (2006)) (,Resolution 
1674'). See also Panyarachun (2004). 
5 Resolution 1674. See also United Nations General Assembly, 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, 
Security and Human Rights for All' Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, para. 138 (A/59/2005) 
('In Larger Freedom'). 
6 United Nations General Assembly, 'Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law', 21 March 2006 (AIRES/601147) ('United Nations, Principles on the Right 
to a Remedy'). 
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obligations, responsibilities and legal institutions for the promotion and enforcement of 
their safety and security (Bruderlein, 2001; Chesterman, 2001). However, there are 
significant legal, sociological and conceptual difficulties in ascribing civilian status to 
persons in situations of conflict, as this thesis will show (Carpenter, 2006a; Slim, 2007). 
In contemporary conflicts it appears unclear how the rules and practices of international 
criminal justice mechanisms such as the ICTY work to construct legal recognition of the 
civilian victims of armed conflict and redress the harms of their victimisation. 
For these reasons, this thesis seeks to develop a more comprehensive account of the 
presence and participation of civilians as both individuals and collectivities within war 
and law. It attempts to explore and explain contemporary issues and questions of social 
and legal importance that are central to the regulation and enforcement of the conduct of 
armed conflict and the legal address and redress to civilian victims of such hostilities. 
How, then, do international criminal justice mechanisms recognise the civilian victims of 
armed conflict? What forms of legal protection does this category of persons hold during 
hostilities and do criminal justice mechanisms adequately enforce instances of their 
breach? Do the criminal prosecutions of civilian harms evidence a selective approach in 
recognising certain 'types' of civilian victims? How, or does, the ICTY enable the 
participation of civilian victims within its legal practices, for example, during its 
prosecutorial processes and trial proceedings? And how, or does, the ICTY provide 
redress to civilian victims of the former Yugoslavia for their sustaining of harm? 
The United Nations and the Protection of Civilians in Conflict 
The UN has recognised that civilians account for the vast majority of casualties in 
situations of conflict? It has also recognised that civilians are increasingly the subject of 
7 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999), 17 September 1999 (SIRES11265 (1999)) 
(,Resolution 1265'). 
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intentional attacks by combatants and other armed elements.8 The new notion of a 
'responsibility to protect' exemplifies the UN's increasing concern with the protection of 
civilians from such attacks. All Member States of the UN General Assembly at the World 
Summit of2005 recently recognised that: 
[e ]ach individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means . . . The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in 
accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, to help protect populations ... we 
are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and precise manner ... should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations.9 
This 'significant, even revolutionary, commitment' by the Member States sets out a 
renewed focus upon the protection of populations in armed conflict and situations of mass 
violence (Arbour, 2006; 2008).10 It builds upon previous UN Resolutions focusing 
specifically on civilians to establish an international collective responsibility to protect 
civilians and develop the frameworks and strategies that afford this protection. Most 
importantly, this concept of a 'responsibility to protect' sets out firstly, a new recognition 
of the civilian victims and populations of armed conflict, secondly, the framework of 
obligations to ensure their protection and thirdly, that 'justice mechanisms' should be 
established for the redress of breaches of these protections. 
Firstly, the UN's construction of a 'responsibility to protect' recogmses civilians and 
civilian populations as 'present' within the practices of armed conflict and situations of 
mass violence. Conventionally, the focus of the laws of war and the wider reporting of 
armed violence has understood the combatant as the central participant and casualty of 
war's conduct (Gardam, 1993a). The concept of the responsibility to protect shifts this 
recognition of the participants of war from the combatant to an express acknowledgement 
8 Resolution 1265. 
9 World Summit Report, paras. 138-139. See also Report of the Secretary-General, 2007 for a more recent 
affirmation of this principle of a responsibility to protect civilians. 
10 It should be noted that despite the widespread support and endorsement of the 'responsibility to protect' by 
world leaders, it is an emerging and contested legal norm (McClean, 2008: 138). 
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of civilians as participants and intentional casualties of armed conflict. Importantly, the 
UN narratives do not describe civilians as being simply 'caught up' in war's conduct as 
part of unfortunate but inevitable collateral damage or the unintentional victims of the 
actions of combatants. Instead, there is an express recognition that civilians are subject to 
intentional, direct targeting and other forms of unlawful conduct that contravene the 
(minimum) protections of international humanitarian law (Panyarachun, 2004: 231-2). 
The increasing concern with the protection of civilians also narrates new obligations to 
construct and implement this protection to civilian populations. The recognition at the 
World Summit of the responsibility to protect was the first explicit acceptance by all 
Member States of this obligation to both their own and other civilian populations 
(Arbour, 2006). In their acceptance of this responsibility, the Member States agreed to 
protect their own civilian populations from being the target of international crimes such 
as war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. More significantly, the World 
Summit Resolution also describes that the responsibility to protect lies with the 
international community as a whole, working through the UN, to take 'collective action' 
when national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations. I I The 
obligation to protect civilian populations has therefore become both the responsibility of 
individual states and the international community. This new international obligation to 
protect marks a shift from the older framework of state 'privileges' over the treatment of 
its citizens, to an encompassing model of an international protection of all civilian 
populations (Jones and Cater, 2001). In this way, there is now an international recognition 
that all civilian populations are necessarily the subject of protection from the violence 
and victimisation of warfare. 12 Whether the civilian population is of the same nationality 
as the state or of a different state, the UN describes that their protection is based upon 
their status as a civilian. For those civilians at risk from the violence of armed conflict, 
II World Summit Resolution, para. 139. 
12 See Report ofthe Secretary-General, 2007. 
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protection is not founded by national ties or any other social characteristic, but 
encompasses 'all populations, everywhere' (Arbour, 2006). 
Thirdly, the UN considers that 'justice mechanisms' applying the rules of international 
humanitarian law are a key means to enforcing this responsibility to protect civilian 
populations.13 For example, the UN has drawn attention to the importance of the work of 
the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in their contribution to 
prosecuting those individuals responsible for breaches of this protection.14 It has 
emphasised the role of humanitarian law in regulating the protection of civilians and the 
(national and international) criminal justice mechanisms enforcing these legal rules. IS 
However, as indicated above, the UN does not simply consider that these criminal justice 
mechanisms will enact retributive justice through the punishment of the perpetrators of 
crimes against civilians. Instead, the UN's Resolutions evidence a shift in the role of 
these legal mechanisms for their establishment and provision of redress to the civilian 
victims who have sustained harm from breaches of the protective rules of humanitarian 
law. 16 In this new recognition of the relationship between the legal enforcement of IHL 
and the civilian victims of armed conflict, the UN reflects a move toward the provision of 
forms of 'restorative justice' for the victims (Ashworth, 2002). This shift toward 
'restorative justice' characterises the victims of violations of humanitarian law (and 
human rights abuses) as having the right to access 'justice', for 'justice mechanisms' to 
symbolically or substantively recognise their status as a victim of violence and provide 
reparations for their harms (Bassiouni, 2006: 205).17 In this way, international criminal 
justice mechanisms are now understood to establish justice for civilian victims through 
the legal recognition of their status as victims and their harms, the punishment of their 
perpetrators and the provision of forms of redress to them. 
13 Resolution 1674. 
14 Resolution 1265. In Larger Freedom, para. 138. 
15 Resolution 1738. 
16 Resolution 1738; In Larger Freedom, para. 138. 
17 United Nations, Principles on the Right to a Remedy, para. 11. 
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The Legal Recognition of Civilian Victims 
This thesis will employ a case-study of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia ('ICTY' / 'Tribunal') for this analysis of the construction of the legal 
recognition of civilian victims and the provision of their redress. The ICTY was 
established by the United Nations Security Council in May 1993. After a series of 
Resolutions condemning the deliberate attacks upon civilians in the former Yugoslavia, 18 
the UN Security Council established a Commission of Experts to investigate reports of 
violations of humanitarian law in the region. 19 The Commission found that such 
violations had been committed in a particularly brutal and ferocious manner and that the 
civilian population had been the deliberate target of attacks.z° Following these findings 
and international condemnation of the armed violence, the Security Council in Resolution 
827 (1993) described that the situation in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to 
international peace and security.21 Arising from this determination, the Security Council, 
acting through Chapter VII of its Charter, established the ICTY as a measure to 
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.22 The ICTY was to aid the 
restoration and maintenance of peace through its legal contribution to 'ensuring that such 
violations are halted and effectively redressed' .23 This task was to be undertaken through 
'prosecuting the persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
1 ' 24 aw. 
18 See for example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 769 (1992), 7 August 1992 (SIRESI769 
(1992)) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 771 (1992), 13 August 1992 (SIRESI771 (1992)). 
19 The Commission of Experts was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 6 
October 1992 (SIRES/780 (1992)). 
20 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 'Commission of Experts' Final Report', 24 May 1994 (SI1994/674), Part V; Annex 
IV (1) (,COE Report'). 
21 United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), 25 May 1993 (SIRES/827 (1993)) (,Resolution 
827'). 
22 Resolution 827. 
23 Resolution 827. 
24 Resolution 827. 
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Situated in The Hague, The Netherlands, the ICTY is a subsidiary organ of the UN, 
whilst functioning as an independent judicial institution.25 This legal mechanism holds 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the offences of Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, crimes against humanity and 
genocide.26 It holds jurisdiction over natural persons who are alleged to have committed 
such offences on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.27 Due to significant 
problems with funding and co-operation with nation-states of the region, the early 
prosecutions of the ICTY were largely focused upon 'low-level' individuals (Schabas, 
2006), most often with crimes committed against civilians. In contrast, later cases from 
approximately 2003 onwards have typically charged senior leaders with the 'most 
serious' crimes committed during the conflict. This shift in the types of perpetrators and 
crimes brought to trial is the consequence of prosecutorial and administrative changes in 
the Tribunal's work as part of a 'completion strategy' to enable its closure by 2010 
(Schabas, 2006). 
The ICTY is considered a key mechanism set up by the UN to enforce breaches of the 
protective rules of humanitarian law against civilians in the Yugoslavian conflict. It 
provides an institutional example of a 'justice mechanism' that the UN describes is 
central to the enforcement of breaches of civilian protection and promoting the emerging 
norms of a 'responsibility to protect' .28 Through its legal practices, the ICTY metes out 
retributive justice to the perpetrators of civilian victimisation through their prosecution 
and punishment. In accordance with the notions of 'restorative' justice set out above, the 
Tribunal also claims that it can 'render justice to the victims' .29 The Tribunal describes 
25 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 3 May 
1993, para. 28 (S/25704) ('Report of the Secretary-General, 1993 '). 
26 http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm. 
27 http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm. 
28 In Larger Freedom, para. 138. 
29 http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm. 
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that it can bring justice to the thousands of victims across the region by acknowledging 
their suffering and 'giving them a voice' during trial proceedings. 3D 
The ICTY is used as a case-study for this research due to its significant role in the 
enforcement of humanitarian law and for crimes committed against civilians more 
specifically. The ICTY was the first international tribunal established by the United 
Nations to prosecute perpetrators of violations of the protective rules of humanitarian 
law.31 While the Nuremberg trials over fifty years ago made an unprecedented 
contribution to the prosecution of war criminals and their crimes, the ICTY is significant 
for bringing the first prosecutions against individuals for acts of civilian (and combatant) 
victimisation by a truly international war crimes tribuna1.32 More specifically, the ICTY is 
an important legal institution for the particular issues and questions of this research due to 
its specific contribution to the expansion of civilian protection law (Slaughter and Burke-
White, 2002: 68). The ICTY has included charges of civilian victimisation as elements of 
war crimes or crimes against humanity within the final indictments of the accused in all 
its completed cases to date.33 It has also made considerable advancements in the 
development of the jurisprudence of crimes committed against civilians. For example, the 
ICTY has provided the first definitions of enslavement and persecution as crimes against 
humanity. Moreover, in recent jurisprudence the ICTY has broadened the scope of 
applying the protective rules of humanitarian law so that in instances of the adjudication 
of war crimes 'no distinction is made between international and non-international armed 
conflict' (Slaughter and Burke-White, 2002: 68). As such, 'the same high level of 
protection is afforded civilians in both types of war' (Slaughter and Burke-White, 2002: 
68). 
30 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia '1994-2004 a UNique Decade' Published by the 
ICTY Registry, 2004, page 34 (,1994-2004 a UNique Decade'). 
31 http://www.un.org/ictv/glance-e/index.htm. 
32 http://www.un.org/ictv/glance-e/index.htm. 
33 As of 15 October 2007. 
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The Absence of the Civilian 
Despite the changing and increasingly important recognition of the participants of war 
and law, there is little sociological work on the legal protection of civilians in armed 
conflict. As Martin Shaw points out, the legal category and concept of 'civilian' has 
'never been properly investigated, even in the context of war, in sociological theory' 
(2007: 113).34 Nor is there a substantive body of sociological work analysing the 
construction of legal recognition of civilians by international criminal justice 
mechanisms. Existing sociological work that has taken civilians and conflict as the 
subject of analysis has not adequately explored the protection of civilians (Kaldor, 2001; 
Shaw, 2005). Where the protection of civilians has figured as the subject of analysis it has 
been through legal commentaries identifying the rules of humanitarian law that constitute 
the framework of civilian protection in armed conflict (Cassese, 2003; Gardam, 1993b; 
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005). There are also important analyses of the historical 
development of the regulation of armed conflict in regard to the protection of civilians 
(Best, 1994; Nabulsi, 2001) and the breaches of these regulations by armed forces 
throughout the centuries (Slim, 2007; Newman, 2004). However, where the concept of 
the civilian has been the express subject of examination, this has largely focused upon the 
gendered construction of the civilian (Carpenter, 2006a; Kinsella, 2005) or civilian-
military interactions and consequent humanitarian issues in specific situations of conflict 
(Lamb, 2001; Roberts, 2001). There is a distinct lack of sociological analyses of the 
international criminal justice mechanisms of the ICTY, International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda ('ICTR') or the International Criminal Court ('ICC') for their contemporary 
construction of legal recognition of civilian victims or the enforcement of breaches of 
their protection (Ewald, 2006). 
34 Emphasis original. 
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In order to address this gap, this thesis draws upon literature and debates within the 
growing field of transitional justice scholarship to analyse the construction of legal 
recognition of civilian victims, the enforcement of breaches of their protections and the 
provision of redress by justice mechanisms. Transitional justice scholarship examines the 
establishment and function of forms of 'retributive and restorative justice with respect to 
human depredations that occur during violent conflicts' (Bassiouni, 2002: xv). This body 
of scholarship is particularly useful for providing a framework to this thesis due to its 
increasing (although not fully developed) examination of the role of mechanisms of 
international criminal justice for their recognition and redress of both victims and 
perpetrators (Kritz, 2002; Mani, 2002; Teitel, 2000). 
As noted above, this thesis undertakes a case-study ofthe rules and practices of the ICTY 
in order to examine the formation of legal recognition of civilian victims. The ICTY 
applies the customary rules of international humanitarian law in its criminal prosecutions 
of the victimisation and violence of civilians (and combatants). 35 This body of law is also 
variously defined as the 'laws of war' (Detter, 2000) or the 'laws of armed conflict' 
(Dinstein, 2004). However, this thesis situates the examination of civilian recognition 
through Jean Pictet's defining of humanitarian law as that part of international law 
'centred on the protection of the individual in war' (1985: 1). This framing of 
humanitarian law considers its application and enforcement as centred upon, and central 
to, the protection of persons from the suffering of war. Pictet's characterisation of the 
protective qualities of this body of law therefore provides an appropriate framework for 
analysis of both the deVelopment of the rules of humanitarian law for the protection of 
civilians and the broader role of the ICTY for its recognition of breaches of this 
protection and provision of justice in their aftermath. However, this exploration of the 
ICTY does not simply examine the current rules of IHL and their framework of 
protection and recognition of civilians. Rather, this thesis employs a sociological analysis 
35 Report of the Secretary-General, 1993, paras 33-35. 
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of the rules and practices that work to recognise the civilian victims of armed conflict and 
provide for their redress. This approach enables an exploration of law as a mechanism of 
regulation of social life through its institutions and practices (Cotterrell, 1992: vii), in this 
instance as the regulation of particular forms of conduct during armed conflict. Moreover, 
a sociological approach shows how the law's rules and practices conceptualises the 
persons central to the social relations of armed conflict, namely combatants and civilians. 
The central argument of this thesis is that the legal construction of persons and 
communities as 'civilian' does not figure as a fixed concept, process or designation. In 
particular, this thesis contends that there is no stable form of the recognition of civilians 
through the UN's framework or the differential sites of the international criminal justice 
mechanisms set up to provide justice to the victims and perpetrators of armed conflict. A 
foundational precept of IHL is the 'principle of distinction' which describes that the 
parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. The 
rules of humanitarian law categorise persons as being either civilians or combatants 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: 3). This framework designates persons as holding 
'civilian' status through the nature of their participation in the conflict (i.e. as non-
combatants), irrespective of any other social characteristics or distinctions (Sassoli and 
Bouvier, 2006). However, this thesis shows that there have been, and continue to be, 
significant historical and contemporary changes in the construction of the legal 
recognition of civilian victims and the parameters of their protection. Moreover, it 
illustrates that characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity or nationality frequently 
become influential or even determinative in the legal practices that recognise persons as 
civilian victims. For this reason, it appears that there are significant complexities in the 
legal ascription of civilian status and, in tum, the possibility for civilian victims to find 
legal recognition of their harms. 
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Chapter one examines the legal notion of 'civilian' as defined by the protective rules and 
principles of humanitarian law. It argues that this body of rules and literatures focus on 
combatants, rather than civilians as a category of persons. This chapter then turns to 
sociological and transitional justice literatures, where greater emphasis is given to 
civilians as a category of persons, their protection and redress. In so doing, it first sets out 
the main literatures and debates framing these areas of analysis and highlights their 
definitional and analytical difficulties. This chapter argues that these existing bodies of 
work do not adequately account for the current focus on the victimisation of civilians in 
situations of conflict, the legal parameters of their protection or the enforcement of 
breaches of this protection by international criminal justice mechanisms. For this reason, 
this chapter then examines and defines the key concepts of this thesis, 'civilian', 
'protection' and 'redress'. It draws on a range of disciplinary approaches and bodies of 
work in order to develop a broader theoretical and conceptual framework through which 
to define these key concepts and analyse the complex issues of this research. 
Chapter two sets out the methodological approach of this thesis and the methods used to 
undertake the research. This chapter draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1987) and 
commentators on his work to argue that it is necessary to understand the ICTY as a 
'juridical field', that is, as a site of social practices comprising of inter-related rules, 
practices and procedures. It then argues that a case-study approach is the most useful 
methodological technique for understanding and analysing the rules and practices of the 
ICTY for their construction of legal recognition, protection and redress of civilian 
victims. This chapter sets out the particular social research methods that are used to 
undertake this case-study analysis, namely documentary analysis, courtroom observation 
and interviews. For example, this thesis employs documentary analysis of a wide variety 
of legal and political texts such as the ICTY Statute and UN Resolutions and Reports, as 
well as legal judgements, decisions and trial transcripts. It also employs courtroom 
observation of trial adjudications as an integral aspect of this research for enabling an in-
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depth analysis of the role, participation and inclusion of civilian victim-witnesses for their 
understanding of the violence of armed conflict and the Tribunal's redress to its 
perpetration. This chapter argues that this social research approach provides a distinct 
perspective of the myriad rules and practices of the ICTY that cannot be found through a 
purely legal analysis. 
Chapter three traces the increasing international legal recognition and protection of 
civilian victims and their victimisation in armed conflict through the unprecedented 
establishment of the Tribunal and its prosecutions of Yugoslavia's war criminals. The 
first section of this chapter examines The Prosecutor v. Du§ko Tadii; ('Tadii;'),36 the first 
judgement of the Tribunal, in order to explore the changing framework and subjects of 
international law. This section argues that this body of law is shifting from a system of 
sovereign states holding exclusive power over the prosecution of the perpetrators of war 
crimes to a body of law which increasingly recognises individual subjects and promotes 
the protection of civilians as a central matter of its concern. The second section traces the 
historical development of the rules of humanitarian law for their recognition and 
protection of civilians. Through an analysis of these rules, this section argues that this 
body of law has, and continues to, prioritise the rights and protection of combatants rather 
than civilians as participants of conflict. Drawing on this analysis, the third section 
returns to the Tadii; case to explore the contemporary terms of the construction of the 
legal recognition of civilian victims through the enforcement of the rules of humanitarian 
law. This chapter ultimately argues that the protective rules of humanitarian law do not 
enact safety and security for all civilians in a situation of conflict. Instead, as the Tadii; 
case exemplifies, the legal recognition and protection of civilians remains dependent on 
ties of group membership, of social categorisations of nation and ethnicity that may 
exclude certain civilians from finding legal recognition oftheir status and harms. 
36 Case No. IT-94-1. 
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Focusing on the UN's increasing emphasis on the role of transitional justice mechanisms 
for establishing the legal recognition of civilians, chapter four explores the Tribunal's 
narrative and record of the civilian victims of the Yugoslavian conflict. This chapter first 
examines the different models of 'justice mechanisms' that have been established in the 
aftermath of conflict situations, namely, truth and reconciliation commissions and 
institutions of international criminal justice such as the Tribunal. It considers how these 
different mechanisms include civilian victims within their practices and argues that the 
Tribunal does not adequately enable civilian victims to participate within its practices of 
narrating the victims and victimisation central to the Yugoslavian conflict. The second 
section of this chapter explores the Tribunal's narrative and record of the civilian victims 
of these hostilities though an analysis of the criminal prosecutions brought to trial. It 
analyses the prosecutions of crimes against humanity for their legal record and 
representation of different categories of civilian victims. This chapter argues that the 
Tribunal does not adequately recognise or record all the categories of civilian victims 
subject to victimisation in this conflict, in particular female civilian victims, and instead 
constructs a differential record of the Yugoslavian conflict's victims and collective 
memory of its conduct. 
Chapter five examines the complexities of defining individual persons as civilian victims 
of armed conflict and, in their role as witnesses at the Tribunal, as civilian victim-
witnesses. This chapter argues that the Tribunal's definition of a victim as a 'person 
against whom a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction has allegedly been 
committed' does not adequately capture their experience of conflict. It determines that it 
is necessary to conceptualise a civilian victim in terms oftheir sustaining of harm, as well 
as understanding the relational qualities of this harm to recognise the broader spectrum of 
victims of violence, including family and friends. This chapter then examines The 
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Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic ('D. Milosevic,)37 to explore how the differential 
parties to the legal process of trial adjudication, that is, the civilian victim-witnesses 
themselves, the Prosecution, Defence and Trial Chamber, recognise individual civilian 
victims and their status as such. It analyses how social characteristics such as age, gender 
and ethnicity can have an impact upon this ascription of civilian victim status and may act 
as exclusionary categorisations. This chapter then examines how civilian victim-
witnesses understand their role and participation in trial adjudications. In so doing, this 
section explores how the trial process enables civilian victim-witnesses to narrate their 
experiences of harm. Drawing on fieldwork undertaken at the Tribunal, this chapter 
argues that civilian victim-witnesses understand their testimonies as an evidential source 
that contributes to the prosecution of the (alleged) perpetrator, but also as a process that 
constructs a relationship with the Tribunal enabling the founding as well as the finding of 
the truth of their experience of conflict, a relationship and practice that cannot be fully 
realised within current legal practices. 
Chapter six examines the legal recognition of civilians as a collective. It undertakes a 
case-study of two important cases heard by the Tribunal that adjudicated acts of civilian 
victimisation perpetrated during the siege of Sarajevo, The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic 
(,Galic,)38 and D. Milosevic. This chapter examines the construction of the legal 
recognition of an ethnically-mixed civilian population, that is, a collectivity of civilians. 
This chapter first explores the difficulties of defining civilians as collectivities, as civilian 
populations, and the forms of victimisation perpetrated against them. It then examines 
how civilian victim-witnesses during these trials understand the victims of the siege of 
Sarajevo and identifies two key assertions. Firstly, that there remains a narrative from a 
small number of civilian victims that the status of being a 'victim' of the violence is 
dependent upon ethnically-founded lines and secondly, that there is a broad 
37 Case No. IT -98-29/l. 
38 Case No. IT -98-29. 
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understanding that all civilians of this city, irrespective of social characteristics, were the 
deliberate target of military actions. This chapter then explores how the trial proceedings 
and judgement of these cases founds legal recognition of the civilian population as a 
victim of 'terror' in comparison to the assertions of the victims themselves. It argues that 
the judgements re-assert the ethnically-based depictions of the warring parties, a narrative 
that fails to recognise all civilians as victims of the violence. Most importantly, this 
chapter argues that the reassertion of ethnic ties fails to recognise the 'positive' social 
relations and allegiances between civilians that were understood by the civilian victims to 
construct the civilian population of the city of Sarajevo before, during and after the siege. 
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Chapter One 
The Legal Recognition of Civilian Victims: War, Law and Post-Conflict Justice 
In anned conflicts in countries as varied as Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Colombia, a 
culture of war has emerged which places civilians at the centre of conflict. The great majority of 
present-day wars are waged across populated areas, sometimes in cities and villages. Combatants 
seek to displace, "cleanse" or exterminate whole ethnic or national groups; they seek the 
demoralization or control of people or territories. In many of these conflicts, simply put, war is a 
war on civilians.39 
Within the fields of sociological, legal and transitional justice scholarship, the protection 
of civilians in situations of armed conflict has increasingly begun to figure as a subject of 
research and analysis. The new focus on the protection of civilians has led to debates over 
the applicability of the protective rules of international humanitarian law and their 
enforcement by legal mechanisms. However, there is a distinct absence of scholarship 
that engages with the production of the category of civilians in law, rather than just their 
protection (Kinsella, 2006). Whether through sociological analysis or other disciplinary 
approaches, the social and legal construction of the participants of war, that is, 'the 
difference of combatant and civilian, the difference of protector and protected - remains 
unexplored and undisturbed' (Kinsella, 2006: 255).40 As such, within this inadequate 
theoretical and conceptual framework the very notions of 'civilian', 'protection' and 
'redress' are themselves concepts that continue to evoke both definitional difficulties and 
analytical contestation. How then, can we begin to develop a better account and 
conception of civilian victims and their role and participation within the context of the 
pervasive violence of armed conflict? And how, without an existing body of sociological 
scholarship to draw upon, should we approach an analysis of the ICTY for its 
construction oflegal models of recognition, protection and redress of civilian victims? 
39 International Committee of the Red Cross (1999). 
40 Emphasis original. It should be noted that Kinsella's focus is upon the gendered production of the category 
and concept of civilians in legal discourse. 
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In order to develop a framework for this analysis and so address the absence of a body of 
theoretical and conceptual work within this research area, this chapter first examines 
three key areas of scholarship that have taken, whether directly or more often indirectly, 
the concepts of 'civilian', 'protection' or 'redress' as the subject of analysis. Firstly, this 
chapter identifies the legal category of 'civilian' as defined by the rules of humanitarian 
law and the parameters of the legal protections afforded to these participants of armed 
conflict. Secondly, it examines debates within sociology which can contribute to the 
development of an analytic framework for exploration of the recognition, protection and 
redress of civilians within the legal field. In particular, this chapter draws on sociology of 
law and sociology of human rights to understand law as a body of rules and practices, 
regulating the interactions between persons and shaping the identities of individuals and 
groups. Thirdly, this chapter then explores the field of transitional justice scholarship for 
its critical engagement with the appropriate role of mechanisms and measures set up to 
establish post-conflict justice. In particular, this body of scholarship provides a useful 
framework for this research for its specific analysis of these institutions and their function 
in constructing and providing 'peace', 'truth' and 'justice' for the victims of violence in 
the aftermath of hostilities. 
Drawing on these fields of scholarship as well as other bodies of conceptual or empirical 
work, this chapter then examines four key areas of enquiry that are central to further 
developing an analysis of the legal recognition, protection and redress of civilian victims, 
but are still subject to conceptual problems or definitional contestation. The first section 
explores the structures of victimisation in situations of armed conflict. The second section 
identifies the participants of armed conflict, as civilians and combatants, and explores the 
historical and contemporary victimisation of civilians during hostilities. The third section 
identifies the current mechanisms of international protection. The fourth section analyses 
the function of post-conflict justice mechanisms and the particular role and practices of 
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the ICTY for its provision of international criminal justice and redress to the civilian 
victims of the Yugoslavia conflict. For each area of conceptual difficulty or 
'problematic', this chapter explores the typical approach to the subject of analysis, 
identifies where such an analysis does not provide an adequate framework for the specific 
research questions of this thesis and then draws on different conceptual or theoretical 
approaches to develop a more nuanced or appropriate account. Drawing on various 
disciplinary fields, literatures and debates, this chapter outlines the main theoretical 
debates framing these areas of analysis, as well as drawing out conceptual and 
definitional difficulties within existing empirical and theoretical work. It employs this 
inter-disciplinary approach to both complement sociological debates and develop a 
broader theoretical and conceptual framework for analysis of the complex processes and 
procedures which work to legally recognise the civilian victims of conflict and provide 
for their protection and redress. 
International Humanitarian Law: The Concept of the Civilian in Law and War 
International humanitarian law ('IHL') constitutes the body of law 'centred on the 
protection of the individual in war' (Pictet, 1985: 1). The legal framework of customary 
humanitarian law sets out the categories of crimes that constitute this body of law 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005; Cassese, 2003).41 It also establishes the principles 
that guide institutions such as the ICTY in their adjudication of crimes against civilians 
(and combatants) such as the 'principle of distinction' (those rules establishing the 
distinction between civilians and combatants) and the 'principle of proportionality' (those 
rules balancing military conduct in terms of civilian casualties) (Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck, 2005). These rules and principles therefore provide the legal framework 
41 Customary international law 'represents the law binding upon all member states' (Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck, 2005: xxx). The existence of a rule of customary international law requires two elements: the 
presence of state practice and a belief that such practice is required, prohibited or allowed, depending on the 
nature of the rule, as a matter oflaw (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: xxxii). 
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for the identification of civilians as a category of persons both 'present' within, and as a 
protected participant of, armed conflict. 
The principle of distinction provides the legal framework for the designation of persons 
as civilians. The authoritative exposition of the current customary rules of humanitarian 
law by the International Committee of the Red Cross ('ICRC') describes that this 
principle holds that '[t]he parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between 
civilians and combatants. Attacks must only be directed against combatants. Attacks must 
not be directed against civilians' (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: 3).42 However, 
the customary rules of IHL do not establish a 'positive' definition of a civilian. They do 
not set out a definition of a civilian through determination of specific characteristics or 
actions. Instead, these rules provide a 'positive' definition of a combatant and determine 
that civilians are all persons who are not combatants. The ICRC study describes that 
combatants are '[p]ersons taking a direct part in hostilities' with the exception of medical 
and religious personnel (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: 12_13).43 From this 
definition of combatants, civilians are persons 'who do not take a direct part in hostilities' 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: 6). During the practice of war, 'members of the 
armed forces must first ascertain whether a person is a combatant or a civilian' (Gasser, 
1999: 210) and in the 'case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be 
considered to be a civilian'.44 As an expert witness testifying at the Tribunal in relation to 
sniping describes, if you do not know whether the person before you is a civilian or a 
combatant, 'you don't shoot' .45 
42 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, para. 48. (,Additional Protocol I' / 'API'). It should be 
noted that certain aspects of the ICRC study on the customary rules of IHL are contentious. For example, 
Turns points out that the study identifies customary rules applicable to internal armed conflicts without the 
necessary evidence of state practice to substantiate its claims (2006). 
43 This thesis uses the term 'combatant' in its generic sense to mean those persons who are directly 
participating and thus 'fighting' in hostilities, rather than the technical sense which differs in relation to the 
context of the conflict (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: 12-13). 
44 API, para. 43(1). It should be noted that there is debate as to whether this is yet a customary rule of 
humanitarian law (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: 23-24). 
45 Fieldwork, The Prosecutor v. MomCilo Peri§ic. Case No. IT -04-81. 2 February 2009 (,Fieldwork, Peri§ic '). 
See also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005: 24). 
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In this dichotomous framing, a combatant is a person who takes a direct part in hostilities 
and as a result of this participation, is 'liable to attack' (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 
2005: 15). For this reason, combatants are 'obliged to distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population'; they must do so by 'wearing military clothing and equipment or at 
the very least by carrying their weapons openly' (Rogers, 2004: 9). In contrast, civilians 
'may not be attacked nor directly participate in hostilities' (Sassoli and Bouvier, 2006: 
143). In this sense, they are legally 'excluded' from hostilities; they are not participants as 
perpetrators of violence, or legitimate targets of the actions of others. For these reasons, 
civilians and combatants can be seen as legally counter-posed to each other. Each group 
of persons must maintain their status as such in order to either have the right to fight in 
the case of combatants, or the right to protection in the case of civilians. However, it is 
important to note that the right to protection for civilians under IHL does not apply to all 
civilians in all situations. Instead, as Sassoli and Bouvier point out, 'some of those 
protections are prescribed for all civilians; most of them only for the benefit of "protected 
civilians'" (2006: 173-4). As will be the subject of further analysis in chapter three, this 
notion of 'protected civilian' has been a shifting concept of legal designation in the 
jurisprudence of contemporary war crimes trials. 
From this classification of persons, as Ingrid Detter (2000) points out, the principle of 
distinction then shapes the applicability and parameters of legal protections. The legal 
rendering of civilian status thus confers the applicability of a particular framework of 
protective rules for such persons. For example, the ICTY holds subject-matter jurisdiction 
over four categories of criminal offences: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
These categories of crimes act as protective rules for civilians (and combatants) as they 
set out legal prohibitions on particular types of conduct and actions during armed conflict. 
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There are now a number of authoritative legal commentators on the principle of 
distinction and the legal protection of civilians under these rules. Legal commentators 
such as Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005) and Cassese (2003) set out the customary 
rules of humanitarian law and provide detailed analyses of their application by 
international (and national) courts and tribunals. More specifically, Gardam (1993b), 
employing the notion of 'non-combatant immunity' sets out a comprehensive exploration 
of these rules for their norms of protection and provision of safety from the effects of 
warfare. Central to these norms is the determination that, unlike combatants, civilians 
'must not form the object of attack', and 'cannot be subjected to murder or mass 
execution' (Detter, 2000: 319). Various commentators have also undertaken examinations 
oflHL's 'principle of proportionality', that is, of the 'legal norm that requires a balance 
to be struck between the [conduct of military operations,] the achievement of a particular 
military goal and the cost in terms of civilian lives' (Gardam, 2004: 3; see also Rogers, 
2004). 
However, it is important to note that legal analyses predominantly focus upon the legal 
rules governing the protection of civilians. Despite there being considerable debate and 
analysis of the legal definition and recognition of combatants, there are few legal texts 
that provide a similarly detailed examination of the definition and legal recognition of 
civilians. For example, Sassoli and Bouvier's text on legal protection in war contains 
separate chapters on the legal recognition and designation of persons as combatants. It 
does not, however, contain similar chapters in relation to the recognition of civilians, but 
instead focuses on their protection (Sassoli and Bouvier, 2006). Where these legal 
analyses do examine the recognition of civilians, they typically take the concept of the 
protected civilian as a legally constituted 'given', as an already present 'type' of person 
or population that then requires identification as such by combatants (or legal 
mechanisms in instances of civilian victimisation). This body of scholarship does not 
sufficiently explore how social characteristics such as gender, age, nationality or ethnicity 
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become influential or even determinative in the processes of legally recognising 
particular individuals or groups as civilians. However, as the following chapters will 
identify and explore, it appears that certain civilians are less likely to find legal 
recognition of their status as such should an act of violence perpetrated against them 
come before the courts. In particular, several 'non-legal' commentators point out that 
discourses of gender can be seen to produce and influence the construction of social and 
legal recognition of civilians and combatants. For example, Carpenter (2006a) argues that 
young males are typically given nexus to having combatant and thus 'perpetrator' status, 
whilst as Kinsella notes, women are seen as 'the paradigmatic "victims" of armed conflict 
(in particular, of its sexual violence) and not its agents' (2005: 255). However, legal 
analyses do not examine whether certain 'types' of civilians are more likely to have their 
harms brought to trial at an international court or tribunal. Nor do they explore In 
sufficient detail how, or whether, the current structure of legal processes such as 
prosecutorial choices or trial proceedings may contribute to the attribution of civilian 
victim status to particular victims in particular cases or judgements. 
Beyond the Law: Sociology and Transitional Justice Scholarship 
The Legal Making of Social Rules 
To understand the construction of legal recognition and protection for civilians requires 
an analysis of the regulatory role and function of law and legal processes and the legal 
constitution and shaping of social identities. This in tum requires an analysis of law as a 
regulatory mechanism of social relations. Sociology of law provides an important analytic 
framework for understanding law in this way. Through theoretical or empirical research, 
this field of study typically identifies and explores how law structures social relations and 
social life and how, or whether, its rules and procedures can act as a useful vehicle for 
social change (Sarat, 2006; Cotterrell, 2006). While sociology of law is a broad field, this 
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thesis will primarily draw upon two key approaches concerning the regulatory function of 
law and its formation of identity. 
The influential social theorist oflaw, Roger Cotterrell, draws upon and develops the work 
of Durkheim to describe that social processes form the field of law that works as an 
'apparatus of regulation of social relations' (1992: 5). As Cotterrell points out, this 
regulation of social relations works through legal institutions (such as courts) and 
particular bodies oflaw (such as criminal law) (2002: 638). These regulatory mechanisms 
and rules function to structure 'routine' social relations, that is, to 'repress disorder and to 
process disputes' (Cotterrell, 2002: 638). However, they also act as a response 'to social 
breakdown' by regulating and shaping social life when there is a collapse or cessation in 
the typical ordering of social relations (Cotterrell, 2002: 639; 1998). In this way, law can 
be understood to act as a regulatory (and enforcement) mechanism during and after 
situations of armed conflict, when interactions between individuals and groups 
contravene the usual (and lawful) structures of social relations and conduct. Employing 
this description of law as a regulatory mechanism, therefore, draws attention to the 
importance of identifying the protective rules of the Statute of the ICTY for their 
designation and structuring of particular social relations and actions between persons as 
lawful, and others as unlawful. It frames an exploration of the role and function of these 
laws for their condemnation of certain types of social relations and their defining of the 
nature of 'rightful' relationships between individuals and groups. 
However, it is important to note that this approach does not understand law solely 'as a 
policy-instrument acting on society', that is, of a field or instrument of legal doctrine 
external to social life, as older socio-Iegal approaches have suggested (Cotterrell, 2002). 
Rather, as Cotterrell points out, it is necessary to consider law's existence and operation 
in terms of 'normative ideas embedded in social practices' (2002: 640). Drawing on 
Foucault's framing of the ubiquity of power in society, Cotterrell emphasises the 
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centrality of law's 'presence' as a body of regulatory ideas and action within and as an 
aspect of social life that works to define and shape social relations (2002: 640). Building 
on this wider role and presence of law within social life, it therefore becomes important to 
consider broader forms of legal regulation other than that of 'black-letter' law, such as 
governmental agencies, organizations and administrative bodies for their role in 
structuring social relations (Cotterrell, 2002: 639). In this way, as will be set out below 
(and in chapter two), it is important to understand the legal protection of civilians in 
conflict in terms of a body of mechanisms, rules and practices. This sociological 
framework is therefore useful for understanding law as a regulatory mechanism, both in 
terms of the 'rules' but also of those mechanisms, practices and procedures that guide 
their application and consequent structuring (and enforcement) of particular types of 
social relations. 
Equally important to an analysis of the legal constitution of the 'civilian' as a juridical 
subject is the increasing understanding that law can be constitutive ofthe subjects and the 
social identities of the persons that it seeks to regulate. For example, Nicola Lacey argues 
that law functions as a social site for the construction and enactment of particular 
identities (in her analysis, of gendered identities) (2006: 472; see also Cotterrell, 2006; 
Kinsella, 2006). However, as Lacey (2006) points out, in order to adequately explore 
law's constitutive role in shaping identities it is necessary to analyse how this process 
operates through law's 'categories, rules, institutional arrangements, modes of reasoning 
and analysis' (2006: 473). Providing a more nuanced approach than CotterreIl, and 
focusing more specifically on the processes of legal adjudication, commentators such as 
Bourdieu (1987), Lacey (2006) and Campbell (2007) describe that the 'law' functions as 
a site of social practices comprising of related structures, rules and procedures.46 It is the 
totality of these legal rules and practices, such as prosecutorial decisions, trial practices 
46 Chapter two sets out how Bourdieu's notion of a 'juridical field' is used as a methodological framework for 
this thesis. 
31 
and evidential procedures that work to shape the formation of social identities and 
regulate social relations (see Campbell, 2007). The legal field constitutes persons as legal 
subjects through these legal processes. For this reason, this research will explore law's 
constitutive role in the making of legal subjects and shaping of social identities through 
the mechanisms and practices of international criminal justice institutions.47 It will set out 
how these diverse legal practices and procedures work together to construct recognition 
of individual and collectivities of civilians within the legal field. In particular, as later 
chapters will illustrate, a central aspect of this research will be to emphasise and analyse 
how social characteristics and relations problematise the seemingly consolidated legal 
designation of this status. Social relations and identities complicate the dichotomous 
framing of civilian and combatant and, as such, the enforcement of protective rules for 
each of these categories of persons in armed conflict. 
However, as commentators such as Hirsch (2005) and Cotterrell (2002) point out, there is 
a distinct lack of analyses of international law or its rules, institutions and practices in the 
field of sociology of law. More specifically, as Ewald notes, there is little literature 
focusing upon the role and function of international criminal justice or the ad hoc 
tribunals and ICC apart from legal literatures on international law and international 
criminal law (2006: 175). Instead, as Sarat points out, traditional sociology of law 
approaches hold an 'association of law with the boundaries of nation-states' (2006: 1). 
They centre on national institutions and their practices for their legal regulation of social 
relations within that particular state. In this way, this body of work typically 
'presuppose[s] the political society ofthe modern nation-state as its overall conception of 
the social' (Cotterrell, 2006: 25). In this literature, it is the society of the nation-state and 
47 The question oflaw's constitutive role in constructing legal subjects has been taken up in other academic 
areas, most obviously in legal theory. For example, Costas Douzinas provides a detailed tracing of the 
emergence of human rights and their role in constituting persons as legal subjects, that in fact, '[h]uman 
rights construct humans. I am human because the other recognises me as a human which, in institutional 
terms, means as a bearer of human rights' (2000: 371). 
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the social relations within this territorial space that require regulation and protection 
through national rules, institutions and norms. 
The increasing international concern with the protection of all civilians, as well as many 
other international or trans-national legal obligations, complicates this state-centric 
approach to the regulation of social relations. As this focus on protecting civilians, as well 
as humanitarian law more broadly shows, international legal obligations are now in place 
for the regulation of a 'society' and social relations that transcend national boundaries. 
These international legal obligations are indicative of the growth of 'transnational 
regulatory forms', as well as international rules and principles for the protection of 
persons beyond a specific state or region (Cotterrell, 2006: 26). They evidence that the 
'state monopoly of the making, interpreting, and enforcing the law is slowly ending' 
(Cotterrell, 2002: 641). Significantly, these laws also show the 'changing character of the 
social in transnational and international contexts' (Cotterrell, 2002: 641). For example, 
the international protection of civilians is not based upon a solely state-centric conception 
of obligations to this group of persons. Rather, these obligations understand all 'civilians 
everywhere' as a group of persons that require protection from the international 
community (Arbour, 2008: 453). In this way, civilians are understood as a group of 
persons that are members of the international community and subject to the international 
protections of customary humanitarian law. However, as Cotterrell argues, despite clear 
examples of transnational social relations and regulatory forms, much sociology of law 
scholarship 'still implies that nation state law and traditional international law, focused on 
relations between states, define the essential nature of the legal' (2002: 641). This body of 
work has yet to develop a body of literatures or debates that analyse international laws 
and institutions for their regulation or construction of relations between persons beyond 
the parameters of the nation-state. 
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Sociology of Human Rights 
In contrast, sociology of human rights has increasingly taken international laws and 
regimes for the protection of persons as the subject of analysis. Such analyses of 
international human rights typically set out the importance of such rights for the 
protection of persons from acts of violence. For example, Turner (1993), Levy and 
Sznaider (2006) and Sjoberg et al (2001) all argue that the development of human rights 
at a supra-national level provides new forms of protection for persons beyond the 
traditional level of the nation-state. They refer to institutions such as the United Nations, 
the ICTY and ICC, and human rights regimes (whether 'hard' or 'soft law') such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as indicative of an emerging international 
framework of protective rules and the possibility for their enforcement. In these accounts, 
the increasing proliferation of these 'human rights' mechanisms in the post-Cold War era 
exemplifies a social and legal change for the advancement of the international regulation 
ofthe conduct of persons (and states) and the protection of individuals and groups.48 
However, while sociological work on human rights provides an important framework for 
recognising the empirical existence and substantive value of international forms of 
protection, it is clear that this is an under-developed field of analysis (see Pearce, 2001). 
This under-development is most obviously seen though the absence of particularity or 
distinction over the context of violence under consideration, the applicable framework of 
protective rules or the 'types' of victims and perpetrators under their jurisdiction. For 
example, Turner (1993) points out that the abuse of human rights occurs within 'peaceful' 
nation-states as well as within situations of armed conflict. However, within a situation of 
armed conflict the regulation of hostilities comes under the purview of humanitarian law 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005). In this and other analyses, there is a lack of 
48 See Pearce (2001) for sociological analysis of the debates around universal values and cultural relativism in 
regard to human rights claims and obligations. 
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distinction between these differential contexts of violence for the applicable frameworks 
of protective rights and rules. As such, these sociological literatures do not clearly 
articulate whether the object of analysis is human rights and institutions, or the rules and 
enforcement mechanisms of international humanitarian law that are specific to situations 
of armed conflict or mass violations falling within its jurisdiction (see Campbell, 2009). 
This lack of specificity over the body of protective rules and crimes subject to 
examination, in tum, prevents an adequate exploration of the categories and conceptions 
of victims and perpetrators of such violations. For example, it is often unclear whether 
these analyses are referring to particular forms of criminal conduct such as crimes against 
humanity, in which case the victims are necessarily civilians, or if the crimes concerned 
could include combatant victims (in the case of war crimes or genocide for example) (see 
Levy and Sznaider, 2006). Similarly, there is often a lack of identification of the 
perpetrators, as to whether they are state officials accused of human rights abuses, or 
individuals (whether civilian or military) being charged or held criminally accountable 
for violations of humanitarian law. In this way, sociological analyses of human rights do 
not provide an adequate framework for analysis of international humanitarian law as a 
distinct body of law or the institutions that enforce its protective rules. This body of work 
largely fails to recognise or address the particularity of civilian victims within the context 
of violent armed conflict. In tum, it does not adequately consider the specific protective 
rules or forms of redress available to them. 
Transitional Justice Scholarship 
While sociological work on the international legal recognition, protection and redress of 
civilian victims remains under-developed, transitional justice is a growing body of 
scholarship that examines 'the conception of justice associated with periods of political 
change' (Teitel, 2003: 69). In particular, as Weinstein and Stover describe, transitional 
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justice scholarship explores how 'societies torn apart by war and mass atrocity pursue 
justice for past crimes and, at the same time, rebuild their shattered communities' (2004: 
3). This body of literatures and debates significantly contributes to some of the gaps in 
sociological and legal analyses of international institutions and their practices. In 
particular, this field of analysis raises important conceptual and analytic questions over 
the role of these legal (and non-legal) mechanisms in the aftermath of conflict that will 
guide explorations of the ICTY's practices and procedures in later chapters (analysis of 
the institutional practices of transitional justice mechanisms, and the ICTY in particular, 
is set out in a later section of this chapter). Most importantly for this research, transitional 
justice has drawn attention to the 'audience' of these institutions and practices, notably, 
the victims, perpetrators, societies and the international community as a whole (Kritz, 
1995; 2002). 
Transitional justice scholarship raises and examines three key issues and practices that are 
commonly put forward as contributing to the objectives of peace, truth and justice and, as 
such, will be the subject of exploration throughout the following chapters. The first key 
issue as Kritz points out, is the necessity of considering the practices of bringing 
perpetrators to account for their crimes (1995: xxiii). For example, it is important to 
examine which persons are tried for their crimes, which crimes are brought to trial and 
which persons were the victims of these crimes.49 The second issue is whether these legal 
and non-legal mechanisms can establish 'an enduring historical account of an evil past' 
(Teitel, 2000: 105).50 For example, this body of work explores whether criminal 
prosecutions and trials can contribute to such a record or whether the inevitable 
selectivity of such adjudications is actually divisive of this process. The third key issue is 
the exploration of the role and function of these institutions, practices and programmes 
for their construction and orientation of forms of justice for the victims of the harms of 
49 As will be the subject of analysis in chapter four. 
50 As will be the subject of analysis in chapter four. 
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armed conflict (see Weinstein and Stover, 2004; Bassiouni, 2006).51 This victim-led 
approach has contributed to analyses of various aspects of transitional justice processes, 
such as the role of victim-witnesses at trial (Dembour and Haslam, 2004; Stover, 2005) 
and programmes of reparation or compensation (Roht-Arriaza, 2004). 
However, it is important to note that this body of scholarship primarily consists of 
analyses of forms of retributive justice, that is, of mostly legal approaches that work on 
the principle that 'wrongdoing must be punished simply because the wrongful act merits 
condemnation and punishment' (Mani, 2002: 33). As Kieran McEvoy argues, through its 
predominant focus on prosecutorial styles of justice, 'transitional justice has become 
overdominated by a narrow legalistic lens which impedes both scholarship and praxis' 
(2007: 412-413; see also Teitel, 2000). While there is a move toward examination of 
forms of restoration and redress for victims of violations of humanitarian law (see for 
example, Bell and O'Rourke, 2007; Weinstein and Stover, 2004), at present transitional 
justice focuses more upon the appropriate action against perpetrators, rather than 
measures for victims (Rubio-Marin, 2006).52 Moreover, where victims are the subject of 
analysis within this body of scholarship, there is often a lack of identification of civilians 
as a specific 'type' of victim within armed conflict. Empirical and theoretical 
examinations either implicitly conflate the identification of 'victims' with 'civilians', or 
do not adequately identifY where issues of legal rules, protection or redress are being 
understood or promoted for the sake of civilian or combatant victims. For example, 
Lundy and McGovern (2008) argue that transitional justice mechanisms need to adopt a 
'bottom-up participatory approach' that enables a greater recognition of victims and their 
role in 'truth-telling' practices for the promotion of social change. However, similarly to 
sociology of human rights studies, they do not take the civilian victim as the specific 
51 A victim-centred approach will both frame and be the subject of analysis throughout the chapters. 
52 Emphasis original. 
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object of analysis, or consider the specificity of forms of legal (or non-legal) protection 
and redress applicable to them. 
The First Conceptual Problematic: Defining Victimisation in Armed Conflict 
How, then, do we define violence against civilians in situations of conflict? Much 
sociological work on violence focuses on the causation or presence of violence within a 
nation-state or by state officials. For example, a central premise is Max Weber's thesis 
that 'a State is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (1948: 78).53 For Weber, the use 
of violence is not only an action that is undertaken or perpetrated by the State. Rather, 'as 
the sole source of the "right" to use violence', the monopoly over such use is that which 
defines the state as a political association (Gerth and Wright Mills, 1948: 78). 
Anthropological approaches can also be seen to engage similarly bounded ties in their 
studies of the use of violence. Whether within a conflict situation or not, anthropological 
studies typically comprise of case-study analyses of a community or social setting. For 
example, the work of anthropologists such as Carolyn Nordstrom (2004) and Paul Farmer 
(2004) explore the presence of particular types of violence and victimisation within 
specific social settings through ethnographic research methodologies. However, they do 
not examine patterns of victim is at ion across social settings or the particularity of civilians 
as the subjects of these violent social contexts. 54 
From these sociological and anthropological analyses it is clear, as Heitmeyer and Hagan 
point out, that at present '[t]oo much research still takes place in national contexts', that 
there is 'no such thing as international violence research' (2003: 11).55 These narrow 
53 Emphasis original. 
54 The conventional anthropological understanding ofthe importance of the ethnographic method explains 
why such analyses focus on particular community or society settings. However, new anthropological work 
focusing upon and employing multi-cited ethnographies may come to challenge this (see Marcus, 1995). 
55 Emphasis original. 
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state or community-centric approaches either do not consider violence within armed 
conflict, or do not explore such a situation beyond the confines of a specific act of 
hostilities within particular states or communities. For these reasons, these studies are 
unable to provide detailed accounts of the presence of specific structures, features or 
trends of harm in conflict across state or community boundaries. Accordingly, they 
cannot frame an exploration into the presence of targeted civilian victimisation within 
past and present conflicts, nor provide an account of which acts of civilian victimisation 
require international, as opposed to national, legal regulation and condemnation. 
Compounding this absence of international research is a developing body of work that 
constructs a counter-conceptualisation to understanding the violence of armed conflict as 
a distinct category through aligning its acts and forms with the violences of 'everyday 
life'. Prominent amongst such a framing is Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois' anthology, 
The Violence of War and Peace, which aims to negate the dichotomy between these 
contexts and forms of violence through purposively organising the text 'around a cluster 
of readings that constantly juxtapose the routine, ordinary, and normative ... with sudden 
eruptions of extraordinary, pathological, excessive, or "gratuitous" violence' (2004: 5). 
For example, within this anthology Paul Farmer points to the similarity of '''event'' 
assaults', such as murder, torture and rape to demonstrate linkage between those 
violences seen In war and peace (2004: 281). Moreover, in order to portray the 
widespread nature of violence in both contexts, commentators such as Kleinman (2000) 
and Farmer (2004) develop analyses of unequally distributed structural violences such as 
illness, poverty and racial discrimination. These structural violences are put forward as 
examples of systematic suffering through large-scale social forces that hold similar 
characteristics to the societal encompassing of the violence of armed conflict. In this 
account, the structural nature of suffering supersedes any distinction between the context 
of its perpetration or sustaining, that is, between war and peace. 
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However, there are four difficulties with this conceptual alignment of the violences of 
war and peace. Firstly, this approach cannot depict those acts of violence that only occur 
within armed conflict, or because of this context of pervasive harm (Kiza et ai, 2006). As 
with the state or community approach to analysis, it cannot frame a distinct enquiry into 
the particular features of violence within armed conflict or inform analysis of trends 
within this context across the divides of particular societies or communities, in this case, 
the impact of violence upon civilian populations. As such, the second problematic with 
this approach is that it does not allow for the recognition of persons and relationships that 
are particular to a situation of armed conflict. Most obviously, it does not figure the 
presence of civilians and combatants as participants in armed conflict, or provide a 
framework for analysis into the interactions, whether criminal or not, between them. 
Thirdly, the alignment of these contexts conceptually constructs the violence of armed 
conflict as a 'normalised' situation through its conflation with everyday violence. As 
Heitmeyer and Hagan point out, this conceptual conflation produces an 'inflation trap' 
where commentators expand 'the discourse of violence in everyday affairs, creating the 
impression that there are virtually no remaining areas where violence is insignificant or 
absent' (2003: 8). For example, there is a notion put forward that the existence of 
'peacetime crimes' conceptually re-figures war crimes as 'merely ordinary, everyday 
crimes of public consent applied systematically' (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004: 
20). However, this conceptual framing does not adequately explain the intentional 
perpetration or motivations behind the presence of structural violence within armed 
conflict or the forms that it takes. Nor does it allow for analysis of the qualitative or 
quantitative impact that such systematic violence or crimes has upon individuals, 
communities and societies. 
Most significantly, as Heitmeyer and Hagan point out, this conceptual alignment between 
the violences of war and peace appears to perceive and interpret 'the violence of 
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particular groups or places as a "nonna!" transient stage of development or even as 
"natural''' (2003: 8). By characterising certain acts of violence as a 'nonnalised' situation 
of social relations, this approach both ignores the potential criminality of their 
perpetration and does not adequately recognise the hanns of their victimisation and 
violence upon the victims. It overlooks or relegates certain acts of violence against 
populations as being purely 'state' or 'community' problems and so does not 
acknowledge that they should come under the purview of international legal regulation 
and enforcement. However, as set out in the previous chapter, the increasing international 
focus on the protection of civilians designates that irrespective of geographical location, 
there are acts of violence, most often in a situation of anned conflict, that obligate 
international address and redress (Arbour, 2006; 2008; Breau, 2006). As a significant 
proportion of civilians are the subject of attack by state officials (Panyarachun, 2004), a 
perception that their victimisation can be either understood as 'nonnal', or left solely to 
state regulation, rejects the very notion that international rules should regulate conduct 
and protect these 'potential or actual victims of massive atrocities' .56 For these reasons, it 
is necessary to develop an understanding of the patterns of violence during anned conflict 
and the effects of perpetration during and after hostilities. Without such an understanding 
it is not possible to assess the implementation of the protective nonns of IHL or their 
enforcement by international criminal justice mechanisms. 
The Violence and Victimisation of Armed Conflict 
In order to develop an analytic framework to explore the violence of anned conflict, 
Ernesto Kiza's victim-centred methodological approach provides a useful means for 
beginning such an analysis (2006: 73). For Kiza, a 'bottom up' or 'victim-centred' 
methodological approach enables the identification and exploration of the experience of 
structural victimisation and, in particular, its impact on civilian populations (2006: 73, 80; 
56 In Larger Freedom, para. 132. 
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see also Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000a).57 Employing this analytic framework prioritises the 
views and concerns of the (civilian) victims of hostilities and, as such, aligns to the work 
of transitional justice scholarship which sets out the necessity of focusing upon the 
participants or 'audience' of conflict (Kiza, 2006; Weinstein and Stover, 2004). Rather 
than simply identifying the legal rules regulating hostilities, Kiza's work provides a 
framework through which to understand and explore the way structural victimisation is 
experienced by civilian populations and its consequences on individuals, communities 
and states. 
This conceptual and methodological approach to analysing the structural victimisation 
and violence of conflict is useful for two reasons. Firstly, this conceptual framework 
centres on identifying the patterns of victimisation evident during armed conflict, rather 
than just acts of violence (Kiza, 2006). Employing this analytic approach does not begin 
with determining the criminal conduct or actions of the perpetrators, those actions that 
may come before a court of law. Rather, the focus on civilian victimisation emphasises 
the centrality of the victims as those who experience harm from the perpetration of 
violence against them. It understands an act of violence as a 'victimizing event' and so 
provides an analytic frame in which to identify persons and groups as victims, as weB as 
exploring the classification of different types of victims (for example, direct and indirect 
victims) (Kiza, 2006: 82). In this way, there is a conceptual shift from a prioritisation of 
the 'perspective [of the conduct of violence] from combatants to civilians' (Kiza, 2006: 
75). This conceptual focus follows the victim-centred approach to consider that it is the 
victims themselves, as those who experience harm, that are the privileged source of 
information on the conduct and violence of armed conflict. For these reasons, this 
conceptual framework will be used in later chapters to examine the structural 
57 As will be set out in chapter two, this thesis employs a 'bottom-up' or 'view from below' methodological 
approach in alignment with Kiza's framework that stems from the premise that civilian victims themselves 
are in the privileged position of providing the most accurate understanding of civilian victimisation in 
conflict. 
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victimisation of the Yugoslavian conflict and the experiences of both individual and 
collectivities of civilian victims. 
Secondly, this framework employs this victim-centred approach to consider the structural 
manner of civilian victimisation in armed conflict. This conception of armed conflict 
contends that there are particular structures and patterns to the violence perpetrated 
against civilians that are not evident in peacetime. For example, Kiza points out that there 
is a particular organisational structure and involvement of combatants in their behaviour 
toward civilians (2006: 73). Following the UN's descriptions of war's conduct, there is a 
specific recognition of the 'systematic, structural and persistent victimizations' against 
civilians by combatants and other armed elements (Ewald and Oppeln, 2002: 44; also 
Kiza, 2006). This identification of war victimisation emphasises that its perpetration does 
not consist of sporadic or unintentional acts of violence, but instead is undertaken through 
deliberate, widespread and systematic attacks against civilians.58 As will be explored 
further in the next section and in chapters four and six, it is therefore important to 
examine both the patterns of civilian victimisation and the relational context of these 
victimisations, that is, the interactions between civilians and combatants. Employing this 
framework of a victim-centred exploration of structural victimisation thus enables 
analysis into the broad structures and patterns of violence in armed conflict without 
'losing' civilian victims as the target of its forms of structural victimisation or the source 
of information of its perpetration. 
Utilising this framework of a 'victim-centred approach' thus enables the development of 
a conceptualisation of structural victimisation within the context of armed conflict, in 
effect, the way in which victimisation is felt and experienced. As most commentators 
suggest and witnesses at the ICTY testify,59 a central element for recognising and 
58 Resolution 1265. 
59 As will be further discussed in chapter five. 
43 
defining an act of violence or victimisation is the experience of harm or injury (Jaukovic, 
2002; Kiza, 2006). Such harm may encompass physical injuries or psychological or 
emotional harms. For example, laukovic points out that in the former Yugoslavia 
physical victimisation was experienced through the 'massacres of a large number of 
people, killing, wounding, rapes, tortures, taking people by force and executions' (2002: 
113). However, in the context of the structural victimisation of war, it is evident that it is 
also necessary to understand psychological or emotional harms as the consequence of 
both direct and indirect violences. Accordingly, it is important to draw attention to forms 
of indirect victimisation such as the widespread exposure to intimidating propaganda seen 
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as many other conflicts (Jaukovic, 2002: 
113). From this account of structural victimisation it is therefore appropriate to 
understand the context of war as a harmful environment of pervasive and overlapping 
forms of victimisation. Unlike a peaceful society, the way in which conflict is 
experienced creates a 'situation of almost total vulnerability' for its civilian population 
(Ewald, 2002: 97). 
From this recognition of the structural harms of the violence of armed conflict, it is then 
also important to emphasise its consequences. As laukovic points out, war victimisation 
generally consists of 'diverse and long lasting' experiences of harm (2002: 109). As such, 
the victimisation and violence of civilians is rarely a transient moment of harm as the 
drawn out Yugoslavian conflict exemplifies. Moreover, it is important to emphasise that 
structural victimisation is a harmful situation both during and after a state of conflict. The 
widespread and systematic victimisation of civilians and the context of encompassing 
violence 'deeply disturb[s] the functioning of individuals, social processes, institutions, 
groups and relations' long after the cessation of hostilities (Jaukovic, 2002: 109). For 
example, Nikolic-Ristanovic points out that the harms of conflict during its perpetration 
and after, ranges from each individual's experience of death and injury to 'the widespread 
destruction of property, homes, families and economic stability' (2000a: 21). For these 
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reasons, it IS appropriate to contend that the consequences of pervasive structural 
victimisation for its participants is that their "'future" becomes a war casualty' 
(Nordstrom, 2004: 69). 
The Second Conceptual Problematic: Identifying the Participants of Conflict: 
Civilians and Combatants 
How, then, should we identify the victims of structural victimisation within armed 
conflict? And are there patterns of such victimisation across the innumerable conflicts 
that have been fought over the centuries? As set out above, the rules of IHL construct the 
framework for the legal identification of civilians. However, they cannot provide an 
account of how civilians are 'present' within the practice of conflict or the manner of 
their victimisation. In order to explore those persons present in situations of conflict, it is 
useful to draw upon the 'new wars' thesis, a key body of work that focuses upon the 
methods and goals of warfare and their consequential impact upon civilian populations. 
This theorisation of contemporary conflicts provides a useful non-legal framework for 
this research, both in its specificity of recognising civilians as 'present' within armed 
conflict but also for its assessment of the structural qualities of military-civilian 
interactions and how they function to construct and sustain a situation of pervasive 
civilian victimisation (Kaldor, 2001; Newman, 2004). 
Mary Kaldor, the most prominent of the new wars theorists, argues that we are witnessing 
a period of 'new wars', that there has been a change in the conduct of hostilities that 
implicates new participants, both perpetrators and victims, within their violence (2001: 
5). As Kaldor's work, as well as that of other ofthe new wars theorists shows, this thesis 
begins with a proposition that there has been a shift in the types of wars being fought in 
the post-Cold War era (Drake, 2007; Miinkler, 2005). This argument draws upon data that 
points to an increasing cessation of inter-state wars, whilst other forms of conflict, 
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namely internal, civil and intra-state hostilities are becoming ever-more frequent (Kaldor, 
2001; Miinkler, 2005). For this reason, the new wars theorists contend that the traditional 
model of 'Clausewitzean' war, of war as acts of violence between states, no longer 
figures as representative of the entities or military organisations that engage in such 
violence (Kaldor, 2001; Miinkler, 2005).60 In Kaldor's framing, the period of these 'old 
wars' is coming to an end (1997; 2001). Instead, recent conflicts such as those of former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda are argued to reflect the emergence of 'new wars' through their 
differential 'goals, the methods of warfare and how they are financed' (Kaldor, 2001: 6). 
They are contrasted with the older model of inter-state wars to depict a shift in the 'type 
of organized violence' seen in the contemporary period, both in terms of the victims of 
such violence and the nature of their victimisation (Kaldor, 2001: 1). 
This theorisation of 'new wars' identifies new participants of war as a key aspect of this 
change in their types of violence. In particular, this area of scholarship illustrates the 
presence of civilians and new 'types' of combatants as a new phenomenon of armed 
conflict (Kaldor, 2001: 98-100). It utilises the legal definition of a 'civilian' to examine 
how such persons are subject to particular patterns of victimisation in the contemporary 
era. However, the new wars conception of civilians and their victimisation does not begin 
with, or accept, that military-civilian interactions follow the protective rules of IHL in the 
conduct of war (see Miinkler, 2005: 14-15). Rather, the new wars model provides an 
account of the practice of contemporary conflicts that articulates 'who' the persons 
present in conflict are, as well as how they actually participate in hostilities as either 
victims or perpetrators. For this reason, this body of scholarship enables an identification 
of military-civilian interactions between these groups of persons. It provides a framework 
for analysis of the 'social dynamics' of conflict, in this case, of how war is lived and felt 
by its differential participants (Newman, 2004: 186). 
60 Clausewitz defines war as 'an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will' (1968: 
10 I). In this defining, the opponents of this violence are states; war arises from their 'relations to each other' 
and is characterised by a 'duel on an extensive scale' (Clausewitz, 1968: 102, 101). 
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Firstly, the new wars scholarship emphasises the participation of non-state actors as 
combatants as a key feature of contemporary conflicts. For example, Kaldor points out 
that these situations of violence are 'increasingly privatized both as a result of growing 
organized crime and the emergence of paramilitary groups' (2001: 5). From this growing 
de-statization of war, there is now 'a bewildering array of military and paramilitary 
forces', often 'augmented by criminals, volunteers and foreign mercenaries' (Kaldor, 
2001: 45). However, unlike the state armies of the Clausewitzean era, these armed forces 
are not necessarily easily identifiable as combatants through the legal principle of 
distinction. The de-statization of armed forces has led to debate over the legal recognition 
of these perpetrators and, if committed, their crimes. As Easton points out, actors in 
conflict such as private military personnel are '[n]ot quite civilians nor soldiers[,] they 
fall under a legal grey area' in terms of the principle of distinction (2006). Such 
difficulties in the legal ascription of combatant status is particularly problematic where 
discipline amongst armed groups either breaks down or regulatory structures were not 
apparent to begin with. If, as Miinkler argues, 'soldiers become looters for whom the laws 
of war or any kind of military code of punishment no longer enter[s] the picture', the 
legal protection of civilians (or other combatants) becomes obsolete in practical terms 
(2005: 14). 
Secondly, the new wars scholarship contends that civilians are now (and so by 
implication not previously) the primary victims of war's violence and so central to the 
structure and practice of its social relations (Gilbert, 2003; Kaldor, 2001; Miinkler, 2005). 
This new recognition of civilians as victimized participants within conflict has arisen 
from two key empirical observations. Firstly, the new wars literature contends that there 
has been a quantitative shift in the casualties of conflict. For example, Miinkler argues 
that in the wars of the early twentieth century, that is the 'old' wars, roughly 90 percent of 
the killed and wounded were combatants as defined by international law (2005: 14). 
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However, in the new wars of the 1990s it is held that this figure has almost reversed so 
that the ratio of military to civilian casualties is approximately 1: 8 (Kaldor, 2001; 
Munkler, 2005). The siege of Sarajevo provides an empirical example of this proposition; 
a number of witnesses (both expert and victim-witnesses) describing that civilians, rather 
than combatants, were the primary and overwhelming victims of the violence.61 This 
transformation in the casualties of war enforces the notion that civilians are no longer 
marginal to the conduct of the military or their actions. In this account, civilians must be 
understood as the majority victims of conflict and so central to its harmful conduct. 
The second key observation of the new wars thesis is a qualitative change in the nature of 
violence through the deliberate targeting of civilians (Gilbert, 2003; Kaldor, 2001). Using 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict as a case-study, Kaldor argues that this intentional 
targeting of civilians is indicative of a 'revolution in the social relations of warfare' in 
terms of its military-civilian interactions (2001: 3, 91). These new social relations are 
formed of the pervasive and explicit use of military actions against civilians that defies 
the protective proscriptions of IHL (Kaldor, 2001: 8). Substantiating the quantitative 
changes in the casualties of war, this recognition of the deliberate targeting of civilians 
reverses the image of the 'old' wars that 'theoretically affected combatants alone' 
(Munkler, 2005: 39). It understands that intentional civilian victimisation is now the 
function of contemporary conflicts (Newman, 2004: 178),62 that its combatants 'mainly 
employ long-term violence against large parts of the civilian population' (Munkler, 2005: 
75). The new wars, therefore, have a profound human and social impact on the civilian 
population. For example, Munkler argues that the involvement of non-state regulated 
combatants contributes to a trend of military indiscipline and lack of professionalism 
(2005: 76). This military indiscipline is evident through the greater frequency and pattern 
of criminal conduct, often motivated by financial or commodity gains. It is seen through 
61 Fieldwork, Perisic, 4 February 2009; The Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic. Case No. IT -98-29/1. 
Transcript of Trial Proceedings, para. 571-2 ('D. Milosevic, Transcript'). 
62 Emphasis added. 
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the pursuit and sharing out of 'prizes of victory', including the plunder of natural and 
economic resources as well as 'human' prizes such as the rape and enslavement of 
women (Mlinkler, 2005). 
A particular explanatory argument is put forward to underpin these quantitative and 
qualitative shifts in the impact of war upon civilians, namely that the new (mostly 
internal) wars are predicated upon, or constructive of, ethnic or religious oppositions 
(Duffield, 2001; Kaldor, 2001). In these wars, 'ethnic and religious divisions [tum] into 
faultlines of a friend-enemy definition', shaping the perpetration of mass violence 
between and against particular groups of persons (Mlinkler, 2005: 6). For this reason, 
Duffield argues that 'within the new wars, people are social beings rather than juridical 
subjects' (2001: 191).63 This argument considers that the perpetrators of violence within 
these wars do not recognise the legal distinction between civilian and combatant, nor 
distinguish between the protected and the legitimate targets of conflict. Instead, it is the 
status of a person or a collectivity along ethnic or religious lines, or the perception of 
such social characteristics by others, that becomes determinative or influential in their 
potential to become the subject of victimisation. For this reason, Kaldor (2001) and 
Mlinkler (2005) hold that in the new wars, there is a breakdown of the civilian I 
combatant divide altogether. Within these particular conflicts, the definitional status of 
'civilian' is itself held to be redundant in designating a distinct group of persons. Such 
classification is no longer meaningful as it does not enact any measure of protection or 
safety for civilians from the perpetration of violent conduct. 
However, as commentators such as Cairns (1997) and Newman (2004) point out, the 
intentional perpetration of civilian victimisation and the consequential breaching of the 
protective rules ofIHL has been part of war's conduct throughout recorded history. In his 
critique of the new wars thesis, Edward Newman argues that it is necessary to see 
63 Emphasis original. 
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patterns of civilian victimisation as a reflection of (historically) contextual rather than just 
temporal variables (2004: 181). This historically contextual analytic approach does not 
deny that deliberate civilian victimisation is a feature of contemporary conflicts. In fact, 
Newman argues that the new wars literature 'provides a great service in explaining 
patterns of contemporary conflict', including its human and social impact (2004: 179). 
Instead, this historically contextual approach broadens the enquiry of conflict through its 
incorporation and attention to historical narrative and so provides a framework in which 
to recognise the civilian victims of conflicts past and present (Newman, 2004: 186). It 
therefore overcomes the reliance on a comparative method seen in the new wars' 
approach of employing a dichotomous temporal framing of 'old' and 'new' conflicts. The 
historically contextual approach allows for a more comprehensive exploration of the 
similarities between their patterns of civilian victimisation and their forms and functions 
of violence, which the 'new wars' theorisation does not attend to. 
First, employing this historically-contextual framework enables identification of civilian 
victimisation as a function ofthose 'old' conflicts perpetrated by the regulated, uniformed 
state soldier of the twentieth century and before. For example, the deliberate targeting of 
civilians was central to conflict situations such as the Armenian genocide and the Second 
World War, amongst many others (Beevor, 2002; Slim, 2007). It is also important to note 
the indirect causes of civilian deaths over the centuries, such as siege conditions, famine 
and disease (see Eckhardt, 1989: 94). Second, these conflicts evidence that ethnic, 
religious or nationalist antagonisms were a significant or even decisive dimension of 'old' 
wars. Indeed, as Wimmer and Schetter point out, typical techniques of 'ethnic expulsion' 
such as mass shootings, rape, pillage and plunder can be traced back to conflicts of the 
fifteenth century (2003: 250). These conflicts provide important clarification that civilian 
victimisation is not limited to internal conflicts as the new wars thesis suggests. Rather, 
this pattern of military-civilian interactions and its destructive consequences for 
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individual and collectivities of civilians is also a distinct feature of international conflicts, 
of wars between states (Newman, 2004). 
Following this recognition of historical civilian victimisation in conflict, it is important to 
examine why such victimisation has been put forward as a new phenomenon, of a new 
mode of social relations in conflict. There are two key reasons for such a proposition. 
Firstly, as the Human Security Report (2005) points out, the data underpinning the 
perception of an increase in civilian casualties has been the subject of confusion and 
somewhat misconstrued in its interpretation. In particular, the often-cited figure of 90% 
of the victims of the new wars being civilians arose from a preliminary statement that 
referred to both civilian refugees and the dead as victims. However, later translations of 
this contention did not emphasise that this figure included refugees and displaced persons 
and instead 'wrongly equated "victim" with "fatality'" (Human Security Report, 2005: 
75). From this mis-interpretation numerous commentators have gone onto state that 90% 
of those killed in contemporary conflicts are civilians, using only secondary sources to 
substantiate their claims (see for example Chesterman, 2001; Smyth, 2001). 
Secondly, this 'new' recognition of civilian casualties may be the result of the greater 
visibility of these victims and their experience of atrocities (Newman, 2004: 182). As 
Newman argues, the 'advances in communications and the media' brings these casualties 
to public attention in a way that they had not before (2004: 179). This greater visibility of 
the victims of conflict can also be attributed to the UN's increasing engagement 
throughout the 1990s with humanitarian crises and civilian victims, as discussed in the 
previous chapter (Golberg and Hubert, 2001). It is also important to note the growing 
involvement of organisations such as the ICRC, NGOs, women's groups and many other 
institutions and charities in raising awareness of civilian casualties and providing 
assistance and protection during conflict situations (Hagan and Levi, 2006: 593). 
However, this increased media attention does not necessarily mean that prior to the early 
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1990s civilian victimisation was absent in situations of conflict. Instead, as the Human 
Security Report points out, 'prior to 1989 information was too poor to be able to make 
estimates of the global civilian death toll' (2005: 75). Drawing on the empirical 
observations of commentators mentioned above, however, it is reasonable to argue that 
the harmful social relations between the military and civilians seen in the new wars, was 
also a structural feature of the old wars. As Jones and Cater point out, the 'practice' of 
war throughout history has shown us that it 'is often between soldiers and civilians' 
(2001: 250). For these reasons, this research approaches analysis of armed conflict 
through an understanding that civilian victims are 'present' as the intentional targets of 
harm in contemporary conflicts, as well as those hostilities that have been fought 
throughout history. It frames the presence and participation of civilians as individuals and 
groups subject to pervasive victimisation due to the harmful (and unlawful) conduct and 
interactions between these persons and combatants. 
The Third Conceptual Problematic: Identifying Mechanisms of International 
Protection 
The protection of civilians has increasingly become a national and international 
obligation. It is therefore important to identify the mechanisms that are in place to both 
define and enforce such protection. The ICRC defines the concept of protection, in 
particular for civilians in armed conflict, as encompassing: 
all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance 
with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights law, 
international humanitarian law and refugee law. Human rights and humanitarian 
organizations must conduct these activities in an impartial manner (not on the basis of 
race, national or ethnic origin, language or gender).64 
This definition follows the UN's description of protection for civilians that emphasises 
the role of humanitarian law in providing the protective rules for the legitimate conduct of 
64 Caverzasio (2001: 19). 
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armed conflict. It defines the individual (rather than a national of a particular state) as the 
subject of this legal protection. In this account, all civilian persons, irrespective of their 
social characteristics, require and hold the right to protection in anned conflict. 
The duty to protect civilians in anned conflict 'traditionally belongs first and foremost to 
the States' (Caverzasio, 2001: 9). As UN Resolutions and Reports emphasise, states have 
the primary responsibility to protect civilians.65 This framework of protection follows the 
traditional legal relationship between a sovereign state and its people: states 'enjoy 
supreme authority over all subjects and objects within a given territory' (Held, 2002: 4). 
They are 'independent in all matters of internal politics and should in principle be free to 
detennine their own fate within this framework' (Held, 2002: 3). In this conception, the 
state holds the overriding authority and obligation to regulate the conduct of its subjects 
(i.e. combatants) and protect its civilian population within a situation of conflict. 
Traditionally, in instances of the breach of national (or international) rules, the state 
prosecutes and punishes the individuals concerned (Cassese, 2003: 37). However, as 
Bruderlein and Leaning point out, this state-centred framework of civilian protection has 
been, and continues to be, frequently overlooked or deliberately violated in the practice of 
conflict (1999). Either states do not adhere to their responsibility to protect civilians, are 
functionally unable to provide security for this group of persons, or their annies are in 
fact the perpetrators of victimisation (Bruderlein and Leaning, 1999; Jones and Cater, 
2001). Moreover, as indicated earlier, the proliferation of non-state military personnel 
highlights groups of combatants that are not necessarily under the control of the state. 
Recognition of this failure of states to protect its civilians is evident in recent UN 
descriptions of the increasing international concern with this issue. It is also evident in 
the role of international criminal justice mechanisms such as the ICTY, ICTR and ICC 
for their prosecutions of acts of civilian victimisation. As outlined in the previous chapter, 
65 Report of the Secretary-General, 2007, para. 3. 
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this focus on civilian protection shifts from a state-centric responsibility to protect to an 
obligation upon the international community to protect civilian victims when a state is 
unable or unwilling to do so (Arbour, 2008; Panyarachun, 2004). In this framework of 
protection, the international community has a responsibility to all civilian victims, 
irrespective of their national ties or any other characteristic. For this reason, as Arbour 
points out, it 'squarely embraces the victims' point of view and interests, rather than 
questionable State-centred motivations' (2008: 448). Significantly, this international 
responsibility to civilian victims does not rest on a singular 'moment' of protection, as 
either prevention or redress. Rather, as Arbour argues, it is necessary to conceptualise a 
'web of protection' that encompasses 'a continuum of prevention, reaction, and 
commitment to rebuild, spanning from early warning, to diplomatic pressure, to coercive 
measures, to accountability for perpetrators and international aid' (2008: 448).66 This 
'web of protection', as the UN's Resolutions describe, ranges from the condemnation of 
civilian victimisation to the enforcement of the protective rules of IHL and redress to its 
victims.67 
In this model of civilian protection, the UN considers that international humanitarian law 
is central to the international community's construction and implementation of the 
responsibility to protect all civilians. David Held's conception of 'cosmopolitan law' 
provides a useful framework for analytic enquiry into this shift in the legal protection of 
persons from the state to the international community (2002). Providing a more 
developed account of legal frameworks than those commonly offered within sociology of 
law, Held argues that changes in IHL, human rights law and other legal domains 'have 
placed individuals, governments, and nongovernmental organizations under new systems 
oflegal regulation - regulation that, in principle, is indifferent to state boundaries' (2002: 
11). For Held, the emergence of these new 'sets of norms and legal frameworks' 
66 See also Panyarachun (2004) for a similar conceptualisation of the obligations ofthe international 
community in respects to the norm of a responsibility to protect civilians. 
67 See Resolution 1738. 
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represents the shift from a state-law system to a regime of 'cosmopolitan law' (2002: 23-
24). In particular, the laws of war (i.e. IHL), the laws governing war crimes and crimes 
against humanity and human rights are given as key elements in the development of 
international criminal justice frameworks that transcend the traditional state system of 
legal regulation and protection (Held et at, 1999; Held, 2002). These systems and 
mechanisms of international legal rules and norms, such as IHL, create new forms of 
authority which delimits a state's authority over its peoples (Held, 2002: 17). In this 
account of a largely 'top-down' system of global regulation, states are no longer entirely 
free to determine their own standards or forms of behaviour towards their citizens. 
Instead, states are now subject to new forms of surveillance and monitoring in the form of 
international regimes, international courts and supranational authorities (Held, 2002: 17). 
Held argues that cosmopolitan law comprises two key principles. These concern the 
subjects of regulation and protection and the (international) mechanisms that enforce 
these regulatory and protective ideals. First, this framework of law takes individual 
human beings as its central concern (Held, 2002: 23). It defines and 'protect[s] basic 
humanitarian values' for the interests of individuals 'which no political agent, whether a 
representative of a government or state, should in principle, be able to cross' (Held et at, 
1999: 70). Similarly to the encompassing figuration of those persons that come under the 
increasingly international obligation to protect civilians, these basic values determine that 
the treatment of individuals must be 'based upon the equal care and consideration of their 
agency irrespective of the community in which they were born or brought up' (Held, 
2002: 23). In this account, cosmopolitan law does not privilege the sovereign state or 
prioritise a nexus between a state and its nationals. Rather, it is a 'law of the peoples', for 
there is a 'universal recognition' of all persons as subjects of its regulatory and protective 
rules and norms (Held, 2002: 1, 29). 
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Secondly, cosmopolitan law is comprised of an international framework of 'rule systems 
and institutions' for the enforcement of these regulations and protections for individuals 
(Held, 2002: 24). These systems and institutions characterise the existence of 'forms and 
layers of accountability and governance' at a global level and therefore 'have already 
transformed state sovereignty' (Held, 2002; 2005). International criminal justice 
institutions and regimes such as the UN, ICTY, ICTR and ICC (as well as the Nuremberg 
trials before them) are given as concrete examples ofthis cosmopolitan framework of law 
(Held, 2002: 23). In the case of the ICTY, for example, this international institution 
prosecutes individuals for breaches of customary IHL and so enforces the protective rules 
of this body oflaw (in particular, as will be set out for civilian victims). For this reason, it 
is important to emphasise that this transformation of legal regulation and protection from 
the state to the international domain is not, to employ Held's framing, 'a remote utopia' 
(2002: 23). Rather, as David Hirsh notes and these examples attest, cosmopolitan 
criminal law has a 'limited but real institutional existence' (2003: 16). There is in place, 
despite its limited framework, international criminal justice mechanisms and institutions 
that found regulation, accountability and protection both during and after conflict. It is 
this international criminal justice framework and its institutions that the UN prioritises as 
underpinning the construction and implementation of the norm of a responsibility to 
protect civilians (Arbour, 2008; Panyarachun, 2004). 
However, Held's account does not provide a detailed account of the terms of 
establishment or functioning of those mechanisms and international criminal justice 
institutions that both enforce legal protections and provide redress for civilian victims. 
Instead, as Dahbour notes, the 'hierarchies and asymmetries of power that have always 
existed in international relations are largely abstracted out of cosmopolitan democratic 
theory' (2005: 2l3). For example, while Held points to the ICTY as a key institution of 
'cosmopolitan law' (similarly to other scholars of cosmopolitan law, see Kaldor, 2001: 
116), it is notable that he does not provide a detailed analysis of its establishment, or 
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more particularly, the role of particular (powerful) states as integral to this process. As set 
out in the previous chapter, the ICTY was established through the Security Council's 
adoption of Resolution 827 (1993). However, it is important to note that the adoption of 
this Resolution was a complex process of political negotiations among the five permanent 
members of the Security Council, with particular reticence on the part of China and the 
USA at different stages of the process (Hazan, 2004: 35-37). Without the support of the 
five states who hold the powerful political tool of 'veto', unlike other Member states,68 it 
is uncertain how or whether this international institution would be functioning in the 
present day. 
Despite these analytic absences, Held's model of cosmopolitan law is useful for its 
recognition of the shift from a state model of legal obligations and protections of persons, 
to that of an international 'law of the peoples' (2002). It enables identification of the 
existence of differential institutions and mechanisms that enforce and redress breaches of 
the protective rules of IHL for civilians. However, in order to broaden Held's account, it 
is also necessary to examine the differential methods of their formation. Anne-Marie 
Slaughter provides a useful model of a 'new world order' in order to analyse the 
emergence and existence of a system of global governance and its institutions and 
mechanisms (2004: 15). Rather than conceiving of a system of global governance through 
a network of institutions and rules that exist 'above' states, Slaughter argues that we also 
need to think 'about a world of governments . . . interacting both with each other 
domestically and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts' (2004: 5). These 
interactions between states occur through regulatory, judicial and legislative channels 
(Slaughter, 2004: 5). Providing a more nuanced account than Held's, therefore, 
Slaughter's conception of global governance recognises the integral role of the state and 
interactions between states at divergent levels for the formation of international criminal 
justice institutions and rules. It understands states as 'crucial actors' in the construction of 
68 See Fasulo (2004) for an overview of the United Nations and its composition. 
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these mechanisms, as well as being subject to their regulatory rules and authority 
(Slaughter, 2004: 5). For Slaughter, envisioning this 'new world order' and the actuality 
of its contemporary instantiation requires an appreciation of existing government 
networks at both a vertical and horizontal level (2004: 15). In this account, vertical 
networks refer to situations where states 'choose to delegate their individual governing 
authority to a "higher" organization - a "supranational" organization that does exist, at 
least conceptually, above the state' (Slaughter, 2004: 20). Alternatively, horizontal 
networks refer to those networks between high-level officials of national states through 
differential areas such as law enforcement and human rights (Slaughter, 2004: 19). They 
are then, 'national to national' networks (Slaughter, 2004: 132). 
From this framing of vertical and horizontal networks, it is possible to examine the means 
of establishment of those differential mechanisms and institutions that narrate and enforce 
the growing norm of an international responsibility to protect civilians. There are three 
key mechanisms central to the contemporary enforcement of civilian protection: the norm 
of an international responsibility to protect, the notion of international peace and security 
and international criminal courts and tribunals. First, the development of an international 
norm of a responsibility to protect exemplifies the construction of a 'horizontal' network 
of protection for civilians. As set out in the previous chapter, there is now an acceptance 
by all states of their responsibility to protect persons from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.69 Moreover, these states determine that they are 
prepared to take collective action to help protect persons from these crimes.70 Employing 
Slaughter's framing, this construction of protection of persons figures as a horizontal 
network of collective action and interactions between all Member States of the General 
Assembly (notably not just the members of the Security Council). These interactions 
between states and their formation of an international responsibility to protect figures, in 
69 World Summit Report, para. 138. 
70 World Summit Report, para. 139. Emphasis added. 
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Arbour's framing, as a 'web of protection' through the commitment to prevent violations 
and help states 'build capacity' to protect their populations from such crimes.7l 
Secondly, the growing concern for the protection of civilians can be seen through the 
changing notion of international peace and security. Golberg and Hubert point out that 
there has been a 'more holistic definition of "threats to international peace and security" 
evolving throughout the 1990s' (2001: 223). This holistic framing increasingly conceives 
of acts of violence between persons, and in particular, the victimisation of civilians in 
armed conflicts such as that of the former Yugoslavia, as constituting such a threat 
(Golberg and Hubert, 2001; Knoops, 2004). For example, the UN Security Council in 
1992 cited the abuses being committed against civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a 
threat to international peace and security.72 However, it is notable that the response to 
such threats has largely been undertaken by the Security Council through, for example, 
condemnation of the targeting of children, humanitarian personnel and civilians in 
conflict and authorization of peace-keeping operations (Golberg and Hubert, 2001). 
Furthermore, the Security Council's establishment of the ICTY as 'a means to maintain 
and restore international peace' evidences a new institutional legal response to threats to 
international peace and security (Knoops, 2004: 531). This institution's establishment 
through Chapter VII of the UN Charter as an enforcement measure mandates that all 
states, including the warring parties, have 'to cooperate with the Tribunal in all aspects of 
its operations and proceedings' (Cassese, 1994: 56). In this way, as Morris and Scharf 
argue, the members of the Security Council 'acted not as individual States on their own 
behalf, but rather as the Security Council exercising its responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security on behalf of the Member States of the United Nations' 
(1995: 45). The ICTY therefore evidences the construction of a 'vertical' network of 
71 World Summit Report, paras. 138-139. 
72 See for example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 757 (1992), 30 May 1992 (SIRESI757 
(1992)) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 770 (1992), 13 August 1992 (S/RES/770 (1992)) 
(,Resolution 770'). 
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protection for civilians. It is a vertical network of enforcement through its creation by 
particular states of the Security Council, rather than all states. This international criminal 
justice institution evidences that vertical networks are increasingly responding to 
violations against civilians and establishing new forms of mechanisms to enforce those 
protective rules of international law that are in place to regulate actions toward this group 
ofpersons. 
Thirdly, as set out in the prevIOUS chapter, the establishment of criminal justice 
mechanisms such as the ICTY and ICC are seen as key mechanisms for the enforcement 
of the responsibility to protect civilians. For example, the ICTY has taken the 
enforcement of civilian protections as a central aspect of its criminal prosecutions (as will 
be the subject of analysis in chapter four). Through the processes of trial adjudication and 
judgement of these criminal prosecutions, it has greatly contributed to the expansion of 
civilian protection law (Slaughter and Burke-White, 2002: 68). Slaughter also refers to 
the ICC as an example of a vertical network of global governance (2004: 149-150). This 
vertical structure can be seen, for example, in elements of its jurisdiction such as the 
Security Council's ability to refer states to the Court, even if they are not state parties to 
the Rome Statute.73 It is through this form of referral that the situation in Darfur, Sudan 
has become the subject of investigation and prosecution by the ICC.74 However, it is 
important to note several 'horizontal' elements to the ICC. Most obviously, the ICC's 
entry into force on 1 July 2002 was the result of the requisite sixty ratifications of the 
Rome Statute (Schab as, 2004: 18). Without the impetus of these states (and those that 
have since ratified the Statute) to submit themselves to this 'higher' governance structure, 
this jurisdiction would not have come into being. Hirsch points out that treaties (such as 
that creating the ICC) seek to 'embody the common subjective expectations of the 
73 ICC Statute, Article 13(b). 
74 See http://www.icc-cpi.intlcases/Darfur.html. 
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contracting parties' (2005: 924).75 Upon ratification, therefore, these treaties also reflect a 
common acceptance of a particular jurisdiction, its rules and practices. In this instance, 
the ratifying states agree to be bound by the jurisdictional rules of the ICC. Moreover, as 
Schabas points out, states may also have to 'undertake significant legislative changes in 
order to comply with the obligations of the Statute [such as] enacting the offences of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in the Statute' into their 
national jurisdictions (2004: 20). These states will therefore broaden the protective rules 
for civilians within their own national jurisdictions. 
From these examples, it is possible to identify and analyse an international framework for 
the enforcement of civilian protection. This international framework figures as both 
international treaties and obligations setting out the terms of civilian protection (e.g. the 
responsibility to protect and the developing notion of international peace and security) as 
well as institutions to enforce these protections. As set out in the previous chapter, the 
UN places increasing significance upon international criminal justice institutions such as 
the ICTY, ICTR and ICC for the development of the enforcement of civilian protection. 
However, these institutions apply the protective rules of IHL, rather than human rights or 
any other national rules or standards. While other fields of law such as human rights 
undoubtedly contribute to civilian protection in an international frame, they do not hold 
sufficient particularity in their address to the civilian victimisation of armed conflict. 
For this reason, this research will examine the functioning of the ICTY as an institutional 
measure for the enforcement of civilian protection through the protective rules of IHL. 
The ICTY illustrates the shift from a state-centric framework of authority over persons, to 
communal actions for the legal enforcement of civilian protections through this particular 
body of law. However, it is also important to emphasise that courts and tribunals such as 
the ICTY, ICTR and ICC do not act solely as regulative and protective mechanisms in 
75 Emphasis original. 
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relation to civilian victimisation. Instead, as the UN sets out, 'justice mechanisms', such 
as the ICTY (as well as truth and reconciliation commissions) are now seen as central to 
the provision of redress to the civilian victims of armed conflict. 76 In this account, these 
mechanisms contribute to the 'web of protection' necessary to respond to the structural 
victimisation of civilians within a conflict situation, both through acknowledgement of 
the victims and the provision of forms of redress for their harms. For this reason, it is 
important to analyse the differential practices and procedures of these transitional justice 
mechanisms for their construction of this second objective, that is, for how they construct 
redress for those persons that have been subject to the civilian victimisation inherent in 
armed conflict. 
The Fourth Conceptual Problematic: Identifying Forms of Post-Conflict Justice and 
Redress 
Ruti Teitel argues that the ongms of transitional justice lay in debates and activism 
centred around legal and non-legal responses to the 'wave of democratic transitions' from 
prior authoritarian or repressive regimes in the post-1989 period (2003: 70). However, as 
Teitel points out through a genealogical tracing of transitional justice, in recent years 
there has been an expansion and 'normalisation' of such discourses and the substantive 
establishment of mechanisms and measures (2003: 90). The ICTY and ICC are key 
examples of the increasing establishment of institutions of post-conflict accountability 
through their enforcement of IHL. Mirroring the development of civilian protection 
indicated previously, forms of transitional justice, both through academic literatures and 
their practical application (through UN policies for example), are increasing called upon 
to guide, enforce and redress an array of different conflict situations and attend to a 
variety of persons, communities and societies (Sriram, 2007: 583). However, transitional 
justice literatures rarely analyse these mechanisms of post-conflict justice in terms of 
76 Resolution 1738; In Larger Freedom, para. 138. 
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their specific address and redress to civilian victims. How, then, might we understand 
how TRCs and legal mechanisms redress 'victims' as a broader group ofpersons?77 
In institutional terms, transitional justice literatures and practices centre on two key 
mechanisms, legal institutions (see Bassiouni, 2002; Teitel, 2000) and truth and 
reconciliation commissions ('TRCs') (see Hayner, 2002; Minow, 1998). As indicated in 
the previous chapter, the UN's recent Resolutions and Reports show a shift from the role 
of these institutions being solely for the founding of accountability of the perpetrators, to 
the provision of redress to the victims of harm. Rama Mani argues that this first form of 
justice, of apportioning accountability to the perpetrator, figures as 'retributive justice' 
(2002: 33-36). This form of justice centres upon the condemnation of the perpetrator and 
the meting out of punishment for his or her crimes. The retributive model of justice is 
most associated with legal mechanisms through their framework of criminal prosecutions, 
judgement and punishment (Mani, 2002; Aldana, 2006). In this framework, criminal 
prosecutions transfer the 'responsibility for apportioning blame and punishment from 
victims to a court that acts according to the rule ofIaw' (Weinstein and Stover, 2004: 14). 
The retributive framework thus recognises the victim(s) of the crime and founds 
accountability of the perpetrators on their behalf. However, victims rarely figure as 
participants within retributive processes. If they are 'present' within legal mechanisms, it 
is only as witnesses to the crime under adjudication (Van Boven, 1999).78 
In contrast, Mani argues that a model of 'reparative' justice (often also termed 
'restorative' justice) goes beyond traditional notions of punishment central to the 
retributive approach. Although Mani's conception of reparative justice figures as a new 
proposal of justice for post-conflict societies rather than an instantiated framework 
77 Later chapters will focus on civilian victims in their specificity as a social and legal group within processes 
of justice mechanisms. 
78 It is important to note, as Mani points out, that the ICC has incorporated a number of 'victim-friendly' 
practices and procedures within its functioning that can be seen as 'reparative' (2002: 175). For example, the 
ICC has a Victims Trust Fund and enables (certain) victims to act as participants in the legal proceedings. 
The ICC's practices will be the subject of examination in the conclusion of this thesis. 
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already in existence, its main tenets follow those principles of victim's redress set out by 
the UN.79 This form of justice comprises two key principles that stem from the notion of 
'reparation', that is, either moral or material practices that 'aim to recompense for loss 
and ... reintegrate the marginalized and isolated into society' (Roht-Arriaza, 2004: 122). 
Firstly, for Mani, this reparative justice seeks to redress the 'legal injustice, such as 
injury, loss of life, employment or property' (2002: 174). Secondly, reparation is given 
for 'the moral, or psychological injustice, that is, victimization, trauma, and loss of 
dignity' (Mani, 2002: 174). In this expansive notion of justice, reparative justice 
constitutes a variety of forms of redress including material remedies (such as monetary 
compensation and restitution of property), but also non-material reparations (such as 
official acknowledgement of the injustice, commemorations and education) (Mani, 2002: 
174). Through this framework, reparation is given for the crime, as a breach of the law. 
However, it is also an 'explicitly "survivor-orientated'" conception of reparation, as 
redress is also given for the social injury, namely the victim's experience of victim is at ion 
and their sustaining of enduring harms through material or symbolic reparations (Mani, 
2002: 174). This framework of reparative justice for injustice thus follows Kiza's framing 
of civilian victimisation as a 'victimising event' that has significant implications for the 
present and future of the victim. However, as most commentators point out, this 
expansive notion of justice is typically only associated with TRCs models of justice, and 
does not figure within legal prosecutorial frameworks (Aldana, 2006; Hayner, 2002). 
Recent UN Resolutions, however, do not designate the retributive model of justice to 
legal institutions, and the reparative model to TRCs. Rather, both of these institutions are 
now seen as central mechanisms for constructing these forms of justice through their 
practices and procedures.8o Moreover, these retributive and reparative models inform the 
overall objectives of transitional justice mechanisms, of founding peace, truth and justice 
79 United Nations, Principles on the Right to Remedy. See also Bassiouni (2006). 
80 See Resolutions 1674; 1738. 
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(Mani, 2002: 176). For this reason, it is important to note that these mechanisms are not 
simply tasked with righting wrongs and redressing victims, whether in a legal frame or 
not. Instead, as Vikki Bell and Kirsten Campbell point out, transitional justice, as the term 
itself describes, 'implies a present movement from the past to the future', of a shift from 
one social situation to another (2004: 303). Most often, this shift is from a prior violent 
past, such as a conflict situation, to a peaceful future. For this reason, the task of these 
institutions must be understood as 'reconstructive', as assisting the re-founding of new 
societies and the composition of their social relations (Bell and Campbell, 2004: 299; see 
also Hamber and Wilson, 2002). In this way, as most commentators and the mandates of 
the institutions themselves consider, these transitional justice institutions have the 
complex and expansive tasks of restoring 'normalcy to societies torn apart by conflicts' 
(Bassiouni, 2002: xv), condemning and / or holding the perpetrators accountable for their 
crimes (see Kritz, 1995) and the promotion of 'reconciliation by forcing societies ... to 
"come to terms" with the past, achieve "closure" and stability' (Weinstein and Stover, 
2004: 13). How then do these two divergent forms of transitional justice seek to both 
enforce civilian protections and provide redress to this group of victims? What forms of 
'justice' and redress do they attempt to construct for victims in the aftermath of conflict? 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
While taking different forms, truth and reconciliation commissions typically work on the 
premise that the process of revealing and confirming past wrongs can facilitate a shared 
memory and in so doing, create a sense of unity and reconciliation (Hamber and Wilson, 
2002: 35). Priscilla Hayner, a leading commentator of TRCs points out that these 
mechanisms generally take the 'approach of collecting thousands of testimonies and 
publishing the results of their findings in a public and officially sanctioned report [which] 
represents for many victims the first sign of acknowledgement by any state body that 
their claims are credible and that the atrocities were wrong' (2002: 16). In this way, the 
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TRCs have a particular 'narrative-making' focus, both in terms of its process and product 
(Hayner, 2002: 225).81 These aspects of the TRCs functioning are understood to 
recognise the victims of conflict, the broader context of atrocities and construct an 
authoritative account of its crimes and criminality. 
Firstly, the TRC process prioritises the victim by hearing the 'truth' of the violent act 
from the victims themselves. This process serves to recognise the victim as such, and 
their experience of victimisation within conflict and its resultant harms. By placing the 
victim at the centre of the process of founding and narrating the official 'truth' of the 
armed conflict or prior regime, they become both visible and included in the process of 
founding its historical record. Secondly, the TRC model founds a broader historical 
record of the previous conflict situation as the product of its functioning. Most often 
taking the form of a 'Final Report', such as in the case of South Africa, this narrative of 
the crimes make these violent acts known to the national state in which they took place, 
the victims themselves and the international community (Hamber and Wilson, 2002; 
Hayner, 2001). Forming a narrative of the conflict through the articulations of the victims 
themselves provides an official record of its perpetration and an authoritative means 'to 
resist predictable attempts to rewrite history' (Neier, 1999: 39). 
For these reasons, TRCs are seen to largely reflect the provisions of victim's rights set out 
by the United Nations (Garkawe, 2003: 351). This form of justice is seen as 'restorative' 
or providing redress in the sense that it provides victims with a 'greater decision-making 
power' in their access to these mechanisms and an inclusive role within their proceedings 
and the construction of their 'product' (Garkawe, 2003). Unlike a legal trial, as will be 
discussed, TRCs are understood to provide an 'open and receptive environment' in which 
victims can narrate their victimisation and harms sustained (Aldana, 2006). Moreover, 
depending upon the particular TRC, victims can also seek reparations for the harms of the 
81 Emphasis original. 
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crime and request the return of seized property, following the UN's conceptualisation of 
the appropriate forms of 'remedy' for crimes sustained (Hayner, 2001). 
However, it is also important to note two key difficulties with the TRC process and 
product that may complicate its form of redress for post-conflict societies and their 
persons. Firstly, while TRCs undoubtedly prioritise the needs of victims in terms of their 
narrative-making function, Hayner points out that they 'do not offer long-term therapy; 
they offer survivors a one-time opportunity to tell their story, usually to a stranger they 
will never see again' (2002: 135). TRCs do not necessarily provide a therapeutic 
environment, as some victims may envisage. This framework of reparative justice does 
not establish a long-lasting therapeutic relationship for victims of conflict through which 
they can address psychological or emotional trauma. Secondly, Fiona Ross, through a 
case-study of the South African TRC, points out that although approximately equal 
proportions of men and women made statements, 'for the most part women described the 
suffering of men whereas men testified about their own experiences of violations' (2003: 
17). As Ross illustrates, this pattern of prioritising the experiences of men led to a 
narrative of the violence as being primarily related to the deaths of men, rather 
encompassing the range of violations perpetrated to women including sexual violence, 
structural and symbolic violence (2003: 18). For these reasons, any understanding or 
exploration of the construction of the 'truth' of the prior conflict by TRCs requires a 
consideration of which persons testifY to their harms or those of others and which forms 
of violence and victimisation become part of the national (or international) narrative of 
the conflict. As Ross points out, the testimonial procedures of TRCs may have the effect 
of silencing and eliding the recognition and thus redress of certain victims (for example 
women) and certain violences (2003). 
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International Criminal Justice Mechanisms 
In contrast to the general structure of TRCs, it is widely understood that legal models of 
transitional justice are largely perpetrator-driven and thus not 'victim-friendly' in either 
their processes (for example the trial) or their product (typically the legal judgement) (see 
Aldana, 2006; Weinstein and Stover, 2004). International legal models of transitional 
justice consist of various forms in the contemporary period. Alongside the 'international' 
models of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, the international community has also established 
various other legal institutions such as the 'mixed judicial model' or 'hybrid model' such 
as that of Sierra Leone (Sriram, 2006). However, similarly to all these legal courts and 
tribunals is their primarily retributive approach, that is, to charge, adjudicate and punish 
the war criminals that come before them. This analysis of the construction of forms of 
justice within criminal justice mechanisms, both in terms of this chapter and the thesis 
more generally will use the ICTY as a representative case-study for the inclusion of 
(civilian) victims within its legal practices. 
The ICTY largely mIrrors Mani's model of retributive justice through its criminal 
prosecutions and punishments of violations of customary humanitarian law. The UN 
Security Council established the Tribunal for 'the sole purpose of prosecuting persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law'. 82 This retributive 
model of justice charges Yugoslavia's war criminals with their breaches of IHL (mainly 
against civilian victims), adjudicates and judges their perpetration and punishes those 
found guilty. For the Tribunal, this founding of accountability and consequent 
punishment expresses 'the outrage of the international community at these crimes'. 83 Its 
legal practices attempt to dismantle 'the tradition of impunity for war crimes and other 
82 Resolution 827 (1993). 
83 The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski. Case No. IT -95-14/l-A. Appeals Judgement, 24 March 2000, para. 
185. 
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serious violations of international law' .84 The Tribunal considers that this process of trial 
adjudication and judgement constructs a 'legal awareness of the accused, the surviving 
victims, their relatives, the witnesses and . . . convey[ s] the message that globally 
accepted laws and rules have to be obeyed by everybody,.85 This retributive process thus 
recognises the perpetrators and their victims and condemns the interactions between them 
as breaching the protective rules of humanitarian law. 
However, despite the UN's conceptualisation of a series of rights for victims to access 
justice mechanisms, civilian victims of the Yugoslavian conflict cannot initiate or 
demand investigation or criminal proceedings be brought against an alleged war criminal. 
Civilian victims do not have 'rights' within the legal process in the sense of their being 
able to request that the ICTY hears charges of the acts that caused their sustaining of 
harm. This failure of the Tribunal to adopt the UN guidelines (or an earlier, similar 
declaration)86 has been the focus of substantial critique and concern by legal 
commentators on, and researchers of, transitional justice mechanisms (see Chifflet, 2003; 
Jorda and Hemptinne, 2002). The detrimental effect to the efficiency and speed of the 
proceedings, particularly due to the terms of the completion strategy, have been given as 
key reasons for the lack of provision of these victims rights (Tolbert and Swinnen, 2006: 
195). Correspondence with staff members of the ICTY indicate that there is unlikely to be 
any substantive change in their policies or practices in terms of victims' rights or 
.. . 87 partIcIpatIOn. 
For these reasons, it is necessary to approach an analysis of the ICTY with an 
understanding that it does not follow the latest 'trends' in contemporary international 
criminal justice which prioritise the participation of victims at trial and provision of 
84 http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm. 
85 The Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjic. Case No. IT -02-61-S. Sentencing Judgement, 30 March 2004, para. 
149. 
86 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, UN Doc. 29 
November 1985 CA/RES/40/34). 
87 Correspondence with a staff member of the VWS, December 2008. 
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reparations for their harms (see Jorda and Hemptinne, 2002). In this retributive model, 
therefore, it appears that the ICTY has a narrow framework of measures and means of 
providing justice and redress to civilian victims. Unlike the TRC model, victims are not 
central to the narrative-making process or the focus of forms of redress such as 
reparations or compensation. Rather, as Theo van Boven argues, victims are only present 
at the Tribunal to provide evidence against the perpetrators and so 'serve the interests of 
criminal justice' (1999: 81). For these reasons, the following chapters identify the key 
'sites' of the ICTY's judicial processes which work to legally construct recognition, 
protection and redress to the civilian victims of the Yugoslavian conflict. Through 
exploration of the prosecutorial, evidential and adjudicatory processes, the chapters 
consider how civilian victims are included in these legal practices and whether the current 
structure of such practices ultimately work to exclude certain civilian victims from 
finding legal recognition or redress for their harms. 
Conclusion 
Uwe Ewald argues that an underlying rationale of international criminal justice is the 
process of 'constructing "victims'" (2006: 173). As Ewald points out, international 
criminal justice mechanisms, and the ICTY in particular, are key legal mechanisms for 
constructing the identities of individual and collective victims through their prosecutions 
of large-scale victimisation (2006). However, as has been set out above, there is a distinct 
absence of research identifying or exploring how international criminal justice 
mechanisms construct legal recognition of civilian victims, enforce their protections or 
provide for their redress. In particular, there does not yet exist a detailed body of 
sociological literatures or debates that take these key concepts and practices as the subject 
of enquiry. For these reasons, this thesis employs the conceptual, methodological and 
theoretical frameworks set out above that provide a more comprehensive and adequate 
means for approaching these complex issues. It utilises these approaches to undertake a 
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case-study of the ICTY and examine the various practices and processes of this 
international criminal justice mechanism for its construction of legal recognition of 
civilian victims. As such, this thesis seeks to contribute to the evident gaps in current 
literatures and debates by developing a better and more complete account of the 
'presence' of civilians within armed conflict and, more importantly, how such legal 
mechanisms recognise, protect and redress such victims in the aftermath of hostilities. 
The next chapter sets out the methodological approach of this thesis. It draws on 
Bourdieu's notion of the 'juridical field' to understand the ICTY as a site of rules and 
practices that work together to construct legal recognition of civilians, their protection 
and redress. This chapter then sets out the social research methods employed to undertake 
an exploration of the juridical field of the ICTY. It describes that this research uses a 
case-study approach which incorporates documentary analysis, courtroom observation 
and interviews. 
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Chapter Two 
The Juridical Field of the ICTY: Researching Legal Rules and Practices 
To evaluate the ICTY's construction of legal recognition, protection and redress of 
civilian victims requires an analysis of the protective rules of humanitarian law and the 
legal practices that enable their enforcement. In order to develop a methodological 
framework for this analysis, this chapter draws on Pierrre Bourdieu's thesis of 'a 
sociology of the juridical field' (1987). It uses Bourdieu's notion of a juridical field to 
study the ICTY as a system of rules and practices. The chapter shows the usefulness of 
using a case-study approach to this field. The chapter then describes the social research 
methods utilised for the fieldwork of this thesis, namely documentary analysis, courtroom 
observation and interviews. The juridical field is analysed in terms of a 'view from 
below' or 'victim-centred' approach. This approach considers the role of the ICTY as it 
functions, or should function, for the recognition and redress of victims rather than just 
the prosecution of perpetrators (Kiza, 2006; Weinstein and Stover, 2004). 
Analysing the Juridical Field of the ICTY 
How, then, should we analyse the ICTY as an institution that regulates and places 
judgement upon acts of social conflict and violent relations between individuals and 
groups? Through which practices does the ICTY construct legal recognition, protection 
and redress of civilian victims? Drawing on Bourdieu's work, this research understands 
the ICTY as a juridical field of rules and practices, in which the enactment and re-
enactment of these practices can hold a transformative potential for the adjudication of 
social conflict. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the ICTY functions as a retributive mechanism of 
international criminal justice through its prosecutions, trials and punishment of 
Yugoslavia's war criminals. Its address to, and redress of, the crimes of civilian 
victimisation during this conflict works through the enforcement of breaches of the 
protective rules of humanitarian law. In this way, the ICTY can be understood as 
functioning as a 'juridical field' in Bourdieu's sense of 'a social space [that is] organized 
around the conversion of conflict between directly concerned parties into juridically 
regulated debate' (1987: 831). For Bourdieu, the social space of the juridical field hears 
incidences of social conflict and constructs legal judgment of its lawful or unlawful 
nature (1987: 827). Through the interpretive practices of the trial process, the juridical 
field is understood to found a legal 'solution' and 'resolution' to the act of conflict or 
violence (Bourdieu, 1987: 816, 831). In this model, the ICTY can be understood as a 
juridical field that functions to try acts of civilian victimisation and renders judgement as 
to whether these harmful social interactions breach the rules of humanitarian law. This 
framing of the ICTY understands its practices as regulating social conflicts and enforcing 
their breach. 
Bourdieu describes that the functioning of the juridical field encompasses two key 
factors, which provide a useful means for identifying and exploring the central concepts 
of this research. Firstly, Bourdieu points out that it is necessary to understand the juridical 
field as comprising of an inter-related system of rules and practices (1987: 831). Such 
practices encompass 'not only the written record (in the law, for example, legislation, 
judicial decisions, briefs and commentaries), but also the structured behaviours and 
customary procedures characteristic of the field' (Terdiman, 1987: 809). For example, 
Hagan and Levi draw on Bourdieu's work to point out that the 'substantive and 
procedural norms' of the ICTY are framed 'by a mixture of common and civil law 
custom, along with treaties, conventions and resolutions of the UN Security Council and 
General Assembly' (2005: 1503). As will be further discussed in later chapters, Hagan 
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and Levi's work shows how these rules and practices shape aspects of the Tribunal's 
functioning such as its prosecutorial regimes and their discretion over the enforcement of 
IHL (2005). Focusing more specifically on the adjudicatory process, Campbell employs 
Bourdieu's framing of the juridical field to analyse the ICTY as a case-study of 
international prosecutions of sexual violence (2007). Such analysis, as Campbell sets out, 
requires identification of the international legal rules defining sexual violence offences, as 
well as the legal practices (such as prosecutions and trial proceedings) that represent 
particular forms of adjudicating conflict (2007: 412-413). These Bourdieuian analyses of 
the ICTY show how a comprehensive and adequate exploration of the ICTY's 
functioning cannot simply focus on its rules or practices. Rather, both these factors 
require identification and examination to understand the complex juridical functioning of 
this institution. 
From these analyses, it can be seen that this exploration of the ICTY's construction of 
legal recognition, protection and redress of civilian victims requires analysis of both its 
rules and practices. It is the entirety of these legal practices that function to adjudicate 
social conflicts such as that of the former Yugoslavia and ultimately found judgement 
upon the interactions between persons during these hostilities. Utilising this approach, the 
chapters that follow all identify the relevant rules of the ICTY Statute that set out 
protections for civilians in armed conflict and then examine the legal practices specific to 
this institution for their enforcement of breaches of these rules. In particular, they explore 
the ICTY's construction of legal recognition of civilian victims through the application of 
the protective rules comprising its Statute (chapter three), the prosecutions of crimes 
against civilians (chapter four), trial processes (chapter five) and its judgements (chapter 
six). 
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The Enactment and Re-Enactment of Law 
Bourdieu argues that the structuring oflegal practices and 'logic' of juridical functioning 
work to establish the 'force of law' (1987). In Bourdieu's framing, '[e]ntry into the 
juridical field implies the tacit acceptance of the field's fundamental law, ... [and] the 
rules and conventions of the field itself (1987: 831). The acceptance ofthe jurisdiction of 
the court by its legal actors necessitates conforming to its legal practices and agreeing that 
they will shape and organise juridical debate (Terdiman, 1987). For example, the 
Prosecution and Defence agree to the structure of trial proceedings within the specific 
juridical field in which they adjudicate alleged criminal (or civil) conduct. In the case of 
the ICTY, the parties conform to the largely adversarial system of trial procedures, as will 
be further discussed, and structure their bringing of evidence in alignment with these 
rules and conventions. 
However, Bourdieu does not only claim that these legal practices shape the juridical 
process. Rather, this model of the juridical field considers that the force of law arises 
from its 'reproduction and continuation', that is, through the repetition of legal practices 
(Terdiman, 1987: 809). It is through law's continual 'enactment and practice' (Hagan and 
Levi, 2005: 1502) that its legal practices hold a particular influential power, namely to 
'determine in part what and how the law will decide in any specific instance, case, or 
conflict' (Terdiman, 1987: 807).88 For example, while the ICTY does not follow the 
system of 'precedent' found in many jurisdictions, during the trials of violations of IHL 
and their judgement, the Trial Chamber's frequently refer to decisions in previous, similar 
cases. During the case of D. Milosevic, for example, the judges frequently referred to the 
prior interpretation of the charge of 'terror against a civilian population' by the Trial 
88 Emphasis original. 
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Chamber of the Galii: case.89 The prior interpretation of legal rules, or the enactment of 
aspects of proceedings such as evidentiary principles in similar cases are thus influential 
in shaping the adjudicatory processes of later cases and substantiating the force of the 
authoritative judgement of the Trial Chamber. 
The practices of the law, however, do not necessarily figure as 'static' forms of re-
enactment and continuation. As noted above, Bourdieu argues that the structure of the 
juridical field arises from the 'structurally organised competition between the actors' 
(1987: 818). Such competitive struggles as Hagan and Levi illustrate through their 
analysis ofthe ICTY, can be seen through 'clash[es] on the courtroom playing field' over 
aspects of the enactment of law such as the interpretation of legal rules and the 
appropriate parameters of evidentiary and procedural processes (2005: 1520). As chapter 
three will analyse in more detail, a particular example of such competitive struggles arose 
during the adjudication of the Tadii: case. In the first judgement of this case, certain 
charges through the grave breeches category of crimes were held not to encompass some 
of the civilian victims due to their having the same nationality as the accused, a situation 
that was contrary to the legal elements of the charge. However, after appeals by the 
Prosecution over the judge's interpretation of the jurisdictional aspects of this charge, the 
decision was reversed. Unlike the first judgement, Tadic was found guilty of crimes 
against these civilians. In Hagan and Levi's terms, this decision was a consequence of the 
competitive struggles between the legal actors of the ICTY, such struggles working 
ultimately to construct 'new law with new force' (2005: 1520). 
For this reason, it is necessary to recognise that the legal practices of the juridical field 
are not rigid or static in their functioning, but can 'develop and change' (Dezalay and 
Garth, 1996: 15). More particularly, as Hagan et al contend, the competitive struggles 
89 Fieldwork, The Prosecutor v. Dragomir Mi{osevic. Case No. IT -98-2911. April and June 2007 ('Fieldwork, 
D. Milosevic '). 
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over the ICTY's enactment and re-enactment oflegal practices can have a 'transformative 
potential' in relation to the interpretation of rules or procedural frameworks (2006: 587). 
For this reason, exploration of the ICTY's legal practices must be attentive to changing 
aspects of their form and functioning, such as developments in its case-law and 
procedural innovations. The ICTY, for example, describes its accomplishments as 
including having made pivotal determinations with regard to crimes against humanity 
committed against civilians and significant advances in the legal treatment and 
punishment of sexual violence in wartime.90 As these examples illustrate, since its 
inception, the legal practices of this institution have enforced the customary rules of 
humanitarian law that protect civilians during armed conflict. It has also had, and 
continues to have, a transformative potential for recognising and enforcing the protection 
of civilian victims through the enactment and re-enactment of its legal practices. 
Case-Study Research 
In order to examine the juridical field of the ICTY, this thesis employs a case-study 
research approach. As Campbell (2007) points out, case-study research involves the study 
of a complex social phenomenon or set of social practices that can be identified as a 
'case' through their spatially and / or temporally bounded existence (see also Gerring, 
2004; Yin, 2003). It concerns the in-depth and systematic study of a single 'case' for 
examination of the specificity of its structure and functioning (Berg, 1998; Gerring, 
2004). As this definition sets out, a case-study approach provides a useful means for 
researching the ICTY as a juridical field in alignment with Bourdieu's framing. 
Employing a case-study approach enables identification of the juridical field of the ICTY 
as the 'case' under examination and the enactment and re-enactment of its rules and 
practices as comprising its structure and functioning. Case-study research consists of two 
key techniques that will establish the focus of this analysis. Firstly, it involves 
90 http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/factsheets/achieve-e.htm. Emphasis original. 
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identification of a social phenomenon as a 'case', in this instance the ICTY, and 
secondly, the use of a 'mixed-method' approach for researching its practices, in this 
instance the legal rules and practices of this institution (Berg, 1998; Yin, 2003). 
Identification of the Case 
Case-study research begins with the identification of a social phenomenon or set of social 
practices as a 'case' or 'unit of analysis' (Stake, 2000; Yin, 2003). Such social 
phenomenon may be individuals, events or communities, or as in this analysis, an 
institution or organisation (David and Sutton, 2004: 111). From this initial identification 
of a 'case', it is then necessary as Stake points out, to recognise that a 'case' is typically 
'an integrated system', a social phenomenon or practice that comprises a number of 
functioning 'parts' (2000: 436). For this reason, where an organisation is the object of 
analysis, it is necessary to gain a thorough understanding of its establishment and 
functioning, including the sub-units, parts, relationships, motivations and stressors within 
it (Berg, 1998: 219; Stake, 2000). In this way, as Berg points out, understanding the case 
as an integrated system requires analysis into 'how each sub-unit fits together and serves 
the overall objectives of the organisation', that is, how the organisation operates as a 
whole (1998: 219). However, the sub-units of a case may not necessarily be 'aligned' or 
consistently work together as part of a whole. Rather, as Bourdieu's figuration of the 
juridical field illustrates, there may be aspects of the case, such as its activities or 
practices that are in tension or are seen as competing entities (1987; see also Hagan and 
Levi, 2005). For this reason, thorough and effective analysis cannot be undertaken 
through exploration of a singular 'part' or 'section' of a case. Instead, it is necessary to 
consider the 'holistic' characteristics of a case and research its overall composition and 
functioning (Stake, 2000; Yin, 2003). 
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This research defines the ICTY as the 'case' under examination. The ICTY is a spatially 
bounded 'case' in its institutional form, and temporally bounded in terms of the limited 
time of its institutional existence and temporal jurisdiction over violations of IHL in the 
former Yugoslavia.9J Following the case-study approach, this examination of the ICTY 
understands this institution as a case that consists of a system of 'parts' and 'sub-units' 
that work together to constitute its overaIl functioning. As noted above, this analysis of 
the ICTY follows Bourdieu's conception of the functioning of the juridical field to 
examine both its legal rules and practices (see Bourdieu, 1987: 831; Terdiman, 1987: 
806-807). However, as well as the legal rules and practices that figure as part of the 
prosecutorial process, the juridical field of the ICTY also encompasses various 'sub-
units' and procedures. For example, for the purposes of this research it is important to 
examine the mandates and practices of the Victims and Witnesses Section ('VWS') and 
the Outreach program for their protection of, and assistance to, civilian victims and 
witnesses. As chapter five sets out, it is also necessary to explore how the ICTY figures 
civilian victim-witnesses within the evidential procedures of the trial process and 
understand how, or whether, these practices enable their inclusion and facilitate their 
testimonies of the experience of the conflict. 
Case-Study Research: Employing a Mixed-Method Approach 
Case-study research also establishes a useful framework for analysis of the 'case', in this 
instance the ICTY. A case-study approach employs a range or mix of research methods to 
facilitate the collection of in-depth information and data of the case (Hammersley and 
Gomm, 2000; Yin, 2003). This analytic approach adheres to the defining of the case as a 
complex but holistic system (in similarity to Bourdieu's framing of the juridical field) by 
91 The ICTY has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 
1991 (rCTY Statute, Article 8). At its establishment, this temporal jurisdiction was not given a date of 
cessation as 'there was no indication of when the serious violations of international humanitarian law would 
cease' (Morris and Scharf, 1995: 119). However, United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 indicates 
that this temporal jurisdiction will cease upon the 'restoration of peace' , a situation yet to occur. 
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utilising a range of methods that enable examination of its various structures and 
practices. It also mIrrors the sociological research technique of 'triangulation' that 
prioritises the use of a number of differential methods. The 'triangulation' approach, as 
Denzin points out, considers that 'no single method can ever completely capture all the 
relevant features of [a] reality', as the use of different 'method[s] leads to different 
features of empirical reality' (1989: 13). For this reason, it is necessary 'to employ 
multiple methods in the analysis of the same empirical events' (Denzin, 1989: 13). This 
mixed-method approach enables the drawing out of the complexities of the case and an 
understanding of the overall functioning of its practices and procedures, whether they are 
aligned or in tension with each other. 
Following the case-study approach, this research utilises three sociological research 
methods that are seen as central to an in-depth examination of a case and form the basis 
of the fieldwork undertaken for this research: documentary analysis, direct (courtroom) 
observations and qualitative interviews (see Yin, 2003). Utilising these different methods 
enables a broad perspective of the legal practices of the ICTY, ranging from the 
protective rules of IHL set out in its Statute, to the legal procedures of the trial and 
judgement. However, while this multiple method approach facilitates analysis of the 
totality of the ICTY, it is equally important to emphasise that particular aspects of its 
functioning can only be understood through a specific research method. For example, 
chapter five analyses the role and positioning of victim-witnesses during the trial process. 
Identification of the protective measures in place for these witnesses was undertaken 
through documentary analysis of the ICTY's Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. However, while these documents set out the rules that structure the 
adjudication process, it is not possible to understand how this aspect of legal proceedings 
or the role of victim-witnesses within them works in practice through a purely textual 
analysis. For this reason, it was necessary to undertake direct observation of trials for 
exploration of the role and positioning of victim-witnesses within the adjudicatory 
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processes of the ICTY. This utilisation of courtroom observation as a research method, as 
will be set out below, enables first-hand analysis of trial proceedings in relation to the 
role and experiences of victim-witnesses themselves. 
Despite the beneficial attributes of case-study research for this analysis of the ICTY, it is 
important to note the main critiques of this approach. The most significant and often-cited 
critique of case-study research is that its focus upon a specific 'case' does not easily 
allow for generalisations to be made from the data and information found through the 
research process (see Stake, 2000). However, there are two key reasons for undertaking a 
case-study approach for this research and more generally as a social research technique. 
Firstly, this approach provides the most appropriate research technique for 'understanding 
the case itself' (Stake, 2000: 439). In its specific focus upon a 'case' through a multiple 
method approach, case-study research enables an exploration of the specificity of its 
existence and functioning. Such focused exploration is particularly useful and important 
for 'unique' cases such as the ICTY that do not have any equivalent in their existence or 
functioning. As has been noted previously, the ICTY was the first international tribunal to 
enforce violations of humanitarian law and has substantive differences from the 
Nuremberg trials, ICTR or ICC, despite their similarities in certain aspects of their 
functioning. For this reason, case-study research enables an in-depth and systematic 
exploration of the ICTY and the specificity of its rules and practices that analysis of any 
other institution would not facilitate. 
Secondly, as a number of commentators point out, a case-study methodological approach 
can afford a degree of generalizability in its findings. For example, Berg argues that case 
studies can 'generally provide understanding about similar individuals, groups, and 
events' (1998: 218).92 While it is important to be attentive to the particularities of a 
specific case, this proposition indicates that it reasonable to argue that exploration of the 
92 Emphasis added. 
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ICTY's legal recognition of civilians may inform analysis of similar institutions such as 
the ICC. For this reason, although this case-study of the ICTY explores the rules and 
practices and the specificity of their enactment and re-enactment at this institution, it also 
recognises that there are similarities with other institutions, for example, through the 
enforcement of the customary rules of IHL, the notion of prosecutorial discretion and, in 
large-part, the largely adversarial system of trial adjudication. It is therefore reasonable to 
consider that analysis of the ICTY's legal practices, both in terms of its 'successes' and 
deficiencies, can inform debate and perhaps practical recommendations for developing 
the legal practices of these and other enforcement mechanisms. In this way, as the 
conclusion of this thesis will set out in more detail, exploration of the ICTY may provide 
an understanding of better and more comprehensive practices and procedures for 
recognising, protecting and redressing the civilian victims of conflicts yet to come. 
Fieldwork and the Use of Social Research Methods 
This research takes the Tribunal as the object of analysis in accordance with the case-
study approach set out above and utilises a range of qualitative research methods for its 
examination. In accordance with Bourdieu's framing of the functioning of the juridical 
field, this research employs documentary analysis of the ICTY's legal texts such as its 
Statute, trial transcripts and judgements. For in-depth examination of its legal practices, it 
employs courtroom observation of trials, as well as in-depth interviews with staff 
members of the ICTY. To understand these practices, the thesis also employs quantitative 
research for an analysis of the criminal prosecutions brought by the OTP (see chapter 
four). In order to explore the criminal prosecutions of crimes that involve acts of civilian 
victimisation, this section of the research analyses the charges of crimes against humanity 
brought in the final indictments against accused in completed cases. It 'counts' the 
number of charges brought for each act within the category of crimes against humanity 
and through that process identifies notable patterns or trends within the criminal 
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prosecutions. In accordance with the overall focus of the thesis, this quantitative analysis 
of criminal prosecutions is employed to explore whether any particular categories of 
civilian victims are more likely to find legal recognition of their status as such and their 
sustaining of harm during the conflict. 
Documentary Analysis 
This research draws on documentary analysis of the Tribunal's key texts as a central 
method for examination of its legal rules and practices. As with most public institutions, 
the Tribunal produces a vast number of documents that detail its role and practices.93 
These include the two key 'legal texts' that determine and structure the Tribunal's rules 
and practices, that is, the Statute that sets out the terms of its jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in the former Yugoslavia and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence that 
establish the principles of the enactment of its legal practices (see Oosthuizen, 2001). 
Moreover, the Tribunal produces and publicises important aspects of its work through its 
official website. For example, the Tribunal's Annual Reports detail the judicial activity of 
the previous year, while the indictments, trial transcripts and judgements set out the 
decisions taken at differential stages of the prosecutorial process for each of the indicted 
accused. 94 
These documents act as a form of representation through their account of the Tribunal's 
role and structures of its functioning. As Atkinson and Coffey point out, documents are a 
key resource for an organisation's representation of itself and for enabling the external 
and public consumption of its practices and processes (2004: 45-46). For the purposes of 
this research, the Tribunal's public documents are used for two key reasons. Firstly, 
93 See Macdonald and Tipton (1993) for discussion of the various types of documents that are available to 
social researchers, from 'public' records (such as those accessible on the ICTY website), to private 
documents such as papers and diaries. 
94 http://www.un.org/ictv. 
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documents are used as a resource for their description of substantive aspects of the 
Tribunal's functioning, namely its jurisdiction, prosecutions, judgements, trial 
proceedings and procedural and evidential rules. For example, it is important to identify 
the categories of crimes that the ICTY has jurisdiction over in order to analyse the 
charges brought against individual accused for acts of civilian victimisation (as was 
necessary for the analysis carried out in all the chapters). It is also necessary to 
understand the rules that guide trial proceedings for exploration of their framing of the 
legal practices of the courtroom, such as confidentiality measures for victim-witnesses or 
the structuring of testimonies (see in particular, chapter five). 
Secondly, as will be evident in later chapters, documents are used as a research resource 
for analysis of the 'sequence' of the Tribunal's legal practices and activities. Atkinson 
and Coffey point out that documents are rarely 'free-standing' (2004: 57). Rather, there is 
often a dimension of 'intertextuality' between documents that can be seen in their 
reference to other documents (whether explicitly or implicitly), and / or the sequences or 
links between them (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004: 56_57).95 This recognition of the 
relationships between texts provided an important framework for analysis of a key 
argument of this thesis, that is, that there is not a fixed norm of the legal construction of 
persons as 'civilian' through the differential sites of the Tribunal. As noted previously, 
the Tribunal produces legal texts throughout the stages of judicial activity, from the initial 
indictment of an accused to the transcript of their trial and the judgement of their acts of 
civilian victimisation. Examination of these documents, and the narrative relationships 
between them, should therefore, show how civilians are 'recognised' and understood as 
victims of the crimes of war in the different stages of the legal process. It should help 
illuminate, along with first-hand observation of trial adjudications, whether this form of 
recognition is enacted as a consolidated norm or an unstable category of definition. As 
Bourdieu's framing of the juridical field and the principles of case-study research 
95 Emphasis original. 
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emphasise, it is important to examine rules and practices as they function in relation to 
each other, rather than as isolated aspects oflegal practice. 
In undertaking this aspect of the research, as well as the recognition, protection and 
redress of civilian victim-witnesses more generally, trial transcripts are a particularly 
useful and key source of information. Sarat points out that 'the essential narrative 
elements of the trial are recorded and encoded in the transcript' (1999: 355). This 
comprehensive document, unlike the final judgement, details all aspects of the trial 
process that are heard in public session, from the testimonies of the witnesses to the 
verdict and sentencing of the judges. It acts as form of 'memorialization' of the trial 
process, that is, of a 'history of the "truth" of what was said, what was decided' (Sarat, 
1999: 358). However, as Sarat argues, the trial transcript not only invites a reading of 
what was said by the various legal actors and witnesses, but also those aspects that are 
'denied, repressed, or excluded' (1999: 360). As chapter's five and six will illustrate, trial 
transcripts are an important source of information for this research for understanding the 
role and positioning of victim-witnesses at trial, as well as their views of the Yugoslavian 
conflict and interactions between civilians and combatants. They act as a key resource for 
identification of these aspects of civilian testimonies and their victimisation, but also as 
chapter six will describe in more detail, for understanding the 'denial' or exclusion of 
particular civilians as victims of the acts of victimisation under adjudication or their 
experiences ofthe pervasive violence of the conflict. 
For this reason, this research utilises narrative analysis to examine both trial transcripts 
and judgements rendered by the Tribunal. Narrative analysis is a useful sociological 
technique for exploration oflegal texts as it enables examination 'not only [into] how the 
law is found but how it is made' (Gewirtz, 1996: 3; see also Ewick and Sibley, 1995). 
This research method has 'the capacity to reveal truths about the social world that are 
flattened or silenced by an insistence on more traditional methods of social science and 
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legal scholarship' (Ewick and Sibley, 1995: 1999). For example, narrative analysis of the 
trial transcript can move beyond recognition of the legal charges of a case to illuminate 
the legal practices of adjudications such as the use of evidential procedures or the role of 
judges in guiding (or preventing) testimonies being heard. More significantly for the 
purposes of this research, it can frame examination and 'awareness of the particular 
human lives that are the subjects or objects of the law' (Gewirtz, 1996: 3). For example, 
the use of narrative analysis of trial transcripts alongside the judgement of the case, 
following the approach of intertextuality, can illustrate how and where the testimonies of 
civilian victim-witnesses figure in legal processes. This approach enables a focus upon 
the victims of the acts of victimisation under adjudication, as well as the legal practices 
that exclude such testimonies from being heard. 
However, while documentary analysis of the Tribunal's legal texts provides a significant 
account of its practices and procedures, this research technique cannot enable a 
comprehensive examination of their actual enactment and practice. As Atkinson and 
Coffey argue, we 'should not use documentary sources as surrogates for other kinds of 
data. We cannot, for instance, learn through records alone how an organization actually 
operates day-by-day' (2004: 47).96 For this reason, it is necessary to use a research 
method that provides first-hand examination of legal practices as part of the case-study 
approach to this study. This research uses courtroom observation of trials of civilian 
victimisation at the Tribunal for an in-depth examination of the legal practices of 
adjudication. 
Courtroom Observation 
In order to examine the legal practices of the ICTY, a key research method for this thesis 
is courtroom observation of trial proceedings. Courtroom observation, as Weis Bentzon et 
96 Emphasis added. 
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al argue, allows for 'a more effective interrogation of the legal system' than employing a 
singular methodological approach such as documentary analysis of judicial decisions 
(1998: 143; see also Mack and Roach Anleu, 2007: 346). For this reason, courtroom 
observation at the ICTY was undertaken as part of the case-study approach of this thesis 
to facilitate a broad collection of data and information relating to this specific legal 
system. In particular, courtroom observation was used as a research method to move 
beyond a restrictive analysis of the Tribunal's official 'texts', such as its Statute or 
judgements, to a more expansive exploration of its legal practices, in particular of trial 
proceedings and the role and participation of the differential subjects present in the Trial 
Chambers during this process. 
Courtroom observation has not, however, been utilised extensively as a research method 
by either sociologists or legal researchers. 97 As Baldwin points out, few researchers have 
spent much time in courts [either national or international] engaged in the observation of 
legal hearings (2000: 244). However, it is important to note those studies of legal trials 
which have undertaken courtroom observation as part of their methodological approach. 
For example, there are influential analyses of rape and sexual violence cases within 
national jurisdictions that examine the structure of the adjudicatory process, both in terms 
of the 'legal' actors within it, and the positioning of the victim-witness in relation to these 
actors and their standing in the trial process (see for example, Lees, 1996; Taslitz, 
1999).98 However, these studies of national trials tend to focus upon the legal practices of 
an adversarial criminal system. As such they do not provide an adequate framework for 
examination of the specific rules and practices of the 'increasingly hybrid system of 
procedure' at the ICTY or the role and positioning of the legal actors and victim-
witnesses within it (Schabas, 2006: 410). For example, these studies cannot frame an 
97 It is notable, for example, that Starr and Goodale's edited collection on ethnography and law does not 
include any discussion of researching trials through courtroom observation (2002). 
98 It should be noted that the courtroom observation used in these studies was fairly minimal. Instead, these 
researchers used transcripts or surveys as their data resource more extensively. 
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analysis, or capture certain aspects of the functioning of the ICTY that do not figure as 
part of national, adversarial systems, such as the existence and work of the VWS for 
protecting victim-witnesses or the particularities of the RPE that shape the evidential 
procedure for the inclusion and examination of victims of sexual violence (see Rule 96). 
In terms of international courts, and the ICTY more specifically, Hagan and Levi's study 
of the juridical field of this institution appears to be the only notable use of courtroom 
observation for analysis of its legal practices and processes (2005; see also Hagan et ai, 
2006). As set out previously, employing Bourdieu's conception of the juridical field, 
Hagan and Levi utilise this research method to explore the constitution of the 'force of 
law' through the competitive 'struggles' between its legal actors (most often the 
Prosecutors, Defence and the judges) (2005: 1504). In so doing, they focus upon the cases 
of The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (,Kunarac 
et ai)99 and The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic ('Krstic/oo to analyse the struggles over 
the interpretation of the rules of IHL, such as the legal elements of sexual violence 
charges, and the utilisation of certain legal practices, such as the timing of the 
introduction of evidence (Hagan and Levi, 2005: 1520-1521). However, while Hagan and 
Levi state the periods of time spent in the courtroom, there is little detail as to how they 
used this research method as a data collection technique. For example, it is unclear to 
what extent their theoretical and empirical insights arise from courtroom observations, or 
whether the predominant source of their data came from the numerous in-depth 
interviews they conducted. 
It is also notable that other studies of the ICTY's practices do not utilise this research 
method. For example, Dembour and Haslam (2004) explore the role of victim-witnesses 
in the Krstic case, which involves charges of genocide in relation to the crimes committed 
99 Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1. 
100 Case No. IT-98-33. 
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in Srebrenica. However, they do so through an analysis of trial transcripts, rather than 
first-hand observation of the trial proceedings. While the length of the trial (fifteen 
months) acts as a significant practical limitation for observing the entirety of its 
adjudication, a more direct perspective of its legal practices would provide a more 
nuanced account of the positioning of victim-witnesses within this landmark trial. 101 
Similarly, Mertus (2004) uses the case of Kunarac et af as a case-study to explore 
whether survivors of rape in armed conflict are afforded any agency in the trial process to 
enable their experience of violence to be heard and documented by a court of law. 
However, it is unclear whether Mertus undertook any periods of courtroom observation 
during this case, or whether transcript analysis was the primary or sole source of data. 
In order to address the absence of detailed research of the ICTY practices, in particular 
for its victims and witnesses, courtroom observation was undertaken for this research for 
two key reasons. These concern the structure of the trial itself and the positioning of the 
subjects within it. Firstly, as Blanck argues, '[e]ach courtroom has a different culture', a 
different system of procedures and processes or style of trial adjudication (1987: 347). It 
is therefore necessary to understand the distinct attributes of a particular legal institution 
in order to begin an examination into its trial practices and procedures. Exploration of the 
ICTY's adjudicatory practices is particularly necessary, for while this institution adopts a 
'largely adversarial approach to its procedures', there are also elements of the civil or 
inquisitorial approach (Cassese, 1994: 71-74; see also Orie, 2002). For example, as 
Cassese points out, there are divergences from the typical adversarial system such as 
there being 'no technical rules for the admissibility of evidence', the Tribunal being able 
to 'order the production of additional or new evidence' alongside that brought by the 
Prosecution or Defence and the rule that there is to be no granting of immunity or plea-
bargaining (1994: 72-74). Moreover, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence were 
101 The Krstic case was the first successful conviction of a charge of genocide at the ICTY (Jorda, 2002: 97). 
This conviction was later upheld on appeal and the accused sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment for 
this and the other crimes with which he was convicted (Schabas, 2006: 163). 
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'purpose-made' in relation to the pervasive civilian victimisation of the Yugoslavian 
conflict and so, for example, incorporate a range of rules that address the need for witness 
protection and security at trial (Cassese, 1994: 75; Lobwein, 2006). These legal practices, 
as well as others discussed further in chapter five, shape the procedures of trial 
adjudication in its particularity at the ICTY. For this reason, courtroom observation was 
undertaken to provide first-hand knowledge and data of this institution's criminal 
proceedings. This strategy adopts, in Hagan and Levi's framing, an 'inside-out' 
methodological approach to researching this institution (2005: 1506). It prioritises 
examination and analysis of legal processes by observing their 'enactment and practice' 
inside the courtroom, rather than through documentary sources or secondary 
commentaries (Hagan and Levi, 2005: 1502). 
Secondly, courtroom observation was undertaken to observe the role and participation of 
civilian victim-witnesses during trial proceedings, following the victim-orientated 'view 
from below' approach that will be set out below. It is during trial adjudication and no 
other aspect of the legal proceedings that the victim-witness has a 'substantial role' in the 
retributive processes of the ICTY (Tolbert and Swinnen, 2006: 194). For this reason, 
courtroom observation was utilised as a research method for analysis of the role and 
participation of victim-witnesses for four reasons. Firstly, it enables identification of the 
physical environment of the courtroom. For example, it allows for an understanding of 
where civilian victim-witnesses are placed within the courtroom when they testify, such 
as their proximity to the accused or the judges (see Stover, 2005: 82-84). Secondly, this 
research method allows for examination of the process of adjudication, of the practice of 
testifying for victim-witnesses, such as their giving of evidence and the subsequent cross-
examination by the Prosecution and Defence (and the Chambers if they so require). 
Thirdly, as Weis Bentzon et at point out, courtroom observation provides a means to 
observe the 'behaviour of the officials [which] gives insights into how responsive the 
courts are to the needs of individuals' (1998: 143). It enables exploration into the legal 
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practices of the ICTY's trial processes to analyse their compliance or adherence to the 
principles set out in the UN's guidelines for victims and their determination of the 
centrality of criminal trials for the provision of truth and redress for civilian victims. 
Fourthly, courtroom observation allows for the documentation of particular narratives of 
civilian victimisation that arise during testimonies, but do not appear in the official 
judgement of the case. For example, as will be set out in chapter six, a significant insight 
into the social relations of the civilians and soldiers of Sarajevo was gained from first-
hand observation of the trial adjudication of the D. Milosevic case, information that is not 
readily apparent in the judgement of the charges against him. 
The Observation of Trial Adjudications 
In order to examine the legal practices of trial proceedings, and in particular the role and 
positioning of civilian victim-witnesses, courtroom observation was undertaken at the 
ICTY in The Hague, The Netherlands during May 2005, April 2006, June 2006, April 
2007, June 2007102 and February 2009.103 During these periods of fieldwork, courtroom 
observation was undertaken during public sessions of trial proceedings at different stages 
of the judicial process, including initial appearances of indicted accused,104 'status 
conferences' ,105 prosecution and defence stages of trial adjudication 106 and hearings 
where closing statements were being given.107 These cases involved the adjudication of 
alleged acts of civilian victimisation (as well as alleged crimes against combatants) 
102 Fieldwork during June 2007 was specifically focused upon the role of civilian victim-witnesses during the 
trial process and is the subject of analysis of chapter five. This period of fieldwork was funded by a Central 
Research Fund Grant awarded by the University of London in May 2007. 
103 Although a small period of time during fieldwork in February 2009 was spent undertaking courtroom 
observation at the Tribunal and an interview with a staff member of the Victims and Witnesses Section, this 
fieldwork was more specifically focused on courtroom observation during The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo. Case No. ICC-OI/04-01l06 ('Lubanga') at the International Criminal Court which is the first 
trial to be adjudicated by this institution. The fieldwork undertaken at Lubanga is referred to in the conclusion 
ofthis thesis. 
104 For example, The Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Djordjevic. Case No. IT -05-8711. 19 June 2007. 
105 For example, The Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin. Case No. IT-99-36. 28 June 2006. 
106 The majority of trial sessions that I attended were at this stage of proceedings. For example, The 
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic. Case No. IT -02-54.25 May 2005; The Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic. 
Case No. IT -98-29/1. 18-22 June 2007; The Prosecutor v. Momcilo Perisic. Case No. IT -04-8l. 2-5 February 
2009. 
107 For example, The Prosecutor v. Naser Oric. Case No. IT -03-68.4 April and 6 April 2006. 
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brought through the categories of crimes comprising of the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, 1949 and genocide. In particular, courtroom observation was 
undertaken during trial proceedings of The Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic during 
April and June 2007, a case charging the accused with the war crime of 'terror against a 
civilian population', as well as other crimes against civilians, for his actions (and those of 
his subordinates) during the siege of Sarajevo. Courtroom observation of the D. Milosevic 
case provides the basis of chapters five and six, both in terms of the data used but also the 
development oftheir research questions, which arose from the trial narratives themselves. 
As the ICTY is a public institution, gammg access to the public galleries of the 
courtrooms did not pose any significant difficulties. 108 Once issued with a visitor ticket 
(after supplying photographic identification) and two sets of security checks, I was able to 
attend trials in any of the three courtrooms if they were in public session. In this 
institutional setting, my role was as a 'complete observer' (Gray et ai, 2007; Ruane, 
2005). The public nature of legal trials meant that myself and any other persons in the 
public gallery, of which there were generally few, were entirely 'visible in the setting' 
(Gray et aI, 2007: 187).109 This visibility is a necessary aspect of the high security and in 
Hagan and Levi's terms, the 'secretive' nature of the Tribunal (2005: 1506), a situation 
somewhat confirmed by frequent questions from the security guards as to the reasons for 
my presence in the courtroom, the nature of my research and the content of my field-
notes. 110 In this way, my 'observer-role' contrasted with other sociological research 
methodologies such as 'participant observation' where the researcher becomes 'part of a 
group or organization [in order] to understand it' (May, 1997: 141). The closed, bounded 
social space of the courtroom, as Bourdieu and Hagan and Levi describe, means that 
108 See ICTY Statute, Article 21(2). 
109 It is interesting to note that I was often the sole person within the courtrooms. While there were several 
incidences where school groups were present at the Tribunal, there were generally few members of the public 
or press during trial hearings (other than at sessions involving initial appearances where there would be a few 
journalists present). 
110 Fieldwork, April 2005, May 2007, June 2007. 
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those external to the social practices of the law have no access to, or participation in, the 
trial itself. There is no possibility that any researcher focusing on legal processes can 
'engage fully in the activities of the group or organization under investigation' in the 
same manner as is possible for studies of some other aspects of social phenomenon or 
practices (May, 1997: 140). 
However, while the generally 'open' nature of the courtrooms was conducive to this 
methodological approach, it is also important to note that courtroom observation itself 
provides 'only the public face of justice' (Baldwin, 2000: 245). For example, I was only 
able to attend 'public' sessions of trial proceedings. There were many instances where a 
trial hearing was in 'closed' session, most often due to privacy measures having been put 
in place for the witnesses that were testifying. Frequently, trial proceedings shifted 
between being in 'public' and 'closed' session, which on occasion made it difficult to 
follow proceedings, identify who a new witness was, whether they were testifying for the 
Prosecution or Defence, or even grasp the nature or context of their testimony. During the 
closed sessions, there is no admittance to the public gallery (or the sound is muted and the 
witness is shielded from view), the corresponding tele-visual transmission of the 
proceedings in the foyer of the Tribunal is switched off and testimonies given are 
redacted from the trial transcripts that are posted online. Similarly to national 
proceedings, therefore, there were many instances of testimonies, decisions and cross-
examinations during trial adjudications that I was not able to observe, or follow-up 
through analysis oftrial transcripts (see Baldwin, 2000). 
Despite these difficulties, courtroom observation provides the only first-hand means to 
analyse trial adjudications as they function in practice. More specifically, this research 
method enables examination of the enactment of certain legal practices (such as the 
admission of particular forms of evidence) that cannot be understood through a purely 
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textual reading of judgements or trial transcripts. I I I In undertaking this form of research, I 
followed the usual sociological research practice of first familiarizing myself with the 
social setting of the research and the people within it, and then focusing my research and 
observations in line with my specific theoretical and conceptual interests (see May, 1997: 
144). For this reason, I conducted a preliminary field-work trip to the Tribunal (in May 
2005) to acquaint myself with the structure of the trial process and the functioning of this 
institution more generally. During this period of courtroom observation I focused upon 
the layout of the courtroom, the process of trial adjudication (such as the structure of 
examination and cross-examination by the Prosecution and Defence) and the participation 
of the judges, both in terms of their influence over the testimony process and their 
interactions with other actors in the courtroom such as the interpreters, court officials and 
the parties themselves. 112 As the trials I attended were all necessarily public sessions, I 
took extensive field-notes during the sessions themselves. The taking of field-notes 
during the trial sessions did not pose any difficulties; other members of the public and 
journalists were often doing likewise. In this way, as Hammersley and Atkinson describe, 
taking field-notes was 'broadly congruent with the social setting under scrutiny' (1995: 
177). In instances of incomplete notes, or of particularly noticeable testimonies or 
behaviours that I could not record adequately at the time, I followed the usual technique 
of writing-up observations in as much detail and as promptly as possible after their 
observation, which was most often during session breaks of the trial proceedings (see 
Fielding, 1993: 161-162).113 
III For example, evidence in the form of photographs, maps or videos cannot be 'seen' through analysis of 
judgements or transcripts. These forms of evidence were frequently admitted into evidence during the periods 
of courtroom observation I undertook of D. Milosevic (Fieldwork, April and June 2007). 
112 It is important to note that due to the number of different languages being spoken by the various legal 
counsel and the witnesses, and the resulting interpretation of the testimonies, there is often difficulty in 
recognising who is speaking and to whom that person is addressing their comments or questions. It was often 
the case that this difficulty held for both the public observer and the legal counsel themselves, who repeatedly 
asked for clarification of certain information or details of testimony (Fieldwork). 
113 Recording devices are not permitted in the Tribunal. 
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Subsequent fieldwork trips to the Tribunal were more precisely focused upon the role and 
positioning of civilian victim-witnesses within the trial process and the narratives arising 
within the content of their testimonies. For this reason, I attended trials that were centred 
upon or included charges of civilian victimisation through the various categories of 
crimes that comprise the subject-matter jurisdiction of this institution (in particular, D. 
Milosevic). During this phase of courtroom observation, my specific focus upon the role 
and participation of civilian victim-witnesses led to a consequent focus upon taking notes 
in relation to legal practices either orientated toward these witnesses (such as the 
provision of protective measures) or those that implicated them (such as the form of 
cross-examination or, as will be discussed further in chapter five, the structuring of 
testimony to prove (or disprove) their very identity as civilian victim-witnesses). For this 
reason, I paid particular attention to detailing the role and positioning of civilian victim-
witnesses in the trial process. As argued earlier, this is the only aspect of legal 
proceedings where civilian victims are 'present' in the legal process. As chapter five will 
set out in more detail, analysis ofthe inclusion of civilian victim-witnesses was important 
for this research, both due to the general focus of this thesis upon civilian victims, but 
also as the role and participation of victim-witnesses at the Tribunal and its procedural 
rules in relation to these witnesses has been the subject of significant debate and 
contention (see Kirk McDonald, 2000). 
Interviews 
As part of the fieldwork undertaken at the Tribunal, I participated in interviews with staff 
holding a range of different roles within the functioning of this institution. 114 Interviews 
were held with eleven members of staff, consisting of eight members of the Office of the 
Prosecutor (,OTP'), a member of staff of the Victims and Witnesses Section ('VWS'), a 
114 I participated in these interviews while a research assistant to the "Codification of Trauma" project, with 
Dr Kirsten Campbell and Dr Sari WastelJ as principle investigators (2006). 
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member of staff of the Outreach Programme and a member of staff of the Military 
Analysis Team. The member of staff of the Outreach Programme was interviewed twice 
and I also spoke with her on an informal basis at a conference held in London in June 
2007. Several of the interviews were the result of recommendations by other 
interviewees, following the 'snowball' technique of selecting persons to interview (see 
Arber, 1993: 73-74). These interviews were all carried out as part of fieldwork trips to the 
Tribunal in April and June 2006. In February 2009, I also carried out a follow-up 
interview with a member of staff of the Victims and Witnesses Section which was 
focused upon the role of the VWS and victim-witness testimonies during the 'higher-
level' cases that are now being heard at the Tribunal (as will be discussed in chapter's 
four and five). These interviews all took place in The Hague, most often at the Tribunal 
itself, although a few were carried out in locations in close proximity to it. I am in 
continuing correspondence with several staff members of the Tribunal, in particular with 
VWS staff. 
Following the case-study methodology set out earlier, these interviews were used as a 
further research method for gaining information and a broader knowledge of the Tribunal, 
its various sub-units and legal practices. In this way, the interviews were used as a 
'resource', as a method of gaining information and an 'account of [a] social situation' 
(Seale, 1998: 204, 209). The interviews all followed a semi-structured format. Semi-
structured interviews generally follow a format where 'part of the interview is structured 
with a set of questions asked sequentially while other parts are unstructured and are 
designed to explore the views of the interviewee in detail' (Bloch, 2004: 165). As such, 
semi-structured interviews enable 'the interviewer to have more latitude to probe beyond 
the answers and thus enter into a dialogue with the interviewee' (May, 1997: 111). In this 
way, this style of interview can be seen as more 'open' than a structured interview where 
the adherence to a strict list of questions cannot follow-up on useful or interesting 
information that the interviewee may raise or address in their answers (see Fielding, 
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1993). Rather, semi-structured interviews allow greater flexibility for the interviewees to 
draw attention to particular topics of interest, including topics that the researcher may not 
even have prior knowledge of. 
This interview format was employed to gain 'general' information about the Tribunal and 
confirm data found through previous documentary analysis. It was also employed as a 
data collection strategy for access to information on aspects of legal practices specific to 
the staff member and their role within one of the Tribunal's sub-units. Therefore, prior to 
the interview, a set of questions was drawn up to guide the interview and the topics 
covered during it. A set of questions was drawn up that was specific to each 'category' of 
interviewees dependent on their role within the institution. However, this interview guide 
was not followed rigidly and as the semi-structured approach allows, questions were 
asked to facilitate both clarification and elaboration on the answers given (see May, 1997: 
111). In this way, the interviews were 'tailored to the unique experiences and 
perspectives of each individual' (Gray et ai, 2007: 161). As well as enabling the 'probing' 
of particularly useful or interesting information, the interviewee was relatively free to 
speak of any particular aspects of their role or ofthe Tribunal's role more broadly as they 
wished (see May, 1997). Similarly to the approach taken for courtroom observation, notes 
were taken during the interview, or as soon as possible after their completion. 
In terms of the 'type' of data sought, this was relatively specific to the role of each staff 
member. Interviews with the members of staff of the Outreach Programme, Victims and 
Witnesses Section and Military Analysis Team were carried out to facilitate a fairly 
preliminary understanding of the role of these sub-units, as little information was 
available regarding their existence or functioning at that time. I 15 In particular, the 
interviews related to the VWS and Outreach Programme were focused upon gaining 
115 Prior to December 2008 when the ICTY's website was significantly updated and a great deal of 
information was posted online, there was little information on these sub-units. Further information on the 
VWS can be found in academic texts (see Lobwein, 2006). 
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knowledge of the role of these units in relation to the broader functions of the Tribunal 
and their relationship to other units within this institution. More specifically, these 
interviews focused upon the policies and practices of these units, both in terms of their 
general functioning and the strengths and difficulties that have arisen in providing 
protection, information and redress to the victims and witnesses that come before the 
Trial Chambers. As will be discussed further in chapter five, one particular issue of 
exploration was the more 'victim-friendly' policies and practices of the ICC and whether 
the adoption of these practices had had an impact upon those of the Tribunal. IJ6 
In terms of the Office of the Prosecutor, there has always been a greater degree of 
information available on the Tribunal's website. For example, there is detailed 
information on the indicted accused, the charges brought against them and if brought to 
trial the finding of their guilt or acquittal by a Trial Chamber. For this reason, the 
interviews held with the OTP were more precisely focused upon five areas of legal 
practices. These were the prosecutorial choices over the bringing of charges against 
different 'types' of accused and for different criminal conduct; the role of the Tribunal as 
a mechanism of transitional justice; the selection and protection of witnesses at trial; the 
effect of the completion strategy and their perception of any 'gaps' in legal practices that 
had become evident during the conduct of their work. These topics are all consistent with 
the themes and subjects of analysis of the following chapters. Information from these 
interviews is used throughout this thesis to frame and analyse the legal practices of the 
Tribunal. 
116 A number of documents supplied by the VWS in relation to the structure of this unit and the 'types' of 
witnesses that have testified at the Tribunal are used extensively as a data source in chapter five. 
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A 'View from Below' 
As indicated previously, this case-study of the ICTY and the fieldwork undertaken for 
this research employs a 'view from below' or 'from the ground up' approach. Weinstein 
and Stover's edited collection 'My Neighbor My Enemy' (2004) provides the framework 
for this conceptual and methodological approach. Reflecting the central tenets of feminist 
standpoint theory which describe that the views of oppressed groups provide a 
'privileged' perspective and vantage point of experiences and knowledges (see Harding, 
2004; Tanesini, 1999), Weinstein and Stover's influential text analysing war crimes trials 
and notions of justice does not being with an analysis of legal rules or policies. Nor does 
it adhere to the proposition that criminal trials (or the practices of TRCs) will be healing 
or therapeutic, or that they will recognise all victims of conflict. Rather, the various 
authors all attempt to 'unhinge' discussions of justice or legal redress 'from high-blown 
assumptions and assertions, and ... ground it in the everyday life of those who should be 
most affected by it' (Weinstein and Stover, 2004: 5). In this way, the authors examine 
various forms of redress through 'the eyes of those most affected by collective violence', 
in particular from victims of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan conflicts, to critically 
examine their adequacy and efficacy in light of their experiences of the forms and 
structures of victimisation (Weinstein and Stover, 2004: 4). Similarly to the standpoint 
theory approach, the 'view from below' approach makes visible the experiences and 
opinions of victims as an 'oppressed group', but more importantly, also prioritises their 
experiences as forms of knowledge on the violences and victimisation of armed conflict. 
Following this methodological model, this research adopts a 'view from below' or 
'bottom-up' approach to analyse the civilian victimisation of conflict and the construction 
of legal recognition and redress of its perpetration by the ICTY. In so doing, the 
following chapters all examine the Tribunal's legal practices for their recognition of 
civilian victims and the possibility for their construction of forms of redress, rather than 
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employing a purely doctrinal analysis of rules or jurisprudence for the prosecution of 
perpetrators. For example, I utilise civilian victim-witness testimonies to understand the 
civilian victimisation of the siege of Sarajevo and so prioritise their experiences to 
analyse the Tribunal's recognition of the victims of this context of violence (see chapter 
six). This methodological approach seeks to represent 'the non-dominant alternative 
views and experiences ofthe social world' (Armakolas, 2001: 176). It attempts to address 
the traditional under-reporting of civilian violence, as well as the lack of academic study 
of this particular group of persons in armed conflict (Gardam, 1993a; Kinsella, 2006). It 
also aligns to the earlier descriptions of researching civilian victimisation during conflict 
from a 'bottom-up' approach set out in chapter one, and as is advocated by Kiza (2006) 
and Nikolic-Ristanovic (2000a). 
Ethical Considerations 
It is important to note two areas of this research where ethical issues or issues of 
confidentiality have arisen and the way in which I dealt with them. The first issue is the 
sensitive and often highly personal nature of testimonies given by victim-witnesses 
during trial proceedings. Due to the nature of the acts of civilian victimisation that are 
under adjudication at the Tribunal and the focus of this thesis, there were many occasions 
during the courtroom observation that I undertook where victims of such crimes were 
testifying. It was therefore important to recognise that these victim-witnesses may have 
been, and often were visibly, in an emotionally vulnerable state. I17 However, although the 
trial sessions were necessarily 'public', I did not personally interview any victim-
witnesses or have any first-hand or direct contact with them. Where issues of protection 
or support for victim-witnesses are an issue during trial proceedings, the VWS deals 
directly with the witnesses, although this situation did not occur during any of the trial 
proceedings that I attended. In instances of issues of confidentiality for witnesses during 
117 See Lee and Renzetti (1993) for discussion of researching sensitive topics. 
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trial proceedings, the Trial Chamber ordered the session to become a 'closed' session and 
as such, I did not remain in the public gallery. It was also notable that during trial 
sessions that I attended, where a witness requested a break in the proceedings or for their 
testimony to be heard in closed session, their request was always granted by the presiding 
judge of the Trial Chamber. For these reasons, I did not face any serious ethical issues 
over the recording of testimonies of a sensitive nature, as they were all held in public 
session and as such, are available to the public through the transcripts on the Tribunal's 
website. 
The second issue concerns the confidentiality of those members of staff whose interviews 
I either undertook or participated in during fieldwork trips in 2006 and 2009. While it was 
notable that only one member of staff requested their anonymity to be upheld, I have not 
identified any of the staff members by name in this thesis and only referred to the position 
that they held within the Tribunal. This anonymity was given due to the often personal 
opinions and views given by the interviewees in regard to the general functioning of the 
Tribunal or the difficulties of prosecuting the perpetrators and protecting the victims that 
come before its Trial Chambers. The interviews were not recorded by a digital recording 
device and my interview notes are kept in a secure place in accordance with the British 
Sociological Association guidelines. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the methodological approach to this analysis of the ICTY and the 
research methods that are used in this thesis. As argued above, Bourdieu's conception of 
the 'juridical field' provides a useful framework for defining the practices of the ICTY, 
both as an enforcement mechanism of the protective rules of IHL and a forum for the 
recognition and redress of civilian victims. This notion of the juridical field sets out the 
necessity to approach analysis of the practices of the juridical field and their 'force' in the 
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legal domain through both its legal texts and practices. For this reason, as the following 
chapters will establish, I will examine the protective rules that come under the jurisdiction 
of the ICTY for their construction of the legal recognition and protection of civilian 
victims, as well as undertaking first-hand observation of its legal practices in terms of its 
trial adjudications. This inter-disciplinary, mixed-method approach is used to facilitate an 
in-depth and critical examination of the ICTY as it works to prosecute the perpetrators 
and redress the civilian victims of the Yugoslavian conflict though the complex 
functioning of its rules, practices and institutional elements. 
The next chapter of this thesis draws on the theoretical, conceptual and methodological 
frameworks set out in this and the preceding chapter to trace the increasing legal 
recognition and protection of civilian victims by the institutions and rules of international 
criminal justice. It first examines the changing framework and subjects of international 
law for the protection of civilian victims of conflict. It then traces the development of the 
protective rules of humanitarian law and finally, examines the Tadic case for its 
construction of legal recognition of different categories of civilian victims. 
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Chapter Three 
Laws of Protection? The Changing Subjects, Regulations and Protections of 
Humanitarian Law 
One of the fundamental challenges facing the international community today is how to give the 
world a human face. More than a mere vision, this must be a moral and legal imperative.ll~ 
Figure zII9 
In February 1995, Dusko Tadic a cafe owner from Kozarac, Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
indicted for his participation 'in the attack on, seizure, murder and maltreatment of 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats in opstina Prijedor' .120 For his perpetration of these crimes 
against civilians during the Yugoslavian conflict, Tadic came before the Tribunal charged 
with thirty-four counts of violations of the laws or customs of war, grave breaches of the 
118 The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski. Case No. IT -95-1411 -T. Judgement, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Rodrigues, Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber, Decision of25 June 1999, para. 50. 
119 Photograph taken at the ICTY, April 2006. 
120 The Prosecutor v. Du§ko Tadic. Case No. IT-94-1-I. Second Amended Indictment, 14 December 1995, 
para. 1 ('Tadic, Second Amended Indictment'). 
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Geneva Conventions, 1949 and crimes against humanity. I2l During the adjudication of 
Tadi6's crimes, the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal argued that international law, whilst 
'safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually tum to the protection of 
human beings'. 122 In this innovative decision, the Appeals Chamber cited the necessity to 
enforce the protection of all civilians caught up in armed violence, asserting that a 'State-
sovereignty-orientated approach has gradually been supplanted by a human-being-
orientated approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law hominum causa omne jus 
constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a firm 
foothold in the international community' .123 How, then, does the Tribunal construct and 
enforce the parameters of civilian protection in light of this 'human-being-orientated 
approach'? On what grounds does the Tribunal legally recognise and represent this 
necessity for all civilians to hold 'protected person' status amid a situation of armed 
conflict? 
This chapter uses The Prosecutor v. Du§ko Tadic (Tadic ') as a case-study to explore the 
Tribunal's construction of legal recognition of civilian victims. It examines the 
construction of these models of legal recognition through the Tribunal's application and 
interpretation of the protective rules of humanitarian law (subsequent chapters will focus 
on legal practices). As noted in chapter one, a central premise of humanitarian law is the 
principle of distinction, determining that all parties to a conflict must distinguish between 
combatants and civilians. Civilians are all persons in a situation of armed conflict who are 
not combatants (SassOli and Bouvier, 2006). All civilians come under the protections of 
humanitarian law during a situation of conflict. However, this chapter argues that 
contrary to the seemingly precise definitional dichotomy of civilians and combatants, the 
121 Tadic, Second Amended Indictment. 
122 The Prosecutor v. Du§ko Tadic. Case No. IT-94-1. Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 97 (,Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction'). 
12 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 97. Although a 'human-being-orientated approach' does 
not constitute a matter oflegal doctrine, this framing of humanitarian law has been used by a number of 
commentators to illuminate the shift from a state-centric body oflaw to that which encompasses and 
prioritises the protection of individuals (see for example, Douzinas, 2000; Meron, 2000a). 
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Tadic case illustrates that when acts of victimisation become the subject of criminal 
enforcement and sanction, the construction of legal recognition of civilian victims is 
based upon legally and historically shifting categories that found this particular status of 
the participants of armed conflict. The complex legal proceedings of this case show that 
during the legal enforcement of acts of victimisation, the legal recognition of civilian 
victims as 'protected persons' through certain categories of crimes remains dependent 
upon ties of group membership, of nation and more recently, of ethnicity. As Tadic 
shows, the construction of the protective laws regulating the conduct of armed conflict 
and, more particularly, their enforcement by legal mechanisms fails to recognise or 
implement a conceptualisation of the 'civilian' as such, that is, as a member of a distinct 
category of civilian persons irrespective or distinct from 'legal bonds' of relations of 
group membership. 
This chapter comprises three sections. The first section of this chapter explores Tadic for 
its representation of the changing configuration of the subjects of international law. It 
examines the gradual erosion ofthe state as the sole subject holding 'the sovereign power 
to prosecute perpetrators of crimes committed within their respective territories' and the 
new and growing recognition of individuals as subjects of humanitarian law 
(Kittichaisaree, 2001: 10). The second section traces the historical development of the 
rules of humanitarian law in light of the changing character of armed conflict for the 
progression of the legal frameworks in place for the protection of civilians. It examines 
the development of these protective rules for their legal recognition of the category of 
civilians as participants of armed conflict. Finally, this chapter returns to the Tadic case 
and explores the Tribunal's construction of the legal recognition and protection of the 
civilian victims of the crimes under adjudication. In particular, this section examines 
Tadic for its interpretation of the protective rules of customary humanitarian law that 
constitute the legal recognition of particular civilian victims as 'protected persons' 
through the grave breaches provision. It explores the legal processes that determine 
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whether criminal sanctions can be brought against the accused for his violent actions 
against particular groups of civilian victims. This analysis shows how the Tribunal 
constructs two models of 'protected persons' through the grave breaches regime during 
the Tadii: case. These are, firstly, a model of 'nationally' protected persons and, then 
following its determination that legal bonds based on national allegiances does not 
necessarily reflect the complexities of contemporary conflicts, a second model of 
'ethnically' protected persons (see Bohlander, 2000). 
The Subjects ofInternational Humanitarian Law: From State to Human 
Tadii: was the first trial and judgement rendered by the Tribunal. 124 In this case, the 
Tribunal renders its 'first determination of individual guilt or innocence in connection 
with serious violations of international humanitarian law' for crimes committed against 
civilians in the Yugoslavian conflict. 125 Tadii: is a significant case for this exploration of 
the construction of legal recognition and protection of civilian victims for two reasons. 
Firstly, following the accused's challenge to the lawful establishment of the Tribunal and 
its jurisdiction, the Tadii: case provides an account of the legitimate terms of the 
Tribunal's own creation, role and practices (see Schabas, 2006: 23). In particular, the 
Trial Chamber describes the shifting role of IHL towards a more comprehensive 
framework for the protection of civilians and its authority to enforce such breaches. 
Secondly, Tadii: concerns the first adjudication of charges of 'Grave Breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949' ('grave breaches') by the Tribunal (Jones, 2000: 
70). In this case, the Tribunal provides the first definition and understanding of the legal 
construction and thus recognition of civilian victims of this category of crimes (Sassoli 
and Bouvier, 2006: 115). As will be discussed, while this definition is itself problematic, 
124 It should be noted that Tadic was the first case subject to the adjudication of the Tribunal. There was a 
prior judgement rendered by the Tribunal in the Erdemovic case. However, the accused in this case pleaded 
guilty to the charges and the Tribunal rendered a sentencing judgement rather than adjudicating his guilt or 
innocence through trial proceedings. 
125 The Prosecutor v. Du§ko Tadic. Case No. IT-94-I-T. Opinion and Judgement, 7 May 1997, para. 1 
(,Tadic, Judgement'). 
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this interpretation of the protective rules of IHL represents new and progressIve 
jurisprudence for the legal recognition and protection of civilian victims. Now understood 
as 'settled jurisprudence', 126 the Tribunal has followed the Tadii decision on the 
recognition of civilian victims in its subsequent decisions. 127 
The Tribunal's account of the changing role of humanitarian law for the protection of 
civilians and its definition of the civilian victims of the grave breaches category of crimes 
both rest upon an identification and exploration of the subjects of modem international 
humanitarian law. Traditionally, the primary and universal subjects of international law 
have been states (Akehurst, 1997: 91). States 'possess full legal capacity, that is, the 
ability to be vested with rights, powers, and obligations' (Cassese, 2005: 71). For 
example, states have the right to 'independence, equality, sovereign territorial 
jurisdiction, and self-protection' (Joyner, 2005: 50). They also have the obligation to 
'protect the rights of its people' (Joyner, 2005: 58). However, as Akehurst points out, 
'while states have remained the predominant actors in international law, the position has 
changed in the last century', with individuals increasingly acquiring a degree of 
international legal personality (1997: 91). For example, as will be further discussed, in a 
situation of conflict, combatants have an obligation to observe humanitarian law and can 
be held individually criminally responsible for breaches of these rules (Sassoli and 
Bouvier, 2006: 144). Whilst vague in its definitional terms, the principle of distinction 
determines that civilians have the 'right to be respected' during a situation of conflict and 
protected from certain aspects of its conduct (SassOli and Bouvier, 2006: 144-145). 
126 The Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin. Case No. IT -99-36-T. Judgement, 1 September 2004, para. 125 
('Brdjanin, Judgement'). 
127 See for example, The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez. Case No. IT -95-14/2-A. Appeals 
Judgement, 17 December 2004, para. 331; Brdjanin, Judgement, para. 125. In The Prosecutor v. Radoslav 
Brdjanin. Case No. IT-99-36-A. Appeals Judgement, 3 April 2007, the Appeals Chamber upheld a number of 
the convictions of grave breaches rendered against the accused (for example, of charges of torture as a grave 
breach (see para. 503)). 
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How, then, does the Tribunal recognise and understand the subjects of international 
humanitarian law? In order to explore the Tribunal's recognition of the subjects of 
humanitarian law and its account of the role of international criminal justice, this section 
analyses the arguments put forward in Tadic by the Prosecution, Defence and the 
Tribunal (predominantly following those of the Prosecution). In particular, this section 
examines the Defence's arguments that the Tribunal cannot prosecute the accused for his 
acts of civilian victimisation, a proposition that relies upon a traditional conception of 
states being the sole and privileged subjects for enforcing laws within their territory in a 
situation of armed conflict. It then explores the Tribunal's description of the necessity for 
humanitarian law to protect all persons from the violence of war, a framing of the role of 
law and the function of this enforcement mechanism that works to reject the arguments 
put forward by the Defence. From these differential framings of the role and functioning 
of the Tribunal, it is possible to understand and examine the shift from a state-centric 
notion of IHL to that of a body of law that regulates and enforces the protection of 
individual subjects, in particular of the civilian victims of armed conflict. 
The Submissions of the Prosecution 
The Prosecution described that after the hostilities broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
accused Tadic had randomly entered camps set up by the Bosnian Serbs 'to carry out 
assaults, murders, rapes and sexual assaults on the prisoners that he had selected'. 128 
Amongst other acts of violence, the indictment set forth by the Prosecution alleged that 
Tadic had personally committed and participated in the severe beatings of numerous 
prisoners in the Omarska camp, forced two prisoners to commit oral sexual acts and 
sexual mutilation on another prisoner causing his death, had beaten and abused prisoners 
and wilfully killed persons both within camps under the control of Serb forces and in the 
128 The Prosecutor v. Du§ko Tadic. Case No. IT-94-1. Transcript of Trial Proceedings. 7 May 1996, para. 34 
(,Tadic, Transcript'). 
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region of opstina Prijedor in Bosnia-Herzegovina.129 Moreover, it was alleged that Tadic 
had been 'willingly used by the advancing Serb forces as an important source of 
intelligence and as a person capable of identifying local Muslims, Croats and other 
persons disloyal to the Serb nationalist cause' .130 
For his perpetration of these particular crimes, the Prosecution charged Tadic with nine 
counts of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 1949. Comprising of Article 2 of 
the ICTY's Statute, the 'grave breaches' category of crimes is a subcategory of 'war 
crimes' (Cassese, 2003: 54). This category of crimes arises from a provision in each of 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, as well as the Additional Protocols of 1977 (as 
will be further discussed) and, broadly speaking, constitutes a set of violations such as 
wilful killing, torture, inhuman treatment and taking civilians as hostages (Cassese, 2003: 
55-56). However, it is important to note that charges can only be laid through the grave 
breaches provision for international, and not internal conflicts. Therefore, 'it is an 
element of any prosecution for grave breaches pursuant to article 2 of the ICTY Statute 
that there be an international armed conflict' (Schabas, 2006: 242).131 As such, the 
characterisation of the conflict as either international or internal in Tadic was central to 
determining whether the accused could be charged with crimes through the grave 
breaches provision. While it is important to note that Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, 1949 and, in certain circumstances Additional Protocol II applies to internal 
conflicts (as will be further discussed), this chapter focuses upon the charges of grave 
breaches brought by the Prosecution in Tadic as this case concerns the first adjudication 
of this category of crimes and thus, the first definition of civilians as 'protected persons' 
129 Tadic, Second Amended Indictment. 
130 Tadic, Transcript, para. 26. 
I3l It should be noted that there has been debate as to whether grave breaches could, or should, apply to 
internal conflicts. For example, Judge Abi-Saab has argued that 'a strong case can be made for the application 
of Article 2, even when the incriminated act takes place in an internal conflict' (The Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic. Case No. IT -94-1. Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995). 
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through this provision. Subsequent chapters explore the construction of legal recognition 
of civilian victims in relation to the other categories of crimes. 
The Submissions of the Defence 
The duty to regulate combatants and protect civilians in armed conflict traditionally 
rested, and to a large extent still rests with, the sovereign state (Caverzasio, 2001). As the 
principle subjects of international law, states held an encompassing range of sovereign 
privileges and responsibilities over the governance of its citizens and territory (Shaw, 
2003: 1). They held the exclusive power to 'determine [their] own direction and politics 
without undue interference from other powers' and so were 'independent in all matters of 
internal politics' (Held, 2002: 3). In this way, the sovereign of the state held the exclusive 
power to prosecute and punish an individual's transgression of national or international 
laws regulating their conduct toward other persons (or objects) in armed conflict (see 
Cassese, 2003: 37). It was for the state alone to instigate proceedings that would work to 
legally recognise the civilian victims of any unlawful conduct of its citizens. However, as 
Ratner and Abrams point out, this sovereign authority also meant that it was for the state 
to choose to enact impunity for such breaches, as often was the case during or after a 
situation of conflict (2001: 4-5). 
This traditional framing of the state subject and its sovereign power to authorise the 
regulation and enforcement of breaches of international law underpins Tadi6's 
submissions of defence against his adjudication by the Tribunal. The central tenet of 
Tadic's defence was founded upon a proposition that the Tribunal did not hold 
jurisdiction, that is, 'a legal power, hence necessarily a legitimate power, "to state the 
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law",.132 Prior to the adjudication of his crimes, Tadic attempted to negate the possibility 
of his acts of violence coming to trial by alleging: 
a) unlawful establishment of the International Tribunal; 
b) unjustified primacy of the International Tribunal over competent domestic courts; 
c) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 133 
Through these submissions of defence, as will be examined in more detail later, Tadic 
asserted that the Tribunal could not legitimately or lawfully adjudicate or judge his 
alleged perpetration of crimes against civilians (see Greenwood, 1996). He argued that 
the Tribunal could neither enforce violations of law committed within a national 
jurisdiction, nor establish international justice for the victims of their breach. 
For Carl Schmitt, it is the sovereign of a state that holds the authority to declare war and 
determine the appropriate conduct of these hostilities, as it is to 'the state as an essentially 
political entity belongs the jus belli . .. [that is] the technical means by which the battle 
will be waged' (1996: 45-6). Moreover, Schmitt argues that the 'extreme case' of warfare 
allows the comprehensive authority ofthe sovereign to determine this situation a 'state of 
exception' (1996: 35). From this pronouncement of a state of exception, Schmitt argues 
that the mark of the power of the sovereign permits his or her 'authority to suspend valid 
law' (1985: 9). In a situation of war, the 'state remains, whereas law recedes' (Schmitt, 
1985: 12). The power of the sovereign of a state lies with their authority to decide to 
apply, or choose not to apply, the regular rules and laws of peacetime to the conduct of a 
situation of armed conflict. It is for the sovereign of a state and no other entity to make 
such a decision. 
While TadiC's appeal does not consider that the Yugoslavian conflict allows the states 
concerned to suspend law, his first line of defence reflects Schmitt's claim that it is 
definitively the sovereign of a nation-state who holds 'the monopoly to decide' over the 
132 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 10. 
\33 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 8. 
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application, or non-application of law during such a state of exception (1985: 13). In 
Schmitt's view, it is the 'essence of the state's sovereignty' to make such a decision and 
for no other entity or subject (1985: 13). Mirroring this Schmittian conception of the ties 
of nation and law in a situation of armed conflict, Tadic argued that the Tribunal was not 
'duly established by law', as the 'action of the Security Council in establishing the 
International Tribunal and in adopting the Statute under which it functions is beyond 
power'. 134 The Security Council was, in the Defence's submissions, functioning 'beyond' 
sovereign power as the Tribunal 'should have been created either by treaty, the 
consensual act of nations, or by amendment of the Charter of the United Nations'. 135 As 
such, the Defence claimed that the creation of a legal enforcement mechanism should be 
'undertaken directly by States'. 136 For Tadic, the Security Council infringed upon the 
sovereignty of states to decide upon the establishment of legal enforcement mechanisms. 
In his view, the sovereign nation state alone and no higher authority should authorise, or 
choose not to authorise, the regulation of the conduct of hostilities in the former 
Yugoslavia and so the enforcement of breaches of civilian protection. 
Schmitt's contention that there exist fundamental ties between states, law and war also 
frames TadiC's second line of appeal - that the Tribunal's primacy over national courts is 
'inherently wrong,.137 Tadic contended that this primacy is 'inherently wrong' as the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction 'invade[s] an area essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
States' .138 This argument follows Schmitt's framing, as well as the traditional model of 
international law, in which states hold 'the sole and exclusive authority and autonomy 
over [their] territory' and the individual subjects within it (Kittichaisaree, 2001: 5; see 
134 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic. Case No. IT -94-1. Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, 10 
August 1995, para. 1 (,Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction'). A central and contentious 
aspect of the Tadic case was whether the United Nations Security Council was acting outside of its mandate 
set out in the United Nations Charter by creating a judicial institution, as such an action is not one of its 
enumerated powers in either Chapter VI or VII (see Alvarez, 1996). 
135 Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, para. 2. 
136 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 35. 
m Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, para. 2. 
138 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 55. 
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also Held, 2002). It draws upon the state-centric approach of international law (rather 
than the contemporary framework of humanitarian law, as will be set out), which founds 
the doctrine of 'non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other recognized states' (Held, 
2002: 3). The doctrine of non-intervention holds that only the state itself can regulate the 
conduct of its subjects or establish protections for its population. Following this model, 
the Defence contends that the Tribunal cannot 'interfere' in the domestic policies or 
practices of the states of the former Yugoslavia. It is for these states to regulate and 
protect its peoples and territory and for no other entity or 'higher' body oflaw. 
The Defence begins with the proposition that the state is the subject of international law 
and, as such, holds ultimate power and authority to enforce the legal rules regulating 
armed conflict. This framing of state sovereignty considers that the Tribunal is infringing 
upon the 'privileges' of states to regulate domestic affairs and prosecute (or not) their 
nationals for war crimes. The Defence, therefore, contends that the Tribunal cannot act as 
an international criminal justice mechanism for the enforcement of breaches of civilian 
protection. This understanding of the Tribunal's institutional functioning considers that it 
cannot provide legal address or redress to those civilians who have been harmed during 
the Yugoslavian conflict. Such legal address should be left to the measures considered 
appropriate by a nation-state. The Defence's understanding of the ties between state, law 
and war does not consider that the presence or injuries to the individual subjects of the 
civilian victims can impact upon the sovereign authority of the state. It does not reflect or 
recognise the increasing trend in international law that figures the individual as a subject 
of the protective rules of humanitarian law, or that these protections restrict the rights of 
states to hold exclusive jurisdiction over these individual victims and their perpetrators 
(see Joyner, 2005: 59; Held, 2002). Instead, for Tadic, the protection of civilians can only 
come under the purview of a state's jurisdiction and no higher body of law. In this 
account, the Tribunal cannot enforce breaches of civilian protection nor provide legal 
recognition or redress for them. 
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The Tribunal's Judgement 
Despite this defence, the Tribunal ultimately refused all Tadi6's grounds of appeal and 
authorised the adjudication and judgement of his crimes. After lengthy and complex 
judicial proceedings involving numerous judgements and appeals over a period of five 
years, Tadi6 was ultimately found guilty of twenty counts of violations of humanitarian 
law (Bohlander, 2000). The Tribunal, taking into account his 'enthusiastic support for the 
attack on the non-Serb civilian population' and the nature of his involvement in the 
crimes against these civilians, sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment. 139 Tadi6 was 
granted early release in July 2008, having served approximately fourteen years of his 
sentence. 140 
During the judicial proceedings in the Tadic case, the Tribunal counters the Schmittian 
model of states, war and law that underpins Tadi6's defence that the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction to try perpetrators of violations of humanitarian law 'constitutes an 
infringement upon the sovereignty ofthe States directly affected' .141 Instead, the Tribunal 
sets out a different account of its role and functioning, articulating a relationship between 
the protective rules of customary humanitarian law, armed conflict, and its individual 
perpetrators and civilian victims. In turning to the 'protection of human beings', the Tadic 
case affirms that humanitarian law must establish and develop the parameters of safety, 
security and protection for persons from the hostilities of war. 142 The Tribunal acts as an 
enforcement mechanism of this protection, legally recognising civilians as victims and 
adjudicating the breaches of their protections during the Yugoslavian conflict. As 
139 The Prosecutorv. Du§ko Tadic. Case No. IT-94-1-T bis-RI17. Sentencing Judgement, 11 November 
1999, para. 20. See also The Prosecutor v. Du§ko Tadic. Case No. IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis. Judgement in 
Sentencing Appeals, 26 January 2000. 
140 The Prosecutor v. Du§ko Tadic, Case Information Sheet (http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/cis/tadic/cis-
tadiC.pdf). 
141 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 50. 
142 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 97. 
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Antonio Cassese, the first President of the Tribunal argues, this institution's functioning 
is significant for its unprecedented contribution to the alleviation of the suffering caused 
by 'unbearable abuses perpetrated in the region [which] have spread terror and deep 
anguish among the civilian population' (1994: 75). 
Through the adjudication of the Tadic case, the Tribunal substantiates the United Nations 
Security Council's authority to establish a judicial organ in the form of an international 
criminal tribunal as 'a measure contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace 
in the former Yugoslavia' .143 Although this decision has been the subject of critique (see 
Alvarez, 1996), the Tribunal rejects the Defence's first line of appeal and held that the 
Security Council holds this power through Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and 
as such, acts as an absolute authority in the course of actions that it deems necessary for 
the restoration of peace. 144 This position affirms that the Security Council's Resolutions 
'are legally binding. It has the authority to decide matters affecting the fate of 
governments, establish peacekeeping missions, create tribunals to try perpetrators 
accused of war crimes' (Fasulo, 2004: 39). The Security Council is empowered to enact 
measures that are both 'coercive vis-a-vis the culprit State or entity [and] mandatory vis-
a-vis the other Member States, who are under an obligation to cooperate with the 
Organization' .145 For this reason, the Tribunal does not figure as a juridical organ 
established by a singular State or treaty of a collective of states. Rather, it is an 
international institution as all States are 'under a binding obligation to take whatever 
action is required to carry out a decision taken as an enforcement measure under Chapter 
VII,.146 For this reason, the ICTY functions as the first 'truly international tribunal', the 
Nuremberg trials before it being 'multi-national in nature, representing only part of the 
ld . ,147 wor commumty. 
143 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 38. 
144 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 40. See also Morris and Scharf (1995: 37-48). 
145 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 31. Emphasis original. 
146 Report of the Secretary-General, 1993, para. 23. 
147 Tadic, Judgement, para. 1. 
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Following its affirmation of the lawful establishment of the Tribunal, the Trial Chamber 
then counters TadiC's second defence submission and affirms that in accordance with 
Article 9 of its Statute, the Tribunal holds jurisdictional primacy over domestic courts 
(Alvarez, 1996). While national courts are 'encouraged to exercise their jurisdiction', 148 
this institution holds primacy and as such, 'all states must cooperate with the Tribunal' 
(Article 29). In this model, the 'relationship between the Tribunal and national 
jurisdictions is not horizontal, but vertical' .149 This framework negates the Schmittian 
model of encompassing ties between states and law. It also overcomes a traditional 
critique of the functioning of international law that contends that there is no enforcement 
mechanism if 'States wish to break or bend the law' (Best, 1994: 5). The states of the 
former Yugoslavia cannot assert their 'sovereign will' to override the authority of the 
Tribunal to prosecute their war criminals and thus potentially institute impunity for 
breaches of civilian protection.150 Instead, the Tribunal's model of international criminal 
justice follows the norms of the 'responsibility to protect' and establishes that the 
traditional 'reservations of "sovereignty", "national honour", etc ... have receded from 
the horizon of contemporary international law'. 151 As such, the Tribunal maintains its 
primacy over national courts for it 'would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the 
universal need for justice, should the concept of state sovereignty be raised successfully 
against human rights. Borders should not be considered as a shield against the reach of 
the law,.152 Even if the violation is 'domestic in nature, ... [where offences] trample 
underfoot the elementary rights ofhumanity',153 the Tribunal is 'properly constituted [for] 
trying these crimes on behalf of the international community' .154 
148 Report of the Secretary-General, 1993, para. 64. See also Slaughter (2004). 
149 The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic. Case No. IT -94-2-PT. Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the 
Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, 9 October 2002, para. 76. 
150 Report of the Secretary-General, 1993, para. 19. 
151 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 24. 
152 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 58. 
153 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 58. 
154 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 59. 
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This recognition of the necessity to protect individuals also serves to counter Tadi6's 
third line of appeal- that the Tribunal lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Tadi6 argued that 
'there must exist a state of international conflict' for customary international law to apply 
and that none existed at the time and place of the perpetration of his acts of violence. 155 
The Tribunal rejected this ground of appeal and held that the 'laws and customs of war' 
(Article 3) does encompass non-international armed conflicts, for 'customary rules have 
developed to govern internal strife' (see Greenwood, 1996).156 In particular, Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 1949 applies to internal conflicts. The Tribunal 
acknowledges that what 'is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, 
cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife' .157 It cites that the first customary 
rules applicable to internal conflicts 'were aimed at protecting the civilian population 
from hostilities' .158 For this reason, the Tribunal held that the distinction between 
international and internal conflicts has 'become more and more blurred, and international 
legal rules have increasingly emerged or have been agreed upon to regulate internal 
armed conflict' .159 While the Tribunal considers that Article 2 of the Statute applies only 
to international armed conflicts (Greenwood, 1996: 275_276),160 the Tadic case affirms 
that Article 3 and Article 5 (crimes against humanity) applies to both internal and 
international conflicts. The Tribunal therefore determines that the 'traditional and 
artificial' divide between the rules applicable to international and internal conflicts can no 
longer negate an absence of protective rules for certain categories of civilians (Goldstone, 
2000: 124). As Greenwood points out, in addition to those rules regulating international 
armed conflicts, there 'is likely to be broad agreement that the law of internal conflicts 
includes principles regarding the protection of the civilian population' (1996: 278). 
155 Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, para. 50. 
156 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 127. 
157 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 119. 
158 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 100. 
159 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 97. 
160 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 84. 
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Through its dismissal of all of Tadi6's grounds of appeal, the Tribunal constructs an 
account of IHL as a protective regime of law for persons, rather than a state-centric model 
reflecting the interests or values of states. It describes the role of this institution as central 
to the enforcement of breaches of civilian protection during the Yugoslavian conflict. 
Louise Arbour points out that the growing emphasis on the protection of persons is 
'fundamentally a recognition of the rights of others' (2006). This recognition of the 
'rights of others' necessitates a shift from the action of states alone to the international 
community's obligation to 'take action to protect populations' (Arbour, 2006; see also 
Evans, 2008). Reflecting the central tenets of the norm of a 'responsibility to protect', it 
can be seen that a notion of 'civilian protection' guides the legitimation of the Tribunal's 
establishment, its terms of jurisdiction and legal practices. This prioritization of the 
conception and application of legal protections rejects the notion that the regulation or 
protection of persons should be left to the action (or in-action) of individual states. It also 
negates the contention that even where international laws are in place, that they are 
unenforceable and so ineffective (see Best, 1994: 5). Instead, the adjudication of 
Yugoslavia's war criminals establishes that acts of civilian victimisation and the legal 
enforcement of their protections in conflict is a matter of concern to the international 
community. 
From this recognition of the development of protective rules for civilians and the 
Tribunal's role in their enforcement,161 the Tadic case can be understood as affirming and 
broadening the legal recognition of individuals and, in particular, civilians as subjects of 
humanitarian law. Christopher Joyner argues that individuals now have a recognized 
status in international law as they have 'international rights, duties, and protections' 
(2005: 82). In particular, Joyner points to the expansion of protective legal rules that are 
'designed expressly to protect the rights of individual persons' from the commitment of a 
variety of depredations and the international community's acceptance of these protections 
161 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 127. 
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(in similarity to Arbour's conception of 'the rights of others') (2005: 82). Although this 
recognition of individuals as subjects of humanitarian law does not figure as the 
comprehensive international legal personality held by states (see Akehurst, 1997), the 
Tribunal's significant focus and development of civilian protections (and not solely state 
interests) suggests that civilians are increasingly figuring as subjects within international 
law. 
Following Joyner's argument, the Tadic case substantiates this conception that 
individuals, and civilians in particular, now hold certain international 'rights' and 
protections and, as such, can be thought of as subjects of humanitarian law. As set out 
above, this case develops a framing of civilians as having the 'right' to be protected from 
the criminal conduct of combatants. In particular, as this chapter will go on to describe 
but also problematise, the Tribunal founds a significant legal recognition that all civilians 
(and civilian objects) come under the protective rules that regulate the conduct of armed 
conflict, in particular those that prohibit indiscriminate attacks. 162 In this regard, the 
Tribunal holds that all civilians require the 'same protection [from] armed violence', 
irrespective of the international or internal character of the armed conflict in which they 
find themselves or their nationality or other social characteristics. 163 That framing of 
civilians suggests that all civilians are equally the subjects of humanitarian law. Whatever 
the context of their sustaining of victimisation or harm, all civilians are understood to 
have the right to enforcement of such breaches of protection. However, the Tadic case 
also illustrates that the historical framework of legal protections for civilians serves to 
both develop, but also constrain, the potential application of such protection through 
particular categories of crimes. It is therefore necessary to examine why and in what ways 
these protective rules do not offer an encompassing protection to all civilians present in a 
situation of armed violence. How, then, has a notion of 'protection' for civilians guided, 
162 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 127. 
163 Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 97. 
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or failed to guide, the construction of the framework of IHL? And, why have these 
protective laws, as Jones and Cater (2001: 259) point out, come to function in such a 
'fractured and disparate nature'? 
Laws of Protection? 
The legal categories of civilian and combatant inherent in the principle of distinction 
describe that 'war is to be waged against the enemy's armed forces, not against its 
civilian population' (Rogers, 2004: 7).164 This protective regime differentiating between 
these categories of persons has been traced back to the rules applicable to war since the 
eighteenth century (Best, 1980; Rogers, 2004). However, as commentators such as 
Geoffrey Best (I980; 1994) and Karma Nabulsi (2001) describe in their detailed tracings 
of the historical emergence and developments of the laws of war, this 'protective' 
standard underpinning these rules and regulations did not pertain to an expansive 
recognition of ·civilians. Nor did these rules prioritise their safety and security from the 
effects of hostilities. Rather, these rules were a means to sustain the 'ancient privileges of 
soldiers' and safeguard their right to fight (Nabulsi, 2001: 16). In light of this 
predominant focus upon combatants, therefore, how do civilians come to figure as a 
legally recognisable category of persons within IHL? Are there selectivities in the 
historical and contemporary parameters of their protection from the violence and 
victimisation of armed conflict? 
Frits Kalshoven traces the emergence of legal protection back to the 1864 Geneva 
Convention, 'for the wounded in armies in the field' (1987: 40).165 In this era, most 
commentators agree that military practice largely reflected the Clausewitzean image of 
war as violent conduct between state armies (Clausewitz, 1968; Kaldor, 2001). Inter-state 
164 The principle of distinction is discussed further in a later section of this chapter. 
165 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in the Armies in the 
Field. 
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wars, predominated by territorial 'conquest and occupation' (Nabulsi, 2001: 18), required 
an ideological interest to retain war's character as a conflict between states and its 
soldiers purely as 'servants of the state' (Hirst, 2001: 23). The 1907 Hague Conventions 
reflect this limited framing of the subjects of war; these regulations 'were drafted to 
"professionalize war" and thus pertain to the conduct of standing armies toward each 
other' (Jones and Cater, 2001: 250).166 The legal focus on disciplining military forces 
conceptualised war's subjects restrictively; the soldier was the paramount figure of 
regulation, protection and condemnation of unlawful conduct. The early laws of war did 
not shape legal recognition of, or prioritise the protection of civilians. Rather, the notion 
of 'soldier's honor' guided the terms of the appropriate social dynamics of conflict, that 
is, of the types and form of the conduct and interactions of combatants with civilians 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: xxv). This subjective intention and custom of the 
soldier shaped the possibility for civilians to remain protected (or not) within and from 
the hostilities of war. 
The consummg violence of World War II brought this Clausewitzean narrative of 
'professional' war between 'honourable' armies on the battlefield to a close. Lord Wright, 
Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, relates that the aggressors of 
both World Wars 'set up a theory of totalitarian war, totalitarian not merely because all 
the nations resources of men and material were swept into the war, but also because the 
war was waged with a total disregard of all humane and moral or legal restraints' (1948: 
9). In particular, the Nazi atrocities brought to social and legal recognition that "'the 
people" became, more than ever, both an instrument and a target of combatants' 
(Gregorian, 2001: xiii). As argued in chapter one, the civilian population was not 
marginal or removed from the conduct of the Axis or Allied powers in World War II (see 
Beevor, 2002). Rather, the intentional perpetration of violence against civilian 
166 See in particular, 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land: Annex 
to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 
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populations revealed their integral placing and victimisation through specific, targeted 
military strategies. Most significantly, the Axis powers' genocidal practices and 
techniques of 'ethnic cleansing' produced civilian casualties not through acts of 
unfortunate 'collateral damage', but through 'the settled policy of extermination and 
terrorism' (The United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1948: 14). 
However, while this experience of 'total war' illustrated the requirement for a fuller legal 
framework of 'protective' rules and norms, it also raised complexities in designating 
persons along the civilian / combatant divide. That the war effort requires the 'civilian 
society [to] be militarized, all labour and resources being subject to state control' (Hirst, 
2001: 41), problematises the traditional image of civilians as "'those who are passive'" 
(Jones and Cater, 2001: 250). This image of passivity is further complicated by a 
distinctive feature of internal conflicts, the 'widespread entanglement of civilians as 
agents and victims', of civilians acting and present in hostilities as both perpetrators and 
victims (Alley, 2004: 2). As chapter five will examine in more detail through the cases of 
Gali(; and D. Milosevic, the difficulties of determining civilian and combatant status and 
their ensuing protections was, and remains, an issue of practical and legal debate in 
contemporary conflicts and trials of their hostilities. 
Despite the complexities of these legal categorisations, the laws of the early twentieth 
century were 'preoccupied with what happened to the fighters and the interests of non-
combatants [were] tragically neglected' (Best, 1980: 60). Following World War II, the 
formulation of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War ('Geneva Convention IV'), instigated a significant new legal 
recognition of civilians. Now considered customary law, Geneva Convention IV was the 
first treaty to designate civilians as a specific category of protected persons in armed 
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conflict. 167 Although it is notable that this treaty does not establish a specific definition of 
a civilian (instead they are understood as persons who are not members of the armed 
forces), this Convention is significant for its designation of protective rules solely for 
civilians in armed conflict (see Roberts and Guelff, 2005: 299). Broadly put, Geneva 
Convention IV establishes that protected persons 
are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family 
right, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall 
at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of 
violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curioSity.168 
In this way, the Convention shifts the previous focus of the laws of war 'which had been 
directed solely at state's interests rather than those of the civilian population' (Nabulsi, 
2001: 19). It provides a significant new legal acknowledgement of civilians as individual 
subjects who have been 'granted legal rights and protections under international law' 
(Nabulsi, 2001: 19). From this legal recognition, this Convention figures civilians as 
subjects of international law and that this category of persons comes under the safety of a 
new framework of protective rules and norms for the conduct of armed conflict. As noted 
above, the Tadic case follows this conception of civilians as subjects of international 
humanitarian law that are both recognised and protected by (certain aspects of) its 
framework of rules and principles. 
However, despite the progressive legal recognition of civilian persons and the provisions 
for their protection, it is important to note that Geneva Convention IV is applicable only 
to international armed conflicts (Schabas, 2006: 232). With the exception ofthe minimum 
standards set out in Common Article 3, this Convention does not apply to internal armed 
conflicts. It is for this reason that the ICTR's jurisdiction over war crimes committed 
during the Rwandan conflict is confined to Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II 
and does not include other aspects of the Geneva Conventions (see Schabas, 2006: 235). 
167 See Report of the Secretary-General, 1993, para. 35. See also Roberts and Guelff (2005: 299). 
168 Geneva Convention IV, Article 27. 
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Moreover, in terms of the framework of protective rules, this treaty 'is mainly confined to 
the treatment of civilians in the hands of the adversary, whether in occupied territory or in 
internment' (Roberts and Guelff, 2005: 299). For example, there are detailed rules setting 
out satisfactory standards in relation to safety, hygiene, health, sanitation and food. 
However, with the exception of Common Article 3, this Convention 'deals less 
extensively with the protection of civilians from the effects of hostilities' (Roberts and 
Guelff, 2005: 299). Civilians are only protected from attacks when interned or in 
occupied territory and do not come under a comprehensive framework of legal protection 
in all circumstances of conflict. 
The later supplements to the Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, provide the most comprehensive recognition of 
combatants, civilians, civilian populations and their protection during hostilities to date. 
As set out in chapter one, API defines civilians as all persons who are not members of the 
armed forces. In both Additional Protocol I, applicable to international armed conflicts 
and Additional Protocol II (' APII,)169 regulating internal armed conflicts, there are 
provisions which determine that civilians and civilian populations shall not be the object 
of attack. l7O In these provisions, 'protection' as a conceptual and legal bar to war's 
conduct is re-figured to preclude violence itself directed toward civilians. Unlike the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, legal norms determine protection not just from treatment 
by belligerents, but protection from directed violence itself. 
However, it is important to note that APII is considerably narrower than API in its 
prohibitions of conduct. APII does not define a civilian, set out prohibitions on the 
perpetration of indiscriminate attacks upon this group of persons, or prohibit reprisals 
against them. Moreover, the customary status of these Protocols is still ambiguous. 
169 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
170 Articles 51 (2) and Article 13(2) respectively. 
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Recent commentaries suggest that API 'has not yet gained universal adherence' 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: xxviii). Notably, as Greenwood points out, 'a 
number of major military powers, including the United States, are not parties to the 1977 
First Additional Protocol' (2003: 790). Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck affirm this 
observation and further relate that non-international conflicts are taking place in several 
of the states that have not ratified this Protocol (2005: xxviii). Similarly, APII has a 
'limited scope of application' and with 'some important states not being parties it cannot 
be said to be of universal application' (Rogers, 2004: 236). It has therefore yet to be 
understood as declaratory of customary law (Greenwood, 1996: 276). As such, both these 
frameworks of protective rules remain as treaty, not customary law. State ratification and 
thus the decision of the nation-state and their sovereign is thus determinative of these 
protections being afforded to the persons in its jurisdiction. Civilians subject to breaches 
of the rules of this treaty are only legally recognised by certain states and not others, 
including a number of the most powerful states in the international community. 
From this tracing of the evolution of the rules and treaties of IHL, it is seen that the legal 
recognition of civilians as subjects of IHL has not figured as a coherent or static judicial 
concept. Rather, the construction of civilians as a category of persons can be seen as a 
shifting legal concept emerging though the historical development of the protective rules 
of IHL. The legal recognition of civilians has been a gradual process related to the 
changes in the conduct of conflict and the increasing regulation of the actions of 
combatants (see Best, 1994). In this way, the changes and developments in the legal 
protections for civilians illustrate a consequent shift in the recognition of civilians as 
protected persons. From the initial 'absence' of civilians in the Hague Conventions of the 
nineteenth century, there is now a legal recognition in API of civilians as a distinct 
category of persons (albeit only in relation to combatants, as will be discussed). However, 
despite these clear developments in the legal recognition of civilians, the above tracing of 
the development of humanitarian law illustrates that that such recognition of civilians is 
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itself an unstable category and concept. There is not a consolidated or concrete 'positive' 
definition of a civilian, either in older treaties of the laws of war or in present-day legal 
frameworks. There remain significant difficulties in founding legal recognition of civilian 
victims and determining the parameters of legal protections afforded to them when acts of 
civilian victimisation come to trial. 
The Legal Construction of Civilians as Subjects of Humanitarian Law 
Richard Goldstone, former Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal, argues that the war crimes 
trial enables not only the prosecution of the perpetrators, but also the constitution of an 
'official recognition' of the victims of crime and an "'official recognition" of what 
happened' (2007). However, the Tribunal in Tadic constructs shifting models and terms 
of the legal recognition of civilians as victims of the actions of the accused. As noted 
above, this section focuses on the charges of grave breaches brought in Tadic, as this case 
illustrates significant legal developments in the enforcement of these crimes and the 
persons that can be understood as victims of such breaches (see Bohlander, 2000; 
Greenwood, 1996). The construction of international criminal justice for civilian victims 
through this category of crimes rests upon the legal recognition of these individuals as 
'protected persons' during an international armed conflict (Sassoli and Bouvier, 2006). 
During the Tadic case, the question of whether certain civilian victims could hold this 
status of 'protected persons' was the subject of contestation and revision during the 
judicial proceedings (see Bohlander, 2000). As will be set out, the Tribunal first 
constructs a model of 'nationally' protected persons and then a subsequent model of 
'ethnically' protected persons. From these shifting models of recognition of civilians and 
their ensuing protections, Tadic illustrates that there is no fixed form of legally 
recognising or identifying civilian victims through the categories of the crimes 
constituting the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal's Statute. It also illustrates the 
inherent difficulties for civilians to gain recognition of their status as civilian victims 
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during legal proceedings. It highlights the fragmented nature of the rules of customary 
humanitarian law and the disparate nature of its protective regime. Ultimately, Tadic 
shows the possibility that the Tribunal may fail to recognise certain civilian victims or 
bring their perpetrators to account. 
The framework of humanitarian law is founded on a legal categorisation of all persons 
present during the hostilities of a situation of anned conflict. As indicated previously, this 
legal categorisation demarcates individuals into being either combatants or non-
combatants (civilian) (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005; Sassoli and Bouvier, 2006). 
The rules of humanitarian law subsume all persons into this dichotomous framework and 
describe that all persons hold one or other of these definitional statuses (Sassoli and 
Bouvier, 2006: 143-144).171 This characterisation of persons leaves no 'undistributed 
middle between the categories of combatants (or military objectives) and civilians (or 
civilian objects)' (Dinstein, 2004: 114). Of these two distinct groups of persons in anned 
conflict, humanitarian law detennines that civilians, irrespective of gender, age, 
nationality or ethnicity or other social categorisation constitute a specific homogenous 
group of persons (McKeogh, 2002; Nabulsi, 2001). In this fonnulation, all persons who 
are non-combatants are civilians and come under the purview of the protective rules of 
IHL, notwithstanding any other social characteristics or group memberships. 
However, the rules of humanitarian law do 'not tell us who or what protected persons and 
objects are' (Dinstein, 2004: 114). There is no 'positive' definition of a civilian or a 
civilian population. Neither the Additional Protocols nor any other treaties set out 
attributes or 'markers' that would 'affinn' civilian status and so establish the measures of 
their protection in anned conflict. Rather, civilian status is defined in the negative; 
civilians are understood as those persons who are not combatants (Dinstein, 2004; 
171 It should be noted that persons who lose the status of combatant such as prisoners of war, those hors de 
combat and the wounded, sick and shipwrecked also come under specific protections through humanitarian 
law (see Dinstein, 2004). 
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Maxwell, 2004). As API sets out, any person who is not a member of the armed forces of 
a Party to a conflict should be considered a civilian (see Article 50(1)). In this way, 
designation of civilian status is dependent on the co-existence of an opposing status, the 
combatant. However, in the case of Tadic, the legal address to civilian victims 
complicates this seemingly precise narrative of all civilians as protected persons and 
conversely, combatants as legitimate targets. In this case, grounds of group membership 
are equally determinative of protected person status. Through the Tadic case it is seen 
that through certain categories of crimes, civilians cannot hold 'protected person' status 
solely on account of their non-participation in hostilities and thus 'civilian' status. 
Instead, legal bonds of 'allegiance' between victim and perpetrator become constructive 
of the possibility for the legal recognition of civilian victims and the criminal prosecution 
of their experience of victim is at ion and violence. 172 
The Trial Chamber's Judgement 
The Tribunal's legal recognition of the civilian victims as 'protected persons' and their 
suffering as a justiciable crime within its jurisdictional framework was a contentious issue 
in the Tadic case. As Schabas notes, the interpretation of this category of crimes 
'consumed a great deal of judicial energy' (2006: 248). The victims of the actions of 
Tadi6 were all of non-Serb ethnicity; these persons were predominantly Muslim and 
Croat residents of the region of opstina Prijedor and surrounding areas. In its judgement, 
the Trial Chamber determined that the imprisonment of these persons in the camps was 
'to facilitate the ethnic cleansing of that area'.l73 However, neither the Tribunal's Statute 
nor its Rules of Procedure and Evidence define a 'civilian' or a 'protected person'. For 
this reason, the Trial Chamber in its assessment of the grave breaches charges drew upon 
'Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
I72 The Prosecutor v. Du§/w Tadil:. Case No. IT-94-1-A. Appeals Judgement, 15 July 1999, para. 166 ('Tadil:, 
Appeals Judgement'). 
17 Tadil:, Judgement, para. 578. 
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Time of War (Geneva Convention IV), which defines those civilians who fall under the 
protection of that Convention'. 174 This Convention establishes that: 
[p ]ersons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any 
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands 
of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. 175 
For this reason, the Trial Chamber held that the 'central question is thus whether at all 
relevant times the victims of the accused were in the hands of "a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power" of which they were not national' . 176 The Trial Chamber then drew on 
three requirements to establish whether the accused could be held to account for the 
crimes against these civilians. The first and second requirements were, respectively, 'that 
the victims be "in the hands of' a "Party to the conflict or Occupying Power"'. 177 The 
third requirement, and the most significant for this particular adjudication, was that 'the 
civilian victims not be nationals of that Party or Occupying Power' .178 
The model of protected persons set out in Geneva Convention IV can be understood as a 
model of 'nationally' protected persons. In this formulation, the civilian victim must hold 
an opposing national status to the party to the conflict or Occupying Power of the 
territory in which they find themselves. This determination understands a necessity for 
'protection' to arise from a de-linkage between the civilians and that ofthe perpetrator on 
national grounds. Schmitt characterises war as the fighting between nations, between 
states that posit themselves as 'friend and enemy' (1985: 28). For Schmitt, the waging of 
war hinges on a conception of two or more nations grouping themselves as 'friend and 
enemy', in which the combatants engaged in armed violence comprise a nationally-based 
'collectivity of people [which] confronts a similar collectivity' (1985: 28). It is this notion 
of national 'friend and enemy' that constitutes the legal framework of the grave breaches 
174 Tadic, Judgement, para. 578. 
175 Tadic, Judgement, para. 578. 
176 Tadic, Judgement, para. 578. 
177 Tadic, Judgement, para. 578. 
178 Tadic, Judgement, para. 578. 
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crime, for the perpetrator and the victim cannot hold the same national allegiance. The 
grave breaches category requires that the war is international, fought between nations 
whose members perceive of other persons of another nation as the 'enemy'. It is this 
nation-based framework which underpins the definitional terms of the 'protected persons' 
of the grave breaches category and thus the Tribunal's 'requirements' for the founding of 
victims as 'protected persons' (see Bohlander, 2000). This category of crimes requires 
that the warring parties, and the actions of the individuals of these parties, comprise of 
violent inter-State relations. Consequently, for civilians to be understood as 'protected 
persons' through the grave breaches category requires that these civilians are "'enemies" 
in the sense of enemy nationals' to the perpetrators (Sassoli and Bouvier, 2006: 114). In 
the Schmittian sense, the victims of the violent conduct and victimisation of Tadic must 
be members of a different national collectivity of persons that he understood as the 
'enemy'. 
For this reason, the Trial Chamber considered whether the victims held different 'legal 
bonds of nationality' to the accused. 179 Following the necessity to found the first and 
second requirements of Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions IV, the Trial Chamber 
conducted an in-depth tracing and analysis of the armed conflict in the region. The Trial 
Chamber found that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of two main 
parties, 'the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian 
Serb forces, the latter controlling territory under the banner of the Republika Srpska '.180 
The Trial Chamber then analysed the precise date of the take-over of the region of opstina 
Prijedor by 'forces hostile to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina' .181 In its determination, the Trial Chamber affirmed that the victims were at 
the relevant times of the indictment in the hands of a party to the conflict. The civilian 
victims were either held in camps or resident within territory being occupied by the 
179 Tadic, Appeals Judgement, para. 165. 
180 Tadic, Judgement, para. 563. 
181 Tadic, Judgement, para. 580. 
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armed forces of the Republika Srpska ('VRS,).182 As such, the Trial Chamber found that 
the first and second requirements of the elements of the grave breaches category were 
reached. 
The third issue centred on whether the civilians were not nationals of this party to the 
conflict. Despite the Tribunal's determination that the distinction between international 
and internal armed conflicts is becoming 'more blurred', this characterisation of 
hostilities remains determinative of the applicability of the grave breaches regime. The 
third requirement of the Trial Chamber's interpretation of 'protected person' status 
suggests that the armed conflict must be found to be international in character. For this 
reason, the Trial Chamber assessed whether the acts of the armed forces of the Republika 
Srpska could 'be imputed to the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro)' ('FRY') and therefore the organs or agents of another state. 183 
The Trial Chamber, by Majority decision, found that while 'the military and political 
objectives of the Republika Srpska and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) were largely complementary', 184 these armed forces were no 'more than 
mere allies, albeit heavily dependent allies' .185 The armed forces of the Republika Srpska 
were not found to be de facto organs or agents of the FRY. This finding implies (although 
it is not explicitly stated) that the Trial Chamber found that the conflict was internal 
rather than international in character. 186 It was not, as the Schmittian thesis suggests, a 
conflict of national enemies who understand the other, national collectivity of persons as 
'something different and alien' (1996: 27). For this reason, the Trial Chamber by 
Majority decision (Judge McDonald dissenting) held that the civilian victims were not in 
182 Tadil:, Judgement, paras 578-608. 
183 Tadil:, Judgement, para. 588. 
184 Tadil:, Judgement, para. 603. 
185 Tadil:, Judgement, para. 606. 
186 In the later Appeals Judgement, the Chambers acknowledges that the Trial Chamber did not explicitly 
state the nature of the armed conflict. The Appeals Chamber considers that the apparent conclusion of the 
judgement rendered for these particular charges is indicative that the Trial Chamber found that the conflict 
was internal in nature (See Tadil:, Appeals Judgement, para. 86). 
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the hands of a party to the conflict of which they were not nationals (Bohlander, 2000).187 
These civilians were held to be the same nationality as Tadic, that is, nationals of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. For this reason, the Trial Chamber held that these civilian victims were 
not 'protected persons' within the meaning of Article 2 ofthe Statute. 188 
In accordance with the Trial Chamber's finding that the victims were not in the hands ofa 
party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they were not nationals, the first 
judgement rendered by the Tribunal in the Tadic case determined that he must be found 
not guilty of these charges (see Bohlander, 2000: 221).189 In this formulation, the Trial 
Chamber does not dismiss the charges against Tadic on the grounds that he did not 
commit these crimes. It does not dispute that the civilians were victims. In fact, the Trial 
Chamber specifically refers to these persons as 'victims at the hands of the accused' .190 
However, the Trial Chamber submits that the accused cannot be held criminally 
responsible for these crimes, as the victims were the same nationality as the accused. 
Through this particular category ofintemational humanitarian law, these victims were not 
legally recognised or protected by their status as civilians alone. They were not 'protected 
persons' through their status as non-combatants and as such, as persons not taking part in 
the armed conflict. Rather, for legal recognition of their injuries and Tadic's prosecution 
of their perpetration, these victims were required to hold a different national status to the 
Occupying Power. 
187 Judge McDonald contends that the armed conflict was international in character and therefore the civilian 
victims were 'protected persons' (The Prosecutor v. Du§ko Tadic. Case No. IT -94-1. Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion ofJudge McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute, II November 1999, para. 
I). 
188 Tadic, Judgement, paras. 607-608. 
189 Tadic, Judgement, para. 608. 
190 Tadic, Judgement, para. 578. 
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The Appeals Judgement 
Following an appeal by the Prosecution two years later, the Appeals Chamber of the 
Tribunal reversed the prior decision of the Trial Chamber and held that Tadi6 could be 
found individually criminally responsible for the charges brought through the grave 
breaches category of crimes (Bohlander, 2000). The reversal of the Trial Chamber's 
decision can be seen to rest on factual issues in relation to the nature of the conflict. It 
was not based on legal questions regarding whether Tadi6 had committed the crimes 
under adjudication or the nature of the harms sustained by the civilian victims. Rather, in 
formulating its decision, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's previous 
finding that the army of the Republika Srpska was not a de facto organ or agent of the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and instead 
concluded that this army was 'to be regarded as acting under the control of and on behalf 
of the FRY' .191 The Appeals Chamber described that this 'control manifested itself not 
only in financial, logistical and other assistance and support, but also, and more 
importantly, in terms of participation in the general direction, coordination and 
supervision of the activities and operations of the VRS' .192 For these reasons, as 
Bohlander sets out, the Appeals Chamber 'arrived at the conclusion that the control 
exerted by Yugoslavia over the Bosnian Serbs was sufficient to qualifY the conflict as 
being international in character at all times' (2000: 224).193 
Having established that the conflict was international in character, the Appeals Chamber 
then considered whether the civilian victims named in Tadi6's indictment were 'protected 
persons' at that particular time and place. As noted above, the terms of Geneva 
Convention IV defines 'protected persons' through grounds of nationality - that such 
persons must be in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying power of which they 
191 Tadic, Appeals Judgement, para. 162. 
192 Tadic, Appeals Judgement, para. 156. 
193 See Tadic, Appeals Judgement, para. 162. Emphasis original. 
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are not nationals. Problematically, as Bohlander points out through his assessment of the 
Tadic case, the 'Bosnian Muslims and Croats were strictly legally speaking of the same 
nationality as the aggressor's forces' (2000: 225).194 The Appeals Chamber, however, 
considered that the terms of Geneva Convention IV 'intends to protect those civilians in 
occupied territory who, while having the nationality of the Party to the conflict in whose 
hands they find themselves, are refugees and thus no longer owe allegiance to this Party 
and no longer enjoy its diplomatic protection' .195 For this reason, the 'legal bond of 
nationality' is 'not regarded as crucial' .196 Instead, it is absence of a provision of 
'diplomatic protection by the State', that is 'more important than the formal link of 
nationality' .197 For the Appeals Chamber, this 'legal approach, hinging on substantial 
relations more than on formal bonds, becomes all the more important in present-day 
international armed conflicts' .198 This position determines that in armed conflicts such as 
that of the former Yugoslavia, 'ethnicity rather than nationality may become the grounds 
of allegiance' .199 In this case, the victims of the accused 'did not owe allegiance to and 
did not receive the diplomatic protection ofthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on whose 
behalf the Bosnian Serbs had been fighting' (Bohlander, 2000: 225). For this reason, the 
Appeals Chamber held that they could be understood as 'protected persons' through the 
requirements of Geneva Convention IV and subsequently found Tadic guilty of certain 
crimes perpetrated against them. 20o 
In this case, the Appeals Chamber constructs a model of 'ethnically' protected persons. 
The construction of legal recognition of 'protected persons' for grave breaches shifts 
from the terms of nationality seen in the earlier Trial Chamber decision, to the grounds of 
ethnicity established by the Appeals Chamber. In Tadic, there is a new determination that 
194 Emphasis added. 
195 Tadic, Appeals Judgement, para. 164. 
196 Tadic, Appeals Judgement, para. 165. 
197 Tadic, Appeals Judgement, para. 165. 
198 Tadic, Appeals Judgement, para. 166. 
199 Tadic, Appeals Judgement, para. 166. 
200 Tadic, Appeals Judgement, para. 171. 
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grounds of ethnicity are constructive of grounds of allegiance but also constitutive of 
violent interactions between soldiers and civilians. In this way, the Appeals Chamber 
does not follow the Schmittian model of inter-state warfare or national collectivities alone 
as constituting 'friend and enemy'. Instead, the Tadic judgement acknowledges the 
actuality of social dynamics within conflict where 'intergroup hatred takes the form of 
ethnic cleansing ... [and] turn[s] friend into foe' (Cassese, 1994: 75). It thus recognises 
that particular social factors, in this instance ethnicity, found both the grounds for civilian 
victimisation but also of the necessity for broader rules of civilian protection in a time of 
war. From this determination, a category of civilian victims (identified through ethnic 
designations) who were previously excluded from the legal recognition and enforcement 
of the protective rules of IHL became legally understood as civilian victims of the 
accused (Bohlander, 2000). 
Conclusion 
As the Tadic case illustrates, the adjudication of a crime constructs legal recognition of 
both the victims and perpetrators of war crimes. Trials of civilian victimisation at the 
Tribunal and in other jurisdictions establish authoritative accounts of the persons 
implicated in such interactions and the nature of the violent conduct that transgresses the 
protections ofIHL (Goldstone, 2007). Tadic is particularly notable for rendering the first 
international judgement that constructs legal recognition of the civilian victims of an 
individual accused. It is an important case for its provision of (retributive) justice for 
them by an international rather than a national or multi-national enforcement mechanism. 
However, despite its progressive case-law, this case also raises two issues that have had, 
and may continue to have, considerable implications for the construction of legal 
recognition of civilian victims and the enforcement of breaches of their protection when 
acts of civilian victimisation come to trial adjudication. 
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Firstly, Tadic illustrates that the legal recognition of this group of persons not only has 
been, but also continues to be, constructed through shifting categories of protection and 
notions of legal bonds of allegiance. The terms of allegiance that work to designate 
'protected person' status for civilians are the subject of continual progression and 
revision. As set out above, in Tadic these revisions are seen through the development of 
legal bonds of allegiance to incorporate grounds of ethnicity, alongside the older 
framework of nationality. However, despite these developments, this case is significant 
for its illustration that there is no historically fixed framework for founding legal 
recognition or protection of civilian victims. Such designation remains an unstable 
category of recognition and conceptualisation. As the revisions in the Tadic case indicate, 
there is an evident lack of a concrete and stable framework for designating civilian victim 
status to persons in armed conflict or determining the parameters of their protection when 
the international community (or nation-states) bring alleged war criminals to trial. 
Compounding these difficulties, Tadic is perhaps more significant for illuminating that in 
the legal enforcement of the grave breaches provision, civilians do not necessarily hold 
'protected person' status through their civilian status alone. As set out above, the rules of 
humanitarian law designate all persons present in an armed conflict as holding either 
civilian or combatant status. However, the Tadic case shows that when alleged breaches 
of the appropriate conduct between these groups of persons come to trial, the legal 
recognition of civilian victims does not solely rest on their absence of participation in 
hostilities, of their 'non-combatant' status. The civilian status of a victim of a crime does 
not necessarily mean that they will be legally recognised as a civilian victim of a breach 
of IHL, even if the conduct of the accused is beyond dispute. Rather, the construction of 
civilian status as 'protected person' status is equally dependant upon other social markers 
or factors. Aspects of identity such as nationality or ethnicity, or the context in which the 
acts of civilian victimisation took place, that is, whether in an international or internal 
conflict, also shape the possibility for a civilian to be understood as a civilian victim of a 
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breach of IHL. Civilian victim status is constructed only in relation to, or through ties to, 
other social factors or contexts. In this way, the legal enforcement of breaches of civilian 
protection works as an exclusionary framework. It does not necessarily enable the 
construction of legal recognition of all civilians who have been harmed by acts of civilian 
victimisation, even if their perpetrator is brought to trial. As Tadii illustrates, the legal 
adjudication and judgement of the crimes of war may fail to form legal recognition of the 
civilian victims of the actions of an accused, enforce protective norms for them or 
provide redress for their harms. 
The next chapter of this thesis develops this exploration of whether the Tribunal does not 
adequately construct legal recognition of certain categories of civilian victims. The 
chapter first examines the practices of different forms of transitional justice mechanisms 
and, in particular, whether the Tribunal adequately enables civilian victims to participate 
in the legal practices that work to narrate the victims and victimisation of the Yugoslavian 
conflict. It then explores the Tribunal's construction of a legal record of the civilian 
victims of the hostilities through an analysis of the criminal prosecutions brought to trial. 
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Chapter Four 
The Criminal Prosecution of Civilian Victimisation: Recognising Victims and 
Narrating Conflict 
Since the beginning of the Yugoslavian conflict, there have been numerous narrations of 
the modes of its conduct from many fields, including legal, sociological and historical 
analysis. All these accounts unequivocally acknowledge that civilians not only sustained 
prolific injuries during the conflict, but that systematic and targeted civilian victimisation 
was central to the conduct of these hostilities (see for example Bassiouni, 1994; Glenny, 
1996; Kaldor, 2001). This acknowledgement of the high levels of civilian victimisation in 
this conflict has begun to shift the focus of legally recognising the victims of war from 
the traditional prioritisation of combatant casualties, to the unlawful targeting of civilians, 
those crimes which have 'been consistently unreported and unrecorded' (Gardam, 1993a: 
173). As noted previously, a central aspect of the Tribunal's work has been the criminal 
prosecution of these acts of civilian victimisation. Charges of civilian victimisation as 
elements of crimes have arisen in all the completed cases heard to date, most often as 
crimes against humanity (see Schabas, 2006).201 The Tribunal claims that the adjudication 
of the charges of these cases contributes to fulfilling the terms of its mandate, that is, to 
'bring the truth to light and justice to the people of the former Yugoslavia' .202 It considers 
that these criminal prosecutions found 'important elements of a historical record of the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990's ... [as] [fJacts once subject to dispute 
have been established beyond a reasonable doubt'.203 How, then, does the Tribunal 
201 This analysis of the Tribunal's completed cases is correct as of 15 October 2007. 
202 The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic. Case No. IT-94-2-S. Sentencing Judgement, 18 December 2003, para. 
122 (,Nikolic, D, Judgement'). See also http://www.un.orglicty/glance-e/index.htm. 
203 http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm. 
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recognise and represent the civilian victims of these hostilities? And what type of record 
or narrative of the Yugoslavian conflict does it construct? 
This chapter explores the Tribunal's construction of a legal recognition and record of the 
civilian victims and victimisation of the Yugoslavian conflict. It examines this formation 
of a legal narrative of the conflict in light of the increasing emphasis and development of 
forms of restorative justice by legal institutions, as advocated by the UN and numerous 
commentators (see Bassiouni, 2006; Mani, 2002).204 This chapter first analyses whether 
the representation, role and positioning of civilian victims at the Tribunal adheres to the 
terms of these 'victim-centred' procedures. It then examines the Tribunal's legal record 
and recognition of civilian victims through an analysis of the indictments and criminal 
prosecutions brought to trial by the Office of the Prosecutor ('OTP'). While there has 
undoubtedly been a substantial legal focus upon civilian victimisation by the OTP 
(Slaughter and Burke-White, 2002), this analysis shows that there are important patterns 
and trends in the bringing of charges for certain crimes committed against particular 
groups of civilian victims. From these patterns it can be seen that the Tribunal's 
construction of a legal narrative of the perpetration of specific acts of violence against 
certain groups of civilians during this conflict significantly contrasts with other 
authoritative accounts and reports. These divergent accounts thus highlight the 
considerable complexities that exist in either founding, or finding, a cohesive or 
consolidated record of the civilian victims and victimisation of this conflict. 
Transitional Justice Mechanisms: For Victims and Perpetrators? 
In 1992, the United Nations Security Council established an independent Commission of 
Experts to investigate and collect evidence on the perpetration of violations of 
204 See for example, Resolution 1738. 
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humanitarian law in the Yugoslavian conflict.20s Despite its early disbandment, the 
Commission's findings were commonly acknowledged to provide a particularly detailed 
account of the hostilities owing to its 'evidentiary rigour and procedural fairness' 
(Fenrick, 1995: 63; also Schrag, 1997). In its Final Report, M. Cherif Bassiouni, the 
Chairman of the Commission, determined that all parties to this conflict had committed 
violations against civilians, including the killing of civilians, rape, torture, and the 
deliberate destruction of civilian property.206 After expressing his shock over this high 
level of victimization and providing a detailed exposition of these crimes, Bassiouni 
described that it was particularly striking that these victims have 'high expectations that 
this Commission will establish the truth and that the International Tribunal will provide 
justice' .207 In this formulation, the COE Report identified the key 'occurrence[ s] oflarge-
scale victimisation in the former Yugoslavia' (Bassiouni, 1994: 300). The investigations 
of the Commission established what 'may well be the only relatively comprehensive, 
historic record' of the civilian victims and the perpetration of large-scale victimisation 
against them during these hostilities.208 For Bassiouni, the Tribunal would then act as the 
central mechanism for the provision of legal address and redress to these civilian victims 
(1994: 339). Through its criminal prosecutions, the Tribunal's work of legally 
recognising the crimes and its victims would produce a narrative of the Yugoslavian 
conflict to 'complement' that ofthe Commission.209 
Instituting Restorative Justice 
As discussed in chapter one, the formation of recognition and redress to civilian victims 
in the aftermath of armed conflict 'has centred primarily on the employment of 
205 The Commission of Experts was established by the United Nations Security Council through Resolution 
780 (1992) (SIRES/780 (1992)). See F enrick (1995) for discussion of the unprecedented nature of the 
Commission's work and mandate. 
206 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 'Final Report of the Commission of Experts' (S/l994/674) 24 May 1994, Annex IV, 
(1) (,COE Report'). 
207 COE Report, Part V. 
208 COE Report, Introduction to the Annexes. 
209 COE Report, Introduction to the Annexes. 
140 
restorative justice (i.e., truth commissions) and / or retributive justice (i.e., prosecutions)' 
(Aldana, 2006: 107). In this formulation, as Aldana points out, forms of restorative justice 
are largely seen as arising from the practices and procedures of truth and reconciliation 
commissions, while legal mechanisms have long been understood to lack such forms of 
remedy (2006). This dichotomous framing of the forms of restorative or retributive 
justice rests in large part upon these institutional forms of post-conflict justice having 
different persons as their focus: the restorative justice model of truth commissions being 
more 'victim-friendly', unlike the legal, prosecutorial mechanism which has 'a special 
focus on the perpetrators' through its retributive structures and practices (Aldana, 2006: 
111). However, as recent UN Resolutions and Reports set out, the recognition and 
incorporation of victims into these mechanisms is no longer the sole purview of the truth 
and reconciliation commission framework. Instead, these practices are now also seen as a 
requirement of legal mechanisms, institutions of international criminal justice such as the 
ICTY, ICTR and the International Criminal Court?lO 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
As described in chapter one, the practices of truth and reconciliation commissions are 
often seen as prioritising the hearing and founding of the 'truth' of violent acts and 
victimisation from the viewpoint of the victims themselves. This institutional practice 
therefore recognises the status of the victim as such and the individual harm that they 
experienced (Hayner, 2002). TRCs also claim to directly involve the victims in 
constructing a broader narrative of the large-scale victimisation that is under 
investigation, although this does not always happen in practice (see Ross, 2003). Through 
the process of recording a considerable number of narratives of the harm sustained and 
the structures of victimisation of the prior social conflict, the collective memory of both 
its perpetration and harms arises from the victims themselves (Hamber and Wilson, 2002; 
210 See for example, Resolution 1738. 
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Moon, 2006). In this way, truth and reconciliation commISSIOns are understood as 
providing for the inclusivity and participation of marginalised persons, which in this 
context occurs through placing the victims at the centre of the process of finding and 
founding an official narrative of the violence of the prior regime. Through this 
framework, victims are both visible within its institutional practices and hold an inclusive 
and participatory role in constructing the historical record that serves as the product of its 
functioning. 
The Tribunal 
This central positioning of the victim in the TRC framework is in sharp contrast to the 
traditionally perpetrator-focused prosecutorial model and the institutional framework of 
the ICTY in particular. As noted in chapter one, the Tribunal's retributive structure works 
through the initial indictment of (certain of) Yugoslavia's alleged war criminals, and then, 
dependant upon the various investigative and pre-trial procedures, the trial of their 
alleged crimes and, if found guilty, their sentencing by a Trial Chamber and / or Appeals 
Chamber. Despite the UN's framework of rights for victims of violations of IHL which 
determines that these victims should have access to justice mechanisms, this prosecutorial 
process does not include or incorporate the victims of the alleged crimes in its decision-
making or prosecutorial practices, other than as witnesses testifYing at trial (see Henham, 
2008). Civilian (or combatant) victims cannot initiate or demand investigation or 
adjudication of their harms. As noted previously, the Tribunal does not grant victims (or 
witnesses) any 'rights' within the prosecutorial process or the trial itself (Stover, 2005). 
This legal institution does not follow the TRC structure in the sense of encouraging 
victims to come forward and contribute to the recording and narration ofthe crimes of the 
conflict or the specific harms they sustained. It does not prioritise the views (or needs) of 
142 
the victims in either the bringing of charges or the narration of their perpetration at trial 
beyond the necessary 'facts' subject to adjudication.2l1 
As this relative exclusion of civilian victims suggests, the international legal recognition 
of their status as victims by the Tribunal primarily rests upon the decisions and choices of 
the prosecutor?12 Mark Osiel points out that in criminal trials, prosecutors act 'as 
spokesmen for "the people'" (1999: 218). As Osiel suggests, it is their decisions of which 
persons and which acts of the prior conflict require prosecution that constructs a 
'collective representation of that past' and a particular, legal, 'collective memory' of 
those crimes (1999: 218). The role of legal mechanisms in forming a history ofa conflict 
has been the subject of academic contention and critique (see Stover, 2005; Douglas, 
2001). However, this understanding of 'collective memory' does not consider that 
criminal prosecutions can provide a definitive 'history' or comprehensive account of the 
hostilities. Rather, by acknowledging that prosecutions hold a role in constructing a 
'collective memory' and 'representation' of a prior conflict, as Osiel contends, attention 
is drawn to the position of the prosecutor in bringing cases and charges that represent or 
symbolize the pervasive patterns in the crimes of the hostilities. More particularly, as will 
be set out, this notion of collective representation suggests that the legal record of its 
victims should generally align to those of other authoritative accounts. 
In this way, criminal prosecutions brought by the OTP of the Tribunal will construct an 
international collective representation of the civilian victims of the Yugoslavian conflict 
(see Ewald, 2006). As will be further discussed, they will construct international legal 
recognition of particular collectivities of civilian victims that were subject to certain 
forms of victim is at ion and harm. In this way, it can be seen that the civilian victims of the 
211 Fieldwork. 
212 It should be noted that other factors may influence this construction oflegal recognition of civilian victims 
such as the failure to arrest indicted accused, the redaction of charges of an indictment against an accused or 
the transfer of cases to national jurisdictions. 
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conflict are not entirely 'absent' from this institution's functioning as its retributive focus 
upon the prosecution of the perpetrators may suggest. Instead, the legal recognition and 
record of civilian victims and the broader creation of a 'collective representation' and 
narrative of the Yugoslavian conflict primarily rests upon the prosecutorial discretion of 
the OTP of the Tribunal and the charges brought to trial. 
Carla Del Ponte points out that the OTP's prosecutorial discretion is a necessary aspect of 
its work due to the 'amplitude of these crimes, the number of their victims and their 
widespread character' (2004: 516). Prosecutions at the Tribunal cannot be brought against 
all, or even the majority, of Yugoslavia's war criminals. For this reason, there is a 
'practical need for a selective, rather than automatic, approach to the institution of 
criminal proceedings' (Jallow, 2005: 145). As will be discussed further, the OTP has 
focused on the level of the perpetrator and the seriousness of their crimes as the key 
criteria for determining which criminals and which crimes have come to trial (Del Ponte, 
2006: 542-3).213 In this way, the legal recognition of the civilian victims arises through 
the OTP's discretion of bringing indictments against (particular) accused, for their alleged 
perpetration of (particular) crimes against (particular) civilians (see Del Ponte, 2004; 
Goldstone, 2000). However, the selective nature of the prosecutorial process means that 
only a minimal number of civilians will find recognition of their status as civilian victims 
of the Yugoslavian conflict. It also means that there will be inevitable partialities in the 
'collective memory' of these hostilities that the Tribunal founds through its legal 
practices. How, then, do the Tribunal's criminal prosecutions recognise these civilian 
victims and their victimisation during these hostilities? And what form of legal narrative 
of the Yugoslavian conflict do these prosecutions construct? 
213 Interviews with OTP staff, 28 June 2006 and 29 June 2006. 
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Rendering Legal Judgement: The Prosecution of Civilian Victimisation 
Since its establishment in 1993, the Tribunal has rendered judgement in thirty-six 
completed cases.214 However, there is a distinct lack of analysis of the criminal 
prosecutions brought in these cases, either by commentators or the Tribunal itself.215 
Within the field of international criminal justice more broadly, there are important 
analyses of those sexual violence prosecutions brought to trial by the ICTY (Campbell, 
2007) and the ICTR (Breton-Le Goff, 2002). There are also analyses of the legal issues 
arising in particular cases concerning civilian victimisation, most notably the Galic case 
which concerns the siege of Sarajevo (Kravetz, 2004; Kutnjak Ivkovic and Hagan, 2006). 
However, there are no in-depth examinations of the charges of civilian victimisation 
brought in these completed cases for their legal recognition and recording of civilian 
victims or of their construction of a legal narrative of the broader civilian victimisation 
inherent in the Yugoslavian conflict. 
In order to explore the Tribunal's legal record of civilian victims and victimisation, this 
analysis focuses upon the criminal prosecutions brought by the OTP in completed cases. 
While there are a considerable number of charges of civilian victimisation in ongoing 
cases, or those in the pre-trial stages of proceedings, there are three main substantive and 
practical reasons to focus upon completed cases. Firstly, non-completed cases may 
involve a 'sealed' indictment and as such, the name of the accused and the charges 
against him or her are not available or known to the public. Secondly, during the pre-trial 
process charges may be dropped due to lack of evidence or, conversely, charges may be 
added as new evidence comes to light, for example if witnesses come forward prepared to 
testify for the Prosecution. Thirdly, as part of the completion strategy, indicted cases may 
214 As noted earlier, this analysis is correct as of 15 October 2007. 
215 There are no official statistics on the breakdown of charges brought by the Office of the Prosecutor on the 
ICTY website or through other official ICTY documents. 
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yet be transferred to a domestic court of the former Yugoslavia and therefore the crimes 
will not be subject to the adjudicatory processes of the Tribunal. 
For these reasons, this examination of criminal prosecutions of civilian victimisation 
focuses upon the charges of the final indictment of completed cases. The charges in these 
final indictments of completed cases set out the charges of civilian victimisation brought 
by the Prosecutor that have been subject to the adjudication of the Chambers and the 
rendering of a definitive and binding judgement by the Tribunal. They provide a record of 
the prosecutions brought by the OTP for crimes which relate specifically to civilian 
victimisation. Analysis of these prosecutions enables a tracing and exploration into 
whether the Tribunal follows the traditional under-reporting of crimes against civilians as 
Gardam argues (1993a), or whether this enforcement mechanism constructs an adequate 
and representative legal narrative of the civilian harms of this conflict. 
The Victims of Violations of Humanitarian Law: Civilians and Combatants 
The most significant characteristic of the thirty-six completed cases that have been heard 
by the Tribunal is that all these cases include charges against the accused for acts of 
civilian victimisation. Somewhat surprisingly, there are no cases where the charges do not 
prosecute one or more acts of civilian victimisation, or where the exclusive focus of the 
charges is upon acts of violence committed against combatants. These completed cases 
charge acts of civilian victimisation variously through the four different categories of 
crimes constituting the Statute of the ICTY; as grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, 1949 (Article 2), violations of the laws and customs of war (Article 3); 
genocide (Article 4) or as crimes against humanity (Article 5). All these cases adjudicate 
acts of civilian victimisation such as murder, detention and rape, those crimes that 
Bassiouni describes as having been perpetrated in widespread and systematic forms 
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during the conflict in the COE Report (1994) and the United Nations Security Council 
expresses its grave alarm over in Resolution 827 (1993). 
While the comprehensive inclusion of charges of civilian victimisation m all these 
completed cases shows that crimes against civilians are a central component of the 
prosecutions, it is important to emphasise that the Tribunal also hears crimes committed 
against combatants as numerated charges in these indictments. These prosecutions arise 
from breaches of the 'detailed rules protecting combatants when wounded, sick, or 
prisoners of war' (Gardam and Jarvis, 2001: 5). For example, in the case of The 
Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic ('Rajic ,), the Tribunal hears and convicts the accused of 
committing crimes against both civilians and combatants as Grave Breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949?16 However, in Rajic as in other completed cases heard by 
the Tribunal, the indictment specifies that the victims of the crimes were of both military 
and civilian status, but does not establish the particular status of each victim for each 
numerated charge. Notably, a number of cases, in particular those prosecuting the crimes 
of Srebrenica such as The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, describe the victims as men 'of 
military-age,.217 This lack of definition in relation to their status, as Charli Carpenter 
points out, implies that men caught up in conflict are being viewed as 'potential 
combatants' (2006a: 164). The absence of a legal articulation of their status along the 
civilian / combatant distinction creates an ambiguous identification of these persons and 
their placement within the protective rules of IHL. It conceptually conflates these persons 
as having some form of 'military' nexus to the conflict, even when such an assertion may 
be completely unfounded. Claude Bruderlein points out that a move toward categorising 
or grouping civilians through social categories (whether explicitly or implicitly) may 
216 The Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic. Case No. IT -95-12-S. Sentencing Judgement, 8 May 2006. 
217 The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic. Case No. IT -98-33-T. Judgement, 2 August 2001. During the trial 
proceedings of Djordevic there was a particularly problematic discussion about the presence of 'military-aged 
men' during massacres committed in Kosovo in which the Defence appeared to assert that such persons were 
'legitimate' targets of attack by Serb forces, despite the victim-witness testifYing that none of the men 
involved in the alleged crime were members of the armed forces or carrying weapons (Fieldwork, The 
Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Djordjevic, Case No. IT -05-8711. 6 February 2009 (,Fieldwork, Djordjevic )). 
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create a future tendency 'to see some civilians as more "innocent" than others and, 
therefore, more deserving of protection' (2001: 225). For this reason, this failure to 
determine the status ofthese 'military-aged' men further reiterates the perception that it is 
women and children who are unquestionably 'innocent' during armed conflict, with male 
civilians often failing to find a specific recognition of their non-combatant status, by 
either the United Nations,218 transitional justice mechanisms or the Tribunal more 
specifically (Carpenter, 2006a; 2006b; Moser and Clark, 2001).219 
However, this absence of a legal articulation of the status of the victim of the alleged 
crime, whether of male(s) or female(s), is not necessarily a practical oversight or the 
result of a lack of detail in the OTP's drafting of the indictment. The categories of grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, war crimes and genocide set out in the ICTY 
Statute do not solely apply to either civilians or combatants as the persons afforded 
protection. Rather, these legal categories establish protective rules regulating the conduct 
of hostilities for both combatants and civilians (Best, 1994; N abulsi, 2001).220 The 
category of war crimes (Article 3) emphasises this dual protection of civilians and 
combatants through its prohibitions on actions that 'may be perpetrated by military 
personnel against enemy servicemen or civilians, or by civilians against either members 
of the enemy armed forces or enemy civilians' (Cassese, 2003: 48).221 These protective 
rules for example, prohibit the use of certain weapons such as land-mines or poisonous 
gases that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering against all persons present in 
armed conflict, that is, civilians and combatants (see Cassese, 2003: 56-57). For these 
reasons, for these categories of crimes, the status of the victim is not necessarily a legal 
218 See for example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000) expressing concern for 'the 
hardships borne by civilians during in armed conflict, ... especially women and children and other 
vulnerable groups' (SIRES/1296 (2000)). 
219 The recognition of male individuals as civilians is the subject of further analysis in chapter five. 
220 As argued in chapter three, there is persuasive discussion determining that the protective rules of IHL were 
first established for the protection of combatants and not civilians (Best, 1994; Nabulsi, 2001). 
221 Emphasis original. 
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element of the cnme. The victim's status along the principle of distinction does not 
necessarily figure as an aspect of the adjudication of categories of crime. 
In contrast, the category of crimes against humanity is significant for its function as a 
body of protective rules which apply solely to civilians. This category of crimes legally 
determines that it is a civilian population as 'a specifically protected group' in armed 
conflict that finds safety through this 'protective scheme' of rules, and that in their 
breach, the victim is necessarily and specifically a civilian person (Bassiouni, 1999; 
Cassese, 2003). First identified and prosecuted as 'positive international criminal law' in 
the Nuremberg Charter in 1945 (Bassiouni, 1999: 1), the ICTY describes that the 
category of crimes against humanity establishes prohibitions on the conduct of armed 
conflict as 'war should be a matter between armed forces or armed groups and that the 
civilian population cannot be a legitimate target,.222 Unlike the other categories of crimes 
constituting the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal, crimes against humanity do 
not establish prohibitions against acts carried out against combatants. As the Tribunal 
affirms, crimes against humanity can never be considered as conduct or practice 'merely 
of a military sort' .z23 Rather, as the Tribunal establishes, the prosecution of persons with 
crimes against humanity arises from a breach of the prohibition of conduct committed 
with the 'deliberate attempt to target a civilian population' .224 For this reason, the 
Tribunal holds that 'to convict an accused of crimes against humanity, it must be proved 
that the crimes were related to the attack on a civilian population (occurring during an 
armed conflict) and that the accused knew that his crimes were so related' .225 
This analysis of criminal prosecutions will focus upon the OTP's charges of crimes 
against humanity for their distinct and significant articulation of civilians as the sole 
222 The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic. Case No. IT -96-23 & IT -96-
2311-T. Judgement, 22 February 2001, para. 416 ('Kunarac et at, Judgement'). 
223 The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vu/wvic. Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-
2311-A. Appeals Judgement, 12 June 2002, para. 101 (,Kunarac et at, Appeals Judgement'). 
224 Tadic. Judgement, para. 653. 
225 Tadic. Appeals Judgement, para. 271. Emphasis original. 
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victims of this category of crimes. These charges represent an official recognition that 
civilians were intentionally targeted in a 'widespread' or 'systematic' manner during the 
conflict (Schabas, 2006: 191). Crimes against humanity prosecutions are brought for 
actions against civilians carried out not for singular acts of violence, but for attacks 
perpetrated as part of 'a "course of conduct'" (Bantekas and Nash, 2003: 357).226 These 
charges indicate that these acts of civilian victimisation were a significant and pervasive 
aspect of these hostilities. The criminal prosecutions of civilian violence in crimes against 
humanity cases can therefore illuminate the 'pattern of the deliberate war against 
civilians' (Bruderlein and Leaning, 1999: 431). These charges can illuminate these 
patterns as they focus on the intentional and purposeful perpetration of crimes against 
civilians, which cannot be dismissed or overlooked for simply being 'collateral damage' 
or the recklessness of a soldier's conduct (see Downes, 2006). 
The OTP brings prosecutions of civilian victimisation as crimes against humanity through 
Article 5 of the Statute, which determines that the Tribunal has: 
the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in 
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any 
civilian popUlation: 
(a) murder; 
(b) extermination; 
(c) enslavement; 
(d) deportation; 
(e) imprisonment; 
(f) torture; 
(g) rape; 
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) other inhumane acts.227 
The vanous acts constituting this category of crimes provide a legal articulation of 
different modes of civilian victimisation and violence. In particular, they establish which 
specific acts can be subject to international adjudication and judgement. During the 
course of the Tribunal's functioning, the OTP has set important precedents for bringing 
226 It should be noted that the issue of whether singular acts of violence can constitute is contentious (see 
Cassese, 2003). 
227 The ICTY's definition of crimes against humanity deviates from the now standard definition within 
customary law that a nexus to armed conflict is not required as ajurisdictional element (Cryer, 2007: 191). 
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the first charges of imprisonment, torture and rape to be subject to the adjudication of an 
international criminal court. These crimes were not included in the Nuremberg Charter as 
numerated acts within the category of crimes against humanity (Cassese, 2003: 69). As 
such, the Tribunal has rendered the first judgements of these crimes at an international 
criminal court. Following these prosecutions, the Tribunal has provided the first 
definitions for the offences of imprisonment and rape as crimes against humanity (see 
Kordic and Cerkez228 and Kunarac et aI, respectively). It has also reviewed the existing 
definitions of torture found in human rights treaties and conventions and set out the 
specific elements of this offence as a crime under international humanitarian law (see 
Kunarac et al and the later decision of Kvocka et al affirming this definition)?29 These 
criminal prosecutions thus expand upon those acts of violence against civilians that find 
legal articulation as crimes against humanity. They also develop the jurisprudence of this 
category of crimes (see Schabas, 2006: 186). 
The Prosecution of Civilian Victimisation 
Charges of acts of civilian victimisation as cnmes against humanity constitute 189 
charges out of the total of 529 charges brought to trial by the OTP. As seen below in 
Figure three, this translates to thirty-six percent of charges being for crimes against 
humanity, that is, approximately one-third of the total number of charges. More 
significantly, however, from the first judgement rendered against Dusko Tadic in 1997 to 
the latest completed case of Limaj et aI230 concluded in September 2007, thirty-one out of 
the thirty-six completed cases to date have included charges of crimes against humanity 
as either the sole basis of the final indictment, or the partial basis in conjunction with 
228 The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez. Case No. IT-94-14/2. 
229 The Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka, Dragoljub Prcac, Milojica Kos, Mladjo Radic and Zoran ZigiC. Case 
No. IT-98-30/1. See Cassese (2003: 74-81) for an overview of the Tribunal's case-law for this category of 
crimes and the establishment of the definitions of each of the crimes. 
230 The Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala and Isak Musliu. Case No. IT -03-66. 
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charges brought through other categories of crimes.231 As Figure four below illustrates, 
charges of crimes against humanity have arisen in eighty-six percent of cases, that is, in 
more than three-quarters of the Tribunal's completed cases: 
Figure 3 
Charges by category of Crimes 
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Within these thirty-one cases involving crimes against humanity charges, the most 
significant trend is that the charges fall into two groupings of charges, those frequently 
brought to trial and those that rarely arise as criminal prosecutions. As Figure five shows, 
the majority of the charges involve three offences, those of murder (58 charges in 17 
cases), persecution (39 charges in 23 cases) and 'other inhumane acts' (39 charges in 16 
cases). In contrast, there are comparatively few charges of the other crimes, with only 6 
charges of extermination (in 5 cases), 4 charges of enslavement (in 2 cases), 6 charges of 
deportation (in 4 cases), 6 charges of imprisonment (in 3 cases), 19 charges of torture (in 
8 cases) and 12 charges of rape (in 5 cases). Overall, these charges constitute only 27 
percent of crimes against humanity charges, as opposed to the other offences within this 
category which make up 73 percent of these charges brought by the OTP: 
231 Cases including charges of crimes against humanity in the fmal indictments are: Tadic (IT -94-1); Nikolic, 
D (IT -94-2); Sikirica et al (IT -95-8); Simic et al (IT -95-9); Todorovic (IT -95-911); Simic (IT -95-9/2); Jelisic 
(1T-95 -10); Cesic (IT -95-10/1); Blaskic (IT-95-14); Kordic and Cerkez (IT -95 -14/2); Kupreskic et al (IT-95-
16); Bralo (IT -95-17); Erdemovic (IT -96-22); Kunarac et al (IT -96-23 & IT -96-2311); Stakic (IT -97 -25); 
Krnojelac (IT -97-25); Galic (IT-98-29); Kvocka et al (IT -98-3011); Vasiljevic (IT -98-32); Krstic (IT -98-33); 
Naletilic and Martinovic (IT -98-34); Brdjanin (IT -99-36); Plavsic (IT -00-39 & IT -4011); Mrdja (IT -02-59); 
Blagojevic and Jokic (IT -02-60); Nikolic, M (IT -02-60/1); Obrenovic (IT -02-60/2); Deronjic (IT -02-61); 
Banovic (IT -02-65/1); Limaj et al (IT -03 -66) and Babic (IT -03 -72). 
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A substantial number of the charges of those lesser-prosecuted offences were brought by 
the OTP in the case of Kunarac et at. This case brings the majority of charges involving 
sexual violence against women that have been heard by the Tribunal (Campbell, 2007: 
423). In its final indictment, Kunarac et al brings 3 charges of enslavement (out of a total 
of 4 overall), 8 charges of rape (out of 12) and 4 charges of torture (out of 19). With 
Kunarac et al taken out of the analysis, there is a further and even more obvious disparity 
in the acts of civilian victimisation that have been brought to trial, with a reduction in 
charges of these lesser-prosecuted offences falling to only twenty-one percent of the 
prosecutions. As seen in Figure six below, charges of rape now constitute only two 
percent of the total number of charges and enslavement one percent of prosecutions of 
crime against humanity. With this case excluded from the analysis, it is important to note 
that the OTP has brought only one other charge of enslavement (in the Krnojelac case) 
and four other charges of rape as a crime against humanity (in Tadic; Nikolic, D; Cdic 
and Kvoc"'ka et al). 
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It is unsurprising that there are notable patterns and unequal allocations in the charges of 
civilian victimisation that the OTP brings to trial. As Carolyn Nordstrom points out, 
different conflicts are characterised by the perpetration of different modes of violence 
against civilians (2004: 62-63). However, the particular patterns in these prosecutions 
were unforeseen as they do not follow the trends in civilian victimisation that 
authoritative accounts narrate as being central to the Yugoslavian conflict. Instead, they 
construct an alternative record and narrative of its predominant civilian victims. In order 
to examine which acts of civilian victimisation the Tribunal has legally 'acknowledged' 
and made 'transparent' in accordance with other accounts,232 this analysis undertakes a 
comparative exploration using the COE Report as an authoritative non-legal account of 
the hostilities for the reasons given above. This section first examines the COE's findings 
of the perpetration of civilian victimisation and then considers the adequacy of the OTP's 
prosecutions in relation to these patterns of criminal conduct. In accordance with the most 
notable patterns in the charges seen above, this exploration focuses on murder as the most 
frequently prosecuted crime against humanity and the offences of enslavement, rape and 
232 http://www.un.org/icty/glance-elindex.htm. 
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imprisonment due to their markedly infrequent prosecution. This focus also follows the 
Security Council's determination in Resolution 827 (1993) that the continued perpetration 
of these particular crimes constituted a threat to international peace and security. 
The COE Report identifies the murder and mass killing of civilians as a central aspect of 
the conflict, that it was 'one of the hallmarks of attacks by a given group' in their 
victimisation of another.233 This identification of the pervasive perpetration of murder 
follows the findings of numerous sociologists, historians, legal commentators and other 
reports on the Yugoslavian conflict (see Glenny, 1996; Kaldor, 2001). The COE Report 
describes that the murder of civilians was perpetrated within camps (i.e. detention 
facilities) set up to detain civilian populations that had been forcibly displaced from 
particular regions. 234 Mass killing of civilians also took place during campaigns of ethnic 
cleansing, that is, during the removal 'by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian 
population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas,.235 This 
crime was therefore a feature of both these modes of victimising the civilian population. 
It was an aspect of the structural victimisation of civilians within all regions of the 
conflict.236 Such high fatalities continue to resonate in the present-day, with high numbers 
of persons remaining unaccounted for and the subject of investigations by organisations 
tasked with finding missing persons.237 As one witness testified, even though it was 
known or widely presumed that particular persons from his region had been killed, 'many 
of the bodies were never recovered' .238 
In terms of the other lesser-prosecuted crimes, the COE Report describes high numbers of 
incidences of the perpetration of widespread and systematic rape and other forms of 
233 COE Report, Part II (H) (2). 
234 COE Report, Part IV (E). 
235 COE Report, Part III (B); Annex IV (1). 
236 COE Report, Part IV (G). 
237 See International Commission on Missing Persons (http://www.ic-mp.org). The Commission describes 
that there are still approximately 13,500 missing persons within Bosnia and Herzegovina and a further 2,020 
~ersons registered as missing in Croatia. There also remains high numbers of missing persons in Kosovo. 
_38 Fieldwork, Djordevic, 6 February 2009. 
155 
sexual assault during the conflict.239 Such offences are cited as occurring in detention 
facilities and as part of policies of ethnic c1eansing.24o Similarly, the COE Report 
identifies the prolific use of camps by all the warring factions to detain (thus imprison) 
civilians and notes that torture, rape and sexual assault were frequently committed within 
these facilities. 241 It also refers to multiple occurrences of the enslavement of civilians. In 
particular, the COE Report identifies the sexual enslavement of women and that the 
perpetration of this crime occurred in differential regions of the conflict.242 The COE 
Report, alongside media reports and commentators determines that these particular modes 
of (female) civilian victimisation were a significant aspect of the hostilities (see Nikolic-
Ristanovic, 2000b: 46). Although as Valentino et at (2006) point out, there are 
considerable difficulties in accurately measuring intentional civilian fatalities or 
casualties of this or any other conflict (see also Tabeau and Bijak, 2005), it appears 
indisputable that the 'high level of victimization' of civilians was the consequence of 
'consistent and repeated practices' rather than isolated or random attacks.243 
However, the charges brought by the OTP do not adequately record the high numbers and 
prevalent perpetration of all these different acts of civilian victimisation perpetrated 
against civilian victims. Following the COE Report's determination of the high level of 
the murder of civilians, the OTP's charges do similarly record this crime as central to the 
conduct of the conflict. Charges of murder arise in approximately fifty percent of crimes 
against humanity cases, this act being the most frequently prosecuted in terms of the 
number of charges. These charges were brought in cases that concern crimes committed 
by different levels of perpetrators (as will be further discussed) and in different 
239 COE Report, Part IV (F). See also, Askin (1997); Cockburn (! 998) and Cleiren and Tijssen (! 994). 
240 COE Report, Part IV (F) (3). See also Part III (B). 
241 COE Report, Part IV (E). 
242 COE Report, Annex IX (A) and (C). 
243 COE Report, Part V. It is important to note that civilian victims of 'collateral damage' will not find legal 
recognition of their harms. This 'legitimate' mode of violence does not come within the jurisdiction of the 
ICTY and so its impact upon civilians cannot be undertaken through an analysis of charges (see Best, 1994). 
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geographical regions of the conflict, for example in Srebrenica and Sarajevo.244 It is 
therefore reasonable to argue that the high number of charges of murder adequately 
reflects the pervasive perpetration of this crime. The legal narrative of the prevalence of 
this act of civilian victimisation aligns with the COE Report (and other accounts) to 
construct a cohesive and consolidated record of its perpetration. Through these consistent 
legal and non-legal descriptions of the high numbers of civilian victims murdered during 
the conflict, there cannot be any dispute over the widespread and systematic perpetration 
of murder. 
In contrast, there are minimal prosecutions for the cnmes of enslavement, rape and 
imprisonment, either in terms of the number of cases in which they have arisen or their 
prevalence within the overall number of charges (see Figure five above). There have been 
only five cases including charges of rape, three cases including imprisonment charges and 
two cases including enslavement charges. More notably, however, when viewed in terms 
of convictions the legal narrative of the prevalence of the commission of these crimes is 
even more concerning. Successful convictions have only been rendered for seven charges 
of rape (two excluding Kunarac et aT), two charges of imprisonment and two charges of 
enslavement (nil excluding Kunarac et aT). With the charges within Kunarac et al 
excluded from the analysis, the convictions for these three crimes totals only six percent 
of the overall charges of crimes against humanity (11 out of 174 charges). The charging 
and convicting of these crimes has been minimal and infrequent; the legal record of these 
modes of civilian victimisation directly conflicting with the COE Report as well as the 
Security Council Resolutions and commentators. 
These disparities in the legal and non-legal accounts of civilian victimisation complicate 
any understanding of the victims and violence of this conflict. Uwe Ewald points out that 
244 For example, charges of murder as a crime against humanity are brought in Krstii: for crimes committed in 
Srebrenica and in Galii: for crimes committed in Sarajevo. 
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'constructing "victims'" is a significant aspect of the processes of international criminal 
justice and the ICTY more specifically (2006: 173, 180). As noted in chapter three, this 
construction ofIegal recognition of civilian victims works through the OTP's bringing of 
charges for the acts of the accused. These charges constitute a legal recognition that the 
individual civilians were the victim of an act of violence. They figure the act as a 
'victimizing event' that should be the subject ofIegal adjudication (Kiza, 2006: 82). 
However, it is important to note that this legal construction of victims constructs 
recognition of two 'types' of civilian victim. Firstly, the prosecution of an act of 
victimisation constructs legal recognition of the individual civilian victims that were the 
subject of the harm under adjudication. In this way, the charges represent the 'direct 
interaction (act) between individual perpetrators and victims' (Ewald, 2006: 184). 
Secondly, as Ewald points out, through the prosecutorial process 'victims [can] appear as 
members of a victimised collective' (2006: 181). In this way, the individual victims 
appear within the legal process as representative of the broader collectivity of civilian 
victims subject to the same forms of harm. The prosecutions can therefore be understood 
to represent the typical social dynamics in the interactions between particular categories 
of civilians and combatants during the conflict (Ewald, 2006). From these descriptions of 
the patterns of the acts of victim is at ion during the conflict it should, therefore, be possible 
to analyse how different social groups of civilians experience its violence and harm. 
Through their charging of differential acts of civilian victimisation, the prosecutions show 
significant partialities in their construction of the legal recognition or representation of 
particular groups of civilian victims. For example, the COE Report, commentators and 
the Kunarac et al case suggest that female civilians were the most prominent victims of 
enslavement, rape and imprisonment. It is commonly understood that this social category 
of civilians was specifically targeted through these particular modes of victimisation and 
that the perpetration of these crimes was widespread and systematic throughout the 
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conflict (Gardam and Jarvis, 2001; Campbell, 2007; Sharratt, 1999). However, the low 
numbers of prosecutions do not adequately construct legal recognition of the female 
civilian victims of this conflict. They do not represent the pervasive victimisation of this 
category of civilians and their subjection to particular modes of victim is at ion. 
Even where the prosecutions of these crimes do construct legal recognition of this 
category of civilian victims, these charges only arise in certain types of cases heard by the 
Tribunal (as will be set out below). Feminist analyses of international law consider that 
this body of law rests upon and reproduces a distinction between 'public' and 'private' 
violences (Charlesworth et ai, 1991; Engle, 1993). As Hilary Charlesworth et al point 
out, international law regulates 'matters of international "public" concern', while 
domestic jurisdictions govern 'private' issues 'in which the international community has 
no recognized interest' (1991: 625). As such, the acts of civilian victimisation brought to 
prosecution by the OTP are matters of international public concern. They are 'public' 
violences of international concern through their designation as violations of humanitarian 
law, unlike other 'private' violences heard only by national courts. In this way, the 
prosecutions heard by the Tribunal construct an international public recognition and 
record of the civilian victims of these crimes. International legal recognition of their 
victimisation makes transparent their status as civilian victims to the international 
community (Ewald, 2006). It also includes the harms of their victimisation within the 
Tribunal's construction of an international legal narrative ofthis conflict. 
However, the OTP's strategy of further designating cases in terms of their context and 
their 'seriousness' complicates this dichotomous framework of 'public' and 'private' 
violences. Carla Del Ponte describes that the investigative and prosecutorial strategy of 
the OTP has followed a distinct temporal focus in terms of the types of perpetrators and 
cases that are brought to trial (2003; 2006). The initial indictments typically concerned 
crimes that were committed in camps, in detention facilities such as those of Omarska, 
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Keraterm and Foca.245 In contrast, the later stage of indictments, those issued from 
approximately 1998 onwards focus on crimes that were committed as part of policies or 
campaigns of 'ethnic cleansing'. 246 These ethnic cleansing cases typically came to 
judgement from 2003 onwards and constitute the context of the majority of the cases 
under adjudication at present. It is not, however, only the context of the perpetration of 
the crimes that distinguishes these two categories of cases and the stages of the 
indictments and charges. This phasing of indictments also focuses upon the political or 
military leadership level of the accused and the perceived 'seriousness' of their crimes. 
As Del Ponte notes, the early (camp) cases concern 'persons holding higher levels of 
responsibility for physically committing exceptionally brutal or otherwise serious 
offences' (2006: 542), while the later (ethnic cleansing) cases focus on 'very high-level 
persons suspected of being responsible for the most serious crimes' (Del Ponte, 2003).247 
Although this phasing of indictments has been the subj ect of critique, most often in terms 
of the initial focus on lower-level accused such as Tadic (Bass, 2000: 207), there are three 
reasons given by the Tribunal for its 'pyramid indictment strategy,.248 Firstly, as Del 
Ponte points out, at its inception there was a need to establish the credibility of the 
Tribunal through the bringing of an accused to trial, irrespective of his or her 'level' of 
responsibility (2004: 516). Secondly, this initial focus on lower-level accused 'was 
intended over time to lead investigators up the chain-of-command to the highest level 
suspects' and build up a collection of evidence and resources for their adjudication.249 
Thirdly, there were (and still are) political difficulties in arresting high-level officials who 
it is alleged were (or are) under the protection of state or military officials (Hazan, 2004: 
101). This shielding of indicted accused is commonly understood to be the reason for 
245 Interviews with OTP staff, 28 June 2006 and 29 June 2006. 
246 Interviews with OTP staff, 28 June 2006 and 29 June 2006. 
247 Emphasis added. This prosecutorial strategy was endorsed by the Security Council to facilitate the 
completion of the Tribunal's investigations, prosecutions and trials (United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1503 (2003),28 August 2003 (SIRESI1503 (2003))). 
248 http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm. 
249 http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm. 
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Rtako Mladi6's continued freedom and the late arrest of Radovan KaradZi6. Whether this 
prosecutorial strategy is either effective or necessary remains the subject of debate by 
both commentators and the prosecutors themselves.25o However, for the purposes of this 
research it is important to note that there is a categorisation and gradation of offences 
dependent upon the perception of their 'seriousness', the context of their perpetration and 
the character of the accused. Broadly speaking, the 'serious offences' in the early 'camp' 
cases are understood as different category of cases and crimes to 'the most serious 
crimes' brought to trial in the later 'ethnic cleansing' cases. 
Of the 31 completed cases including charges of crimes against humanity, 55 percent are 
'camp' cases and thus 45 percent are 'ethnic cleansing' cases. If charges are analysed in 
terms of their indictment in either 'camp' or 'ethnic cleansing' cases, it can be seen that 
prosecutions of murder arise in both these types of cases (see Figure's seven and eight 
below). There are an approximately equal number of prosecutions within these 
differential contexts; charges of murder constitute 29 percent of the prosecutions in the 
camp cases and 33 percent of the prosecutions in the ethnic cleansing cases. Murder as a 
mode of civilian victimisation arises in cases where offences are understood as both 
'serious' and the 'most serious' of crimes, perpetrated by low and high-level accused. 
This approximately equal charging can also be seen for the crimes of persecution and 
'other inhumane acts': 
250 Interviews with OTP staff, 26 June 2006 and 29 June 2006. 
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In contrast, there are not comparable numbers of charges for the enslavement, rape and 
imprisonment of (female) civilians within these two types of case?51 Rather, there is a 
distinct designation of these particular modes of civilian victimisation, with these 
offences only arising in the 'camp' cases (see Figure seven above)_ While civilian 
victimisation through the perpetration of these acts may arise in 'ethnic cleansing' cases 
251 As noted above, the COE Report and commentators describe that female civilians were the most 
prominent victims of these particular crimes, This does not mean to suggest that male civilians (or 
combatants) have not been subjected to sexual violence during the Yugoslavian conflict, rather that the 
majority of the victims of these crimes were female (see Campbell, 2007)_ 
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as evidence of the crime of persecution, as was the case in The Prosecutor v. Biljana 
Plavsi(: for example,252 there are no numerated charges brought for acts of enslavement, 
rape or imprisonment within this category of cases (see Figure eight above). Such a lack 
of charges is particularly surprising given that the COE Report describes that these crimes 
were a central aspect of strategies of ethnic cleansing throughout the conflict. It is also 
surprising given that there were numerous reports describing the perpetration of gender-
based violences against women who were displaced, refugees, and that these acts of 
victimisation took place at border-crossings, in public places or in their own homes 
(Gardam and Jarvis, 2001: 27-31). 
The exclusive prosecution of these crimes against female civilians within 'camp' cases 
can be seen to problematise the seemingly clear distinction between those crimes 
understood to be of 'public' international concern as opposed to those of 'private' 
domestic concern. This difficulty of a straightforward ascription of the crimes of 
imprisonment, rape and enslavement as matters of international 'public' concern arises 
through their designation as 'less serious' than other acts of civilian victimisation. In 
addition to the overall lack of such prosecutions, there are two factors that illustrate the 
designation of these acts as 'less serious'. Firstly, the construction of the 'lesser 
seriousness' of these crimes against female civilians emerges through their predominant 
inclusion in early cases that charge low-level perpetrators for acts of civilian victimisation 
in detention facilities. Secondly, these crimes do not figure within the 'more serious' 
'ethnic cleansing' cases and as such, there is an impression given that imprisonment, rape 
and enslavement were only part of certain aspects of the conduct of the conflict, rather 
than figuring throughout the differential contexts of its perpetration. These patterns in the 
exclusion of these crimes from the 'more serious' cases trying the higher or highest 
leaders create an impression that they are marginal to the concerns of the international 
Tribunal. The lack of international prosecutions for their perpetration figures the 
252 Case No. IT -00-39 & IT -40/1. 
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victimisation of these (female) civilian victims as a particular type of violence that does 
not necessitate a comprehensive or full legal response by the Tribunal. In this sense, their 
harms are not adequately made 'public' to the international community through the 
processes of international adjudication and judgement. 
This exclusion of the construction of international legal recognition of the victimisation 
of female civilians can also be seen through the notable inclusion of charges of rape in 
cases that the Tribunal has transferred to domestic 'private' jurisdictions of the former 
Yugoslavia.253 Charlesworth et al argue that the international public sphere fails to legally 
recognise violence against women and that specific harms against them are typically 
relegated to the 'private' domain (1991: 625-627). In this sense, it is notable that charges 
concerning the rape of female civilians are brought in two out of the eight cases that have 
been transferred to domestic jurisdictions?S4 Although these figures may appear minimal, 
prosecutions for this crime are brought in a quarter of the transfer cases as opposed to 
approximately an eighth of the cases heard by the Tribunal. Similarly to the distinctions 
of 'seriousness' seen in the 'camp' and 'ethnic cleansing' cases, the Tribunal assesses 
'the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of the responsibility of the accused' in 
their determination of the applicability of cases to transfer.255 In these two cases, it is 
determined that the crimes allegedly committed against the female civilians are 'not of 
such gravity as to demand trial at the Tribunal'.z56 For this reason, these 'less serious' acts 
of female civilian victimisation will be heard within the 'private' sphere of the relevant 
domestic jurisdictions. The relegation of these cases to domestic jurisdictions means that 
the Tribunal will not found international legal recognition of their particular civilian 
victims or include their harms within its record of the victims and violence of the conflict. 
253 As part of the completion strategy, the Tribunal has referred a small number of cases to domestic 
jurisdictions of the former Yugoslavia, mostly to Bosnia and Herzegovina. These cases are transferred 
rursuant to Rule Ilbis of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
54 Charges of rape are brought in Jankovic (Case No. IT -96-23/2) and Stankovic (Case No. IT -96-23/2). 
255 http://www.un.org/ictv/glance-e/index.htrn. 
256 The Prosecutor v. Radovan Stanko vic. Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT. Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 
II BIS, 17 May 2005, para. 15; The Prosecutor v. Gojko Jankovic. Case No. IT -96-23/2-PT. Decision on 
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 BIS, 22 July 2005, para. 20. 
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Conclusion 
The rules and norms of humanitarian law characterise all persons who are not combatants 
as civilians. This description of the participants of conflict describes that all civilians are 
equally subject to the protections of this body of law and so have the same rights to safety 
and security during hostilities. However, as has been set out above, the legal enforcement 
of breaches of these protections by the Tribunal creates an impression that certain 
civilians are 'more deserving' of the criminal prosecution of their victimisation than 
others. 
The patterns in the criminal prosecutions show that there has been an unequal 
construction of international legal recognition and record of different social categories of 
civilian victims and the crimes perpetrated against them during the Yugoslavian conflict. 
This analysis shows that particular acts of civilian victimisation are heard at trial as 
criminal prosecutions in a far greater frequency than others. It also highlights that the 
hierarchical designation of crimes (and their criminals) as more or less 'serious' and the 
distinct patterns seen in those crimes falling into these categorisations establishes an 
impression that particular acts of civilian victimisation are marginal or of lesser concern 
to the Tribunal. In this regard, the most notable aspect of the OTP's prosecutorial strategy 
is that acts of civilian victimisation are not viewed as equally 'deserving' of criminal 
prosecution. Instead, particular crimes against civilians such as rape, imprisonment and 
enslavement are understood as less serious than other acts and consequently are not 
subject to the same levels of international prosecution and adjudication by the Trial 
Chambers. 
Drawing on both these aspects ofthe practices of criminal prosecution, of their frequency 
and gradation of 'seriousness', the second important pattern seen in the cases and charges 
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brought to trial is that the Tribunal does not adequately construct international legal 
recognition of certain collectivities of civilians, and of female civilians in particular. As a 
consequence of the few charges of certain crimes (imprisonment, rape and enslavement) 
there is an inadequate legal construction of female civilians as a victimised group during 
the Yugoslavian hostilities, that this particular category of civilians was the target of 
structural victimisation and violence. Even when gendered crimes are brought before the 
Trial Chambers, they are not attributed the same level of 'seriousness' as other acts of 
civilian victimisation and so, again, are constructed as marginal or of less concern to the 
processes of criminal prosecution. The transfer of cases to domestic jurisdictions 
involving crimes against female civilians reinforces this impression that the ICTY's 
processes of international adjudication are focused on 'more serious' crimes such as 
murder and persecution. This relative exclusion of female civilian victims and their harms 
within the prosecutions, in tum, has the consequence that particular categories of civilian 
victims do not appear within the legal representation of the victims and violence of the 
Yugoslavian conflict, as other accounts suggest they should. In particular, as this analysis 
sets out, there is not a comprehensive legal 'collective memory' of female civilians as a 
victimised group or the particular modes of violence and ensuing harms that they were 
subjected to during the hostilities. 
This inadequate legal recognition of female civilian victims also draws attention to the 
broader problem of the lack of a consolidated or cohesive collective memory and 
representation of this conflict. As has been set out above, the criminal prosecutions heard 
before the Tribunal construct a very different representation and account of the conduct 
of the hostilities to other authoritative sources, such as the Commission of Experts, but 
also historians, sociologists and other commentators. In this way, there is not a shared or 
mutually acknowledged account of the victims and acts of victimisation during the 
hostilities. Rather, the Tribunal's criminal prosecutions can be seen to inadequately 
enforce the perpetration of particular crimes, such as rape and enslavement, against 
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particular civilian victims, such as females, which distinctly contrasts with other accounts 
of the types of victimisation and victims central to its conduct. In this way, there are not 
only various narratives of the hostilities and its participants from different sources, but 
inconsistent and competing representations of its modes of victimisation. Such a situation 
creates a multiplicity of conflicting 'memories' that complicates, or perhaps negates, any 
commonly acknowledged understanding of its victims and perpetrators. It creates a 
situation where certain groups of civilian victims may find recognition of their victim 
status by particular organisations or commentators, but not international legal address or 
redress for their harms. 
The next chapter of this thesis explores how victims of acts of victimisation such as those 
set out above are legally identified as civilian victims. Using the case of D. Milosevic as a 
case-study, the chapter first examines the complexities of identifying the victims of 
crimes of war. It then explores how the different parties to the trial attempt to prove (or 
disprove) the civilian status of individual civilian victims. 
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Chapter Five 
War and Its Witnesses: The Trials and Testimonies of Civilian Harm 
Once you have taken the solemn declaration, you are a witness of justice?S7 
From the first trial of Dusko Tadic to the current adjudications in The Hague, a 
significant area of debate in relation to the Tribunal's legal practices has been the 
inclusion of victim-witnesses at trial and the provision of protective measures enabling 
their testimonies to be heard by the Chambers (Chinkin, 1996; Leigh, 1996; Stover, 
2005). In Tadic, following its recognition that the abuses perpetrated in the Yugoslavian 
conflict had spread terror among the civilian population, the Trial Chamber held that the 
Tribunal had an 'affirmative obligation to protect victims and witnesses'. 258 This 
protection is a necessary aspect of the Tribunal's legal practices as a 'fair trial means not 
only fair treatment to the defendant but also to the prosecution and to the witnesses'. 259 
How, then, does the Tribunal construct its practices of trial adjudication for the 'fair 
treatment' of victim-witnesses that come to testify before the Chambers? More 
specifically, what is the role and positioning of civilian victim-witnesses within the 
Tribunal's legal proceedings? This chapter first considers the complexities of defining 
witnesses as civilian victim-witnesses in light of the conduct of the Yugoslavian conflict. 
It then analyses the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence and, in particular, its 
framework of protective mechanisms and measures that enable civilian victim-witnesses 
to come before the court. Finally, this chapter explores the practices of identifying and 
257 Fieldwork at the trial of Jadranko Prlic et aI, Statement of the Presiding Judge, 26 June 2007. 
258 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic. Case No. IT-94-1. Decision on the Prosecution's Motion Requesting 
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 10 August 1995, paras. 23-26 (,Tadic, Protective Measures 
Decision'). 
259 Tadic, Protective Measures Decision, para. 55. The Tribunal's provision of protective measures has been 
contentious. In particular, commentators have argued that the use of anonymous witnesses is not consistent 
with the rights of the accused for a fair trial (see Leigh, 1996). 
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including civilian victim-witnesses during trial adjudications and the structuring of their 
testimonies from the differential positions of the civilian victim-witnesses themselves, the 
Prosecution, Defence and the Trial Chamber. 260 
In order to explore the Tribunal's recognition of civilian victims as witnesses and the 
structuring of their testimonies at trial, this chapter uses The Prosecutor v. Dragomir 
Milosevic ('D. Milosevic') as a case-study of the Tribunal's legal practices.261 This case 
charges the accused with the war crimes of 'terror against a civilian population' and 
'attacks on civilians' and four counts of crimes against humanity (murder and inhumane 
acts) for his participation in the shelling and sniping of civilians in the region of Sarajevo. 
For this reason, a substantial number of the witnesses testifying during the trial 
proceedings were the civilian victims of these alleged crimes. At trial, the Prosecution 
brings witnesses before the Trial Chambers to establish 'facts' relating to the case and to 
provide evidence supporting the charges of the alleged unlawful actions of the accused 
(Schabas, 2006: 471). However, in D. Milosevic, the specificity of the charges for acts of 
violence against civilians brought against the accused did not only require the victim-
witnesses being brought by the Prosecution to establish the perpetration of violence by 
the accused during the siege. Rather, in this case, the victim-witnesses testifying also had 
to provide proof of their status as civilians through their own actions at the time of the 
conflict. These witnesses had to narrate their forms of participation in the conflict as well 
as the actions of the accused, a matter that was subject to challenge by the Defence. As a 
consequence, the legal proceedings rested upon an 'adjudication' of the identity of the 
victim, for without proof of their civilian status, these victims could not be understood as 
victims or even relevant witnesses to the case. 
260 It should be noted that during courtroom observations, there were many instances of persons testifying at 
the Tribunal who could reasonably understood to be combatant victim-witnesses. However, this chapter 
focuses upon civilian victim-witnesses in light of the research questions of the thesis. 
261 Case No. IT-98-29/1. 
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Civilian Victims as Victim-Witnesses: The Difficulties of Defining Persons in 
Conflict 
Civilian victims of the Yugoslavian conflict can only come before the Tribunal during 
trial proceedings. They can only participate in these legal proceedings if summoned upon 
to give evidence against (or for) the accused for his or her alleged perpetration of criminal 
conduct (Chifflet, 2003; Van Boven, 1999). Despite the development of forms of 
restorative justice within international criminal justice mechanisms and the progressive 
victims' rights set out by the United Nations, as discussed previously, a civilian (or 
combatant) victim cannot initiate legal proceedings at the Tribunal or claim compensation 
for the sustaining of harm. Instead, as David Tolbert and Frederick Swinnen point out, the 
'only formal category of victims in terms of the Tribunal's proceedings is the victim as 
witness' (2006: 195). This limited positioning of victims arises from the necessity of the 
parties of the legal proceedings, that is, the Prosecution and Defence to bring evidence in 
the form of witness testimony before the Trial Chamber. For example, in D. Milosevic, 
the Prosecution presented evidence 'through the testimony of surviving victims and other 
eyewitnesses' to demonstrate the patterns and scale of the perpetration of terror to the 
civilian population.262 Acting as witnesses, a limited number of civilian victims narrated 
their experience of victimisation, providing evidence that worked to illustrate the broader 
patterns of acts of civilian victimisation during the siege of Sarajevo. 
The Tribunal does recognise that many of the witnesses that come before the Trial 
Chambers will be victims of the Yugoslavian conflict. This recognition is seen, for 
example, through the Tribunal's establishment of a Victims and Witnesses Section 
('VWS ') to assist and protect such persons during their time in The Hague. It can also be 
seen through the terms of the early Tadic decision on the protective measures for victims 
262 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 6 May 2003, para. 21671. 
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and witness,263 and the ongoing provision of protective measures for victim-witnesses 
testifying in cases currently under adjudication.264 However, the Tribunal does not 
provide a definition of a victim-witness or a civilian victim-witness more specifically in 
either its Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence. While the concept of a victim-
witness is employed by ICTY prosecutors and staff members of the VWS to describe 
witnesses who have suffered harm from the conflict (see Lobwein, 2006; Tolbert and 
Swinnen, 2006),265 it is important to note that the Tribunal as an institution does not keep 
or provide official statistics on the number or 'type' of victim-witnesses that have come 
before the Chambers.266 
Commentators also often employ the concept of 'victim-witness' in analyses of war 
crimes trials. For example, Marie-Benedicte Dembour and Emily Haslam (2004) provide 
an insightful exploration of the role and participation of victim-witnesses and the 
structuring of their testimonies during the genocide trial of Radislav Krsti6. Through an 
analysis of the transcripts of this case, they show that the victim-witnesses were 
prevented from testifying in a manner that goes beyond the provision of 'literal facts' to 
their subjective experiences and as such, are effectively 'silenced' during the trial process 
(Dembour and Haslam, 2004: 164, 175). For this reason, Dembour and Haslam argue that 
war crimes trials are not beneficial for victims as the current structure and form of legal 
processes may cause harm to those testifying (2004: 177). However, considering the 
centrality of the testimonies of victim-witnesses for this analysis, it appears problematic 
that the authors do not conceptualise a 'victim-witness' or address how they designated 
such status to eighteen out of the one hundred and sixteen witnesses that testified in the 
263 Tadic, Protective Measures Decision, para. 23. 
264 See for example The Prosecutor v. Mile Mrs!dc, Miroslav Radic and Veselin Sljivancanin. Case No. IT-
95-13I1-T. Decision on Prosecution's Additional Motion for Protective Measures of Sensitive Witnesses, 25 
October 2005, para. 5 ('Mrskic et aI, Protective Measures Decision'). 
265 Interviews with VWS staff, May and June 2006. 
266 Email correspondence with member of staff of the VWS, December 2008. 
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Krstic case.267 More broadly, there is little consideration of the particular complexities in 
ascribing victim-witness status to those victims of armed conflict who provide evidence 
of alleged crimes (who can be both civilians and combatants), or the consequent impact 
that their status along the principle of distinction could have upon the process of trial 
proceedings. 
In contrast, Eric Stover through an interview-based study of eighty-seven victims who 
had testified at the Tribunal does not find such overriding negative opinions of the trial 
experience from the victim-witnesses themselves (2005). Instead, Stover describes how 
the majority (seventy-seven percent) of the victim-witnesses he interviewed found 
testifying a positive experience, with a number of witnesses citing the professionalism of 
the Tribunal staff and the fairness of the trial process as the basis of this opinion (2005: 
134). Similarly to Dembour and Haslam however, the establishment of a definition of a 
victim or a victim-witness is also lacking in Stover's study. Instead, he draws attention to 
the fact that in the aftermath of mass violence there are substantive difficulties in 
ascribing a definitive status to particular individuals or collectivities, despite the 
overriding tendency 'to lump those who survive into three distinct groups: perpetrators, 
victims, and bystanders' (2005: 4). Stover further complicates the ascription of this status 
by raising the issue that few survivors of armed conflict definitively categorise 
themselves along the victim / perpetrator divide, with it often being the case that this self-
categorisation would not align to that given by other persons, social groups or institutions 
(2005: 4). Moreover, it is also the case that known perpetrators may claim or seek the 
status of 'victim' to justify or seek legitimation for their unlawful actions (Kiza, 2006; 
Stover, 2005). As Stover highlights, there are significant contestations over the very 
concept of victimhood, with the status of victim and thus 'victim-witness' being both an 
actively sought after status for founding address and redress for the experience of harm, 
267 See The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic. Case No. IT-98-33. Case Information Sheet. 
(http://www.un.org/icty/glance/casefactindex-e.htm). 
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but also rejected for its lack of representation of the survival of mass violence (2005: 4-
5). One example of this is found in Kunarac et aI, when a civilian victim testified that the 
perpetrators would describe her and other women and children they had held as 'slaves'. 
However, despite sustaining profound harm, she asserted that despite the perpetrators 
designation of her as such, she 'wouldn't accept that' and that instead she felt 'dignified 
and proud' .268 For this witness, her self-characterisation as a survivor, rather than as 
'victim', shaped her understanding of her experiences and the violence of the conflict 
more broadly (see Mertus, 2004). 
These difficulties in defining which persons can be understood as 'victim-witnesses' can 
arise from the complexities of ascribing a status of 'victim' to persons in a situation of 
armed conflict. Most commentators conceptualise a war victim as a person who has 
experienced harm, either directly from the actions of another person (most probably a 
combatant), or indirectly through human actions that victimise persons living through a 
conflict (for example in siege conditions) (see Kiza, 2006; Jaukovic, 2002). The United 
Nations similarly defines a victim of a breach of human rights or humanitarian law in 
terms of their suffering of harm, determining that this harm can take the form of physical 
or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their 
fundamental rights.269 For the UN, the victims of such breaches include those directly 
targeted individuals, but also 'the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim 
and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to 
prevent victimization' .270 These definitions of the victims of armed conflict (and / or 
human rights abuses) characterise the impact and experience of victimisation 
expansively, as causing harm to both 'direct' and 'indirect' victims. They understand the 
268 The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic. Case No. IT -96-23-T & IT-
96-2311. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, 24 April 2000, para. 2424 (,Kunarac et at, Transcript'). 
269 United Nations, Principles on the Right to a Remedy, para. 8. It should be noted that the UN definition of 
a victim does not require civilian status and therefore may include victims who are combatants. 
270 United Nations, Principles on the Right to a Remedy, para. 8. 
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experience of victimisation as a relational harm, as impacting upon the direct victim as 
well as the broader community, particularly those with whom the victim has familial ties. 
It is therefore important to recognise the widespread and systematic nature of violence 
perpetration and thus victimisation in armed conflict. As noted in chapter one, Emesto 
Kiza points out that the process of identifying a war victim and their victimization 
requires employing a 'structural model of war victimization' (2006: 81). As Kiza argues, 
a structural model of war victimization emphasises the interrelated conditions for the 
existence of violence and its perpetration, and how it differs from conditions of peace, 
most notably in the total loss of security, the high degree of offences such as assault and 
rape and the lack of functioning institutions and other systems of social control to prevent 
its occurrence (2006: 80). Building upon the UN's recognition of the existence of both 
direct and indirect experiences and sources of violence during conflict situations, in this 
structural form, violence becomes a constituent aspect of the conditions of everyday life. 
Its encompassing character is evident as it permeates throughout the affected community, 
state or states to affect their inhabitants either directly or indirectly (Kiza, 2006). Since 
the massive scale of this structural victimization will 'crystallize into the sharp, hard 
surfaces of individual suffering', the majority of the persons within the 'larger social 
matrix' will become the victims of its harm or fear its future perpetration (Farmer, 2004: 
282). As the trial proceedings and judgements of the Tribunal exemplify, under 
conditions of war, this broad spectrum of violence can range from individual assaults to 
the broader targeting or indiscriminate victimisation of a civilian populace or society. In 
D. Milosevic, for example, conditions of structural violence and victimisation to both 
individual and community can be observed in the testimonies of the individual victims 
who act as victim-witnesses to their personal experience of sniping or shelling. Viewed 
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together, the Tribunal considers that these acts of violence can reflect the overall terror 
perpetrated to the civilian population of Sarajevo through the actions ofthis accused.271 
As set out previously in chapter one, this framing of structural war victimisation centres 
upon a recognition of the infliction (and sustaining) of 'harm' to both individuals and the 
social matrix. However, the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence does not follow 
this approach in defining a victim in relation to their sustaining of harm. It has not revised 
its rules to encompass the more recent definition set out by the ICC Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, which defines victims as 'natural persons who have suffered harm as a 
result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court' (Rule 85 (a)). 
Rather, the Tribunal characterises a victim as a 'person against whom a crime over which 
the Tribunal has jurisdiction has allegedly been committed' (Rule 2 (A)). This 
formulation of a victim fails to acknowledge their sustaining of harm, whether it be of a 
physical or psychological nature, unless the perpetration of violence and victimisation 
against them is affirmed as an act of criminal conduct. In these terms, the Tribunal's 
characterisation of a victim does not clearly figure the victim as being a victim because of 
the direct or indiscriminate actions of a perpetrator. By defining a victim's status in terms 
of an (alleged) crime under the Tribunal's jurisdiction, the role of the perpetrator is not 
readily apparent as the cause of the victimisation of an individual or collectivity (or their 
resulting harm). 
Whether following the ICTY's definition of a victim, or a more expanSIve 
conceptualisation that recognises the sustaining of harm, identifying a person as a victim 
of conflict is often a complex process and the subject of challenge and dispute. Rama 
Mani points out that legal trials over-emphasise the categories of 'perpetrator' and 
'victim' as 'mutually exclusive, rigid and unchanging' (2002: 121). However, as Mani 
271 The Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/l-T. Judgement, 12 December 2007, paras. 
967-978 ('D. Milosevic, Judgement'). Conditions of structural victimisation as collective victimisation of 
collectivities of civilians is explored in chapter six. 
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argues, it is 'observed - though rarely discussed - that in many conflicts the distinction 
between victim and perpetrator may not be so sharp' (2002: 121). Within the conditions 
of the Yugoslavian conflict, as well as many others (see Mani, 2002; Moser and Clark, 
2001), there are significant difficulties in ascribing or retaining the seemingly precise 
legal divide between civilians and combatants through the principle of distinction. The 
intersection of both these categories of persons figuring as victims and perpetrators 
complicates any simple designation of civilians figuring only as victims of the 
Yugoslavian conflict, or of combatants being the only perpetrators. For example, in D. 
Mi!osevic, a number of witnesses described themselves as having been 'forced' to act as 
combatants by one of the armies present in Sarajevo.272 They were not willing fighters, 
indeed, as one witness asserted, 'this was not my war and I did not want to bear arms'.273 
In these terms, reflecting the complexities of categorising persons in armed conflict, these 
combatants were victims of the actions of the military persons controlling their 
participation in the conflict (for it was not their choice to fight). However, they were also 
perpetrators of violence (in their commitment of criminal conduct) and therefore 
contributed to the victimisation and harm of civilians and other combatants in either 
direct or indirect forms. 
This amalgamation of victim / perpetrator status in relation to the principle of distinction 
is also evident in terms of persons understood as civilians directly or indiscriminately 
targeted by D. Milosevic, and as civilian victims by the Tribunal. In this case, the 
Prosecution brought civilian victims to testify to their civilian status and their experience 
of violence in Sarajevo, crimes which were successfully brought to judgement by the 
Trial Chamber. However, as chapter six will further discuss, in D. Milosevic, a distinct 
feature of the trial proceedings was a number of civilian victim-witnesses describing 
distinct alliances to military personnel of 'their' side through ethnic groupings and 
272 Fieldwork, D. Milosevii:, 18 June 2007. 
273 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007. 
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refusing to acknowledge the perpetration of violence by these combatants.274 These 
military-civilian alliances illustrate that in the Yugoslavian conflict, as in others, there is 
often a degree of 'participation of civilians in war as agents rather than passive victims' 
(Nabulsi, 2001: 18). It is important to acknowledge that with the 'growing involvement of 
both civilians and civilian installations (factories, etc.) in the war effort' (Cassese, 2005: 
404), both combatants and civilians can be active participants and integral to the 
structural victimisation and violence inherent in the conduct of war. In this way, 
following the structural model of war victimisation, it can be argued that both combatants 
(particularly 'forced' combatants) and the civilians who suffered harm from the violence 
were victims of the conflict. This broad experience of victimisation is a consequence of 
the pervasive violence of war that permeates the social matrix and all persons, on both 
sides of the principle of distinction, within it. 
Despite the difficulties of recognising the civilian and combatant victims of armed 
conflict, it is a fundamental principle of the Tribunal's legal proceedings that certain 
witnesses are victim-witnesses, whichever side of the civilian / combatant divide they 
fall. In order to analyse the Tribunal's adjudicatory processes, it is therefore necessary to 
develop a definition of a victim-witness in the absence of such a definition in its Statute 
or RPE. Tolbert and Swinnen describe a victim-witness as a 'victim of alleged crimes 
who then testifies about the events that he or she has witnessed' (2006: 196). This 
definition largely follows that set out in the ICTY Statute. However, as Tolbert and 
Swinnen acknowledge, and as has been argued above, these witnesses have also been 'the 
direct victims of crimes, such as rape, beatings or torture' (2006: 197). They have 
experienced harm and may be subject to re-traumatization or fear reprisals through their 
witnessing of these acts of violence and victimisation (Stover, 2005: 101). However, to 
understand war victimisation also necessitates recognising the indirect forms of 
274 See D. Milosevic, Transcript, 22 January 2007, para. 808. 
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victimisation as outlined above, rather than narrowing a conceptualisation of violence to 
direct crimes or acts within a conflict situation. 
For this reason, this analysis will understand victim-witnesses as persons who have either 
directly or indirectly experienced harm from the acts of victimisation and violence under 
adjudication and come to trial to narrate its perpetration. This definition of a victim-
witness follows the UN's description that both the 'direct' victim and their family or 
dependents may suffer from the harms of victimisation, that injuries can be experienced 
as relational harms. For example, a person who observes the death or injury to a family 
member or friend through an incident of sniping or shelling should be understood as a 
victim-witness for their 'indirect' experience of a victimizing incident of harm. In this 
regard, as noted in chapter one, it is necessary to conceptualise harm expansively, as 
encompassing both physical and psychological injuries, to capture the variety of ways 
that the effects of victimisation can be sustained and felt by direct and indirect victims. 
As such, this definition of victim-witnesses broadens the UN's description of a victim to 
consider that the context of consuming violence will inevitably impact upon persons in 
the vicinity of such violence, or those who have observed and endured the perpetration of 
harm to others. It takes account of broader experiences of structural victimisation and 
harm by a civilian population, for example through conflict situations such as a siege or 
campaigns of ethnic cleansing which create an atmosphere or terror and risk for both an 
individuals own safety and that of others. 
This analysis of victim-witnesses and their testimonies will focus upon those persons that 
can be identified as civilian victim-witnesses, those witnesses who have experienced 
harm either directly or indirectly as civilians. In addition to the general focus of this 
analysis of the Tribunal's work in relation to civilian recognition and redress, there are 
two main reasons for concentrating on civilian victim-witnesses, which have been set out 
in previous chapters. Firstly, it is evident that the conduct of the Yugoslavian conflict 
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centred upon a high degree of deliberate targeting of the civilian population and as such, 
the majority of victims were civilians (Bassiouni, 1994). For this reason, as Kiza points 
out, the testimonies of civilians may well 'provide the best information on events that 
have taken place during wartime, on the structure of victimization' (2006: 73). Secondly, 
as set out in chapter four, the considerable majority of cases brought by the Prosecution 
are for acts of violence against civilians, with all completed cases having included 
charges for such conduct through the various categories of crimes comprising the 
Tribunal's Statute. For these reasons, it is likely that a substantial number of victim-
witnesses giving evidence at trial were civilians during the conflict. Indeed, courtroom 
observation at the Tribunal in D. Milosevic and other cases affirmed this inclusion of 
civilian victim-witnesses within legal proceedings. 
Enabling Victim-Witness Testimony: The Rules of Procedure, Evidence and 
Protection 
From the initial investigations to the later adjudication of cases and charges during trial 
and appeals hearings, the Tribunal's Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence set out 
the framework of this institution's legal practices. These documents are central to the 
Tribunal's functioning as they structure the 'proper administration of justice ... to govern 
the principal aspects of the proceedings' (Cassese, 1994: 57). They establish the 
procedural rules for the conduct of trial proceedings and the forms of evidence that can be 
submitted by the Prosecution and Defence to support their case. For witnesses coming to 
testify before the Chambers, the Statute and RPE also determine the Tribunal's provision 
of protection measures and the manner in which victims (as witnesses) are able to 
participate in the trial process. How, then, does the Tribunal understand the role of 
civilian-victim testimony as a form of evidence? And in consideration of the necessity to 
ensure the safety and security of these witnesses, how does the Tribunal enable civilian 
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victims to act as victim-witnesses? What forms of protection are in place to mitigate 
reprisals or re-traumatisation from their participation in trial processes? 
Victim-Witness Testimony as Evidence 
Following their investigations and bringing of charges, for perpetrators such as D. 
Milosevic to come before the Trial Chamber, the Prosecution must bring 'sufficient 
evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal' (Rule 47(B)). If a judge confirms the counts 
of an indictment an arrest warrant can be issued and 'the suspect shall have the status of 
an accused' (Rule 47(H)(i) and (ii)). Once trial proceedings have been initiated, Rule 
66(B) determines that the Prosecution shall permit the Defence to inspect any supporting 
materials of the indictment that they will use as evidence or may be 'material to the 
preparation of the defence'. As was seen during periods of courtroom observation at the 
Tribunal, and as is typical of national and international legal proceedings, such evidence 
is generally admitted in two main forms, as either 'live' witness testimony or as 
documents such as maps, photographs, video and audio-recordings (May and Wierda, 
2001: 254). In the later stages of the Tribunal's functioning, witness statements have also 
been increasingly submitted in documentary form, as will be further discussed. 
Accordingly, the Prosecution III D. Milosevic brought a number of these different 
evidential forms to support the charges of acts of violence against civilians committed by 
the accused, while the Defence similarly used such materials to attempt to discredit these 
allegations. Following the procedures of the Tribunal, these evidential sources provided 
both the grounds to indict the accused and upon his arrest, the holding of a trial to 
adjudicate the charges brought against him. 
Of these evidential sources, witness testimony and civilian victim-witness testimony 
more specifically has been central to trial proceedings. The Trial Chamber 'may admit 
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any relevant evidence which it considers to have probative value' (Rule 89). While the 
expansive terms of this Rule have been the subject of debate, in particular in relation to 
the submission of 'hearsay' evidence (Scharf and Schabas, 2002: 87), these terms of 
admission require that the evidence must 'be relevant and capable of authentication' 
(Boas, 2001: 265). At its inception, the Tribunal placed a high value on 'live' testimony 
as a relevant evidential source to be admitted at trial by either the Prosecution or Defence. 
Rule 90(A), which has since been revised, determined that '[w]itnesses shall, in principle, 
be heard directly by the Chambers'. This prioritisation of witness testimony arose, as 
unlike the Nuremberg trials 'whose prosecutions relied heavily on the meticulous 
documentary record seized from the Nazis' (Morris and Scharf, 1995: 242), the Tribunal 
'did not begin its investigations with a victor's trove of documents' (Tieger and Shin, 
2005: 669). During its early functioning, there was a predominant use of witness 
testimony as an evidential form within trial proceedings. Indeed, as the Tadii: decision 
notes, the Tribunal was 'heavily dependent on eyewitness testimony' to try the 
?75 perpetrators that come before the Chambers.-
There has, however, been a marked change in the Tribunal's preference for particular 
evidential forms over the course of its functioning. As the focus has moved to the 
prosecution of higher-level leaders, as discussed in chapter four, there has been a shift 
from the prioritisation of witness testimony to an increasing use of written and 
documentary evidence. Central to this shift in evidential forms was the inclusion of Rule 
92bis to the RPE in 2000 which determines that: 
[A] Trial Chamber may dispense with the attendance of a witness in person, and instead 
admit, in whole or in part, the evidence of a witness in the form of a written statement or a 
transcript of evidence, which was given by a witness in proceedings before the Tribunal, in 
lieu of oral testimony which goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct of 
the accused as charged in the indictment. 
275 Tadic, Protective Measures Decision, para. 63. 
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As an interview with a staff member of the VWS confirmed, a particular consequence of 
the adoption of this Rule has been a lessening of the number of victim-witnesses 
testifying 'live' before the Chambers. Although a few victim-witnesses are typically 
brought before the Chambers during the early stages of the Prosecution's case to give 
evidence, the majority of witnesses now testifying are military or political leaders, or 
expert witnesses.276 For this reason, as the Tribunal's adjudications continue, it appears 
that the procedural changes to its functioning are significantly reducing the possibility for 
a civilian victim to be a witness and narrate their experiences of conflict. 
The modification in the Tribunal's admission of evidential forms from witnesses to 
documents has arisen through two interrelated factors. Firstly, the Tribunal's adoption of 
Rule 92bis is central to the process of expediting trial proceedings (Jorda, 2001: 41). In 
line with the terms of the completion strategy, there has been an ongoing focus on 
decreasing the use of time-consuming witness testimony and, instead, admitting written 
statements, as was often seen during courtroom observation in D. Milosevic (see Fairlie, 
2003). Secondly, the shift to the prosecution of higher-level leaders requires information 
and evidence that witness testimonies cannot provide. Zahar and Sluiter point out that the 
Tribunal's later cases concern 'defendants in formerly senior positions who did not 
themselves commit statutory crimes, but whose decisions are said to have caused, at the 
ground level, widespread perpetration of such crimes' (2008: 343). The prosecution of 
these accused requires documentary evidence that proves 'the so-called "crime base''', 
evidence which can include transcripts or statements of prior ICTY proceedings 
concerning the conviction of accused who were subordinate to those senior leaders now 
on trial (Zahar and Sluiter, 2008; also Kay, 2006). In this respect, following the 'pyramid 
strategy' of prosecutions, it was notable during fieldwork at the D. Milosevic case that the 
276 Interview with a staff member of the VWS, 3 February 2009. 
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judges made frequent references to the Galic case, involving D. Milosevi6's former 
superior.277 
Despite the decreasing use of witness testimony in favour of other documentary forms, 
the Tribunal has tried, and continues to try cases that require civilian victims to come to 
court to name the accused and narrate his or her crimes to the Chambers. This necessary 
inclusion of civilian victim-witnesses within cases such as D. Milosevic is a consequence 
of the charges of the indictment relating to specific injuries to individual, named civilians. 
As Cassese points out, unless the crime under adjudication concerns a fatality, often 'the 
principal witness against the perpetrator of a crime will be the victim' (1994: 78). The 
'live' testimony of the victim-witness is therefore still integral to the legal process of 
adjudication as only they can testify to their direct experience of victimisation and harm 
(Mertus, 2004). It can also be seen that there is a symbolic element to the inclusion of 
certain victim-witnesses during trial proceedings. Victim-witnesses are not only brought 
before the Chambers by the Prosecution or Defence for evidential reasons, but also to 
impress upon the judges and, perhaps also the public, that the criminal conduct under 
adjudication had a direct or indirect harmful impact upon the lives of individual or 
collectivities of civilians. For example, in D. Milosevic, the Defence brought a number of 
Bosnian Serb witnesses before the Chambers to emphasise that both Bosnian Muslims 
and Bosnian Serbs were victims of the siege of Sarajevo.278 These witnesses were 
portrayed as 'victim-witnesses' by the Defence to illustrate the structural nature of the 
victimisation and violence and its pervasive perpetration throughout the region (as will be 
further discussed in chapter six). However, in cases such as D. Milosevic, the Prosecution 
does not only bring victim-witnesses to trial to narrate the circumstances of the act of 
violence under adjudication, or symbolise the personal impact of its harmful 
consequences. Rather, as will be further discussed, the specificity of the charges 
277 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007. 
278 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007. 
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necessitates that the victim was a civilian at the time of their victimisation. In this way, 
the Prosecution's inclusion of the victim-witness at trial through their provision of 'live' 
testimony enables the Trial Chamber to assess the characteristics of the victim-witness 
and make a judgement as to their civilian or combatant status. 
Victim- Witnesses and the Tribunal's Protective Measures 
In light of the dependency of these categories of cases on 'live' witness testimony, the 
Tribunal must facilitate the inclusion of civilian victim-witnesses within trial 
proceedings. However, as the Tribunal acknowledges, there is a specific social context to 
the acts under adjudication, namely 'that the abuses perpetrated in the region have spread 
terror and anguish among the civilian population'. 279 With the conflict ongoing in the 
former Yugoslavia during its early years of functioning, the Tribunal was particularly 
aware of this social context and its probable impact upon the evidential processes of trial 
proceedings. As the Tadic decision describes, the judges of the Tribunal feared that amid 
an ongoing conflict 'many victims and witnesses of atrocities would be deterred from 
testifying about those crimes or would be concerned about the possible negative 
consequences that their testimony could have for themselves or their relatives' .280 Despite 
the cessation in hostilities, this social context is still a factor for victims to consider when 
deciding whether to testify, with the threat of reprisals remaining a possibility. As a staff 
member of the VWS confirmed, there continue to be instances or threats of physical 
violence perpetrated against potential witnesses or those that have already testified (see 
also Stover, 2005: 75).281 
For these reasons, the Tribunal has developed an extensive range of protective measures 
to enable victims to come to The Hague and testify to their harms. As well as the practical 
279 Tadic, Protective Measures Decision, para. 23. 
280 Tadic, Protective Measures Decision, para. 23. 
281 Interview with a staff member of the VWS, 3 February 2009. 
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need to include victim-witnesses within trial proceedings, the Tribunal facilitates the 
inclusion of victims in the trial process through the provision of protective measures 
because of its recognition that 'they often testify at considerable risk to themselves and 
their families' (Chi ffl et, 2003: 75). A central element in the Tribunal's assessment of 
whether a victim requires protective measures is the determination of whether, 'should it 
become known that the witness has testified, there is a real risk to his or her security or 
that of his or her family,.282 If the Prosecution (or Defence) can prove that such a 
situation is a possibility, the Trial Chamber establishes protective measures for the 
witness. These measures are intended to facilitate the presence of the witness in the 
courtroom by preventing further harm, suffering or re-traumatisation to them from their 
act of testifying (Lobwein, 2006: 199). 
The Tribunal's central mechanism for the provision of protective measures for civilian 
victim-witnesses is the Victims and Witnesses Section. Comprising of Operations, 
Protection and Support Units and a legal officer at the Tribunal, and a Sarajevo Field 
Office with a Protection and Support Unit, the VWS advises on protective measures for 
victims and witnesses relating to their presence and participation during trial proceedings. 
Under Rule 75(B) of the RPE, these protective measures may include: 
(i) measures to prevent disclosure to the public or the media of the identity or 
whereabouts of a victim or a witness, or of persons related to or associated with a victim 
or witness by such means as ... 
(a) expunging names and identifying information from the Tribunal's public 
records 
(b) non-disclosure to the public of any records identifying the victim; 
(c) giving of testimony through image- or voice- altering devices or closed 
circuit television; and 
(d) assignment of a pseudonym; 
(ii) closed sessions ... 
(iii) appropriate measures to facilitate the testimony of vulnerable victims and witnesses, 
such as one-way closed circuit television. 
Moreover, it is important to note that the staff of the VWS, in accordance with Rule 
34(A), recommend protective measures for victims and witnesses . . . and provide 
282 Mrskic et aI, Protective Measures Decision, para. 5. 
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counselling and support for them, in particular in cases of rape and sexual assault. They 
monitor the testimony process during trial proceedings to ensure that witnesses are being 
examined in a manner which is not intimidating or causing them any unease.283 In more 
practical terms, the VWS also organises the security and practical arrangements for 
witnesses to come to The Hague, such as visas, accommodation and travel (Lobwein, 
2006). 
A number of legal and transitional justice commentators contend that the Tribunal's RPE 
represent a significant advance in the provision of protective measures as they 'are more 
"victim friendly" than most parallel domestic criminal codes' (Ni Aolain, 1997: 892)?84 
In particular, the Tribunal's provision of protective measures is held to facilitate the 
inclusion of civilian victims of sexual violence and their giving of testimony during trial 
proceedings (see Chifflet, 2003; Cassese, 1994). Measures such as closed sessions and 
the granting of pseudonyms are understood to protect the privacy of these victims and 
prevent the victim from experiencing any further trauma (Chifflet, 2003: 88-89). 
However, as noted previously, the Tribunal does not figure victims in any other role or 
capacity other than as witnesses. The Tribunal's legal practices do not follow the UN's 
Principles of a Right to a Remedy which prioritise the rights of victims to have 'access to 
justice' and reparations,285 or the views of commentators that consider victims should 
have a participatory role in trial proceedings (Stover, 2005). Nor do they follow the ICC's 
more recent 'victim-focused' practices ofparticipation.286 While there have been attempts 
to establish a scheme of reparations for victims by staff at the Tribunal, this has not been 
283 Interview with a staff member of the VWS, 3 February 2009. 
284 It should be noted that certain national criminal courts do include victims within legal processes, for 
example through the admission of victim-impact statements or facilitating victim-offender mediation (see 
Cornwell, 2007). 
285 United Nations, Principles on the Right to a Remedy, para. 12. 
286 An interview with a staff member of the Outreach Programme affirmed that the Tribunal has not adopted 
the more progressive victims rights and protections at the ICC, and despite liaison between the institutions, 
has no plans to do so (27 June 2006). 
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successful.287 For this reason, the Tribunal's RPE dealing with victims only relate to their 
role as witnesses, they 'are in fact part of a witness protection scheme and are not 
addressed to victims as such' (Chifflet, 2007: 77). Despite the UN's framework of 
victims' rights there is no possibility for civilian victims to participate within the 
Tribunal's institutional proceedings other than in this capacity. Instead, these victims 
remain marginal to the trial process unless called upon by the Prosecution (or Defence) to 
testify before the Chambers, testimonies which the Tribunal may (or may not) facilitate 
through the provision of protective measures. 
This provision of protective measures does not, however, only apply to victim-witnesses 
or civilian victim-witnesses more particularly. Rather, the VWS's mandate to assist and 
protect applies to any 'type' of witness. Protective measures enable the testimonies of 
Prosecution and Defence witnesses, those persons that can be understood as victim-
witnesses in accordance with the definition given above as well as persons who have 
themselves been indicted for war crimes (Lobwein, 2006: 199-200). As the above 
discussion sets out, there may be difficulties in designating witnesses as being a particular 
'type' and some persons may fall within the categories of both 'victim' and 'perpetrator' 
witnesses. However, the amalgamation of victim-witnesses with other types of witnesses 
and the lack of a specific unit for them within the VWS appears problematic.288 By failing 
to designate victim-witness status, there is no institutional recognition that these victims 
have had a very distinct (and harmful) experience of conflict and its aftermath, which 
other types of witnesses have not endured in the same manner. In this regard, as Tolbert 
and Swinnen point out, the 'danger of re-traumatization is unique to the victim-witness' 
(2006: 197). However, the absence of a unit or framework of protective measures specific 
to these witnesses does not appear to adequately acknowledge that they will have 
287 Interview with a staff member of the VWS, 3 February 2009. Furthermore, this staff member related that 
there while Rule 106 of the Tribunal's RPE allows victims to bring an action for compensation in a national 
court if an accused has been found guilty of causing injury to that person, there have not been any cases to 
date where compensation has been granted. 
288 Interview with VWS staff, 3 April 2006. 
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particular needs within the testimony procedure and, as such, that they may require levels 
or measures of protection and support that other witnesses do not. 
Whether for civilian victim-witnesses or other 'types' of witnesses, there are two aspects 
of the Tribunal's proceedings that appear to diminish the possibilities for witnesses to 
find a comprehensive level of protection should they choose to testify against their 
perpetrators. Firstly, as Stover points out, neither before, during, or after the trial does the 
Tribunal 'provide victims and witnesses with specific "rights". Instead, the ICTY staff 
refer to witness services as "entitlements'" (2005: 136). It is important to emphasise that 
a victim-witness cannot demand protective measures at trial. Instead, the judges of the 
Trial Chamber determine the risk to the person or their family in testifying without them 
(Lobwein, 2006: 205). In this regard, it is notable that fifty-three percent of witnesses 
have testified without any protective measures. 289 Moreover, less than one percent of 
witnesses have testified with complete anonymity.29o Considering the recognition by the 
Tribunal that witnesses and in particular, victims that act as witnesses will 'feel 
threatened, either directly or indirectly' (Cassese, 1994: 78), it is surprising that the 
majority testify in open session without any confidentiality measures. This situation may 
arise due to the lack of witness 'rights' to claim protective measures, but also as 
Bassiouni points out, the 'vagueness of the standards' of the protective measures set out 
in the RPE 'such as "may be in danger or at risk", "appropriate measures" and "consistent 
with the rights of the accused", leaves much uncertainty as to how the rules regarding 
disclosure will be applied' (1996: 604). In highlighting these deficiencies in the 
protective measures framework, it is reasonable to suggest that a considerable number of 
victims may have been deterred from testifying due to the possible risk to their safety, 
fear of reprisals to themselves or their family or re-traumatization during the adjudicatory 
process itself. 
289 Information supplied by the VWS, 26 January 2009. 
290 Information supplied by the VWS, 26 January 2009. 
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Secondly, the international rather than domestic character of the Tribunal has a 
significant impact upon the actual forms of protection that can be instituted and the 
temporal limits of their enactment. Witnesses testifying during legal proceedings in 
domestic jurisdictions can often access medical, or counselling support through the 
provision of state services (Lobwein, 2006: 199). In domestic jurisdictions, these services 
assist the functioning of the legal system by providing levels of support to victims that are 
met through non-legal mechanisms and measures. However, due to its international 
character (as well as financial and staffing issues), the Tribunal 'can only provide 
psychological and legal counselling in the limited period when the victims and witnesses 
are at The Hague, pending trial of the accused' (Cassese, 1994: 97). Moreover, unlike a 
national system there is 'no police force that can care for the safety of witnesses once 
they leave the premises of the International Tribunal. The International Tribunal has 
neither a long-term witness protection programme, nor the funds to provide for one' .291 
As Lobwein argues, this does not enact protection or support at the time when the victim 
is likely to need it most, upon their 'return to an impoverished environment ... where 
they do not feel totally safe' (2003). 
Civilian Victim-Witnesses At Trial 
The inclusion of civilian victim-witnesses and their testimonies during the trial process is 
structured by the Tribunal's largely adversarial approach (Orie, 2002). In this structure of 
proceedings, the Prosecution first presents their evidence in support of the charges against 
the accused. Witnesses brought by the Prosecution testify before the Trial Chamber with 
their evidence-in-chief, providing factual knowledge and 'a narrative of events relative to 
the case' (Schabas, 2006: 472). Subsequent to this evidential process, the Defence can 
then raise doubt 'by attacking the credibility and reliability of the prosecution witnesses 
291 Tadic, Protective Measures Decision, para. 65. 
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by means of cross-examination and by calling its own witnesses' (May and Wierda, 2001: 
251). In a divergence from the adversarial approach, Rule 85(A) also allows the judges of 
the Trial Chamber to summon witnesses to give evidence, although this only accounts for 
around two percent of witnesses testifying.292 Following the 'inquisitorial' approach of 
civil systems, the judges are 'more actively involved in the search for the truth at trial' 
and through Rule 85(B) have the right to put questions to the witnesses (Orie, 2002: 
1464). Fieldwork at the Tribunal affirmed that this was a common practice, with 
substantial periods of time being spent on the judges examining the witnesses or 
confirming aspects oftheir testimony. 
The following analysis focuses upon the D. Milosevic case to understand the role of 
civilian victim-witnesses and their testimonies during the adjudicatory process from the 
perspectives of the different parties, namely the civilian victims themselves, the 
Prosecution, Defence and the Trial Chamber. In particular, it examines the charges of 
sniping against civilians that name individual persons as the victims of the acts of 
violence. For these charges, the individual victims (or relatives or friends in the instances 
of fatalities) came before the Chambers to testify to their sustaining of harms. However, 
these victim-witnesses also had to testify and, in effect, 'prove' their status as civilian 
victims. This necessity for victims to identify themselves as civilians arose from the 
charges brought against the accused, for his perpetration of crimes against humanity 
(crimes directed against any civilian population) and the war crimes of 'terror against a 
civilian population' and 'attacks on civilians' .293 These crimes are therefore 'victim 
specific' - they concern acts of violence against civilians and do not include combatant 
victims within their subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber held that 
to find the accused guilty of the charges of sniping, it would have to consider 'whether 
292 '1994-2004 a UNique Decade', page 34. 
293 Emphasis added. 
190 
the person who was killed or seriously injured was a civilian' ?94 Unlike trials that do not 
require an identification of the victim along the principle of distinction (see chapter four), 
the identity of the victim as a civilian victim was a central aspect of these proceedings. 
However, analysis of the D. Milosevic proceedings exemplifies the lack of a consolidated 
legal approach to identifying victims as civilian victims. Through the divergent 
approaches of the different parties, this case illustrates the inherent difficulties of 
identifying individual victims as civilian victims and, in turn, the complexities that 
civilian victims face in seeking recognition of their injuries through the process of legal 
trials. 
Identifying Civilian Victims 
The Victim- Witnesses 
Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White point out that the identification of 
persons in armed conflict has centred on the use of both 'civilian' and 'non-combatant' as 
definitional terms (2002). Commentators often employ the dual and interchangeable use 
of these terms (see for example, Primoratz, 2007).295 However, as Slaughter and Burke-
White argue, there are important reasons to prioritise the 'civilian' identification of 
persons who choose not to act as combatants. In distinguishing between these terms, they 
argue that civilians should be characterised as 'individuals who do not choose to engage 
in armed conflict, who seek only to go about their lives and participate in their 
communities', whereas non-combatant 'implies individuals trying to stay clear of the 
violence swirling around them' (Slaughter and Burke-White, 2002: 67). In this way, the 
designation of 'civilian' status does not simply relate to individuals who avoid the 
violence of conflict. Rather, this definitional term identifies those individuals who make 
294 D. Milosevic, Judgement, para. 245. 
295 See also In Larger Freedom, page 58. 
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an express choice not to participate or engage in the hostilities. It is, however, important 
to note two issues that can arise in designating either 'civilian' or 'non-combatant' status, 
in contrast to combatant status, during situations of conflict. Firstly, the nature of a 
person's participation in military conduct, or their choice to act as a combatant, may 
change during the course of hostilities. As such, persons can move in and out of the 
categories of civilian and combatant through their enactment of different forms of 
conduct, as the testimonies in D. Milosevic suggested was the case for some of the 
witnesses.296 Secondly, as noted above, there are substantial difficulties in designating 
either civilian / non-combatant or combatant status in a situation of 'total war' or large-
scale victimisation where the majority of persons in a given society or state are involved 
in the war effort. In this regard, it remains a matter of legal and academic debate as to the 
types or forms of participation and actions constitute 'civilian' or 'combatant' 
involvement in armed conflict (see Rogers, 2004). 
By employing Slaughter and Burke-White's definition of 'civilians' and 'non-
combatants', the testimonies of the civilian victim-witnesses in D. Milosevic show that 
they understood themselves as civilians and not as non-combatants. During the trial 
proceedings a number of the victim-witnesses identified themselves as civilians, 
explicitly describing that they were 'speaking as a civilian' during their testimonies.297 In 
this way, these victim-witnesses drew on the legal category of 'civilian', as opposed to 
combatant, and stated that they held this definitional status. However, while many others 
did not explicitly speak of being a civilian, their self-characterisation as such was evident 
through their portrayal of certain aspects of their appearance or actions. As discussed in 
chapter one, the customary rules of humanitarian law do not establish a 'positive' 
definition of a civilian. They do not set out any fixed characteristics or actions that can 
identify a person as a civilian (in contrast to combatants who are obliged to wear military 
296 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 19 June 2007. 
297 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 17 January 2007 para. 570; Transcript, 2 February 2007, para. 1475. 
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clothing and carry weapons openly). Nevertheless, a number of victim-witnesses 
definitively understood themselves as being civilians and sought to emphasise or even 
'prove' this status through narrating the nature of their presence and participation during 
the conflict. As will be shown, this self-characterisation of being a civilian (and not a 
non-combatant) was typically figured through the civilian victim-witnesses emphasising 
particular aspects of their appearance, actions and choices that they considered would 
identify their status as such. They described aspects of their identity that they considered 
would substantiate that they were not combatants or members of the military involved in 
the siege of Sarajevo. 
This self-characterisation of being a civilian victim was figured in two main ways during 
the testimonies. Similarly to Slaughter and Burke-White's framing, these involve the 
victim-witnesses describing their active choice not to participate in military conduct and 
through the enactment and performance of particular actions, their attempts to preserve 
'normalcy' to their own lives and that of others. Firstly, the victim-witnesses emphasised 
their civilian identity through suggesting they had made an informed choice not to 
participate in military conduct in any way: 
Q. Did you know that that hill or mountain was totally controlled by the BiH army? 
A. I am not meddling with these kinds of things, nor do I know anything about them. 
MS. ISAILOVIC: [Interpretation] An objection with the transcript. The witness said "I'm 
not interested in military business," and on the transcript this is not written. 
Q. SO did you say that you were not interested in any -- in military business? 
A. I know nothing about these things.298 
Q. Did you know at the time where the ABiH army soldiers were? 
A. No, I didn't know. I wasn't a soldier; I was simply a civilian. And I didn't know where 
they were.299 
Q. Did you sometimes see soldiers pass through Sokolovic Kolonija and Hrasnica? 
A. No. No, no one. Not those soldiers and not those others. I never saw that. I did say that, 
didn't I? I didn't want to know about those things. God forbid I should have seen anything 
like that. I never saw a single rifle. There was a war on, but I didn't see anything ... I 
didn't see either army. Please, don't ask me about that. I wasn't interested. I didn't know 
about that. All I wanted to know about was my children and whether they would make 
it. 300 
298 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 23 January 2007, para. 874. 
299 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 28 January 2007, para. 2885. 
300 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 16 February 2007, para. 2283. 
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An important narrative throughout the testimonies of the victim-witnesses was an 
articulation of their civilian status, whether explicitly or implicitly, through an active 
denial of being a combatant or participating in military conduct. As the examples above 
illustrate, the victim-witnesses forcefully expressed that there was a distinct separation 
between their own status as civilians and others who were combatants or members of the 
military. This separation was understood through the absence of a wish to know any 
details of military actions or operations or to participate in such activities. In this sense, 
the victim-witnesses emphasised their civilian status by focusing upon their deliberate 
choice not to engage in the siege as a combatant or to support their conduct. These 
victim-witnesses did not simply remove themselves as far as possible from the harmful 
conduct of the military operations, in Slaughter and Burke-White's sense of a non-
combatant, but made an informed choice not to engage or have any knowledge of its 
perpetration. 
The second way that the victim-witnesses presented themselves as civilians was by 
narrating their attempts to maintain a degree of 'normality' through the carrying out of 
tasks necessary to everyday life. As one witness, in similarity to many others illustrates, 
her presence as a civilian in the conflict rested upon protecting herself and her children: 
Q. And now I'm going to be asking you some questions about the day on which you were 
shot. On the 18th of November, 1994, did you leave the place that you were living in 
Bistrik? 
A. Yes. I went to my mother-in-law's to collect some firewood. 
Q. Why did you need to go to your mother-in-law's residence in order to collect firewood? 
A. I didn't have firewood at home to make fire for my children. 
Q. Was there any reason connected to the war that you had to go and get firewood? Let 
me ask a different question. How would you normally cook in your residence during 
times of peace? 
A. I was using electricity. 
Q. Were you able to use electricity during the armed conflict? 
A. No. It just was there occasionally and then it went off again. 
Q. Did you use the wood that you were going to your mother-in-law's for to cook food 
with? 
A. Yes.30l 
30l D. Milosevic, Transcript, 22 January 2007, para. 764. 
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As the example above shows, this civilian victim-witness understood 'daily life' and 
participation in conflict in two ways. Firstly, her 'civilian' participation in the conflict is 
seen through the carrying out of actions to facilitate everyday life, such as collecting 
firewood to cook despite the obvious risks of travelling through the besieged city. As a 
civilian, the continuance of everyday life meant protecting their own lives and those of 
others from the harms of the military actions that they chose not to participate in. 
Notably, as this example illustrates, this protection of self and others did not figure only 
as safety from direct harms such as sniping or shelling, but also from indirect harms that 
commentators describe as prevalent during hostilities such as hunger and an 
impoverished environment, in the sense of structural victimisation set out above (Kiza, 
2006; Slim, 2006). 
Secondly, as this victim-witness and many others describe, their 'civilian' participation in 
the conflict was presented and understood as a relational experience of harm or of an 
ever-present potential harm. As Dembour and Haslam point out, witnesses often narrate 
conflict in terms of other persons, in particular those that they have lost through the 
hostilities (2004: 159). The witnesses portray the experience as a situation shared (and 
feared) with others, most often family and friends, who lived through the same 
atmosphere of violence and victimisation: 
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. You know what your job is. 
Thank you very much for allowing me to get it off my chest, what I have been suffering 
from, in the name of the children and all other people who suffered. Thank you, and I 
appreciate this Honourable Court.302 
As a later section of this chapter will further examine, a high number of the testimonies of 
the civilian victim-witnesses are not solely directed at portraying their own injuries or 
experiences. Rather, the relational experience of conflict can also be seen through their 
using the opportunity to testify as a means to speak of the harms of others. The civilian 
victim-witnesses therefore presented themselves as 'civilian' through a lived experience 
302 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 27 February 2007, para. 2829. 
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of conflict as both a structural environment of harm and a relational experience endured 
by both themselves and others. 
The Prosecution 
The Prosecution did not begin by asking these witnesses to identify their status as a 
civilian during the conflict. Nor did they ask the victim-witnesses whether they were a 
combatant or had engaged in 'combat activity'. Instead, for each of the victim-witnesses 
that had been injured from the actions of a sniper, the Prosecution's approach was to 
adduce a 'positive' identification of the victim as a civilian. Following the self-
identifications of the victim-witnesses as civilians in line with Slaughter and Burke-
White's definition, the Prosecution characterises these witnesses as civilians rather than 
as non-combatants. This identification is sought through bringing evidence of their 
'civilian' participation in the conflict and 'markers' of their civilian status before the Trial 
Chamber: 
Q. Mr. Witness, how old were you when the war began? 
A. Fourteen. 
Q. Where were you living between August 1994 and November 1995? 
A. In Sarajevo ... 
Q. What town were you living in at that time, between August 1994 and November 1995? 
A. Novi Grad. 
Q. Between those dates - again, August 1994 and November 1995 - with whom were you 
living? 
A. With my mother and sister. 
Q. How did you get access to food? 
A. It was difficult. 
Q. Can you explain? 
A. There was a war on. Sarajevo was surrounded. It was difficult to get any food aside 
from the humanitarian aid that kept arriving. 
Q. And who was responsible for feeding your family? 
A. I, for the most part. 
Q. How did you get water? 
A. That was difficult, too. 
Q. Did you go out of your house to get food and water? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how was that? 
A. Water came in special water tankers and food came in shipments of humanitarian aid 
which would then be distributed. 
Q. Was it easy to go out and get food and water? 
A. No, not really. 
Q. Why was that, please? 
A. Shellings were quite frequent and sniping, too. It wasn't really that easy.303 
303 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 23 January 2007, paras. 881-882. 
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There are no fixed characteristics or actions that can unequivocally 'prove' a persons 
civilian identity. As noted in chapter three, the 'negative' definition of civilians 
established by the rules of humanitarian law as those persons who are not combatants 
leaves open the means to identify a civilian or a civilian object (see Dinstein, 2004). 
However, in D. Mi!osevic, the Prosecution directed the testimonies of the victim-
witnesses towards their giving of key 'markers' of identity and actions that it considered 
would represent the victim's identity as a civilian identity. Most commonly, this 
'positive' mode of identification was constructed through illustrating the young age of the 
victim at the time of their injury, their profession, their appearance (most often in regard 
to their clothing) and their actions or behaviour at the time of the incident: 
Q. Was the tram crowded? 
A. Yes, it was pretty crowded. 
Q. Can you tell us what you were wearing on that day? 
A. I was wearing a light purple jacket, blue jeans, Addidas tennis shoes, and a green 
blouse and a green umbrella ... 
Q. Madam Witness, how old were you when this incident occurred? 
A. Eighteen, almost 19 304 
The Prosecution does not ask the victim-witness to state they were not wearing a uniform 
or any other typically 'combatant' signifier. In this way, the Prosecution does not seek to 
prove that the victim was not a combatant, but that the victim was in fact a civilian. The 
'positive' characteristics of the victim are assumed to present the individual as a civilian 
participant in the siege of Sarajevo and as such, not a legitimate target of violence or 
victimisation. 
The Defence 
It is notable that the Defence rarely questioned the civilian status of the victim-witnesses 
that testified at trial, perhaps because the Prosecution only brought victims whose identity 
304 D. Milosevil:, Transcript, 6 February 2007, paras. 1657-1658. 
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was unequivocally 'civilian' and unlikely to successfully be the subject of challenge. 
However, on one of the few occasions that the Defence did raise this challenge to the 
victim's identity, the allegation was that the victim of a sniper was not a civilian but a 
combatant at the time of his injury: 
Q. I have to put it again to you. I'm sony that as a young person, a young man of 15 years 
of age, you found yourself in the situation with all the rest of the people of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. But I'm putting it again to you that, as young as you were, you were a 
member of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can you answer this question for me? 
A. You are just putting it to me. And second, I am saying again, and there [sic] is 
verifiable, I was not a member of the army ofBosnia-Herzegovina.305 
As set out in chapter four, there has been a conceptual construction of military-aged men 
in armed conflict as 'potential combatants', a notion that can be seen both in the 
Tribunal's judgements and the narratives of the UN and other institutions (Carpenter, 
2006a: 164). In this instance of a construction of a victim's identity along the combatant / 
civilian divide, the Defence reflects an empirical example of this nexus between the status 
of a male civilian (as the Trial Chamber found him to be )306 and the possibility that he is a 
combatant. Reflecting this notion of a 'potential combatant', the Defence seeks to 
challenge the victim's status through his gender and age and create his personhood and 
presence in the conflict as 'ambiguous' in terms of the principle of distinction. For the 
Defence, a young male 'may' have been a combatant, that is, these gendered attributes of 
personhood create a greater possibility that he will have chosen to participate in the 
military conduct of the conflict. It is thus notable that the Defence did not similarly 
'adjudicate' the identity of females and question their civilian or combatant status. In this 
way, the Defence reiterates the traditional framing of gender relations of armed conflict 
where it is 'men who make war', whilst women stay at home with the children 
(Cockburn, 2001: 20, 19). This understanding and representation of the civilian and 
combatant participants of conflict does not take into account that male civilians are often 
the express targets of victimisation, as the Srebrenica genocide so poignantly exemplifies, 
305 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 7 February 2007, paras. 1749-50. 
306 D. Milosevic, Judgement, para. 378. 
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nor that women are increasingly 'choosing to enter, or being enlisted in, national armies' 
(Cockburn, 2001: 20). 
This conceptual construction of the (male) witness as a potential combatant also 
illustrates a lack of adherence to the legal terms of identifYing a civilian, as well as 
Slaughter and Burke-White's framing. The Tribunal describes that the 'term "civilian" .. 
. include[ s] any person who is not a member of the armed forces or an organised military 
group belonging to the conflict,.307 Following Article 44(7) of API, the 'generally 
accepted practice is that combatants distinguish themselves by wearing uniforms, or at 
the least, a distinctive sign, and by carrying their weapons openly'. 308 However, in their 
argument that this male civilian was in fact a combatant, the Defence did not allege that 
he was wearing a uniform, an insignia or carrying a weapon. In fact, this allegation does 
not appear to have any substantive basis, either from the testimony given by the witness 
himself or from those of other witnesses. There is no evidence that this victim had been a 
combatant or had any military connections during the conflict. Rather, the Defence's 
proposition appears to have arisen solely from the (male) gender of the victim and his 
(young) age. Contrary to the 'negative' definition of civilians held by the customary rules 
of humanitarian law, this Defence argument suggests that the lack of obvious 'markers' 
of civilian or combatant status held by this victim creates the possibility that he was a 
combatant.309 In this way, the Defence contends that civilians must present themselves as 
distinct from combatants. However, as young male civilians cannot remove themselves 
from traditional combatant markers of identity, the Defence's contentions in D. Milosevic 
suggest that the status of this category of persons will always be a matter of particular 
dispute in both the practice of armed conflict and the legal adjudication of its conduct. 
307 D. Milosevic, Judgement, para. 945. 
308 D. Milosevic, Judgement, para. 946. 
309 Similar assertions were made by the Defence in the Perisic case which also involves charges of sniping 
and shelling of the civilian population of Sarajevo. In cross-examining a witness about the sniping activity in 
Sarajevo, the Defence appeared to assert that if a sniper did not know whether the person was a civilian or a 
combatant, that it was reasonable for that person to be the target of attack (Fieldwork, Perisic, 2 February 
2009). 
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The Trial Chamber 
In the D. Milosevic judgement, the Trial Chamber sets out its determination of whether 
the victim was a civilian or a combatant for each incident of sniping. For each victim, the 
Trial Chamber reiterates the Prosecution's 'positive' markers of civilian identity, namely 
their age, 'civilian' clothing and actions, and the Defence's challenge (if any) to this 
identification. In the overwhelming majority of these cases of sniping, the Trial Chamber 
does not raise any issues over the identification of the victim and simply declares the 
victim a civilian and, as such, a civilian victim of a crime alleged against the accused. 
However, in making their assessment ofthe status of the victims, the Trial Chamber looks 
to further evidence of the victim's appearance and actions to corroborate their civilian 
status. For example, it emphasises that the clothes worn by one victim 'would have 
enabled the shooter to identify her as a civilian' as 'the colours would have been visible 
with optics mounted on the rifle,.310 It is now considered customary law that in 'case of 
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian' 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: 23-4), a principle that the Trial Chamber 
emphasises in its judgement.311 However, in the small number of incidents where the 
civilian identity of the victim was called into question, the Trial Chamber does not appear 
to fully adhere to this principle. In this case there is no evidence brought that any of the 
victims were wearing a uniform, an insignia or carrying weapons at the time of the 
incident of sniping as the terms of API require a combatant do. Following the 'negative' 
defining of civilians, there are no indications that any of the victims were combatants, but 
were civilians. Therefore, by drawing attention to the clothing of the victim, the Trial 
Chamber (in similarity to the Defence) appears to place a further requirement of civilians 
310 D. Milosevje, Judgement, para. 353. 
311 D. Milosevje, Judgement, para. 946. 
200 
to distinguish themselves as such during a conflict through their portrayal of a 'civilian' 
appearance and actions. In this way, the onus of combatants alone to distinguish 
themselves during conflict is broadened to a similar necessity for civilians to do likewise. 
Such a requirement appears particularly problematic, for, as argued above, in evidential 
terms there are no definitive 'markers' of civilian identity. There are no definitive means 
for civilians to protect themselves from being attributed combatant status through the use 
or employment of particular actions or appearance. Instead, the designation of civilian 
identity by the Chambers rests upon an interpretation of forms of actions or appearance 
that are understood not to characterise combatant status. As the above analysis sets out, 
however, it appears that there are certain categories of civilians whose status in armed 
conflict will be under greater scrutiny, a situation that will impact upon the provision of 
protections for them and legal redress in instances of their breach. 
The Participatory Possibilities of Civilian- Victim Witnessing 
While the D. Milosevic trial highlights the complexities and contestations of the legal 
identification of civilian victims, it also provides a useful case-study for an exploration of 
the participation of civilian victim-witnesses within the adjudicatory process and their 
understanding of the role of their testimonies as a form of evidence. Although victims can 
only participate in trial proceedings as witnesses, the Tribunal acknowledges that the 
prosecutorial process 'depends on the victims themselves to tell their story'. 312 As 
indicated earlier, this dependency arises through needs of the Prosecution, Defence and 
Trial Chambers for victims of the alleged crime to act as 'a source of information on the 
offence' (Tochilovsky, 1999: 287). However, courtroom observation of the D. Milosevic 
trial and analysis of its transcripts and those of other cases illustrates that civilian victim-
witnesses do not only see their participation in the adjudicatory process as providing 
evidence of the 'facts' of criminal conduct. Instead, they understand their testimonies as 
312 '1994-2004 a UNique Decade', page 34. 
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enabling a broad 'story' of the conflict to be heard by the Tribunal, a wish that cannot be 
fully realised by current legal practices. 
For the civilian victim-witnesses, the significance of their giving testimony before the 
Chambers rested upon an understanding of their participation at trial as constructing a 
connection between themselves and the Tribunal. Although there are undoubtedly 
personal reasons for seeking such a connection with the Tribunal for each of the victim-
witnesses, it is possible to identify three main reasons through the substantive content of 
the testimonies and the broader context of this legal institution's work. Firstly, as several 
of the civilian victim-witnesses in D. Milosevic described, their reason for wanting to 
come to The Hague and testify was through a belief that they could facilitate or contribute 
to the retributive processes of the Tribunal, and so help bring the perpetrator(s) to account 
for their criminal conduct.3J3 Secondly, there was a narrative throughout the testimonies 
that the witnesses wished to testify before the Chambers in order to express the 'truth' of 
the hostilities as they experienced it.314 Such a motivation to testify is similarly articulated 
by a number of witnesses in Stover's study (2005: 76-77). Thirdly, it is important to note 
that there have been relatively few national trials in the former Yugoslavia and where 
trials have been held there have been concerns about the fairness of the adjudications and 
the provision of protective measures to witnesses (Stover, 2005). As a consequence of 
such difficulties and a broader lack of legal (or non-legal) mechanisms in the region, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the Tribunal may be understood as the central, or only, means 
to engage with forms of post-conflict justice. 
During the trial proceedings of D. Milosevic, the victim-witnesses understanding of 
having a connection with the Tribunal was most notably presented through their shaping 
of testimonies to emphasise their experiences of harm. As will be set out, the victim-
313 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007. 
314 Fieldwork,D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007. Interview with a staff member of the VWS, 3 February 2009. 
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witnesses gave testimonies to narrate and seek legal recognition of their personal 
experiences of harm (see Campbell, 2002; Stover, 2005). This reason for testifying is 
clearly expressed by one of the witnesses in Stover's study through her explanation that 
she came to give evidence because she 'wanted the tribunal to know that this is what was 
done to me' (2005: 76). Testimonies were also given by victim-witnesses to present and 
emphasise the harms sustained by others, of family and friends, in particular of those lost 
to the harms of war (see Dembour and Haslam, 2004). They were given to narrate the 
relational experience of conflict as a harm of the past, but also as that which continues to 
affect their lives in the present. 
For Self 
Ann Cubilie describes that in legal discourse, testimonies are spoken from the position of 
the person 'who was there and knows what happened because she or he experienced it 
with his or her own body' (2005: 189). In this sense, testimonies were given by the 
civilian victim-witnesses to present their personal experience of victimisation to the Trial 
Chamber, of the harms to their 'self. Through their participation at trial, the witnesses 
used the procedure of giving testimony as an opportunity to make visible their harm and 
emphasise the impact it had had on their lives: 
Q. How did this incident and your wartime experiences affect your life? 
A. This incident itself as well as the whole war and the suspense, whether you were 
going to be shot or not, whether you would be injured seriously or not, prevailed 
throughout the war. Wherever you were, moving out or sitting in your home, we could 
hear the shots passing by throughout the war, including the shells. You could never 
know where they were going to land. They just whizzed by, and as soon as it passed it 
was a kind of relief. When I saw that I had sustained a slight injury, it was also a relief. 
But the worst thing was the moment of fear, or the fear that engulfed us throughout the 
war.315 
However, as the above example illustrates, it is important to note that the witnesses did 
not simply experience the conflict in 'physical' terms, that is, as bodily injuries as 
315 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 6 February 2007, paras. 1658-1659. 
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Cubilie's description may imply. Rather, the harm was both physical and psychological. 
Moreover, it was not a singular injury but a continuing experience of victimisation and 
harm over the years of the siege. In this way, the victim-witnesses can be seen as 
describing their experience of the conflict in alignment with the UN's definition of a 
victim (and not that of the ICTy).316 They present their experience of victimisation 
during the conflict as a situation that 'created' their victim status. This status was 
understood in relation to harm, whether physical, psychological or emotional, as well as 
its pervasiveness, both in terms of its encompassing injury to personhood, but also in its 
infliction over a substantial period oftime. 
For Others 
Wendy Lobwein, the prior Head of the VWS, describes that witnesses testify at the 
Tribunal 'to speak for the dead', 'to look for justice in the present', 'to tell the world what 
happened' and as a 'contribution that such crimes will not happen again' (2006: 206). As 
Lobwein indicates, the motivation to testify frequently rests upon a wish to speak for the 
dead, to narrate the act of harm before the Trial Chamber on their behalf. Testimonies are 
given as an address to the Trial Chambers and to found some form ofredressJor others. 
These are testimonies that cannot be given by the victims themselves as they were fatally 
injured from the perpetration of the victimisation of civilians during the conflict (see 
Campbell, 2002; Stover, 2005): 
Q. You say, Madam, that it looks like a motor, so my question is very simple. What sort 
of motors are you thinking of now? 
A. I absolutely forgot all about that. I can't remember what it looked like. There is 
absolutely nothing I can tell you. I'm like really -- it's all true about the air bomb and me 
leaving home and being compelled to leave and the bomb landing. It's all true. What I'm 
telling you is true, but there is absolutely nothing else that I can tell you. There should be 
evidence. There is evidence. I have shrapnel lodged inside my body. You want pictures 
of that, perhaps? Don't press me on this, all right? There are victims. One of my brothers 
was killed. My father died soon after. It's all true.317 
316 United Nations, Principles on the Right to a Remedy, para. 8. 
317 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 16 February 2007, para. 2275. 
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As this witness illustrates, her testimony is given as an address to the Tribunal for her 
brother and father. Testimony is given to emphasise the relational experience of conflict 
and its pervasive injuries. Throughout the testimonies of this case (and others) there was a 
clear depiction that conflict was not a solitary experience, but, as the UN describes, a 
situation of violence that harms the immediate victims as well as those with whom they 
have familial ties. In her address to the Trial Chamber, this witness relates the past harms 
of the conflict in terms of physical, psychological and emotional injuries. Most 
importantly, she prioritises the harms to those close to her rather than concentrating on 
technical facts or details of military conduct. Participation at trial is seen to provide a role 
not only for the provision of 'factual' knowledge, but of telling the broader story of the 
harms of the conflict as she experienced it. There is almost a dismissal of being a source 
of 'facts' or figuring as a bystander or neutral witness to the alleged criminality as the 
Defence seeks to construct. Instead, the witness presents herself and others as central to 
the act of violence under adjudication and the civilian victim of its perpetration. For her, 
the incident under adjudication and the broader conflict situation was a 'victimising 
event' as Kiza describes (2006: 82). It was not only an act of criminal conduct, but also a 
harmful event that established herself and others as victims of the hostilities. 
However, while the above testimony illustrates how the witness employs her participatory 
role in the trial proceedings as an opportunity to narrate past harms, it also demonstrates a 
temporal shift in her articulation of harm during the testimonial process. Similarly to 
many other witnesses testifying during the D. Milosevic trial, this witness shows a 
striking move from speaking of past acts of harm to a narration of how these injuries 
affect her life in the present. As Dembour and Haslam point out, testimonies of the harms 
of conflict often become 'inscribed in the present' (2004: 171). As well as describing the 
physically present harm of having shrapnel still lodged inside her, this witness quickly 
moves to articulating the presence and continuation of the effects of the conflict by 
speaking of the loss of her family members. For this witness, the harm is 'an event that, in 
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effect, does not end' (Laub, 1992: 67). The experience of violence and victimisation still 
imbues her present life both physically and emotionally. However, as other commentators 
have pointed out, the Trial Chamber does not and cannot facilitate such emotive 
discussion unless it is relevant to the charges of the case (Dembour and Haslam, 2004). 
For this reason, after the testimony is given by the witness (as above), the judge merely 
thanks the witness and requests the Defence counsel to continue with their questioning. 
As the Defence counsel describes, these are 'criminal proceedings and I have to defend 
the rights of my client ... and therefore I need more specifications. Could you tell me 
exactly the place where the bomb fell ... ?'. 318 As Dembour and Haslam articulate, the 
legal process is such that victim-witnesses are required to 'give their account in a form 
which leaves them subject to the pace and interest of those who have the power to ask 
questions (the Prosecution, the Defence and the Judges) (2004: 175). In this way, the 
Defence's requirement for 'more specifications' relates only to the facts of the case; the 
narrative of the experience of harm by the witness and her family is not considered 
relevant to the process of criminal adjudication. 
This shaping of the personal experience of conflict (or that of others) or the possibility of 
participating at trial through speaking of these harms and injuries, figures as a broader 
impossibility of founding a connection with the Tribunal, as noted above. Although this 
relationship with the legal institution cannot be realised, there were several occasions 
during periods of fieldwork where witnesses appeared to suggest that their motivation for 
testifying was not simply founded on their wish to provide facts or knowledge, but as 
their need to find the broader truth of the acts under adjudication. While courtroom 
processes make it difficult to convey a particular instance of this during the D. Milosevic 
318 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 16 February 2007, paras. 2275-2276. 
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case, a very poignant and clear example of a witness seeking answers from the 
Tribunal can be seen in the Kunarac et at case: 
Q. Can I ask the Honorable Judges something? 
A. Yes. Please go ahead. 
Q. I just want to say that I came here today because I want to know about the bones of 
my husband and my daughter. That is what I wish to say to you. Thank you. 
A. Thank you very much.32o 
In this way, the witness is 'engaged in an appeal' (Felman, 1992b: 204). It is an appeal 
not only to know ofthe broader harms and losses of the conflict that are not the subject of 
adjudication, but also to found a relationship with the Tribunal. The witness understands 
the testimony procedure as the possibility to participate in 'a discursive practice, ... 
rather than to simply formulate a statement' (Felman, 1992a: 5).321 Her perception of the 
trial process is as a participatory possibility for constructing or becoming a part of a two-
way communicative relationship where both sides, herself and the Tribunal, found the 
truth of the conflict but also aid the other in achieving the finding of its harms.322 
However, the procedural and evidential models of the Tribunal do not function to 
facilitate an expansive narration of conflict or work as a site within which to gain or 
'find' knowledge. Instead, as Judge Robinson explains, within the courtroom this 
possibility cannot be realised, the witness is there to 'just answer the questions'. 323 
Conclusion 
The inclusion of civilian victims as witnesses at trial is intended to facilitate the trial 
proceedings and judgement of the actions of the accused. These witnesses testify to his or 
her actions (or those of their subordinates) as contrary to the protective rules of 
319 For example, there were frequent occasions where the judges or the parties quickly spoke over a witness, 
their microphones were switched off so that it was not possible to clearly hear their questions or responses, or 
their responses were in non-verbal form. 
320 Kunarac et at, Transcript, 28 March 2000, para. 1108. 
321 Emphasis original. 
322 As an interview with a staffmember of the VWS highlighted, many victim-witnesses wish not only to 
retain some form of contact with the Tribunal after they have testified, but also expect or desire 'something 
back' from the process (3 February 2009). 
323 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 29 February 2007, para. 2924. 
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humanitarian law. However, the D. Milosevic case shows how, for certain cases, the 
inclusion of this 'type' of witness necessarily gives rise to an 'adjudication' of their 
identity as civilian victims. Just as the previous two chapters have set out, it illustrates 
that this process of constructing legal recognition of civilian victims often acts as an 
exclusionary process of categorisation through the evoking of social categories of group 
membership. This case reveals both the processes that enable this construction of civilian 
identity, but also the possibilities that the Tribunal may fail to recognise all civilian 
victims and their sustaining of harms in a situation of armed conflict. 
In D. Milosevic, the parties do not employ a singular or consolidated approach to the 
process of recognising individual civilian victims and their status as such. Rather, the 
Prosecution, Defence and Trial Chamber all utilise different frameworks of identity 
construction to 'adjudicate' the status of the individual civilian victims that come before 
the Chambers. For example, the Defence draws upon particular notions of gendered 
personhood to present young males as 'potential combatants' irrespective of their civilian 
appearance and actions. By not raising similar challenges to the status of female persons, 
the Defence reiterates the traditional assumption of 'innocent' women and children as 
civilians within conflict, despite the growing inclusion of women within military 
structures. Through the employment of social categories of group membership, it can be 
seen that there is a construction of higher levels of doubt and particular scrutiny over the 
status of certain participants of conflict and their placing along the principle of 
distinction. Contrary to the legal terms of the principle of distinction, this case shows that 
these processes of constructing the identity of persons through their holding of particular 
attributes of personhood disrupts the notion that all persons who are not combatants are 
civilians. Instead, certain categories of persons must further 'prove' their civilian 
participation during hostilities in order to find legal recognition of their status as such. 
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Analysis of the D. Milosevic case also begins to draw attention to the complexities of the 
Tribunal's work of legally recognising collectivities of civilian victims. As the above 
examination of the testimonies shows, there is a distinct difference between the 
Tribunal's notion of a (victim) witness as a source of 'factual' evidence of the crime 
under adjudication and the use of this participatory role by the civilian victim-witnesses 
themselves. These witnesses strikingly prioritise their experience of civilian participation 
within conflict as an environment of relational harms. Broadening the individualised 
nature of the charges of sniping, the civilian victim-witnesses present their experience not 
only in terms of the act under adjudication but as the wider victimisation and harms to 
other persons, most often those with whom they have familial ties. However, the 
Tribunal's legal practices cannot include these broader harms within the trial process nor 
recognise all civilian victims of the conflict. As chapter six will further explore, the 
current practices of legal adjudication display significant difficulties in recognising 
collectivities of civilian victims. Drawing further on the D. Milosevic case, the next 
chapter analyses the Tribunal's adjudication of the charge of 'terror to a civilian 
population' brought in relation to the hostilities of the siege of Sarajevo. It examines how 
the judgement of this case figures (but also fails to figure) the civilian population, that is, 
the collectivity of civilian victims of this multi-ethnic city, as the victims of the charges 
brought against the accused. 
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Chapter Six 
Recognising All? Violence to a Civilian Population 
As for the.~uffering, any human being of any race, ethnicity, colour, or religious conviction suffers 
the same.oA 
In its Opening Statement at the trial of The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic (' Galic '), the 
Prosecution began with a description of the atrocities committed against civilians in the 
city of Sarajevo during the Yugoslavian conflict. Depicting the events under legal 
adjudication as causing such prolific and systematic harm to the civilian population that 
they were without similarity in contemporary armed conflict, the Prosecutor described 
how: 
[t]he siege of Sarajevo, as it came to be popularly known, was an episode of such 
notoriety in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that one must go back to World War II 
to find a parallel in European history. Not since then had a professional army conducted a 
campaign of unrelenting violence against the inhabitants of a European city so as to 
reduce them to a state of medieval deprivation in which they were in constant fear of 
death ... there was nowhere safe for a Sarajevan, not at home, at school, in a hospital, 
from deliberate attack. 325 
Indeed, read alongside the casual disregard for civilians in Antony Beevor's 'Berlin: The 
Downfall 1945' (2002), the siege of Sarajevo strikingly parallels depiction of those 
persons experiencing the violence of conflict - all civilians without distinction of age, 
gender or ethnicity. Contrary to the traditional image of 'armies on the battlefield', this 
state of violence does not figure combatants as the sole participants of conflict. Neither 
can it be understood in terms of harmful interactions between individual combatants and 
civilians, or as instances of collateral damage 'producing' civilian victims. Rather, the 
siege of Sarajevo requires recognition of the perpetration of widespread and systematic 
violence against persons who understood themselves as a civilian populace before, during 
324 Fieldwork,D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007. Testimony ofa Defence witness. 
325 The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic. Case No. IT -98-29. Opening Statement of the Prosecution, Transcript 
of Trial Proceedings, 3 December 2001, paras. 562-3 (,Galic, Transcript'). 
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and after the hostilities. To adequately capture the hanns of the siege, it is therefore 
necessary to develop a conception of a state of structural victimisation against this 
civilian popUlation, that is, against all civilians of the city of Sarajevo. 
The conceptual framework of this chapter was developed from two periods of courtroom 
observation at the trial of Dragomir Milosevi6 in April and June 2007.326 Throughout the 
trial proceedings of this case, both the Prosecution and Defence brought evidence before 
the Trial Chamber to emphasise that the 'mixity' of the population of Sarajevo meant that 
civilians of all ethnicities were subject to the violence of the siege. For this reason, as 
commentators point out, the civilian victims of the criminal conduct were not necessarily 
of a different ethnicity to the perpetrators (see Donia, 2006; Glenny, 1996). Indeed, as 
one expert witness during the D. Milosevic case points out, 'an exploding shell does not 
distinguish along ethnic lines,.327 During the trial proceedings it also became increasingly 
apparent that notions of social relations and interactions were central to the civilian 
victim-witnesses understandings of the victims and violence of the siege. Similarly to 
those testimonies set out in chapter five, there was a strong narrative of the siege as a 
shared experience of collective hann between all civilians of the city without 
distinction?28 By contrast, however, there was also a more divisive framing of the 
violence, with a small number of civilian victim-witnesses framing the experience of 
victimisation through 'ethnic' lines and arguing that it was only members of their 'side' 
that were the true, or only, victims of the criminal conduct.329 How, then, did the civilian 
victims themselves understand 'who' were the victims of the siege of Sarajevo? And does 
326 This chapter employs a case-study of two cases that adjudicate the actions of the accused during the siege 
of Sarajevo, Galie and D. Milosevie. Both these accused were Commanders of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps 
ofthe Bosnian Serb Army ('SRK'), with D. Milosevic assuming command after Galic. These accused were 
both charged with the war crime 'terror against a civilian population' and crimes against humanity. Reference 
is also made to fieldwork carried out during February 2009 at the trial of The Prosecutor v. MomCilo Perisie. 
This case also includes charges in relation to the shelling and sniping of the civilian population. Perisic was 
Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army; both Galic and D. Milosevic were his subordinates. 
327 D. Milosevie, Transcript, 20 February 2007, para. 2553. 
328 Fieldwork, D. Milosevie, 18 June 2007. 
329 Fieldwork, D. Milosevie, 19 June 2007. 
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the Tribunal's legal recognition of the civilian population as the victim of the crimes 
under adjudication align to the views ofthese civilian victim-witnesses? 
This chapter explores how the Tribunal legally recognises the collectivity of persons 
residing in Sarajevo, who understood themselves as a civilian group, which was the 
'victim' of violations of the protective rules of humanitarian law. It builds on the analysis 
of the previous chapter, which set out the complexities of legally recognising individual 
victims as holding 'civilian' status, to examine how the Tribunal constructs legal 
recognition of a collectivity of civilians, of a civilian population. Unlike the Tribunal's 
construction of legal recognition of civilian victims in the Tadic case through the 
designation of ethnic or national bonds (see chapter three), the cases of Galic and D. 
Milosevic necessitate an understanding and recognition of an ethnically-mixed victimised 
civilian population. In this case, the Tribunal was called upon to adjudicate the 
victimisation of a mixed civilian population which had been subjected to the perpetration 
of a prolific campaign of 'terror' with the intention to 'achieve the breakdown of the 
social fabric,.330 In order to explore these complex notions of civilian relations and their 
interactions with combatants, this chapter first considers how to conceptualise civilians as 
a collectivity, that is, as a group of civilians subject to widespread and systematic 
victimisation. It then examines the Tribunal's adjUdication of Galic and D. Milosevic, 
focusing on their war crimes charges of 'terror against a civilian population'. Finally, this 
chapter employs a 'view from below' methodological approach to examine how the 
civilian victims themselves understand the violence of the siege. As set out in chapter 
two, a 'view from below' approach explores the forms of legal (and non-legal) redress of 
armed conflict through 'the eyes of those most affected by collective violence' 
(Weinstein and Stover, 2004: 4). For this reason, this section prioritises the testimonies of 
the civilian victims that came before the Trial Chamber as witnesses by drawing on 
330 The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galil:. Case No. IT -98-29-PT. Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief Pursuant to Rule 
65ter (E) (i), 23 October 2001, para. 24 ('Galil:, Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief'). 
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courtroom observation of D. Milosevic, as well as transcripts of D. Milosevic and Galic. It 
explores these testimonies in order to understand the forms of social relations between 
civilians in this context of collective victimisation, that is, how civilians of this 
geographic area understand their presence and interactions as constructing and 
comprising a civilian population during the conflict. Drawing on these notions of civilian 
relations, it then considers their alignment to the Tribunal's shaping of the trial 
proceedings and its judgement of the accused for its legal recognition, or failure of 
recognition, of the civilian victims of the siege of Sarajevo. 
Identifying Civilian Collectivities: The Victimisation of Civilian Populations 
In its contemporary focus on the protection of civilians, the United Nations identifies the 
'presence' of these participants of armed conflict in collective terms. It is a 'civilian 
population' or civilian 'persons' in the plural that figures as the entity deserving of safety 
and security during the violence of hostilities and of redress in its aftermath.331 As the UN 
and commentators describe, it is necessary to consider the protection of civilians in 
collective terms, for it is the 'well-being of civilian populations', rather than that of 
isolated individuals, that suffers from the harms of war (see Slim, 2007; Kaldor, 2001).332 
These conceptualisations of a 'civilian population' figure civilians as a seemingly 
homogenous group, of a collectivity of persons who have chosen not to participate in the 
conflict, most probably residing in a specific geographic area. The definition of a civilian 
population set out by the rules and principles of humanitarian law uses this conception of 
civilians as a distinct collectivity or group of persons. A civilian population 'comprises all 
persons who are civilians', that is, all persons who do not hold combatant status.333 In this 
way, as has been discussed previously, the principle of distinction constructs and 
331 In Larger Freedom, para. 135. See also Resolution 1674. 
332 In Larger Freedom, para. 135. 
333 API, Article 50(2). 
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identifies two categories of persons, civilians and combatants, as present in armed 
conflicts. Based on the nature of their actions (i.e. whether or not they directly participate 
in hostilities), there is a dichotomous framing of these two groups of persons as legally 
counter-posed to each other.334 While the UN and commentators often draw attention to 
certain persons within the civilian population as 'more vulnerable' in a situation of 
conflict, most often women, children, the elderly and refugees (Panyarachun, 2004; Kiza 
et aI, 2006), the overall category of a 'civilian population' is understood to comprise of 
civilians. In these terms, the 'civilian' identity of the individuals of a group supersedes 
any other social characteristics that these persons may hold. The principles of 
humanitarian law rest on an assumption that it is the civilian identity of these persons, and 
no other aspect of their status, that constitutes such persons as a homogenous group, that 
is, as a civilian population present in a situation of conflict. 
This conception of civilians being both part of, and constituting, a broader category of 
persons can also be seen through the self-characterisations of civilian victim-witnesses 
who testify before the Chambers. A distinct narrative of the testimonies of these 
witnesses in D. Milosevic was their descriptions of participating and experiencing the 
conflict in collective terms. For example, one witness described how 'we were cannon 
fodder. We were just clay pigeons for them to fire at,.335 Another witness testified how 
'that period changed our lives considerably, our way of life,.336 As these witnesses, in 
similarity to many others, illustrate, their participation in the conflict was not understood 
through a perspective of being an isolated individual who was, or may be, subjected to 
violence. Rather, there is a distinct self-characterisation of being both part of, and 
constituting, a broader category of persons understood as a civilian population. As will be 
further discussed, a prominent narrative throughout the testimonies was the civilian 
334 See chapter five for discussions of the difficulties or problems with this distinction in terms of situations of 
'total war' and the movement of persons in and out of the categories of civilian and combatant through the 
nature of their participation in hostilities. 
335 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 2 February 2007, para. 1510. Emphasis added. 
336 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 25 January 2007, para. 1062. Emphasis added. 
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victim-witnesses expressing that their presence and participation in the conflict was as a 
collective experience of living through and enduring the violent practices of the armies in 
the region. 337 
These accounts of civilians having a common experience of conflict suggest that it is 
necessary to recognise civilians as a social group present in situations of conflict (Shaw, 
2007: 122). It is necessary to conceptualise civilians in this way due to the nature of the 
practices of military-civilian interactions, as will be set out. Employing the principle of 
distinction provides the legal designation of a civilian population by a court of law or by 
combatants undertaking military actions. However, this legal principle does not provide 
or enable the construction of a broader conceptual framework for the recognition of 
civilians as a social group for their distinct experiences of conflict. Nor does it allow for 
an exploration of how civilians of a specific geographic area understand their presence 
and participation with others during a situation of conflict as constructing and comprising 
a civilian population. In particular, it does not allow for identification of civilians as a 
social group through their commonality of experiences, choices and actions, or how these 
aspects of their participation in conflict are in contradistinction from that other group of 
persons in conflict, namely combatants. For this reason, following the 'view from below' 
methodological approach, it is important to consider how civilians themselves understood 
the form of their relations with other civilians, as opposed to combatants, during the 
violent practices of hostilities. It is also necessary to consider both how civilians 
themselves view their relations with others as constituting a broader category of persons 
understood as a civilian popUlation, as well as how the conduct of war targets and 
victimises civilians as collectivities and not isolated individuals. 
Iris Marion Young argues that a social group 'is a collective of people differentiated from 
at least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life' (1990: 43). As 
337 Fieldwork, Perish':, 4 February 2009. 
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Marion Young points out, social groups are 'an expression of social relations; a group 
exists only in relation to at least one other group' (1990: 43). More particularly, this 
notion of social groups provides a framework through which to examine how 'many 
groups suffer the oppression of systematic violence' by another group (Marion Young, 
1990: 61). As Marion Young argues, it is necessary to recognise the experience of 
systematic and unequally distributed violence by a social group from the actions of 
another group (1990: 61-63). As set out in chapter five, such violence takes the form of 
direct and indirect victimisation and can be understood as a relational harm to the targeted 
social group. Although it is important to note that Marion Young was not writing 
specifically in relation to the presence or participation of groups in a situation of conflict, 
this framing of social groups provides a useful means to identify civilians as a similarly 
situated collectivity of persons through their commonality of choices, actions and 
experiences during hostilities. It enables the identification of these aspects of the presence 
and participation of civilians that figure in contradistinction to that other group of persons 
in conflict, of combatants. Utilising Marion Young's conception of social groups enables 
the exploration of how systemic violence 'is directed at members of a group simply 
because they are members of that group', in this instance, as has been discussed 
throughout this research, how combatants as a social group (unlawfully) direct violence 
against civilians as the other social group present in situations of conflict (1990: 62). 
As the above descriptions of the collective experience of conflict given by the civilian 
victim-witnesses and Marion Young's framing shows, it is appropriate to understand 
civilians as a social group as well as a legal group of persons. Drawing on the testimonies 
of the civilian victim-witnesses in the previous chapter, it can be seen that there are three 
main aspects of the presence and participation of civilians in conflict that figure these 
persons as a social group. Firstly, employing Marion Young's concept of groups, 
civilians can be seen as a social group through their differentiation from another social 
group, namely combatants who participate as 'legitimate fighters'. Civilians as a social 
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group are distinct from combatants through their common 'practices, or way of life' . This 
common way of life is most obviously seen through the civilians informed choice not to 
participate in military conduct or operations (see Slaughter and Burke-White, 2002; also 
chapter five). As the civilian victim-witnesses describe, it was this choice not to 
participate in military conduct which meant that they were a distinct and separate group 
of persons from 'those soldiers' from whose actions they feared the sustaining of injury 
or broader harms.338 
Secondly, civilians figure as a social group differentiated from combatants through their 
different experiences of living through a situation of structural victimisation. Marion 
Young argues that' [m ]embers of a social group have a specific affinity with one another 
because of their similar experience or way of life, which prompts them to associate with 
one another more than with those not identified with the group, or in a different way' 
(1990: 43). This affinity between civilians, as this civilian victim-witnesses testimony 
illustrates, figures through collective actions to provide safety and security for themselves 
and other members of the social group of civilians: 
Q. . .. My colleague asked you a question, and you showed us three high-rises located in 
Grabavica and from which - you know, that place where you were hit actually - from 
which it was ... The exposure in A and in I is absolutely identical; do you agree with me? 
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I never had any weapons in my hand and I cannot say 
which position is easier to shoot from. But all the civilians who went through the wall, you 
even go into the cupboard believing that it will give you protection and shelter. This place 
where the tram stopped, it was practically between the two buildings on each side. That is 
where we stood between. When you are a civilian, you can find shelter in any place. You 
can bend down, et cetera. There were a million different situations in the war where we 
tried to protect ourselves, and being between these two buildings gave us a sense of 
security, as opposed to this place which was a clear area.339 
A central narrative of the testimonies of the individual civilian victim-witnesses was their 
self-characterisation as a civilian through their commonality of having a 'civilian' 
experience of the hostilities alongside other civilians, and that this experience was distinct 
from that of the combatants in the region. This common civilian experience of the 
338 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 16 February 2007, para. 2283. 
339 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 2 February 2007, para. 1469. 
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conflict was typically emphasised through their collective actions and efforts to try and 
protect themselves from the military, whether physically from the ever-present potential 
of violence and harm, or though having any knowledge of their conduct. As will be 
further discussed, it was the entirety of the civilian population that was collectively the 
target of the criminal conduct of combatants during the siege (see Donia, 2006). For this 
reason, the structural victimisation of the civilian populace meant that there was a 
common experience of fear and harm by the civilian populace, whether through the direct 
sustaining of injury or the wider atmosphere of terror constructed by the accused. The 
siege of Sarajevo illustrates that the nature of the relations between these two groups of 
persons has led, both historically and in contemporary states of hostilities, to civilians 
similarly experiencing the harms of conflict because of the actions of combatants and as 
such, in contradistinction to this group of persons (see Kiza, 2006; Slim, 2007). 
Thirdly, the civilian victim-witnesses in D. Milosevic as well as other cases, articulated 
how civilians as a group held a commonality, and often a solidarity, in trying to maintain 
a 'normality' to their lives. Donia points out that Sarajevans 'survived under siege by 
adhering to their normal routine and rhythms of everyday life to the greatest possible 
extent' (2006: 318). As the testimonies of the civilian victim-witnesses set out in chapter 
five describe, this attempt to adhere to normality figured through carrying out tasks 
central to everyday life such as cooking, shopping or going to work. More particularly, 
this attempt to maintain normality was put into practice through protecting their own lives 
and those of others of the civilian populace, as the witness above testifies to. This affinity 
between civilians, as will be further discussed, can be seen through the collective efforts 
of civilians of all ethnicities and social categorisations to defend the city of Sarajevo and 
its populace from the violence of the combatants.34o Their practical attempts of self-
protection were not 'individual', but collective actions to provide safety and security for 
340 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 2 March 2007, para. 3063. It should be noted that there were civilian victim-
witnesses who articulated understandings of social relations through ethnic identifications, as will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
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themselves and other members ofthe social group of civilians. It was a collective effort to 
defend the city from violence, but also the civilian population as a whole from the effects 
ofthe perpetration of violence by the combatants (see Donia, 2006). 
If it is necessary to conceptualise civilians as present and participating as a collectivity or 
group in conflict situations as the above analysis sets out, it is also necessary to consider 
how they are the subject of collective victimisation through the actions of perpetrators 
and the conduct of war. As the testimonies of the civilian victim-witnesses and the 
discussions of chapter five have begun to indicate, 'the majority of the population is 
traumatized and victimized in a collective manner' through the systematic and 
widespread perpetration of violence in situations of conflict (Kiza, 2006: 80). For this 
reason, it is not useful to employ a model of 'classical victimisation', that is, as Ewald 
and Oppeln describe, of an 'individual victim versus individual perpetrator' in order to 
understand the victimisation of civilian populations (2002: 40). Nor is it adequate to 
consider the perpetration of such victimisation through characterising the conduct of 
combatants as 'simply acts of insanity, barbarity, or hatred' (Jones and Cater, 2001: 240). 
Utilising these individualised models of violence perpetration does not allow for the 
recognition of the 'strategic purpose' of the actions of combatants, that is, of the 
intentional and deliberate victimisation of civilians as collectivities (Jones and Cater, 
2001: 240). They cannot frame a distinct enquiry into the evident patterns of particular 
modes of civilian victimisation in armed conflict, such as those discussed in chapter four 
in reference to the Yugoslavian conflict. 
For these reasons, it is important to recognise the conditions of structural and collective 
victimisation against civilian populations in situations of armed conflict, as set out in 
chapter's four and five. Kiza points out there exists a 'whole spectrum of victimization' 
in situations of conflict that ranges from individual assaults to the 'structurally induced 
vulnerability of the whole population' (2006: 79,80). As Kiza et al argue, the violence of 
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conflict must be understood as encompassing the collective victimisation of civilian 
groups or populaces and not just the targeting of individuals (2006: 17). This framing of 
the conduct of war enables the recognition of civilian groups as the subject of systematic 
and widespread victimisation. It moves from the 'classical victimisation' model of 
individualised acts of violence to those involving a collectivity of civilians. As the 
examples of Sarajevo and Srebrenica exemplify, entire cities or regions are the target of 
deliberate and intentional attacks, with all persons within that geographical area 
vulnerable to attack (Panyarachun, 2004; Slim, 2007). In this way, the conduct of the 
perpetrator(s) 'produces' or 'constructs' the civilian population as a collectivity as the 
'victim' of large-scale and systematic victimisation (Ewald, 2006: 185-6). While the 
perpetration of civilian victimisation may take different forms against different 
individuals, for example as gendered violences such as rape and enslavement, all civilians 
of the broader civilian population share a common experience of conflict as a victimizing 
event. This victimisation typically takes the form of direct harms to individuals, as well as 
indirect injuries through the actions of combatants. It is also often the case, as the siege of 
Sarajevo exemplifies, that repeated attacks on individuals are perpetrated to terrorise the 
civilian group as a whole by creating an environment of violence and fear. As Slim points 
out, such attacks are 'a deliberate intent to inflict widespread wounding so that the horror 
of the attack lives on and is embodied by in the community long after the event' (2007: 
59). In this way, the victimising effects of such conduct may go beyond those directly 
affected individuals to the individuals of successive generations or refugees who have 
fled from the 'possibility of being shelled, subjected to torture, killed or wounded' (Kiza, 
2006: 81; see also Ewald, 2006). 
However, there are further complexities in understanding 'who' the victims of war crimes 
are when examining the victimisation of civilians as a collectivity, as a 'civilian 
population'. Most commentators conceptualise 'collective victimisation' and, in tum, the 
presence of collectivities of civilian victims in relation to social categorisations, most 
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often ethnicity. For example, Kiza et al describe that 'collective victimisation emerges 
when victimisation is directed against a group or specific population. This specific group 
is often identified through religion, ethnicity, and other means of exclusive categories of 
"otherness'" (2006: fn.14; see also Separovic, 1999). In these terms, collective 
victimisation does not figure as the perpetration of violence against a civilian population 
as the targeted group, whatever the characteristics of those civilians may be. Rather, as 
the 'new wars' literature describes, this type of warfare is either predicated upon, or 
constructive of, ethnic divisions (Kaldor, 2001; Miinkler, 2005). In conflicts such as the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the social characteristics of civilian collectivities shapes 
the perpetration of collective victimisation against them by the 'opposing' social group 
(Ewald, 2006: 185). As discussed in chapter four, this form of civilian victimisation and 
interactions between victims and perpetrators forms the basis of the majority of the cases 
heard by the Tribunal. For example, the Tadic case was concerned with the collective 
victimisation of Bosnian Muslims by the accused, a Bosnian Serb. In this case, the social 
characteristics ofthe victims, oftheir being a different ethnicity was the 'reason' for their 
victimisation by the accused rather than simply their being a part of the civilian 
population. 
This form of collective victimisation is typically defined as 'ethnic cleansing' (see 
Miinkler, 2005; Kaldor, 2001). As set out in chapter four, its perpetration encompasses 
modes of civilian victimisation such as murder, torture and sexual violence. The 
Commission of Experts defines 'ethnic cleansing' as a 'purposeful policy designed by 
one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian 
population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas'. 341 As this 
definition sets out, the perpetration of ethnic cleansing as the collective victimisation of a 
civilian population takes the form of structural victimisation as set out above. Its 
structural and collective nature can be seen through the targeting of the whole of a 
341 COE Report, Part III (B). 
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civilian populace understood as a collectivity because of their ethnic or religious 
characteristics or political views (see Mtinkler, 2005: 82-83; Cairns, 1997: 27). This state 
of violence and victimisation 'produces' the civilian collectivity as the victim of the 
crimes of war in relation to their social characteristics (Ewald, 2006). In this way, 
building on the definition set out in chapter five, this form of collective victimisation can 
be understood as a 'relational harm' to that civilian population. It is a relational harm as 
all civilians of the collective group are potentially the target of intentional and systematic 
harm by the combatants of the 'other' social group present in the hostilities. Whether 
each individual civilian person experiences victimisation through either direct or indirect 
harms, the overall systematic and structural victimisation impacts upon the broader 
community of civilians of that specific social collectivity (Ewald, 2006: 186). This 
relational harm constructs, to some extent, a common and shared experience of conflict 
by that (ethnic, religious or politically-motivated) civilian group. It is, as one witness in 
D. Milosevic describes, a shared experience of victimisation by that ethnic group, for the 
potential or actual sustaining of injury was an experience of 'fear that engulfed us 
throughout the war,.342 
However, while this framing of collective victimisation enables an understanding of the 
systematic victimisation of civilian populations in certain contexts, it does not provide an 
adequate framing for all situations of civilian victimisation. In particular, it does not 
allow for an understanding of collective victimisation against a civilian population of 
heterogeneous composition. Cynthia Cockburn employs a conception of 'mixity' to 
describe the composition of social groups along national, ethnic, religious or gender lines 
that retain their distinctiveness, but also interrelate and intermingle (1998: 6). As 
Cockburn suggests, the societal constitution and relations of persons of Bosnia-
Herzegovina reflect the 'extraordinary ethnic mixity of this population' (1998: 29). As 
noted above, the composition of the civilian population of Sarajevo can be understood 
342 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 6 February 2007, paras. 1658-1659. 
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through these terms of 'mixity'. Both prior to the conflict and amid its perpetration, the 
populace did not figure as a homogenous group of a singular ethnicity or of discrete 
regions in which specific groupings of persons lived and worked (Donia, 2006; Bevan, 
2006; Silber and Little, 1996). Rather, this city had a mixed and integrated populace 
where ethnic (or other) groupings did not necessarily figure as determinative of social 
allegiances or relations, as many witnesses in D. Milosevic drew attention to during their 
testimonies (Ali and Lifschultz, 1993: xiii; Jones, 1993: 29).343 It was, as will be further 
discussed, the very 'mixity' and 'common life' of this population that was the target of 
attack and prolific acts of violence and all of its inhabitants that suffered from the harms 
of collective victimisation (Bevan, 2006; Donia, 2006).344 
For this reason, it is necessary to consider social relations and the relational harms of 
armed conflict in broader terms, as both destructive but also more importantly, as 
reflective or even constructive of communal relations and allegiances between civilians 
across ethnic divides. Ewald points out that if we are to more adequately understand the 
nature of suffering in conflict, it is necessary to take 'into account the fact that 
victimization is shaped by the collective modes of experiences and individual 
interactions' (2002: 95). The siege of Sarajevo compels us to recognise and understand 
notions of 'relational harms' beyond the typical framing of collective victimisation and 
consequent injuries to a specific socially-defined group ofthe broader civilian population. 
It requires recognition, both socially and legally, of relational harms experienced through 
a state of violence and injury to all civilians of the mixed civilian population. How, then, 
does the Tribunal conceptualise the collective victims of this siege? Does the city of 
Sarajevo retain its 'mixity' through the processes oflega! adjudication? 
343 See for example, D. Milosevic, Transcript, 18 January 2007, para. 609; D. Milosevic, Transcript, 22 
January 2007, para. 764. 
344 Robert Donia points out tbat before the 1990s, Sarajevans themselves did not use the terminology of 
'multi-etbnic' but instead, referred to the composition and relations of their city as a 'common life' (2006: 3-
4). Similarly to tbe notion of 'mixity', the concept of 'common life' affirms the existence of distinct social 
categorisations, such as nationality or religion, but refers to tbe respect for such differences and the 
intermingling between persons as 'experiences, institutions, and aspirations shared by Sarajevans of different 
identities' (Donia, 2006: 4). 
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Enacting Legal Judgement: The Prosecution of Terror Against a Civilian 
Population 
In March 1999, Stanislav Galic was charged with both direct and command responsibility 
under Article 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute for the war crime 'terror against a civilian 
population' (Kravetz, 2004). This charge was brought for Galic's alleged conduct in 
ordering and participating in a campaign of violence against the civilian population of 
Saraj evo 'with the intent to terrorize the entirety of the population' .345 While the 
presiding judge of the D. Milosevic case contended that the charge of terror was 'a 
troubling area' in terms of the elements of the crime and its jurisprudence,346 the case of 
Galic is significant for the enforcement of the protective rules for civilian populations. It 
is the first instance of the Tribunal's adjudication of the war crimes charge of 'terror 
against a civilian population' (Kravetz, 2006), as well as being 'the first time an 
international tribunal has pronounced on the matter' .347 For these reasons, the case of 
Galic (and D. Milosevic), to employ Hagan and Levi's framing, represents 'new law with 
new force' for crimes committed against civilian populations in breach of the protective 
rules ofIHL (2005: 1520). 
The war crimes charge of 'terror against a civilian population' arises from Article 51(2) 
of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 1949, which determines that '[t]he 
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of 
attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among 
the civilian population are prohibited'. However, the ICTY Statute does not set out the 
345 The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Calic, Case No. IT-98-29-T. Case Infonnation Sheet 
(http://www.un.orglicty/cases-e/cis/galic/cis-galic.pdf). 
346 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, Statement of Judge McDonald, 19 June 2007. During a session break in the trial 
proceedings of this case, the judges expressed concern over the charge of terror and the elements of this 
crime. In particular, the judges agreed that there was a necessity to consider how the Trial Chamber in Calic 
had interpreted the charge and the evidence that had come before it (Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007). 
347 The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Calico Case No. IT-98-29-T. Judgement, 5 December 2003, para. 66 ('Calic, 
Judgement'). 
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specific elements of the offence, nor was there any case-law for the Trial Chamber in 
Galic to draw upon. After an extensive review of national and international treaties and 
Conventions, the Trial Chamber in Galic held that the following specific elements had to 
be met for the crime of terror: 
1. Acts of violence directed against the civilian population or individual civilians not 
taking direct part in hostilities causing death or serious injury to body or health within the 
civilian population. 
2. The offender wilfully made the civilian population or individual civilians not taking 
direct part in hostilities the object of those acts of violence. 
3. The above offence was committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among 
the civilian population.348 
The Galic judgement held that in definitional terms, 'terror' is 'extreme fear'. 349 While 
the Trial Chamber in the later case of D. Milosevic found that 'the SRK succeeded in 
spreading the terror it intended to cause', 350 there is no requirement to prove the 
experience of extreme fear by the civilian population, since the 'actual infliction of terror 
is not a constitutive legal element ofthe crime of terror'. 351 
The offence of 'terror against a civilian population' is a 'specific intent crime' (Schaak 
and Slye, 2007: 567).352 In Calic, the Trial Chamber held that the specific intent is 
'spreading terror among the civilian population,.353 For this reason, the Prosecution must 
prove 'not only that the Accused accepted the likelihood that terror would result from the 
illegal acts - or, in other words, that he was aware of the possibility that terror would 
result - but that was the result which he specifically intended' .354 The later case of D. 
Milosevic follows the specific elements of the crime of terror set out in Galic. However, it 
is important to note that the Trial Chamber in D. Milosevic determines that the evidence 
of the Prosecution must establish 'that the terror goes beyond the fear that is only the 
accompanying effect of the activities of armed forces in armed conflict. The prohibition 
348 Calic, Judgement, para. 133; D. Milo§evic, Judgement, para. 875. 
349 Calic, Judgement, para. 137. 
350 D. Milo§evic, Judgement, para. 993. 
351 Calic, Judgement, para. 134. 
352 Calic, Judgement, para. 136; D. Milo§evic, Judgement, para. 878. 
353 Calic, Judgement, para. 133; D. Milosevic, Judgement, para. 878. 
354 Calic, Judgement, para. 136. 
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of spreading terror among a civilian population must therefore always be distinguished 
from the effects that acts oflegitimate warfare can have on a civilian population,.355 
While the convictions of Galic and D. Milosevic by the Tribunal establishes beyond 
reasonable doubt these accused's criminal responsibility for the perpetration of the crime 
of 'terror', it is important to point out that the customary status of this crime was a factor 
of contention during their adjudication. The legal basis of the charge does not arise from 
an enumerated crime in the Tribunal's Statute, but from Article 3 which 'functions as a 
residual clause designed to ensure that no serious violation of international humanitarian 
law is taken away from the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal' .356 However, in 
compliance with the maxim nullem crimen sine lege (no crime without law), this 
expansive jurisdictional determination is contingent on the violation brought before the 
Tribunal being 'beyond any doubt part of customary law,.357 
A recent exposition of the customary rules of international humanitarian law by the 
International Committee for the Red Cross (,ICRC') found that that 'State practice 
establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts' (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 
2005: 8).358 However, in Galic the Trial Chamber did not pronounce upon the customary 
nature of the charge.359 This omission was a factor contributing to the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Nieto-Navia360 and commentators contending that Galic's conviction could be 
'going beyond the Tribunal's jurisdiction and infringing upon the principle of legality' 
355 D. Milosevil:, Judgement, para. 888. 
356 Tadil:, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 91. 
357 Report of the Secretary-General, 1993, para. 34. 
358The ICRC also notes that no reservations have been made to this provision and that it is an offence under 
the legislation of numerous States, with for example, the United Kingdom holding that it is 'a "valuable 
reaffirmation" of an existing rule of customary international law ' (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: 8). 
359 Galil:, Judgement, para. 97. 
360 Judge Nieto-Navia contends that the 'jurisdictional requirements of the Tribunal' had not been met due to 
the Majority's lack of determination of whether the charge constituted an offence under customary 
international law (Galil:, Summary of Judgement). 
226 
(Mettraux, 2005: 129).361 Despite its contentious justiciable foundation, the majority of 
the Trial Chamber accepted jurisdiction of the charge, citing that the warring parties had 
entered into agreements under the auspices of the JCRC, including ratification of the 
Additional Protocols.362 Galic was found guilty of this charge and the crimes of murder 
and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity. Following an appeal, of which the 
customary status of the crime of terror was one ground put forward by the Defence, the 
Appeals Chamber in 2006 found that the prohibition of terror against a civilian 
population was contrary to customary international law at the time of its perpetration and 
was subject to individual criminal liability for its violation.363 The Appeals Chamber 
sentenced Galic to life imprisonment, the only accused to date to receive this sentence.364 
D. Milosevic was sentenced to thirty-three years imprisonment by the Trial Chamber; his 
case is currently pending before the Appeals Chamber. 365 Radovan Karadzic has also 
been charged with the crime of terror against civilians by the OTP of the Tribunal; his 
case is in the pre-trial phase of proceedings. It is alleged that Karadzic knew or had 
reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his control [such as Galic and D. 
Milosevic] had committed acts which inflicted terror upon the civilian population of 
Sarajevo and had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the 
perpetrators thereof. 366 
361 See Kravetz (2006) for a contrary opinion. 
362 See Galic, Judgement, paras 21-22. This agreement was concluded on 22 May 1992. 
363 The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic. Case No. IT -98-29-A. Appeals Judgement, 30 November 2006, para. 
86-90 (,Galic, Appeals Judgement'). D. Milosevic follows this determination of the customary nature of the 
crime of terror (see D. Milosevic, Judgement, para. 874). 
364 Galic, Appeals Judgement, paras. 90-98. 
365 It should be noted that the exact grounds of the appeal are not known as the Appeal Briefs are not posted 
online, although there is reference to part of the accused's appeal being confidential (see The Prosecutor v. 
Dragomir Milosevic. Case No. IT-98-29/1-A. Decision on Dragomir MiloseviC's Motion to Present 
Additional Evidence, 20 January 2009). 
366 The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadiic. Case No. IT-95-5/18-I. Amended Indictment. 28 April 2000. 
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The Judgement of Social and Legal Relations: Recognising Collective Victims and 
Collective Victimisation 
The charges of 'terror' under adjudication in Galic and D. Milosevic arise from acts of 
collective victimisation against civilians, specifically that the SRK forces under their 
command 'conducted a protracted campaign of shelling and sniping upon civilian areas of 
Saraj evo and upon the civilian population' ?67 In the indictments brought against the 
accused, there is no reference to ethnic categories in its conceptualisation of the 
composition of the civilian population. There is no determination that the victims of the 
crimes should be ethnically 'other' to the accused, in fact there is no identification of the 
victims of scheduled incidents as to their ethnicity. Rather, the indictments broadly 
describe that the military campaign was intended to 'kill, maim, wound and terrorise the 
civilian inhabitants of Sarajevo. The shelling and sniping killed and wounded thousands 
of civilians of both sexes and all ages, including children and the elderly'. 368 In this way, 
the indictments conceptualise the civilian population as a collectivity of civilians without 
any form of ethnic categorisation. The only reference made to ethnic categories is to 
assert that before 1992, 'Sarajevo was a flourishing multi-ethnic community' .369 
However, as this chapter will go on to argue, analysis of the trial proceedings illustrate a 
shift from this notion of the civilian population as a mixed collectivity of civilians to a 
conceptual conflation of the victimised populace as 'other' to the perpetrator and ethnic 
divisions as constructive of civilian victim status. 
The adjudication of the charges against Gali6 and D. Milosevi6 for the war crime of 
'terror against a civilian population' and the 'totality of the campaigns of sniping and 
shelling' was based upon the Prosecution's submission of two schedules of certain 
367 The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galil:. Case No. IT-98-29-I. Indictment, 2 November 2001 ('Galil:, 
Indictment'). See also The Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic. Case No. IT-98-2911-PT. Prosecution's 
Submission of Amended Indictment Pursuant to Rule 50 and Trial Chamber's Decision Dated 12 December 
2006, 18 December 2006 ('D. Milosevil:, Indictment'). 
368 Galic, Indictment; D. Milosevic, Indictment. 
369 GaUl:, Indictment; D. Milosevil:, Indictment. 
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incidents of direct attacks on civilians, one in relation to incidents of sniping and the other 
for incidents of shelling.370 These schedules were examined by the Trial Chamber as to 
whether they were representative of the alleged campaign of sniping and shelling (in 
addition to evidence of non-scheduled shelling and sniping incidents and other aspects of 
the situation in Sarajevo) (Kravetz, 2004: 522).371 As such, the schedules 'should not be 
understood as reducing the Prosecution's case to the scheduled incidents', that is, of 
individualised acts of violence between combatant and civilian.372 Rather, as was found in 
D. Milosevic, these incidents 'fit in a pattern of shelling and sniping contemplated and 
implemented by the Accused,.373 In its assessment of these scheduled (and non-
scheduled) incidents, the Trial Chambers heard testimony from the civilian victims 
themselves and I or expert witnesses who gave technical evidence in relation to military 
strategy and weapons. For each incident, the Trial Chambers assessed whether it was 
'beyond reasonable doubt representative of the alleged campaign of sniping and shelling 
or whether it is reasonable to believe that the victim was hit by ABiH forces [Army of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina], by a stray bullet, or taken for a combatant' .374 As such, the Trial 
Chambers considered whether the Prosecution had proved that the SRK (and not the 
ABiH army) deliberately carried out 'attacks against civilians or against persons whose 
status should have been presumed to have been civilian,.375 In this way, the Trial 
Chambers do not adjudicate all incidents of civilian victimisation during the siege of 
Sarajevo, and as consequence, legally recognise all civilians subject to its violence. The 
Trial Chambers will not hear evidence of attacks against civilians by the ABiH or any 
other forces other than the SRK.376 Nor will they adjudicate attacks against legitimate 
370 Galic, Indictment; D. Milosevic, Indictment. 
371 Galic, Judgement, para. 188. 
372 Galic, Judgement, para. 188. 
373 D. Milosevic, Judgement, para. 978. 
374 Galic, Judgement, para. 188. 
375 Galic, Judgement, para. 207. 
376 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007. 
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military objectives which, as a result, cause civilian casualties through 'collateral 
damage' .377 
The collective victimisation of a civilian population is typically perpetrated by the 
conduct of an invading or occupying army, for example through the plunder of civilian 
property and violation of its populace (see Best, 1994: 35-36), or through the 'ethnic 
cleansing' of an ethnically, religiously or politically defined group, as set out above. 
Using the Bosnian conflict as an example, Marie-Joelle Zahar develops a framework for 
understanding the form of such identifications and interactions between militia groups 
and civilian populations (2001). Zahar defines militia groups as 'all nonstate actors who 
resort to violence in order to achieve their objectives', including irregular forces and 
those formed along ethnic lines such as the Bosnian Serb forces (2001: 44,46). Members 
of such groups may include former civilians who identifY with a specific ethnic group, or 
in the words of one witness in D. Milosevic, of persons such as himself, who had a 
normal 'work' obligation during the day (i.e. as a 'civilian') and a war obligation at night 
(i.e. with the 'military,).378 Zahar argues that there is often is an 'identification' made 
between such militia groups and particular members of a civilian population (2001: 46). 
Such identification arises from 'social constructs, such as ethnicity, religion, language' 
(2001: 46). Members of the same group, civilians and militias, understand themselves as 
an 'in-group' in accordance with these social constructs, in opposition to the 'out-group' 
that do not hold the same characteristics of identification (Zahar, 2001: 46). Through such 
identifications, 'militias are often involved in the protection and promotion of the rights 
of their own civilian populations (in-group members)' (Zahar, 2001: 47). However, in 
similarity to the notions of collective victimisation set out earlier, social categorisations 
and characteristics are often decisive of the perpetration of violence and victimisation by 
militias to those civilians understood as part of the 'out-group' (Zahar, 2001: 46-47). 
377 Galic, Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief, para. 3. 
378 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 19 June 2007. 
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Zahar's account is premised on the identifications and relations between militias and 
civilians in situations of conflict. However, if this account is developed to include 
'regular' combatants and military forces as well as militia groups, it provides a useful 
framework for exploration of the identifications and interactions made between those 
civilians and combatants present in Sarajevo during the siege, that is, of their 'civilian-
combatant' relations. As has been noted above, however, it is also important to recognise 
that the terms of social relations in situations of conflict do not solely rest upon the 
identifications and relations between civilians and combatants. Rather, the types and 
terms of social relations and allegiances between civilians can be seen to shape their 
experiences of conflict situations. In particular, the social relations between civilians, that 
is, of their 'civilian-civilian' interactions are instructive of how we should conceptualise 
civilian collectivities and their victimisation as a civilian population. Utilising the notions 
of 'in-groups' and 'out-groups' in these terms can therefore frame analysis of civilian-
combatant interactions as well as civilian-civilians relations in regard to ethnic 
categorisations and interactions. In this way, employing a developed account of Zahar's 
framework of 'in' and 'out' groups allows for identification of civilian relations and 
victimisation that take the form of ethnically-based divisions. As will be set out, such 
identifications and relations can be seen to shape some of the understandings of which 
persons were the victims of the crimes of terror under adjudication by both the civilian 
victims themselves and the parties to the D. Milosevic trial. However, more importantly, 
utilising this framework allows for recognition and analysis of social interactions that do 
not 'fit' within this model of civilian-combatant relations. Drawing on this framework of 
civilian-combatant identifications and relations provides a means through which to begin 
to understand and develop a notion of social relations and the relational harms 
experienced by a socially 'mixed' civilian populace. 
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'Our Side and Those Others' 
Following this conception of civilian-combatant identifications, for many of the civilian 
victim-witnesses in D. Milosevic, there was an explicit linkage between one side of the 
warring parties in Sarajevo and 'their' ethnic group.379 Despite evidence from members of 
the ABiH and other witnesses that the composition of its troops were not solely Bosnian 
Muslim soldiers, but also Bosnian Serbs and persons of other ethnicities/80 there was an 
underlying perception from many witnesses that the ABiH forces were solely constituted 
by Bosnian Muslims and the SRK by Serbs. For example, one Bosnian Muslim witness 
described this in terms of one of the warring parties constituting 'our men' (the ABiH 
forces) as opposed to 'those others' (the SRK forces).381 For this witness, her 
understanding of 'our side' encompasses persons, whether civilians or military personnel, 
of the same ethnicity as herself. 382 An important narrative during a small number of the 
civilian victim-witness testimonies was an assertion that they could not consider or 
recognise having any form of solidarity or 'positive' social relations with persons of other 
ethnicities during the hostilities. As the testimony of this witness exemplifies, it was held 
that any civilians or soldiers that comprised part of the 'other side', or the 'out-group', to 
utilise Zahar's framing, did not constitute part of their community. In this narrative of 
civilian-combatant relations, any 'other' persons were not part of these civilian victim-
witnesses' community, despite being residents of the city of Sarajevo. 
Cynthia Cockburn argues that the Bosnian conflict 'was a war waged against the 
principle ofmixity itself (1998: 205). As she suggests, '[w]ar is a powerful device for 
convincing the survivors that: "We can't live together ever again'" (1998: 205). A study 
carried out by Corkalo et al in three different cities in the former Yugoslavia, Mostar, 
379 When the witness's ethnicity is referred to, this has been established from assertions by the witness 
themselves during testimony or reference from either the Prosecution or Defence. 
380 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 5 March 2007, para. 3197; Fieldwork, Perisic, 4 February 2009. 
381 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 22 January 2007, para. 771. 
382 See D. Milosevic, Transcript, 22 January 2007, para. 809; D. Milosevic, Transcript, 20 February 2007, 
para. 2553. 
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Prijedor and Vukovar, using participant observation, focus groups and interviews with 
citizens of these communities generally appears to affirm this assertion. Through the 
views of citizens of these communities, all of which have an ethnically-mixed populace, 
the researchers found that immediately before the hostilities and during their perpetration, 
the ethnic 'boundaries between "us" and "them" were solidified' in these regions 
(Corkalo et ai, 2004: 146). In fact, they find that in post-war Vukovar and Mostar, 
'people from different national groups have withdrawn from one another and feel 
insecure in social situations that go beyond family and close friends' (Corkalo et ai, 2004: 
155). Such ethnically divisive relationships can be seen in the testimony of the Sarajevan 
citizen noted above, as well as several others which will be referred to. Of greater 
concern, it appears that such divisive relations are unlikely to change in the near future 
for some civilians. The cessation of intermingling has fed through to the next generation 
of persons of these regions, constructing what could be understood as an 'indirect' but 
relational harm to those persons, in the sense outlined above. For example, although it is 
important to highlight the misgivings of some parents and teachers, in many schools in 
Mostar, Vukovar and Sarajevo the children of different ethnicities are educated separately 
(Corkalo et ai, 2004: 156; see also Warshauer Freedman, 2001). 
This ethnically-divided framework of social relations has also had an impact upon the 
views of the victims and victimisation of the Yugoslavian conflict. Through various 
studies, researchers have found that although persons of the former Yugoslavia 
'recognized the existence of war criminals within their own ranks, they considered their 
national group to be the greatest victim' (Corkalo et ai 2004: 147-8; see also Saxon, 
2005: 562). In accordance with these terms of identification, many witnesses claimed or 
perceived that it was only 'one's own people' that were the victims of the terror under 
adjudication.383 Following Corkalo et aI's findings, many witnesses in D. Milosevic 
asserted that their ethnic group was the victim of the war and that no other group suffered 
383 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 19 June 2007. 
233 
the same level of violence or victimisation. For example, during one instance of cross-
examination, the Prosecution sought to establish from one Bosnian Muslim witness that 
all civilians, whatever their ethnicity, were the victims ofthe siege but without success: 
Q. Bosnian Serbs were also targeted, were also sniped at, weren't they? 
A. What sniping activity do you have in mind? 
Q. I'm talking about the full period from 1992 to 1995, and in particular 1994 to 1995, ... 
everyone suffered, civilians suffered, and civilians of all ethnicities were targeted. Would 
you agree with that? 
A .... I don't know that. 384 
Despite indisputable evidence from expert and other witnesses that Bosnian Serbs were 
also casualties of the siege, from this witness there was no recognition or acceptance that 
there were civilian victims of any ethnicity that are not members of his 'own' ethnic 
group. Rather than considering the violence as an experience by all civilians of the 
civilian population, the implicit depiction from this witness is that it was his 'side' that 
was either the only victimised civilian group or the predominantly targeted group. A 
significant narrative during the testimonies of a small number of civilian victim-witnesses 
was their refusal to speak of the victimisation of the other 'side', of the other warring 
party or of the civilian population as a homogenous group of civilians. This narrative of 
the siege centres on a description of the violence as constructive of ethnic divides, as 
defining of both its perpetrators and its victims. As the witness above, as well as several 
others in D. Milosevic narrate, the violence of the siege is constitutive ofthe identification 
of Serbs as the aggressors and persons of other ethnic groups as the victims. In this way, 
identification of civilians and armies in these terms consolidates the identification of his 
group as those persons who were victimised as opposed to other ethnic groups of whose 
fate he will not speak. 
Through these witness testimonies it can be seen that, following Cockburn, it is in part 
the 'mixity' of a populace which suffers during war (1998: 205). In these testimonies, the 
collective groupings of civilians are understood along ethnic lines, as a collectivity of 
384 Fieldwork, D. Mifosev;c, 18 June 2007. 
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'their' group of either Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Muslims. It is 'their' side as a 
collectivity that has sustained injury and so suffered a 'relational harm' through either 
direct or indirect victimisation and violence. As the witness who spoke of 'one's own 
people' through an ethnic identification shows, the prior identification of being either a 
'Sarajevan' or being a Sarajevan of a particular ethnic group has been lost to an exclusive 
emphasis on ethnic groupings alone?85 Breaking with the prior mixity of the populace, of 
ethnic categorisations being irrelevant to everyday life or social relations as was 
previously seen in the pre-war Sarajevo community (Ali and Lifschultz, 1993; Jones, 
1993), these testimonies are illustrative of a definitive understanding of relations of 'us 
and them' during the hostilities. These testimonies are a narrative of the conduct of siege 
as breaking the previous 'solidarity' and co-mingling between civilians and the 
ethnically-mixed constitution of the civilian population as a whole. 
All Civilians of the Civilian Population 
However, in D. Milosevic there also exists a powerful counter-narrative to this 
presumption of a demise of ethnic co-existence and intermingling through many of the 
witness testimonies. Instead of an understanding of the violence as breaking the 
possibility of social relations between persons of different ethnic groups, ethnic 
identifications are, in some cases at least, revealed as having been, and continuing to be, 
irrelevant. Chandra Mohanty employs a notion of 'solidarity' to refer to the 'recognition 
of common interests as the basis for relationships among diverse communities' (2006: 7). 
While not specific to a situation of armed conflict, Mohanty's conception of solidarity 
enables recognition of the intermingling and cohesion of interests of 'communities of 
people who have chosen to work and fight together' (2006: 7). In this way, moving 
beyond a conception of intersections between different social groups, this notion of 
solidarity can be analytically employed alongside Cockburn's framing of 'mixity' to 
385 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 19 June 2007. 
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frame an understanding of the practice of mutuality, connection and cohesion between 
persons of different communities (Mohanty, 2006: 7, 242). It focuses on the active 
political struggle and resistance of persons to retain and continually re-assert the common 
and 'positive' social relations between individuals and collectivities (Mohanty, 2006: 7, 
243; see also Cockburn, 1998: 196-197). In this way, a notion of solidarity is a 
particularly useful conceptual tool for examining the forms of social relations between 
civilians of different ethnicities amid the symbolic and actual violence of 'nationalist fear 
and murderous loathing that was induced in many people' in the former Yugoslavia 
(Cockburn, 1998: 196). It enables recognition and exploration of the active political 
struggles of retaining and re-asserting solidarity between persons, a state of social 
relations which holds a particular importance and meaning during armed conflict. This 
practice of solidarity can be seen in the resilience and agency of women and men in the 
former Yugoslavia not only actively protesting against the hostilities, but also forming 
organisations for education and health provisions for all citizens without distinction 
(Cockburn, 1998; Boric, 1997).386 
A particularly notable aspect of several of the witness testimonies was their explicit wish 
to make clear that amid the targeting of all civilians, there was a strong will and practical 
effort to retain the mixity of the population and the social infrastructure supporting the 
continuation of such inclusive relations. As one witness describes, irrespective of their 
ethnic background, many of 'my neighbours stayed with me in the city'. As he goes on to 
describe, both Muslims and 'Serbs stayed and remained with me in the city of Sarajevo, 
to defend it'. 387 Through his description of being 'neighbours' with persons of other 
ethnicities and residing in the city alongside them, this witness provides an important 
illustration of some of the ways in which the mixity of the population was, and is, 
386 For example, during trial proceedings of The Prosecutor v. Vojislav Se§elj (Case No. IT-03-67), a witness 
described how there were campaigns and movements in Zvornik, Bosnia and Herzegovina organised by the 
ethnically mixed population to demonstrate against the war. These demonstrations were organised for both 
Serbs and Muslims knew 'that war only meant suffering for both ethnic groups' (Fieldwork, Sdelj, 4 
February 2009). 
387 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 2 March 2007, para. 3063. 
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retained. As his detennination of physically defending the city with his neighbours 
appears to suggest, the mixity of the populace was not simply a continuation of the prior 
co-existence of social relations across ethnic lines, but an active struggle to assert and re-
assert such relations in the face of the actions of others to destroy the city and its 
populace. In this regard, it is important to note that such inclusive relations, in 
contravention to political and military objectives, were not limited to Sarajevo. Rather, as 
commentators point out, despite having a shared ethnicity, civilians in divergent regions 
of the former Yugoslavia did not follow the extremist views of the leadership or approve 
of the actions 'being done in their name' (see Cockburn, 1998: 33; Zahar, 2001). 
The siege of Sarajevo resulted in 10,000 persons killed and 60,000 wounded (Weiss, 
2005: 85). However, although quantitative accounting is indicative of the scale of 
violence-perpetration, it fails to recognise its experiential effect; 'numbers tell us little 
about how a war is lived, felt, and died' (Nordstrom, 2004: 43). As an inevitable 
consequence of civilians of all ethnicities remaining in Sarajevo, it is reasonable to 
contend that all civilians of all ethnicities were subject to the atmosphere of terror and 
actual sustaining of injury through the actions of the perpetrators and their subordinates 
(Bevan, 2006). The crime of terror did not affect one 'in-group' of a particular ethnic 
identity, but as one witness explains, was experienced by 'the entire neighbourhood' .388 
For this reason, many witnesses do not align to a narrative of the siege where only one 
'side' or 'group' experienced injury, but instead relate that the widespread nature of the 
campaign of terror had a profound effect upon all civilians of the civilian population: 
Q: Civilians were Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, Croats and other ethnicities. Civilians of all 
ethnicities remained in Sarajevo didn't they? 
A: Yes. 
Q: The hardships, not just Serbs but Muslims and Croats also suffered didn't they? 
A: Yes389 
388 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 6 March 2007, para. 3234. 
389 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007. 
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For this witness, who, it should be noted spoke in emphatic tones which cannot be 
adequately captured by the court transcripts,390 the violence and terror of the siege is not 
reducible to the acts of violence by the SRK army to non-Serbs or Bosnian Muslim 
civilians alone. Rather, it was a state of violence experienced by all members of the 
community. Ethnic identity did not playa role in 'sparing' a civilian from harm or injury; 
the indiscriminate nature of the shelling and sniping of civilians precluded safety from 
such attacks and as noted during the trial, it is impossible to identify (and thus target) a 
person as a Serb, Croat or Bosnian Muslim through appearance (also Cockburn, 1998: 
29).391 While the Tribunal's terms of trial adjudication generally focus upon the 
perpetration of hostilities from SRK areas to those held by the ABiH forces, these 
witnesses refute any suggestion that it was only one ethnic group that suffered or were 
subject to sniping or shelling attacks. As many other witness testimonies determine, 
during the hostilities that consumed the city, 'all the people in Sarajevo were equally 
exposed to the [same] level of stress, regardless of their ethnicity, whether they were 
Serbs, Croats, or Bosniaks' .392 There was 'no monopoly of suffering in this particular 
war'; it 'was desperate times for all the people of Sarajevo on both sides of the lines'. 393 
The 'active struggle' to retain the mixity and solidarity between persons of the populace, 
as noted above, is particularly evident through testimonies relating that key services such 
as the police force and hospital care were staffed by a multi-ethnic staff: 
Q. There were both Serbs and Croats among the victims, as well as Muslims; would that 
be a fair statement? 
A. It's true that many Serbs stayed back in Sarajevo. Many of them joined the ranks of the 
BH army. As for my own bomb squad unit, there were more Croats and Serbs than 
Bosniaks. They were all loyal citizens, honourable citizens, who tried to get on with their 
lives ... Those up on the hills who were targeting everybody else took everybody else 
down in the valley to be their enemy. So they just killed indiscriminately. That's what they 
did.394 
390 Following the argument set out in chapter two, it should be noted that a number of the testimonies heard 
during courtroom observation and referred to in this thesis were spoken in emotive or emphatic terms that 
cannot be understood or related through transcript analysis alone. 
391 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 15 January 2007, para. 399. 
392 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 29 January 2007, para. 1147. 
393 Fieldwork, Perisic, 4 February 2009. 
394 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 20 February 2007, paras. 2553-2554. 
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Similarly, one witness, a doctor working at one of Sarajevo's hospitals emphasised that of 
the casualties treated, 'the approximate ratio [of patients] was 80: 20 per cent in favour of 
civilians ... the number of injured civilians was always vastly greater than the number of 
military personnel admitted' .395 More significantly, the civilians that were admitted and 
treated were not identified or provided with treatment according to any social 
characteristic; the hospital 'received all the patients that came to see us, regardless of the 
gender, the age, the religion,.396 As this doctor's testimony emphasises, the services 
attending to the injuries of the conflict remained operative for all civilians caught up in 
the conflict, notwithstanding their ethnic or social identity. For employees of these 
services and institutions, it was particularly important to stress that the social 
infrastructure did not become operative for only 'one side' or group, but 'admitted 
everyone' .397 
Indeed, for the majority of the witnesses, it was either irrelevant or wholly wrong and 
inappropriate to ascribe an ethnic status to persons that were the victims of the violence 
as they did not perceive persons in such terms: 
Q. Did you ever notice them [Serb Doctors] being deliberately targeted? ... Were any of 
those ever deliberately targeted? 
A. You mean the doctors? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I can't remember the year, but it may have been the year when outside the war hospital 
at Igman, Dr. Dragan Stevanovic was hit. He lost his foot. 
Q. He was a Serb; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I was asking about members --
A. He was an employee of my hospital, regardless of his ethnicity. Serb or non-Serb, he 
was a hospital employee.398 
Despite the Defence's attempts to designate 'victim status' to a civilian through their 
ethnic status, the witness does not adhere to this prioritisation of ethnic ties and refuses to 
395 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 17 January 2007, paras. 571-2. 
396 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 17 January 2007, para. 560. 
397 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 17 January 2007, para. 571. 
398 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 29 January 2007, para. 1146. 
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speak in 'ethnic' terms of the victim of the injuries sustained. He does not identify or 
relate to other Sarajevan citizens in the terms of an 'in-group' or 'out-group' along ethnic 
lines as Zahar's framework suggests (2001). Rather, this witness identifies with this 
victim in relation to his status as a co-worker and a person injured by the hostilities. His 
understanding of other persons is framed through notions of solidarity, to employ 
Mohanty's notion, of social relations between individuals who are actively trying to 
overcome the harms of the hostilities. The Serb doctor does not figure as a person 'other' 
to the witness, but as a person with whom he has solidarity for being a Sarajevan citizen. 
As this testimony of this witness indicates, the violence, and more importantly, the 
victimisation of the siege was emphatically understood and related as a state of injury to 
all civilians comprising the civilian population of Sarajevo. It was an act of collective 
victimisation perpetrated to the civilian population as a whole in the urban space of 
Sarajevo, rather than to civilians of specific social characteristics or categorisations. For 
this reason, it is necessary to recognise that the violence of the siege was experienced as a 
relational harm to all civilians that comprised Sarajevo's civilian population and who 
were collectively subject to the systematic and widespread perpetration of terror and 
harm. This form of relational harm did not figure as a state of fear shaped through ethnic 
identifications (although, as set out above, this was the case for certain civilian victim-
witnesses). Rather, it was a relational harm in the sense of an inclusive experience of 
injury and violence by all civilians within the collectivity of the civilian population of 
Sarajevo. Whether through acts of direct violence such as sniping or shelling, or the 
'indirect' violence of the experience of 'terror', there was, as the Prosecution in Galic 
determine, 'nowhere safe for a Sarajevan, not at home, at school, in a hospital, from 
deliberate attack,.399 As such, despite the intentions of the perpetrators to divide the 
population across ethnic lines, as will be further discussed, such a desire was not realised. 
Indeed, for many civilian victim-witnesses, despite the extensive physical evidence of 
399 Galie, Transcript, 3 December 2001, para. 563. 
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pock-marked buildings and loss of family members and neighbours, the 'imagined 
community' of Sarajevo, to employ Benedict Anderson's framing (2006), continued 
throughout the war and to the present day as the multi-ethnic community that it was prior 
to the violence of the siege. It was this ethnically-mixed imagined community that was 
the target of the perpetrators and their destructive violence, but which continues to be 
defended and re-constructed by the majority of its populace. 
The Intent of the Perpetrators 
Through the terms of the indictment, there is no necessity for the Prosecution (or the 
Defence) to establish the social characteristics of the civilian population of Sarajevo other 
than as comprising a collectivity of persons who were civilians. However, it was notable 
during the trial proceedings that both the Prosecution and Defence emphasised the 
ethnically-mixed composition of the population. For example, the Prosecution did not 
argue that the SRK forces aligned to a military strategy of targeting non-Serbs and 
sparing Serbs, as civilians comprising of their 'in-group'. Rather, the Prosecution alleged 
that the evidence shows that 'the VRS that were - that encircled Sarajevo ... when they 
sniped into the city at civilians, it didn't matter to them whether the civilians were 
Muslims or Croat or Serb' .400 Although the composition of the civilian population as an 
ethnically-mixed population does not affect the charges against the accused, the 
Prosecution does not allege that the victims of the (Bosnian Serb) accused were only 
Bosnian Muslims or non-Serbs.401 
In contrast, the Defence sought to emphasise the mixed composition of the civilian 
population for two reasons, both of which related to an overall challenge to the nature of 
the charges. Firstly, the Defence brought a number of Serb victim-witnesses allegedly 
400 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007. 
401 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007. 
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injured by the actions of the forces of the ABiH before the court to show the 'terror 
sustained by Serbs, the unnecessary suffering by Serbs' during the siege.402 Although the 
Presiding Judge frequently intervened to question the relevance of these testimonies, 
there were continual attempts by the Defence to assert that it was the victimisation of 
Serbs in SRK-held territory that should be the subject of recognition and condemnation, 
despite these attacks not coming under the terms of the charges.403 In fact, at times, it 
appeared that such witnesses and their testimonies were being used as an opportunity for 
the Defence lawyers to narrate their own grievances of the victimisation of Serb civilians, 
rather than as supporting the legal aspects of their case.404 The second way in which the 
Defence drew on the mixity of the civilian population was through a line of argument that 
sought to determine that the actions of the accused were legitimate in accordance with the 
laws of war. Although this argument was not entirely clear, it appears that the Defence 
was contending that there was a general state of armed conflict between two warring 
parties such that it was not the intent of the accused to target civilians, but to 
'legitimately' fight the opposing army.405 However, as the Presiding Judge went on to 
state that the Trial Chamber did not understand the Defence's strategy of defence and 
prevented the Defence from furthering this line of argument on numerous occasions, it 
would appear that this was not a line of argument that was taken into account during the 
d· d' . 406 a JU lcatlOn. 
This recognition by both the Prosecution and Defence that there was targeting of all 
civilians of the civilian population during the siege raises the issue that the pervasive 
perpetration of terror through sniping and shelling to Sarajevo may have been committed 
because of its mixed population. Although not an aspect of the charge under adjudication, 
402 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007. Similarly, during the trial of Perisic, there were many instances 
where the Defence sought to emphasise the suffering of Bosnian Serbs during the siege (Fieldwork, 4 
February 2009). 
403 Fieldwork, D. Mi!osevic, 18 June 2007,19 June 2007, 21 June 2007. 
404 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007, 19 June 2007, 21 June 2007. 
405 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 21 June 2007. 
406 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 18 June 2007, 19 June 2007, 21 June 2007. 
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historical and biographical accounts relate that despite Serb nationalists trying to portray 
the city 'as overwhelmingly Bosniak ... [t]hat characterization was false ... large 
numbers of Serbs and Croats, and a smaller number of Jews, remained in Sarajevo during 
the war and suffered with Bosniaks the indiscriminate death, injury, deprivation, and fear 
created by the Serb nationalist assault on the city' (Donia, 2006: 321). As one witness 
describes, during the siege, everyday life was 'business as usual', there were 'plenty of 
them [Serbs] who never left Sarajevo during the war' .407 
From these accounts, it appears that the SRK forces did not perceive of Serb civilians as 
part of their 'in-group' and consequently did not seek to advance the 'protection and 
promotion of the rights of their own civilian population' (Zahar, 2001: 47). Instead, as 
biographer Robert Donia's detailed account of the siege of Sarajevo illuminates, targeting 
was directed to 'the signal achievements of the city's secular common life ... shells and 
bullets hit virtually every mosque, synagogue, and Serbian Orthodox structure' (2006: 
314). Not only were the SRK forces seeking to expel and destroy the non-Serb populace, 
violence was perpetrated to destroy images and symbols of prior peaceful social relations 
and solidarity between persons across and within ethnic groupings. In this way, as Robert 
Bevan argues, the 'co-mingling of mosque, Catholic and Orthodox churches in Sarajevo 
is an embodiment in stone of everything the Serbs were fighting against' (2006: 122). 
Saraj evo was targeted because these social relations across ethnic lines constituted a 
denial of the nationalistic groupings sought by the perpetrators. Targeting of 'the city's 
chief institutions of collective memory' sought destruction of the past peace of these 
relations (Donia, 2006: 314). Sarajevo's prior mixed constitution was being forcibly 
'forgotten' through destruction of any reminder of such relations. Through the 
perpetrators violently enforced forgetting, Sarajevo was to have its future sociality re-
407 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 1 February 2007, para. 1427. 
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shaped. As a witness cited in the Galic judgement detennines, the intent of Gali6 and 
other SRK commanders was to 'either destroy the city or rid it of Muslims' .408 
The Trial Chamber's Judgement of Social and Legal Relations 
During the trial proceedings of D. Milosevic, Judge McDonald, the Presiding Judge of the 
Trial Chamber, stated that the Tribunal 'is a court of law, and we are not running a 
university course in the history or sociology of the conflict in Sarajevo'. 409 The Judges of 
the Trial Chamber are not 'interested in a general history of the conflict. We are only 
concerned with the charges of the indictment' .410 The judgements rendered against both 
Gali6 and D. Milosevi6 reflect this focus upon the charges of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity brought against them in the indictments. While there is a brief overview 
of the events leading up to the conflict in Saraj evo and the conduct of the hostilities, the 
structure and content of the judgements predominantly centre on the Trial Chamber's 
detennination of the role of accused, the military structures and confrontation lines and 
the findings in relation to the scheduled incidents. There is little discussion of the context 
of the siege of Sarajevo amidst the break-up of the fonner Yugoslavia or the 'reasons' or 
'purpose' of spreading terror against its ethnically-mixed civilian population.411 Rather, 
as Judge McDonald relates, the Trial Chambers are concerned with the charges of the 
indictment and the guilt or innocence of the accused in conducting a campaign of shelling 
and sniping in Sarajevo with the primary purpose to spread terror among the civilian 
population. In this way, the judgements are concerned with whether the accused 
conducted this campaign of civilian victimisation, not why they perpetrated the violence 
against civilians of all ethnicities and social groupings. 
408 Galil:, Judgement, para. 745. 
409 Fieldwork, D. Milosevil:, 19 June 2007. 
410 Fieldwork, D. Milosevil:, 21 June 2007. 
411 It should be noted that while the Trial Chamber must find that the accused specifically intended to spread 
terror among the civilian population to convict him of this war crime (as discussed above), it is not necessary 
for there to be a determination of the 'social' reasons or motives for the causation of terror. The ICTY Statute 
does not require that intent or motive be proven for charges of crimes against humanity (Cryer, 2007: 190-
192). 
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However, as a consequence of the 'victim-specific' nature of the charges, the judgements 
rendered by the Trial Chambers did have to provide a definition of the civilian population 
that was the target of the charges of terror under adjudication. Drawing on Additional 
Protocol I, the D. Milosevic judgment describes that the 'term "civilian population", 
broadly interpreted, refers to a population that is predominantly civilian. The 'civilian 
population comprises all persons who are civilians,.412 Utilising this definition, the D. 
Milosevic judgement describes that 'the entire civilian population of Sarajevo [was] the 
direct target of countless acts of violence' and the crimes of terror, murder and inhumane 
acts at the hands of the accused.413 The entire area of Sarajevo was held to be 'civilian' 
and, in particular, the 'populated urban areas within the confrontation lines were civilian 
in status' .414 In this formulation, the entirety of the civilian population of Sarajevo was 
the 'victim' of the crime of terror. The finding of guilt against the accused constructs 
legal recognition of all civilians of this populace as the victims of the campaign of terror. 
Although it is important to note that the D. Milosevic judgement does refer to the 
movements of some Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims to areas dominated by persons 
of such ethnicities,415 the overall conception of the civilian population for the terms of the 
charges relates to the whole of Sarajevo. There is no determination that the civilian 
population or civilian persons should be ethnically 'other' to the accused or of an 
'opposing' group. Rather, as stated above, there is no identification of the civilian victims 
of sniping or shelling attacks as to their ethnicity. The judgement simply determines 
whether the person or persons were civilian, and if so, that they were civilian victims of 
the crimes under adjudication. 
412 D. Milosevic, Judgement, para. 992. This section will focus upon the D. Milosevic judgement and the trial 
adjudication. The factual and legal findings in this case follow that of Galic. 
413 D. Milosevic, Judgement, para. 994. Emphasis added. 
414 D. Milosevic, Judgement, para. 896. See paras. 889-906 for discussion. 
415 D. Milosevic, Judgement, para. 895. 
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However, notions of ethnic identification and affiliations did arise as issues of factual or 
evidential concern during the trial proceedings. Although the legal definition of a civilian 
population refers only to a collectivity of persons who are civilians, the Trial Chamber 
can be seen to fill this term with content by drawing upon and evoking ethnic 
categorisations. During the trial process, the Trial Chamber appears to rely on certain 
notions of civilian groupings and social relations in regard to ethnic categorisations and 
identifications which are then used to construct a conception of the civilian population of 
Sarajevo. This conceptual construction of Sarajevo's civilian populace has significant 
consequences for both founding and finding legal recognition of the civilian victims of 
the siege, understanding the terms of social relations between the civilians and 
combatants present in this context of hostilities and recognising how the civilian 
collectivity as a whole was subject to victimisation and violence. As will be discussed, by 
evoking notions of ethnic identification and allegiances, the Trial Chamber during the 
trial proceedings constructs a very different conception of the civilian population of 
Sarajevo to that of the majority of the civilian victim-witnesses. In the trial process, the 
'mixity' of this populace becomes lost to divisive understandings of ethnic groupings and 
territorial boundaries. 
First, the Trial Chamber's structuring of the evidential processes during the trial 
proceedings can be seen to construct a notion of particular civilians being understood as 
civilian victims of the crime of terror in relation to their presence within certain 
geographical areas. As noted above, the Defence frequently sought to admit evidence or 
structure the testimonies of witnesses to depict the perpetration of violence to Serb 
civilians in SRK-held territory. For example, one witness testifies for the Defence that his 
father-in-law and other Serb civilians were injured by shells allegedly fired by the ABiH 
forces. 416 The Defence brought this witness and others to trial to provide evidence that 
416 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 21 June 2007. 
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there were two wamng sides and therefore not just civilian victims on one side.4I7 
However, as Judge McDonald held, 'the Chamber has absolutely no interest m the 
number of Serbs that were killed, unless it relates to a specific issue, no matter how 
hurtful that may be to you or to the witness'. 418 In this instance and many others, the Trial 
Chamber refuses to allow the continuance of the testimony of the witness on these 
civilian deaths and casualties. As evidence of injuries to the civilian population of SRK-
held territories are not relevant to the actions of the accused, 'it should be excluded'. 419 
Legal recognition of these civilian victims cannot and will not be established by the Trial 
Chamber, for their injuries are not part of the criminal acts under adjudication. 
In this way, the Trial Chamber can be seen to 'divide' the civilian population into 
territorial areas. In accordance with the terms of the indictment, the Trial Chamber will 
only hear evidence in relation to incidents of shelling or sniping of the civilian population 
in ABiH-held areas of Sarajevo. The terms of the indictment thus excludes those civilians 
residing in SRK-held territory from being legally recognised as civilian victims of the 
siege, whether or not they were the victims of terror or direct attack. In this way, there is 
a conceptual disjuncture between the entire civilian population of the judgement and the 
territorially-defined civilian populaces referred to during the trial proceedings. Following 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 'in order to be admissible, evidence must be 
relevant to the issues at trial' (May and Wi erda, 2001: 252). For this reason, any 
testimonial or documentary evidence that the lawyers bring before the Chambers 
concernmg crimes against civilians in areas other than ABiH-held territory will not 
necessarily be admitted. As the above example shows, the issue of relevancy precludes 
the Defence from bringing Serb civilians who resided in SRK-held territory before the 
Chambers to narrate their experience of victimisation during the siege. For this reason, 
only the civilian population of ABiH-held territories will find legal recognition of being 
417 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 21 June 2007. 
418 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 21 June 2007. 
419 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 19 June 2007. 
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the victims of the crime of terror in the case of D. Milosevic (and Ga/ic). It is only the 
harms to the civilians residing in those geographic areas that will be heard and 
condemned by the Trial Chamber. As there are no cases that have brought charges for 
crimes committed against civilians in SRK-held territory, it appears that the Tribunal will 
not pronounce legal judgement on the harms to that collectivity of civilian victims. In this 
way, the Tribunal will not hear evidence about the victimisation of all civilians of the 
entirety of the civilian population of Sarajevo. Instead, both geographically and 
symbolically, the civilian population is split into two populaces dependent on territorial 
boundaries. 
Second, the judges of the Trial Chamber can be seen to draw upon and shape a notion of 
civilian-combatant relations within the city of Sarajevo along ethnic lines. In particular, 
the presiding judge of the Trial Chamber assumes that the troops of the warring parties 
have a specific ethnic composition and that civilian groups of the same ethnic 
categorisation will identify and have an allegiance with that army: 
Q [Defence lawyer]: Based on your recollection, can you tell us whether before 1993, you 
were still living in Tmovo, and this territory was controlled, held by your army, wasn't it? 
A [Witness]: Yes. 
JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Cannata. 
MR. CANNATA [Prosecution lawyer]: I'm sorry, just for -- to be sure there is no such 
"her army." The witness hasn't any army to my recollection, and I invite the Defence 
counsel to be more precise on that. There is no such "her army." The witness is a civilian. 
JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it's a technical point but she understood, and I think we 
understand. Please proceed.42o 
While it was notable that the victims of the alleged crimes were not explicitly asked of 
their ethnicity during the trial proceedings, in this instance of cross-examination there is a 
distinct alignment of this Bosnian Muslim witness with 'her army', the ABiH forces. 
Although the Prosecution questions this immediate and unquestioned nexus between this 
civilian and one of the armed forces, the Trial Chamber does not raise doubt over this 
alignment nor ask the witness for her identification, if any, with one of the warring 
420 D. Milosevic, Transcript, 16 February 2007, para. 2270. 
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parties. The Trial Chamber assumes that a Bosnian Muslim witness would align with the 
ABiH forces. There is no question over whether the army was not necessarily a 'Muslim' 
army (as the testimony of other witnesses described), or that even if this were the case, 
that the civilian witness may not have any form of identification with it, despite being a 
Bosnian Muslim. In this way, the Trial Chamber can be seen to understand the warring 
parties and civilians in Zahar's framing of an 'in-group' based upon ethnic identity 
(2001). During the trial process, there is assumption that civilians and combatants of the 
same ethnicity will identify and have an allegiance with each other. 
These notions of civilian-combatant relations therefore align to the conception of 'our 
side and those others' that was put forward by a small number of the civilian victim-
witnesses. Through the implicit (and often explicit) linkages between civilians and 
combatants during the trial proceedings, as noted above, the Trial Chamber appears to 
both rely on, and construct a notion of the siege of Sarajevo through a framing of 
collective victimisation by one 'ethnic side' against another. By aligning civilians of a 
specific ethnicity to an army held to have the same ethnicity, the violence and its victims 
becomes framed though notions of collective victimisation centred on divisive ethnic 
relations (see Kaldor, 2001). Despite evidence relating that all civilians were the targets 
of the SRK forces and the crime of terror under adjudication, the Trial Chamber appears 
to figure the siege of Sarajevo as the SRK forces 'producing' non-Serb civilians as 
victims of terror and other crimes, while the ABiH targets Serb civilians and perpetrates 
the conduct of their victimisation, although not to the same extent. Such a conception of 
the victims and perpetrators of the siege aligns with the image of 'good Muslims, bad 
Serbs' that was portrayed by the media at the time.421 It does not employ a more complex 
or nuanced conception of collective victimisation that takes the 'mixity' of this populace 
into account. Nor does it explicitly figure, either in the trial process or the judgement, that 
421 Fieldwork, Perisic, Testimony of an expert witness (Reporter residing in Sarajevo during the siege), 4 
February 2009. 
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social relations during a situation of conflict are not necessarily divisive, but may 
strengthen across ethnic divides through a collective experience of victimisation and 
necessary attempts at protection. 
If the trial process does not adequately capture all the civilian victims of the siege, neither 
does it recognise the civilian populace of Sarajevo as a cohesive collectivity of civilians. 
From the examples of the shaping of civilian victims and civilian-combatants relations 
along ethnic lines, it can be seen that the Trial Chamber does not figure the entirety of the 
civilian population of Sarajevo as the victims of the terror created by the accused during 
the trial proceedings. In this way, it appears that the testimonies of many of the civilian 
victim-witnesses who described their loyalty to each other as Sarajevans throughout the 
hostilities and their active struggles to retain the mixity of the populace and the terms of 
solidarity between its people have become lost to divisive and exclusionary notions of 
ethnic identifications and relations. The trial proceedings do not recognise the relational 
harm to the civilian populace through their collective experience of victimisation or 
violence. There is no explicit recognition that it was a common experience of harm to all 
members of this collectivity, or that the violence may have been perpetrated in order to 
construct divisive relations between individuals and social groups. Instead, there is a 
further symbolic relational harm to the civilian population of Sarajevo by failing to 
legally recognise the importance of its mixed populace and the collective experience of 
the siege by its citizens. 
In this way, the trial proceedings in D. Milosevic re-imagine the previously mixed 
community of Sarajevo and understand its constitution through notions of divisive and 
exclusionary social relations. The Trial Chamber does not capture the 'mixity' and 
solidarity between its civilian residents and that it was this form of social relations that 
constructed this collectivity of persons as a civilian population before and during the 
hostilities. Without that recognition of the mixity of the populace, the trial proceedings 
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appear unable to emphasise that in the present day, despite 'the losses that violence has 
cost the city in the past century, Sarajevans have demonstrated the capacity and the will 
to revitalize the city's common life and preserve its legacy of diversity' (Donia, 2006: 
356).422 
422 It is, of course, necessary to note that there were a small number of civilian victim-witnesses who did 
speak of the populace as divided along ethnic lines and that such forms of social relations have continued to 
the present day. 
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Conclusion 
International Criminal Trials: Civilian Subjects, Protective Practices, Trial 
Proceedings and Progressive Futures 
Justice is always perfectible.423 
This thesis examined how international criminal justice mechanisms legally recognise, 
protect and redress the civilian victims of armed conflict. It has shown that there have 
been important developments in the rules and practices of humanitarian law that work to 
regulate and enforce civilian protection over the course of the past century. This thesis 
has also shown that international criminal justice institutions are now understood by the 
international community to be a key mechanism for the legal recognition, protection and 
redress of civilian victims. In this regard, the work of the ICTY has been particularly 
important because of the high numbers of prosecutions of acts of civilian victimisation 
brought to trial and its significant contribution to the development of the jurisprudence of 
civilian protection law. However, this thesis has also shown that there are significant 
conceptual and substantive difficulties with the current practices of international criminal 
justice mechanisms when acts of civilian victimisation are the subject of prosecution, trial 
proceedings and judgement. 
What new definitions, rules and practices could, then, provide a better framework for the 
recognition, participation and protection of civilian victims when acts of civilian 
victimisation come before a court of law? In order to begin to address this question, this 
chapter first reflects on the key conceptual, substantive and procedural difficulties with 
the current legal framework of civilian protection. Drawing on the previous analysis, it 
423 Bassiouni (1999: 87). 
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emphasises the problems and gaps in the rules and practices of humanitarian law that 
work to exclude or complicate the legal recognition of the civilian victims of armed 
conflict. This chapter then develops new legal practices to conceptually and substantively 
shift the framework of international criminal justice practices from the current 
perpetrator-focused approach to an institutional approach in which there is a greater 
recognition of the views, interests and needs of civilian victims. 
Existing academic scholarship has not yet adequately developed a victim-centred 
framework through which to explore the legal recognition, protection and redress of 
civilian victims by international criminal justice mechanisms. As chapter one set out, 
neither sociological or transitional justice scholarship sufficiently address the key 
concepts and issues of this thesis, namely, 'civilians', 'protection' and 'redress'. More 
particularly, these literatures do not adequately examine the construction of legal 
recognition and protection of civilians by international criminal justice mechanisms. For 
this reason, the chapter drew on diverse fields of academic scholarship to develop a 
broader conceptual and analytic framework through which to examine the concepts that 
underpin models of the legal recognition and protection of civilians. The first section 
developed a victim-centred approach to identify the patterns of structural victimisation 
against civilian populations. The second section examined the nature of civilian-military 
interactions during the practices of conflict and argued that contrary to the 'new wars' 
thesis, it is necessary to recognise the direct targeting and high numbers of civilian 
victims in both contemporary and historical conflicts. The third section identified the 
various mechanisms that the international community has established for the enforcement 
of civilian protection in armed conflict. The chapter concluded by drawing on transitional 
justice literatures and debates to determine that an analysis of the role and practices of the 
ICTY must consider its provision of forms of retributive and restorative justice. 
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An exploration of the legal recognition, protection and redress of civilian victims requires 
analysis of both the rules and practices of international criminal justice mechanisms. As 
chapter two showed, Bourdieu's notion of the 'juridical field' provides a useful 
methodological approach for understanding the ICTY as a site of complex rules and 
practices that work together to construct legal recognition of civilians, their protection 
and redress. Following this methodological approach, this chapter then argued that 
utilising a mixed-method approach incorporating documentary analysis, courtroom 
observation and interviews would enable identification of both the protective rules of 
humanitarian law for civilians as well as the legal practices of the ICTY which work to 
enforce instances of their breach. In accordance with the overall approach of the thesis, 
the final section ofthe chapter argued that it was necessary to utilise a 'view from below' 
approach in order to examine the ICTY as it functions for the civilian victims of the acts 
of violence under adjudication, rather than simply as a prosecutorial mechanism of trying 
and condemning the perpetrators of criminal conduct. 
Even though the legal concept of the civilian is crucial to the recognition of this category 
of persons, this thesis has shown that the meaning of this term shifts and changes. Social 
characteristics of group membership are drawn upon and evoked during legal processes 
that can act as exclusionary categorisations and prevent certain civilian victims from 
being legally recognised as such. As chapter three argued, the legal recognition of 
civilians through the rules of this body of law has not figured as a fixed or static juridical 
concept. Rather, the recognition of civilians has been a gradual and shifting process over 
the past century dependent on the legal protections afforded to this category of persons. 
Chapter three's analysis of the Tadic case shows that civilians do not necessarily hold 
'protected person' status through their civilian status alone when acts of victimisation 
charged as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 1949 come before a court of law. 
It showed that for the adjudication of some forms of criminal conduct, civilian victim 
status remains problematically constructed in relation to ties of social characteristics that 
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can work to exclude certain categories of civilian victims from having their status legally 
recognised as such. 
The second way in which civilians can have their victim status recognised as such is 
through the prosecutorial practices of international criminal justice mechanisms. 
However, chapter four revealed that there are exclusionary practices in the modes of 
civilian victimisation that have been brought to trial as criminal prosecutions through an 
analysis of completed cases heard by the ICTY. In particular, it showed that there is a 
significant and problematic 'gap' in the international legal recognition of the female 
civilian victims of the Yugoslavian conflict. This legal 'gap' has arisen due to the few 
prosecutions brought for acts of gendered violence as well as their designation as being 
'less serious' than other forms of criminal conduct. These exclusionary patterns in the 
prosecutions have, in tum, meant that the ICTY has constructed a legal record of the 
conflict that is in distinct contrast to other authoritative accounts. As this chapter showed, 
the prosecutorial strategy of this institution reflects a broader problem of a lack of a 
consolidated or cohesive representation or record of the victims and acts of victimisation 
central to the Yugoslavian conflict. 
The third important form of legal recognition of civilians can be found in the 
determination of an individual's civilian or combatant status. As chapter five showed 
through an analysis of trial proceedings, the negative definition of civilians means that 
there are no 'positive' attributes or markers that can be brought as evidence to identify 
civilians as such. The consequence of this deficiency is that there are no standard means 
for the parties to a trial to prove, or disprove, the civilian status of an individual. For that 
reason, social characteristics become evoked or drawn upon to make that assessment 
which, it was revealed, places particular scrutiny over the identification of certain groups 
of civilians and may work to exclude the legal recognition of their civilian victim status. 
It was also shown in chapter five that civilian victim-witnesses do not have any measure 
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of participation in trial proceedings, other than as witnesses. As chapter five argued, the 
failure to define civilian victim-witnesses as such or enabling their participation at trial 
has the consequence that the harms of their victimisation, of that of others, are not 
adequately recognised or addressed through the current legal framework. 
The fourth important form of legal recognition of civilian victims is their recognition as a 
collectivity of civilians, that is, as a civilian population. As argued in chapter six, legal 
proceedings do not adequately recognise the 'mixity' of the civilian populace and its 
constitution through social interactions. For example, the Trial Chamber in D. Milosevic 
did not adequately recognise the 'mixity' of the civilian populace of Sarajevo and its 
constitution through the social relations of its inhabitants. Through analysis of the trial 
proceedings, the chapter showed that the Trial Chamber failed to recognise the entirety of 
this civilian collectivity as the victim of the 'terror' under adjudication or their common 
experience of its perpetration as a relational harm. Instead, the Trial Chamber drew on 
models of collective victimisation that re-inscribed the ethnic divisions and antagonisms 
which reflected the aims of the perpetrators. For that reason, the current legal framework 
of trial adjudication does not recognise the 'positive' social relations and solidarity 
between civilians that are actively struggling to retain the mixity of this populace. 
These substantive and conceptual absences in the construction of legal recognition, 
protection and redress of civilian victims in armed conflict by international criminal 
justice mechanisms indicate that it is necessary to develop and re-conceptualise the way 
in which these processes and procedures currently operate. The problematics and 
difficulties highlighted throughout the preceding chapters show that there are two main 
areas that require the development of new definitions, conceptualisations or practices. 
Firstly, it is necessary to develop a new way of defining civilians as the subjects of 
victimisation in armed conflict. In particular, it is necessary to construct a 'positive' 
definition of civilians to replace the current 'negative' definition in contemporary 
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humanitarian law. Secondly, it is necessary to re-consider and develop a better framework 
of participatory and protective practices for civilians when acts of civilian victimisation 
come to trial. This broadening of civilian participation and protection requires the 
development of two key areas. First, it requires addressing difficulties with the current 
practices of charging acts of civilian for their representation of the civilian victims of a 
conflict situation and second, the legal practices that enable such crimes to be brought to 
trial such as victim-witness protection and support. Following the overall conceptual and 
methodological approach of this thesis, the re-working of both these aspects of the legal 
framework necessitates employing a victim-centred approach. This development of new 
participatory and protective practices seeks to prioritise the interests, views and needs of 
the civilian victims of armed conflict. Such an approach should work to develop a better 
framework of practices and procedures for the construction of legal recognition, 
protection and redress to civilian victims of armed conflict by the ICTY prior to its 
impending closure, as well as the ICC and other international criminal justice 
mechanisms that may be established in the future. 
Civilian Subjects and Protective Practices at Trial: New Rules, Definitions and 
Practices 
(1) The Civilians Subjects of War and Law 
The Tribunal describes the 'protection of civilians in time of armed conflict, whether 
international or internal, [as] the bedrock of modern humanitarian law,.424 The rules and 
principles of humanitarian law understand civilians as a distinct category of persons that 
are legally counter-posed to combatants. As the earlier analysis shows, the large-scale 
victimisation of civilians necessitate that this category of persons require particular 
424 The Prosecutor v. Drago Josipovic, Vladimir San tic, Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vtlako 
Kupreskic and Dragan Papic. Case No. IT-95-16-T. Judgement, 14 January 2000, para. 521 ('KupresJ..ic et 
aI, Judgement'). 
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protections during a situation of conflict. However, as this thesis has shown, the legal 
concept of the civilian does not figure as a coherent norm of conceptualisation or 
designation. When acts of civilian victimisation come before a court of law such as the 
ICTY, there are shifting norms of conceptualisation, as well as deficient and exclusionary 
categorisations that limit the possibility for the legal recognition of civilian victims and 
the redress of their harms. In particular, social characteristics and notions of group 
membership such as nationality, ethnicity, gender and age influence or determine the 
processes of legally recognising persons as civilians. For these reasons, it appears 
necessary to re-consider (1) how the principle of distinction works as a legal concept; and 
(2) the way in which legal mechanisms designate persons as either combatant or civilian 
during the prosecution of breaches of humanitarian law. 
Despite the international community's increasing focus on the legal recognition and 
protection of civilians, it is important to note that certain commentators argue against the 
notion of 'civilians' as a legally recognised category of persons. In this analysis, the 
principle of distinction is both irrelevant and impossible to sustain due to the nature of the 
conduct of contemporary conflicts. For example, Swiney (2005) argues that the principle 
of distinction must be abandoned as it rests on an outdated conception of large-scale 
inter-state wars and not the internal wars of the contemporary period. In particular, 
Swiney argues that the principle of distinction does not capture the complexities of the 
'types' of persons within internal conflicts such as military contractors, civilian settlers or 
civilians working for the war effort (2005: 752). Through an analysis of the protection of 
civilians, Johnson also draws attention to a further challenge to the civilian/combatant 
distinction in relation to conflicts where combatants or armed groups identifY 'the entire 
enemy society or party, and not just its armed forces or its responsible political 
leadership, as the foe' and so perceive that all persons 'may be rightly targeted' (2000: 
423). Drawing on this form of civilian-military relations in conflict, it is argued that the 
status of civilian does not have any meaning for it does not provide any measure of safety 
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to such persons (Johnson, 2000). As civilians are frequently and often overwhelmingly 
the direct targets of violence, the principle of distinction is held to be unworkable and 
irrelevant in practical terms. 
However, this thesis suggests that there are five key reasons for retaining the principle of 
distinction and, as such, a category of persons legally recognised and protected as 
civilians. Firstly, as the victim-witnesses in the D. Milosevic case show, there are a 
substantial number of persons who explicitly choose not to participate or have any 
knowledge of the conduct of hostilities. These persons often actively seek to remove 
themselves from the conflict, maintain their normal lives as far as possible and present 
themselves as 'civilian' through their actions or appearance. It is argued that 
approximately two-thirds of persons in armed conflicts can be considered 'civilians' 
(Downes, 2006: 158). Secondly, as Johnson points out, in situations where 'no distinction 
is made between enemy combatants and enemy non-combatants, the non-combatants 
suffer disproportionately' (2000: 422). To remove a status of civilian from those persons 
who choose not to join the military or participate in their conduct therefore increases the 
potential of their being the target of victimisation. As such, it legitimates their sustaining 
of injury and harm from such attacks. Thirdly, a dismissal of the principle of distinction 
implies that all persons within an armed conflict may be thought of, or should be thought 
of, as combatants. This framing of the participants of conflict constructs a conceptual 
framework in which all persons are involved, to some extent, with the military and as 
such as choosing to participate in the hostilities. From that conception of the choices of 
the participants of conflict, there may be a further move to conflating all persons as 
potentially or actively committing violent acts, or of being complicit in acts of 
victimisation against others. As the victim-witnesses testimonies referred to in this thesis 
illustrate, such a proposition is neither tenable nor reflective of the needs or wishes of a 
vast majority of the civilians present in conflict situations. 
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Fourthly, the principle of distinction shapes the legal framework of protective rules 
afforded to civilians that seeks to mitigate, at least in part, such suffering (Detter, 2000). 
This body of protective rules prohibits the intentional or deliberate targeting of civilians 
and establishes the terms of the appropriate treatment of civilians if interned or within 
occupied territory (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005). The principle of distinction is 
therefore central to the protection of civilians and civilian objects as the rule 'of targeting 
only combatants and military objectives, is only made possible when the parties to a 
conflict have distinguished combatants from civilians' (Maxwell, 2004: 18). Without the 
designation of the distinction between such persons and objects, the provision of specific 
protections to civilians cannot be made. For that reason, as Alexander Downes argues, a 
dismissal of the distinction between civilians and combatants is unacceptable as the 
designation of civilian status 'makes a difference as to whether they may be killed' and 
under which circumstances (2006: 157). As Downes suggests, the designation of civilian 
status establishes a certain measure of safety and security to this specific category of 
persons through the protective rules and norms afforded to them through the principles of 
humanitarian law. However, as indicated previously, it should be noted that 
'humanitarian law provides minimum standards applicable to the most vulnerable in 
situations of armed conflict' (Panyarachun, 2004: 232).425 This body of law does not, for 
example, prevent or provide protection from instances of collateral damage or from many 
other forms of indirect civilian victimisation such as lack of food, health care or an 
impoverished environment (see Slim, 2007). 
Fifthly, therefore, abandoning the legal status and category of 'civilian' may work 
towards dismissing the very notion and necessity of the existence and enforcement of a 
legal framework of protective rules for such individuals and collectivities. That position 
could lead to there being no restraint on the conduct of warfare and thus no condemnation 
of civilian victimisation. It would re-invoke an older argument that this body of law 'is in 
425 Emphasis added. 
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the final account nothing more than camouflage and fraud', that the 'failures of conflict-
restraint in our own time' and throughout history evidence that it is neither effective nor 
useful (Best, 1994: 9, 15). Accepting such a proposal would not only inevitably place 
civilians in a situation of conflict at further risk, but also negate any possibility for further 
enhancing the protective measures that civilians require. If we take account of the 
unnecessary and prolific harm sustained and articulated by the victim-witnesses that have 
been referred to throughout this thesis, the dismissal of such a project is undoubtedly 
unacceptable. Instead, as the testimonies of those victim-witnesses that actively sought 
legal recognition of their own status as civilian victims and that of others illustrates, it is 
necessary to affirm the importance of a 'civilian' status and the protection that it affords 
to this category of persons. However, as has been shown, the difficulties of constructing 
civilian status through legal practices suggests that it is also necessary to consider the 
development of a better definition of civilian status which enables a more effective 
process of constructing legal recognition of such victims when their harms come before a 
court oflaw. This process ofre-defining civilians should, at least in part, work to provide 
a more comprehensive framework oflegal address and redress to this category of persons 
in instances of the breach of the protective rules of humanitarian law. 
Re-defining the Civilian Subjects of War and Law 
Within the field of humanitarian law, the possibility for its protective rules for civilians to 
develop and change is a central aspect of its form and functioning. First seen in the 1899 
Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the updated version of the 
principles termed the 'Martens Clause' in Additional Protocol I determines that: 
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by any other international agreements, civilians 
and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of 
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and 
from the dictates of public conscience.426 
426 API, Article 1(2). 
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A conception of 'protection' for civilians and combatants thus serves as an underpinning 
and guiding principle of humanitarian law. As the terms of the Martens Clause set out, 
humanitarian law is, and should remain, a historically enduring and evolving body of 
protective rules and customs. The Clause enables the provision of protective 'norms in 
cases where there is no textual support' (Detter, 2000: 375) and so 'confirms[s] the 
continuance of customary law' (Rogers, 2004: 7). During the course of its adjudication of 
the crimes and criminals of the Yugoslavian conflict, the ICTY has drawn upon the 
Martens Clause to affirm that the prohibition of attacking civilians emanates from this 
Clause and determine that potential illegalities must be interpreted so as 'to expand the 
protection accorded to civilians' (see Meron, 2000b).427 
In this way, the Martens Clause not only affirms that a notion of protection for civilians 
serves as a guiding principle of humanitarian law, but that this protection does not figure 
as a static judicial determination. Employing the terms of the Clause alongside a 
Bourdieuian framing of the 'transformative potential' of the rules and practices of the 
juridical field therefore provides a useful framework for understanding how such 
practices can continue to be a site of development and change (see Hagan et aI, 2006: 
587). As such, the difficulties and deficiencies set out in this thesis can serve as a basis to 
consider how to re-formulate and develop a more effective framework for the 
construction of legal recognition and protection of civilians. The most important rule that 
requires examination and re-formulation is the current definition of civilians. In order to 
develop a better definition of civilians, it is first necessary to indicate two key areas of 
difficulty with the existing framework of humanitarian law and the terms of its 
enforcement. These are the conceptual problems with the 'negative' definition of civilians 
and the exclusion or inadequate recognition of particular groups of civilian victims 
through the current trial practices of this mechanism of international criminal justice. 
427 Kupre§kic et at, Judgement, para. 525. 
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As this thesis has shown, the principle of distinction inherent in humanitarian law 
describes that it is necessary to distinguish between civilians and combatants as 
categories of persons. The customary rules of humanitarian law describe that combatants 
are persons who take a direct and active part in hostilities (Henckaerts and Doswald-
Beck, 2005: 12). The recognition of persons as combatants is always contextual. For 
example, the wearing of a uniform, an insignia and carrying weapons openly are 
signifiers of a person being a combatant (Palmer-Fernandez, 1998: 518). In this way, 
there is a 'positive' definition of combatants as a distinct category of persons present and 
participating in a situation of conflict. There are specific 'markers' of combatant identity 
that distinguish such persons in their own terms and without reference to any other 
category of persons. Combatants are therefore identifiable as such through their actions 
and appearance during a situation of conflict. 
However, the rules of humanitarian law do not set out a 'positive' definition of civilians, 
either as individuals or collectivities. Civilians are defined in the negative: they are all 
persons who are not combatants (SassOli and Bouvier, 2006). This conceptual framing of 
the participants of war thus fails to attribute a distinct identity to civilians as a category of 
persons present in situations of conflict. The negative definition of civilians means that 
there is no conception of 'who' a civilian may be, nor any determination of typical 
'markers' or features that could identify or distinguish such persons. For that reason, the 
process of legally recognising and defining persons in situations in conflict rests on an 
interpretation of their nexus to the military. Whether by military personnel or the 
adjudicatory processes of a court of law, the assessment of a person's status focuses on 
whether they are or are not a combatant, rather than whether they are a civilian or not. For 
example, in D. Milosevic the Trial Chamber made its assessment of the status of the 
victims of the accused as civilian victims through an interpretation of their forms of 
action and appearance as not being characteristic of being a combatant (see chapter five). 
In this framework, persons are either combatants and thus have the 'right to fight', or are 
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not combatants and so are lacking the 'privilege' of being able to actively participate in 
hostilities (Nabulsi, 2001). 
If the principle of distinction fails to construct civilians as a category of persons with a 
distinct identity, it also fails to recognise the agency of such persons in terms of their 
choices and actions during situations of conflict. Kinsella points out that since its earliest 
manifestations, the civilian has been seen 'as an "innocent" and as a "protected person'" 
rather than an agent (2005: 257). Similarly, Jones and Cater note that civilians are 
typically 'termed [as] "those who are passive'" (2001: 250). However, as noted above, 
the negative definition of a civilian does not give any 'content' to what a civilian may be. 
For this reason, there is no conception of civilians as agentic persons who actively seek to 
act as civilians and not as combatants during a situation of conflict. While this category of 
persons undoubtedly requires protection and assistance, this conception of 'innocent' or 
even 'passive' civilians does not align with the reality of the agentic qualities of their 
choices and actions in situations of conflict. As the civilian victim-witnesses referred to in 
chapter five illustrate, the very basis of their self-characterisation as civilians was their 
informed choice not to participate in the hostilities and the active struggle to maintain 
their normal lives. It was this agency of choosing to be a civilian rather than a combatant 
that shaped and gave meaning to their understanding of being present and participating in 
the siege of Sarajevo as a civilian. There was not a perception of being a 'passive' 
participant or 'non-combatant', but of actively retaining and enacting their civilian status 
through their choices and actions. 
As well as there being significant conceptual problems with the definition of civilians, 
exploration of cases heard by the Tribunal also highlights difficulties with the current 
practices of trial proceedings that recognise harms to civilians. A central issue for cases 
such as Galic and D. Milosevic is the identification of the civilian status of the victims of 
the accused. However, analysis of trial proceedings illustrates two key problems with the 
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current processes of defining and legally recognising civilians during trial proceedings. 
Firstly, the lack of a distinct definition of a civilian means that there is no foundation or 
standard means through which the parties to a trial can prove, or attempt to disprove, the 
civilian status of an individual or collectivity of civilians. As set out in chapter five, when 
'victim-specific' charges of civilian victimisation are brought to trial, the victims 
themselves and the Prosecution have to 'prove' that they were civilians at the time of the 
perpetration of a crime against them. For this reason, the Prosecution sought to present 
particular 'markers' that were understood to demonstrate the civilian identity of the 
individual civilian victims. However, the negative definition of civilians means that there 
are no definitive markers of civilian identity. There are no foundational aspects of a 
person's identity, actions or appearance that can be brought as evidence to unequivocally 
prove such a status and thus aid the construction of legal recognition of civilian victims 
by the Trial Chambers. The absence of a definition of civilian identity suggests that the 
construction of persons as such will ultimately rest on a legal determination that the 
person was not a combatant. It also suggests that there will always be legal debate and 
enquiry as to whether the victim was in fact a combatant, or whether there were 
reasonable grounds for the perpetrator of violence to consider that they held this status. 
Secondly, my analysis of cases heard by the Tribunal, building on the work of other 
commentators, has shown that there is an assumption that certain social categories of 
persons are more likely to be civilians than others. Despite the rules of humanitarian law 
describing that all persons who are not combatants are civilians, social characteristics are 
often evoked to either substantiate or attempt to exclude particular categories of persons 
from being designated the status of civilian. For example, exploration of the D. Milosevic 
case drew attention to the conceptual conflation of young males as being 'potential 
combatants' during a conflict (see also Carpenter, 2006a). Cases including charges of 
crimes committed during the Srebrenica genocide describing the victims as 'men of a 
military age' indicates that the status of male persons is not only held to be ambiguous, 
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but that there may be no legal recognition oftheir status as either civilian or combatant.428 
In contrast, however, women have long been associated with conceptions of 'innocence' 
and 'passivity' and thus given nexus to being a civilian in need of protection (see 
Kinsella, 2005).429 As Carpenter points out, 'the "civilians" frame has been distorted by 
reliance on a proxy - "women and children" - that both encompasses some combatants 
(female and child soldiers) and excludes some non-combatants (adult civilian men)' 
(2005: 296). This conceptual framing of the participants of war thus leads to the potential 
of legal mechanisms failing to recognise certain civilians as holding that status, or at the 
least making them the subject of particular scrutiny. It undermines the very precept of 
humanitarian law that all persons who are not combatants should find safety and security 
from its protective framework of rules and principles. As Bruderlein points out, the 
practice of 'grouping' civilians may problematise efforts to 'proclaim generic standards 
or "fundamental principles" to protect all civilians in all circumstances' (2001: 225). 
For these reasons, it appears necessary to construct a 'positive' definition of civilians that 
captures the nature of their presence and participation in situations of conflict. This 
definition requires a conceptualisation of civilians as a category of persons in their own 
terms, rather than through a nexus to the military. Civilians are 'individuals who do not 
choose to engage in armed conflict, who seek only to go about their lives and participate 
in their communities' (Slaughter and Burke-White, 2002: 67). Therefore, civilians are 
'agentic' persons - they choose not to participate in conflict as part of the military or, in 
many cases, even know of its conduct.43o As the civilian victim-witnesses referred to in 
chapter five indicate, it was the enactment of this choice which defined their identity as a 
civilian and shaped how they acted during the conflict. Their agency of choices and 
actions figured as the means through which to separate their status and participation as a 
428 See chapter four. 
429 As noted throughout the chapters, the construction or denial of legal recognition of civilian victims has 
also worked through the evoking of social characteristics of nationality and ethnicity, as well as gender and 
age. 
430 Fieldwork, Djordjevic, 6 February 2009. 
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civilian from those persons who comprised the military group(s) in that geographic area. 
However, although this choice not to participate in the military conduct of a conflict 
reflects one aspect of the actions and agency of civilians, this definition of civilians 
remains in the 'negative' and so does not overcome the nexus to the military. 
If one aspect of the identity of civilians is their choice not to participate in conflict, then 
the other main factor defining this status is their active struggle to maintain a normal life 
amid the violence. For example, an expert witness in the Perish': case articulated that 
civilians could be identified through their attempts 'to just get on with normal life' .431 It is 
this maintenance of normal life, as far as is possible in a conflict situation, that was 
referred to by civilian victim-witnesses through their carrying out of actions such as 
cooking and collecting firewood (see chapter five). These actions display their agency in 
carrying out actions to protect themselves and others from the harms of a situation of 
conflict. However, there are difficulties with numerating specific actions that can 
definitively identify or 'prove' civilian status. For this reason, a definition or 
identification of civilians through their attempts to maintain their normal life must 
necessarily be contextual in similarity to the contextual defining of combatants. Whether 
by the military or a court oflaw, the interpretation of civilian status through the actions of 
persons must always take account of the particular features of the environment, of the 
presence of systematic violence such as shelling for example, as well as the overall 
context of the armed conflict. An interpretation of the actions of 'normal life' has to 
consider the different means that a civilian may utilise to protect themselves and others 
from forms of both direct and indirect violence. 
Therefore, if a contextual notion of the maintenance of normal life as an aspect of the 
presence and participation of civilians is conceptually and analytically prioritised, the 
definition of civilians put forward by Slaughter and Burke-White can be re-formulated to 
431 Fieldwork, Perisic, 2 February 2009. 
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'civilians are individuals who choose to maintain their normal lives and participate in 
their communities'. As such, this re-formulation constructs a 'positive' definition which 
provides a means to understand and identify civilians as a category of persons in their 
own terms. This definition overcomes the reliance of conceptualising or identifying 
civilians only in relation to their lack of a connection with the military. It conceptually 
prioritises the agency of civilians in choosing to maintain their normal lives and protect 
themselves and others. This re-worked definition therefore conceptualises civilians as a 
distinct category of persons through the nature of their 'positive' choices and actions. 
This new 'positive' definition of civilians also enables us to re-consider how the process 
of legally recognising civilians could be undertaken during trial proceedings. Firstly, this 
positive definition of civilians can be used to develop a framework through which the 
parties to a trial could recognise persons as civilians. It can work to frame definitional 
qualities of a civilian in the same manner as wearing a uniform, an insignia and carrying 
arms openly, are specified as 'markers' of combatant identity (Palmer-Fernandez, 1998: 
518). As has been set out throughout the thesis, the designation of persons as either 
combatants or civilians rests on the nature of their choices and actions, namely, whether 
they are directly participating in the hostilities or not (Rogers, 2004). The development of 
a framework through which to identify civilians can therefore begin with the 
identification of choices and actions that signify persons who are attempting to maintain 
their normal lives and participate in their communities. For example, the carrying out of 
tasks such as cooking, shopping or, as an expert witness drew attention to, carrying water 
to their homes, are all 'markers' of civilians trying to maintain a normal life.432 Such 
tasks, as this witness described, are not typical actions of a combatant.433 Although, as 
Palmer-Fernandez points out, there will always be 'grey areas', of persons whose actions 
may not be easily distinguishable as 'civilian' or 'combatant' (1998: 515), the 
432 Fieldwork, Perish':, 2 February 2009. 
433 Fieldwork, Perisic, 2 February 2009. 
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development of a framework of actions understood as markers of civilian identity shifts 
the focus of trial proceedings away from notions of what a combatant would not be or do, 
to a conception of who a civilian is through their choices and actions. It would work to 
frame an account of 'positive' markers of civilian identity that could be used as evidence 
at trial to support the' adjudication' of the identity of such persons. 
Secondly, then, this framework of civilian choices and actions can be used to develop a 
standard and consistent basis through which the parties to a trial can approach the process 
of legally recognising persons as civilians. As noted in chapter five, there is no standard 
legal practice for approaching the task of identifying persons as civilians. Rather, the 
parties to a trial utilise different approaches, and often evoke notions of social 
characteristics such as age or gender to either substantiate or exclude persons from having 
a civilian status. However, by developing a positive definition of a civilian and a 
framework of actions that works to identify such persons, there can be a subsequent 
development of a standard basis through which to adjudicate the identity of persons as 
civilians. This standard basis of identifying persons would not start with an assumption 
that a person was or could be a combatant, such as through their being a young male for 
example, but instead would begin with ascertaining whether the person displayed choices 
or actions of being a civilian such as those outlined above. This new legal practice could 
therefore work to overcome the problematic use of evoking social characteristics to infer 
that certain groups are more likely to be combatants, or conversely more likely to not 
hold that status. It could provide a new legal framework that enables all civilians to 
equally be defined and identified as civilian victims of acts of harm during conflict. 
(2) Protective and Participatory Practices at Trial 
Alongside the utilisation of this new 'positive' definition of civilians, it is also necessary 
to develop a legal framework that both protects civilian victim-witnesses and allows for 
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them to participate more fully in trial proceedings. As set out during the preceding 
chapters, the ICTY does not formally recognise persons as being different 'types' of 
witnesses, such as civilian victim-witnesses (Tolbert and Swinnen, 2006). Nor does it 
provide these witnesses with a participatory role during legal proceedings in terms of 
being able to articulate their experiences of victimisation and consequent harms before 
the Chambers, unless it is integral to the evidential process. For these reasons, it can be 
seen that victim-witnesses figure as 'passive objects' in the legal process rather than 
persons central to the very ability of the ICTY to prosecute and punish Yugoslavia's war 
criminals (Jorda and Hemptinne, 2002: 1389). 
Recent developments in legal practices and academic literatures are increasingly 
prioritising forms of 'restorative' justice to shape the role and positioning of the victims 
of the crimes of war within institutional practices (see Mani, 2002; Bassiouni, 2006). 
These new notions of 'restorative' justice can therefore provide a useful means to explore 
the development of legal practices that give civilian victims a more inclusive and 
participatory role throughout the course of legal proceedings. I draw on the principles of 
restorative justice to develop a series of strategies that would provide civilian victims 
with a greater role in legal proceedings. The following suggestions do not attempt to re-
formulate the entirety of the legal process or make civilian victim-witnesses 'parties' to 
the trial as the procedures of the ICC have sought to do.434 Instead, these are practical 
proposals that, it is suggested, would contribute to this category of witnesses having a 
degree of 'ownership' of the process and making the experience of testifying more 
productive and beneficial than is currently the case. My suggested strategies focus on the 
development of two key areas of the legal framework. Firstly, I consider how the 
structure of criminal prosecutions could provide a more adequate record of the civilian 
434 Fieldwork, International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 5 February 2009 
('Fieldwork, ICC, Lubanga '). It is too early in the ICC's functioning to know how successful its more 
'victim-centred' approach will be. Although there are many commentators who praise its efforts to provide a 
more comprehensive framework of participation and redress for victims, it is important to note that there are 
critiques and debates over the effectiveness or practicalities of this approach (see Trumbull, 2008). 
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victims and acts of victimisation in a situation of conflict and secondly, are-formulation 
or amendment of legal practices that would work to provide civilian victims with a 
greater level of participation and protection during the various stages of trial 
proceedings.435 
As discussed in chapter one, there has been an emerging trend in academic literatures and 
debate which argues that international criminal justice mechanisms should function to 
recognIse and provide 'remedy' to the civilian victims of armed conflict as well as 
prosecute the perpetrators of criminal conduct (Aldana, 2006; Bassiouni, 2006).436 
Typically characterised as a move toward the provision of 'restorative' justice, this body 
of scholarship generally considers that legal mechanisms and practices of retributive 
justice as they currently exist can render the victim 'invisible' or even cause their re-
victimisation through the 'harshness' of the adversarial process (Aldana, 2006). A 
number of studies exploring the forms of remedy that are available to victims through 
both legal and non-legal transitional justice mechanisms describe that the inadequacies of 
their current practices are a consequence of their perpetrator-orientated focus (see 
Chifflet, 2003; Mani, 2002). For this reason, proponents of restorative justice principles 
consider that it is necessary for international criminal justice mechanisms to shift from a 
predominant focus upon the prosecution of perpetrators to a framework of legal practices 
that provides for the inclusion and remedy of victims of conflict (Bassiouni, 2006). 
This new focus upon the civilian victims of armed conflict and their need for redress has 
not, however, only arisen in academic scholarship and legal debate. Rather, the various 
bodies of the United Nations have increasingly identified the civilian victim of a violation 
of humanitarian law as holding the 'right' to recognition and remedy for their harm by a 
435 There are, of course, many areas of legal practice that could be developed to provide a better framework of 
victim-centred justice and figure their needs and interests within trial processes. Due to the constraints of this 
project, this section focuses on the prosecutorial strategy of charging acts of civilian victimisation and the 
participation and protection of civilian victim witnesses during legal proceedings. 
436 United Nations, Principles on the Right to a Remedy. 
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'justice mechanism,.437 In particular, the United Nations Principles on the Right to a 
Remedy determines that victims have the right to: 
(a) Equal and effective access to justice; 
(b) Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; 
(c) Access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms.438 
This conception of the victim of the violence of armed conflict constructs a relationship 
between their being the holder of 'rights' and the formation of official recognition of this 
status of being a victim. There are numerous critiques of the provision and use of 'rights' 
models and frameworks and the terms of their enforcement (see Charlesworth et ai, 
1991). However, this specific formulation of rights by the UN provides an important 
potential to challenge and overcome the traditional 'societal imbalances' in 'social 
positions' held by victims and perpetrators (Charlesworth et ai, 1991: 635). By framing 
the processes of transitional justice mechanisms as having to encompass specific forms of 
participation and 'redress' for victims, as well as founding accountability of perpetrators, 
the UN's framework of rights conceptualises both these categories of persons as having a 
role and position within their practices. 
Patricia Williams points out that the potential of a rights framework lies in the ability for 
the bearer of these rights to find 'visibility' within institutional structures (1987: 431). As 
Williams suggests, the holding of rights enables the 'inclusion' of persons within a 
previously exclusionary process or practice, such as a legal framework (1987: 431). The 
institutional practices of the ICC provide an important example of the 'inclusion' of 
traditionally excluded persons through the granting of rights to victims. Stahn et ai 
contend that the ICC's legal practices represent a 'major structural achievement' (2006: 
219). This 'structural achievement' figures through the recognition of victims as 
437 United Nations, Principles on the Right to a Remedy; Resolution 1674; Resolution 1738. 
438 United Nations, Principles on the Right to a Remedy, para. 11. 
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participants and 'parties' to its legal proceedings.439 The ICC describes how victims have 
the opportunity to present 'their views and observations' before the Court (Article 68(3)), 
although the practices of legal proceedings appear to limit the possibility for victims to 
have a comprehensive participatory role.440 In this way, the granting of rights to victims 
shifts the framework of legal practices from simply founding criminal accountability of 
the perpetrators to establishing a 'balance between retributive and restorative justice that 
will enable the ICC ... to help the victims themselves obtain justice' .441 Alongside the 
UN's 'Principles on the Right to a Remedy', therefore, the ICC's granting of rights to 
victims exemplifies the growing notion that transitional justice mechanisms should 
function for both victims and perpetrators as subjects of their practices. 
Civilian victims can therefore, be seen to figure as subjects, rather than mere objects, of 
the ICC's legal practices. This important recognition that civilian victims should be 
subjects of transitional justice mechanisms figures through their 'right' to 'access justice' 
and have a participatory role in proceedings.442 How, then, could the participation of 
victims re-configure the role of subjects within the ICC's legal practices and those of 
future international criminal justice mechanisms? How can the new notions of restorative 
justice provide a framework for international criminal justice mechanisms to have a more 
adequate focus upon the 'disclosure of truth and public recognition of wrongdoing,?443 
And how can we develop the current practices of the ICTY and suggest new practices for 
439 http://www.icc-cpi.intlvictimissues.html. Although neither the ICC Statute or its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence describe victims as 'parties' to a case (see Article 68; Rules 89-93), the Trial Chamber in The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo did refer to victims and witnesses as 'parties' to the trial proceedings 
(Fieldwork, Lubanga, 5 February 2009). 
440 For example, victims are not 'present' in the courtroom themselves. Rather, their 'views and concerns' are 
put forward by their legal representatives during the trial process (Fieldwork, ICC, Lubanga, 3-5 February 
2009). It is also important to note that a number of applicants who wished to participate as victims in the 
Lubanga trial were refused participating status. This was either due to their application forms being 
incomplete, the incidents being outside of the time frame of the charges or the applicants being older than 15 
years at the time of their alleged recruitment (see The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Case No. ICC-
01104-01/06. Decision on the Applications by Vicitms to Participate in the Proceedings, 15 December 2008). 
441 http://www.icc-cpi.intlvictimissues.html. 
442 See also Jorda and Hemptinne (2002). 
443 Mani (2002: 174). 
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the ICC's framework so as to enable civilian victims to have a more inclusive role and 
'active participation' during legal proceedings?444 
Most importantly, as Duff et at point out, a participatory role would 're-position the 
victim as one of the central agents in the process' (2007: 200). From this new positioning, 
it can be argued that the participation of victims would serve two functions. Firstly, as 
Duff et at suggest, recognising victims within trial processes 'might help ensure that the 
case for the prosecution is presented in the most effective way' (2007: 214). In both 
practical and evidential terms, victims 'are generally best placed publicly to describe and 
give an account of the way in which crimes have been perpetrated' as they experienced 
the conduct under adjudication (Jorda and Hemptinne, 2002: 1400). Therefore, as Jorda 
and Hemptinne point out, if granted a more central role in criminal processes, and the 
opportunity to provide a fuller account of the crimes under adjudication than is currently 
the case, it is possible that victims could 'establish more accurately the truth' which may 
'assist the judge by clarifying the facts of the case' (2002: 1400, 1397). In this way, 
civilian victims could contribute to the construction of a more accurate or comprehensive 
'collective memory' or representation of the prior hostilities. This form of collective 
memory would encompass not only the criminality of the perpetrators, but also make 
visible the experiences of victimisation by both individuals and collectivities of victims. 
As such, civilian victim participation at various stages of the proceedings could 
potentially overcome the current problems of legal accounts of armed conflict arising 
primarily from the choices and decisions ofthe prosecutor, as discussed in chapter four. 
Secondly, the provision of a personal and participatory role for civilian victims may 
'make the international criminal justice system more "transparent" in relation to them' 
(Jorda and Hemptinne, 2002: 1397). By allowing victims to participate more fully during 
legal proceedings, it would appear reasonable to suggest that there would necessarily be 
444 Sriram (2001: 60). 
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more information and greater access to processes of justice for this group of persons. 
Moreover, a re-configuration of criminal processes as more 'victim-centred' could serve 
to make legal decisions and judgements appear more relevant or authoritative to the 
individual and collectivities of victims of the hostilities. As such, in addition to a more 
encompassing system of protective measures, a framework of civilian victim participation 
may encourage other victims of war crimes to come forward to narrate their sustaining of 
crimes to investigators and to testify to these harms within legal institutions. Although it 
is much debated, a related consequence may be that they hold a greater value of 
deterrence and so are more active in 'preventing [the] repetition of crimes' (Jorda and 
Hemptinne, 2002: 1397). 
Charging Acts of Civilian Victimisation 
As chapter four shows, the charges and cases brought before the Tribunal reveal 
significant selectivities in the modes of civilian victimisation that become the subject of 
legal adjudication. The patterns in the charges of crimes against humanity, in particular 
the notable few numbers of charges of enslavement, rape and imprisonment, do not 
follow the trends in the acts of civilian victimisation that authoritative accounts narrate 
were central to the conduct of the Yugoslavian conflict. Moreover, they show significant 
selectivities in their construction of legal recognition of particular groups of civilian 
victims, in particular as the analysis sets out, of female civilian victims as the targets of 
victimisation. 
The most effective means to overcome, at least in part, these partialities is to adopt that 
which Ewald terms a 'victimological approach', namely, to take the 'appropriate 
representation of all significant victim issues and victim needs' as the guiding principle of 
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a prosecutorial strategy (2006: 185).445 This representative approach should seek to 
legally record the particular patterns and trends of acts of civilian victimisation of a 
conflict though two main, but necessarily related, practices. Firstly, it is necessary for 
prosecutions to represent the central 'sites' or instances of the collective victimisation of 
civilians across the particular geographic area. The focus of this approach should be to 
'systematically reflect the victimising results' ofthe different forms of civilian-combatant 
interactions that were perpetrated in different areas of a conflict (Ewald, 2006: 185). As 
noted in chapter four, different regions of the Yugoslavian conflict were characterised by 
the perpetration of differential forms of civilian victimisation, for example the siege of 
Sarajevo by sniping and shelling, and the Srebrenica genocide by the mass killing of 
Bosnian Muslim men and boys. Utilising a prosecutorial strategy that represents the main 
'sites' of civilian victimisation should therefore work to capture the different modes of 
such victimisation that were perpetrated during the course of a conflict. Consequently, it 
should represent the different categories of civilian victims that were the direct or indirect 
target of victimisation and violence. Indeed, the representation of all categories of civilian 
victims based both on their social characteristics such as gender or ethnicity, as well as 
the forms of victimisation perpetrated against them should be an integral aspect of this 
representative approach. 
However, this representative approach also necessitates taking account of the different 
'levels' of accused and crimes that are brought to prosecution. It is an inevitable aspect of 
criminal prosecutions that the most senior leaders will be, and should be, charged for their 
responsibility in planning and ordering criminal conduct (Del Ponte, 2003). However, as 
Schrag notes, it is also necessary to prosecute lower-level accused who themselves 
committed acts of violence so as to 'bring a personal sense of justice to the victims' 
(1997: 21). As many civilian victim-witnesses emphasised during their testimonies, they 
445 See also Campbell (2007) and Schrag (1997) for arguments that the ICTY or other legal institutions 
should utilise a representative model of prosecutions. 
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wanted to see the person who personally committed the crimes against them, their family 
or the broader community brought before the Chambers.446 For this reason, the second 
aspect of this victim-centred prosecutorial approach necessitates the charging of both 
high and low level accused and their crimes throughout the course of the functioning of a 
legal institution or its prosecution of particular regional atrocities. This practice should 
work to overcome the current practice of typically bringing lower-level accused to trial at 
the early stages of prosecutorial functioning which creates the impression that these 
'direct' crimes and the civilian victims of their harms are of lesser concern to the 
international community. By bringing charges against a representative selection oflower-
level accused for acts of civilian victimisation throughout the prosecutions, the legal 
institution would be seen to take all forms of victimisation and violence as equally of 
concern to the practices of international legal adjudication. Such an approach should 
therefore retain a more effective 'connection' to the victims of the conflict by actively 
prosecuting representative cases of personal harm and constructing a collective memory 
of such conduct. It would move from a predominantly perpetrator-orientated focus to a 
'victim-centred' prosecutorial approach which reflects the different categories of civilians 
victims subjected to harm and the perpetration of different modes of victimisation during 
the conflict. 
Re-defining Protective and ParticipatOlY Legal Practices 
In terms of the protection and participation of victim-witnesses, the most important 
practice for international criminal justice mechanisms to employ is an institutional 
recognition and definition of different categories of witnesses and, in particular, the 
recognition of a distinct category of persons who are 'civilian victim-witnesses'. The 
designation of witnesses as civilian victim-witnesses could draw upon the 'positive' 
definition of civilians set out above to distinguish their status in terms of the principle of 
446 Fieldwork, D. Milosevic, 19 June 2007. 
277 
distinction. It would then apply to civilians who are victims, that is, to those persons who 
have either directly or indirectly experienced harm from the acts of victimisation and 
violence under adjudication and come to trial to narrate its perpetration.447 
This recognition of civilian victim-witnesses would also necessarily construct a 
conceptual and legal framing of this category of persons as 'agents'. This category of 
witnesses must be understood as 'agents' for their 'civilian' choices and actions in the 
conflict, but also in recognition that they often need or wish to testify to their harms or 
those of others, as the testimonies in chapter five illustrate. Utilising this conception of 
civilian victim-witnesses as agentic persons can therefore frame an exploration into how, 
as McEvoy and McGregor describe, 'institutions of transitional justice can broaden 
ownership and encourage the participation ofthose who have been most directly affected 
by conflict' (2008: 5).448 It is suggested that the process of designating persons as civilian 
victim-witnesses should be undertaken by the 'neutral' body of the VWS,449 rather than 
the Prosecution or Defence (who may have an interest in the designation or non-
designation of this status to its witnesses). It is also suggested that the development of the 
participatory and protective practices outlined below should build upon the VWS's 
existing framework of protective measures and be undertaken in consultation with its 
staff members for their invaluable experience of enabling civilian victims to testify before 
the Trial Chambers. 
There are three key reasons for developing a practice of categorising witnesses and 
employing a conceptual and legal category of 'civilian victim-witness'. Firstly, it 
recognises civilian victim-witnesses as a distinct category of witnesses (and victims) for 
their particular experience of conflict as persons who have chosen to maintain their 
447 Following the definition of a 'victim-witness' set out in chapter five. 
448 Emphasis original. 
449 Interview with staff member of the VWS, 3 February 2009. The VWS is part of the Registl)' and therefore 
is neutral in the sense that it is not connected to any of the parties (Tolbert and Swinnen, 2006: 200). 
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normal lives and not participate III military conduct and yet have been (allegedly) 
subjected to direct or indirect victimisation and violence. Secondly, such designation can 
serve as a basis for the establishment of a distinct unit within the VWS or specialist staff 
to focus specifically on the needs and protections that this category of witnesses, as 
distinct from other categories of witnesses, require throughout legal proceedings (see 
Stover, 2005). Thirdly, the categorisation of witnesses as civilian victim-witnesses 
enables the construction of a more participatory and protective framework of legal 
practices for these witnesses throughout the judicial process, as will be set out below. It 
can begin to shift the framework of international criminal trials from a predominantly 
perpetrator-orientated approach to a legal process that provides a substantive role for the 
civilian victims of situations of conflict. 
In order to develop a more comprehensive framework of civilian victim-witness 
participation and protection, it is important to recognise that legal proceedings do not 
simply comprise of the trial in the courtroom, but also pre-trial and post-trial practices. 
For this reason, this section makes several suggestions for new legal practices that figure 
as a framework of rights held by civilian (and non-civilian) victim-witnesses to enhance 
their participation and protection in each phase of legal proceedings. Framing these new 
legal practices in terms of rights held by victim-witnesses works to prioritise and enable 
the 'visibility' and inclusion of these persons with legal proceedings, as Williams' 
conception of the potential of rights describes. A rights framework also ensures that all 
victim-witnesses have equal access, entitlement and information to these new 
participatory and protective practices. 
Firstly, international criminal justice mechanisms should ensure that they assign a 
designated VWS contact to civilian victim-witnesses (and other victim-witnesses) at the 
earliest opportunity during pre-trial proceedings who remains their contact throughout the 
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course of the legal proceedings, to the greatest extent that is practically possible.450 This 
VWS contact would act as a neutral 'link' to the Tribunal or any other international 
criminal justice mechanisms in the sense of being separate from the Prosecution or 
Defence, and provide information on the nature of the legal process and assess any 
possible issues of support or protection that could arise from their giving testimony. In 
this regard, the VWS contact should ensure that the victim-witnesses have adequate 
knowledge of the location and work of the legal institution's field-offices if applicable, as 
well as the relevant support services within their region such as the police, social services 
and any NGOs which could provide assistance should it be needed. 
Secondly, it is necessary for a VWS contact to undertake a standard 'familiarisation' 
process with victim-witnesses once they arrive at an international criminal justice 
mechanism to give evidence. This familiarisation process should include an opportunity 
to visit the courtroom before the day of testifying so that the witness is made aware of 
where they will testify as well as the actual physical layout of the courtroom.451 A staff 
member of the VWS emphasised that victim-witnesses often wish to know where the 
accused in particular will be seated and their proximity to him or her, as well as where the 
Prosecution and Defence lawyers are positioned.452 Although it is already an aspect ofthe 
pre-trial process, it is also important to emphasise that all witnesses should be fully 
informed of the structure of the trial process, that is, that both the Prosecution and 
Defence may put questions to them and not only the party who has called them to 
testify.453 
450 Although the VWS ofthe ICTY does already assist witnesses during their stay in The Hague, it is not does 
not appear that they have the same staff member as a specifically designated contact (,Information booklet for 
ICTY witnesses, 2007'; supplied by a staff member of the VWS). This is not to suggest that the designated 
VWS contact would not be assisted by staff members in the support, operations and protection units for their 
specialist roles and work. 
4 1 The VWS of the ICTY do provide a 'familiarisation' process with witnesses. However, it does not appear 
that this is a standard procedure, but rather that it is conducted at the request of the witnesses themselves 
(Interview with a staff member of the VWS, 3 February 2009). 
452 3 February 2009. 
453 Information booklet for ICTY witnesses, 2007. During one instance of testimony it appeared that the 
civilian victim-witness was unaware that they would be examined by the Defence as well as the Prosecution 
who had called them to testify (Fieldwork, Perish':, 4 February 2009). 
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During the trial itself, it is possible to improve the participation and protection of victim-
witnesses through the development of two legal practices. Firstly, victim-witness should 
have the right to request protective measures during their testimonies. The lack of 
provision of protective measures for some witnesses has led to them refusing to testify or, 
it has been alleged, of being subjected to violent reprisals after they have given 
evidence.454 This process of applying for protective measures, if the witness desires to 
make such a request, should be undertaken with the assistance of their VWS contact, as 
few persons are likely to be familiar with the particular legal procedures of the ICC or 
those of any other international criminal justice mechanisms. It is possible to foresee an 
obvious opposition to witnesses being able to request protective measures, that is, that a 
large number of witnesses would do so and thus compromise the 'public' and transparent 
nature of legal proceedings. However, fieldwork at the Tribunal as well as close reading 
of trial transcripts of various cases does not appear to substantiate such a claim. Instead, 
as set out in chapter five, the majority of civilian victim-witnesses wished for their 
experiences and the (alleged) actions of the accused were made public to the international 
community. It appears unlikely that protective measures, in particular closed sessions, 
would be requested frequently unless the civilian victim has a substantive and important 
reason for doing so. 
The second way in which civilian victim-witnesses could participate more fully in trial 
proceedings, even if it were not in person, is through the admission of victim-impact 
statements during the adjudicatory process. Victim impact statements 'allow victims to 
express, unencumbered by evidentiary restrictions, their pain resulting from the crime, 
and sometimes their desire for justice' (Aldana, 2006: 111). The use ofthis process could 
therefore enable civilian victim-witnesses to narrate their experiences of harm more 
expansively than is possible during the process of examination and cross-examination by 
454 Interview with a staff member of the VWS, 3 February 2009. See also Stover (2005). 
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the Prosecution and Defence. In cases that concern the fatality of an individual or 
collectivities, it should also be possible for their relatives to put forward such a statement 
in regard to their 'indirect' experience of violence. The practice of admitting victim-
impact statements is already an established procedure in some national jurisdictions and 
various truth commission models (see Aldana, 2006: 111). It has not, however, been an 
aspect of the ICTY's trial process to date.455 Employing this process of allowing victim-
impact statements to be given during the trial should serve to provide a greater inclusivity 
and participation for civilian victim-witnesses. It would make the narration of harms that 
stem from the actions of the accused an aspect of the criminal process that it is not 
necessarily tied to the process of proving, or disproving the perpetration of criminal 
conduct. 
Finally, it is necessary for the ICTY to retain a 'connection' with civilian victim-
witnesses once they have given evidence at trial. As noted in chapter five, many civilian 
victim-witnesses seek to remain in contact with the Tribunal and be kept informed of 
developments in the case that they testified in (see also Stover, 2005). For this reason, it 
is necessary for the VWS to establish a 'follow-up policy' for victim-witnesses and any 
other witnesses who wished to be kept informed about its proceedings. This follow-policy 
could comprise of a monthly information sheet sent either by post or, if applicable, by 
email,thatsummarisesthekey aspects of the trial process. In particular, this follow-up 
policy should provide information once a judgement, either by the Trial Chamber or the 
Appeals Chamber has been rendered which explains the finding of guilt or non-guilt of 
the accused for each of the crimes charged against him or her and the sentence imposed 
by the Tribunal. It should also summarise the reasons why an accused has been found 
not-guilty of any of the charges if this is applicable. 
455 The ICC does not incorporate the admission of victim-impact statements during the adjudicatory process. 
Although victims can put forward their 'views and concerns', this appears to function through their legal 
representatives being able to question witnesses rather than give statements. It should be noted that 
parameters of the participation of victims at the ICC is still being shaped and as such, it is not clear exactly 
how this practice will operate (see The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01l04-0l/06. 
Transcript of Trial Proceedings, 27 January 2009). 
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The Presence of the Civilian: Addressing and Redressing the Harms of Conflict 
This examination of the legal recognition, protection and redress of civilian victims by 
international criminal justice mechanisms has shown that the legal concept of the 
'civilian' does not exist as a fixed norm of conceptualisation or designation. Despite the 
seemingly dichotomous framing of the subjects of war through the principle of 
distinction, this analysis of the ICTY has shown that the explicit or implicit evoking of 
social characteristics is influential or determinate in the construction of legal recognition 
of civilian victims. Throughout the different stages of legal proceedings, notions of 
nation, ethnicity, gender and age underpin the rules and practices of humanitarian law 
such that these social characteristics can act as exclusionary categorisations and prevent 
civilian victims from having their status legally recognised as such. 
For this reason, this chapter developed new rules, definitions and practices that can 
provide a more comprehensive and effective legal framework for the recognition, 
protection and redress of civilian victims. Firstly, the legal concept of the 'civilian' needs 
to be re-framed as a 'positive' definitional status. The legal rule that designates civilian 
status requires a conceptualisation that captures their actions and choices to maintain 
'normal' life during a situation of conflict and choice not participate in military conduct. 
This 'positive' definition of civilians provides a standard and consistent foundation from 
which the parties to a trial can assess the status of persons in conflict which does not rely 
on notions or ideas of what a combatant should not be. It provides a definitional framing 
of civilians that legally recognises their choices and actions as determinate of their 
civilian status, rather than drawing upon social factors to make that assessment. 
Secondly, the participation and protection of civilian victim-witnesses (and other victim-
witnesses) should underpin legal practices when acts of harm come before a court of law. 
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As set out above, international criminal justice mechanisms should employ a more 
'victim-centred' approach to re-structure or develop seven new legal practices. First, 
these institutions should take the representation of all significant victim issues as the 
guiding principle of a prosecutorial strategy. Second, the VWS should designate 
witnesses as being different categories, such as civilian victim-witnesses. Third, victim-
witnesses should be given a designated VWS contact during the duration of their 
inclusion in the legal proceedings. Fourth, it is necessary for VWS staff to follow a 
standard 'familiarisation' process with all victim-witnesses. Fifth, victim-witnesses 
should have the right to request protective measures during their testimonies. Sixth, the 
admission of victim impact statements should be an aspect of trial proceedings and 
finally, the VWS should develop a follow-up policy to retain a connection with victim-
witnesses and keep these persons informed of legal developments in the cases. By 
prioritising the inclusion, participation and protection of civilian victims and victim-
witnesses more generally, the legal practices of international criminal justice mechanisms 
can thus work toward rendering justice to both victims and perpetrators. With the 
implementation of these progressive legal practices, civilian victims can become central 
to the future processes of addressing and redressing the harms of conflict. 
The legal recognition and protection of civilians in armed conflict is an important issue of 
contemporary concern. The role of international criminal justice mechanisms in applying 
the protective rules of humanitarian law is central to this process. However, as the above 
analysis has shown, there are significant problems and difficulties with the construction 
of legal recognition, protection and redress of the civilian victims of armed conflict when 
acts of civilian victimisation are the subject of prosecution, trial proceedings and 
judgement. Although the challenges of protecting civilians through a legal framework 
will continue to face the ICTY and the ICC, it is hoped that the development of the 
strategies outlined above can go some way towards addressing these difficulties. 
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